Naming and Its Place in Reference

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It is tempting to analyze the notion of reference for proper names in terms of the notion of naming. Saul Kripke writes:

> ... I speak of the 'referent' of a name to mean the thing named by the name ....[1]

This succinctly formulated view may appear so obvious as to make any attempt at resistance futile. I shall attempt to resist it. My aim is four-fold: to distance the notion of reference from the notion of naming, to offer an account of naming, to endorse an analysis of naming, and to articulate the relation between reference and naming.

I. Reference Without Naming

In 1964, a boxer named 'Cassius Clay' unseated the heavy-weight champion Sonny Liston. Shortly thereafter, the new champion changed his name to 'Muhammad Ali'. Suppose in 1997 someone who is ignorant of the name change says:

   (1) Cassius Clay is religious.

Suppose further that the speaker (call her <u>Susan</u>) clearly and distinctly has in mind the famous ex-boxer, whom she has seen clearly and distinctly on a number of occasions. Susan refers to him. The famous ex-boxer is the relevantly salient individual in the context (call it <u>C1</u>) of Susan's utterance. And her uttered name token has an appropriate causal connection with the famous ex-boxer. She is simply wrong about his current name. She fails to realize that the name she utters is obsolete.

  Suppose for <u>reductio</u> that reference requires naming. Then, since 'Cassius Clay' is not a name of Ali in C1, 'Cassius Clay' does not refer to Ali in C1. No other individual is the referent of 'Cassius Clay' in C1. So, (1) in C1 has no truth condition. In other words, (1) in C1 could not be true or false. But (1) in C1 could be true. Therefore, reference does not require naming.

  Here is a reason to think that (1) in C1 could be true: Suppose that another speaker, Sam, comes forth and says to Susan,

   (2) Cassius Clay is Muhammad Ali.

Susan trusts Sam and, being a competent logician, Susan immediately draws the right conclusion:

(3) Muhammad Ali is religious.

Susan's inference is from (1) in C1 and (2) in the context (call it

C2) of Sam's utterance, to (3) in the context (call it C3) of her

sotto voce utterance of (3) to herself. The inference is valid.[2]

So, it is either vacuously valid or nonvacuously valid.   If the

inference is vacuously valid, then since (3) in C3 could be false, it

is impossible for the premises to be true. But then, the alternative

inference from (1) and (2) to (4) would be also (vacuously) valid:

   (4) Muhammad Ali is not religious.

But the alternative inference is less good than the original. How

can we account for this difference in quality between the two

inferences? Since they share exactly the same premises, if they are

both (vacuously) valid, then they are both sound or both unsound.

So, the difference is not with respect to soundness. Neither is it

with respect to relevance, for the alternative inference differs from

the original only by including a negation in the conclusion.

Likewise, it is extremely implausible to suggest that the two

inferences differ significantly with respect to conversational

implicatures. On the other hand, if the original inference is

nonvacuously valid, we can easily account for the difference by

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saying that the alternative inference is invalid. Thus, I conclude that Susan's inference from (1) and (2) to (3) is nonvacuously valid. So, it is possible for the two premises to be true. Therefore, it is possible for (1) in C1 to be true.

The same line of reasoning contains another argument against the thesis that reference requires naming. If it is possible for the two premises to be true, as just argued, then it is possible for (2) in C2 to be true. But given that the same man had one of the two names and then dropped it in favor of the other name, (2) in C2 could not be true no matter when it was uttered, if reference required naming.

Some might object that even though 'Cassius Clay' does not refer in C1 or C2, this does not prevent (1) in C1 or (2) in C2 from having a possible truth condition. If so, the fact that 'Cassius Clay' names nothing in C1 and C2 does not prevent (1) in C1 or (2) in C2 from possibly being true, even if reference requires naming. The crucial question then is: "What are the possibly satisfiable truth conditions for (1) in C1 and (2) in C2 which do not require the names to refer in those contexts?"

It is tempting to make a linguistic ascent. Suppose we say that (1') as understood relative to C1 would give the truth condition for (1) in C1:

(1') The individual 'Cassius Clay' named then is religious.

Correspondingly for (2) in C2 and (3) in C3:

   (2') The individual 'Cassius Clay' named then is the individual
        'Muhammad Ali' names now.

   (3') The individual 'Muhammad Ali' names now is religious.

We are to understand 'then' in (1') and (2') as referring to some
appropriately chosen time before the name change. One problem with
this proposal is that there is no guarantee that the reference of
'then' can be determined appropriately. Susan may have no definite
time in the past in mind in C1. Or she may have a wrong time in
mind: e.g., she may be confused about the age of Ali and specifically
have in mind a particular time before Ali's birth, say, noon,
December 11, 1941. Either way, (1') with respect to C1 fails to give
the right truth condition.
   Let us look at another set of metalinguistic sentences:

   (1'') The individual I think 'Cassius Clay' names is religious.

   (2'') The individual I think 'Cassius Clay' names is the
          individual you think 'Muhammad Ali' names.

   (3'') The individual you think 'Muhammad Ali' names is
          religious.

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We are to understand these sentences from Susan's perspective in C1, C2, and C3, respectively. This may escape the above objection, but a different objection stands in its way: (1'') - (3'') are about the participants of the dialogue--(1'') and (2'') are about Susan, and (2'') and (3'') are about Sam--while (1) - (3) are neither about Susan nor about Sam. Furthermore--and this applies to all metalinguistic moves in general--(3'') mentions the name 'Muhammad Ali' but (3) does not mention any name; it instead mentions a man, viz., Muhammad Ali. (3'') entails, but (3) does not entail, that someone thinks 'Muhammad Ali' names some individual. (3'') is therefore not equivalent to (3). By parity, it is a mistake to use a metalinguistic sentence like (1'') to specify the truth condition for (1).

Thus, I conclude that we have no good reason to believe that (1) in C1 and (2) in C2 can have truth conditions without the names referring in those contexts.

A different objection is to distinguish the truth condition of a sentence from the truth condition the speaker thinks the sentence has: "(1) has no truth condition in C1. But there is a truth condition Susan thinks (1) has in C1, and that is the relevant truth condition for the possibility of truth for the first premise of her inference." Obviously, for this move to be effective, there must be a way to specify the truth condition Susan thinks (1) has in C1 (and

it must be satisfiable). Let us examine one natural idea. It is to

adapt the metalinguistic approach and say that (1*) specifies the

truth condition Susan thinks (1) has in C1:

   (1*) The individual my (Susan's) utterance of 'Cassius Clay'

        refers to is religious.

To make the inference valid, we should replace (2) and (3)

appropriately:

   (2*) The individual my (Susan's) utterance of 'Cassius Clay'

        refers to is the individual your (Sam's) utterance of

        'Muhammad Ali' refers to.

   (3*) The individual your (Sam's) utterance of 'Muhammad Ali'

        refers to is religious.

The main problem with moves of this kind is that they can be

circumvented by a more detailed description of the imagined scenario.

Suppose Susan is an acute philosopher of language and firmly believes

that all metalinguistic analyses of object-linguistic sentences like

(1) - (3) are wrong. So, when she utters (1), she does not think her

sentence has a metalinguistic truth condition of any kind. Likewise,

(2*) and (3*) fail to specify what she thinks are the truth

conditions for them. Yet, she makes the inference in question in a
nonvacuous manner, all the same.

II. Naming

We have seen reasons against requiring naming for reference. I now
wish to discuss the relation of naming itself. We shall see that the
proper understanding of naming provides yet another reason against
requiring naming for reference.

   Let us first distinguish the naming relation from <u>establishment of</u>
the naming relation. There are many different ways to establish
naming. One may go through a complicated legal process. One may
make an appropriate sort of utterance, say, "I hereby name this
'Nirak'", in an appropriate setup. Or one may simply start using the
name in question for the intended individual and hope that others
will follow. Cataloguing and describing such possible ways of
establishing naming will shed little philosophical light on naming.
We are interested in the relation of naming itself, however it may be
established.

   When an expression is properly introduced as a name of some
individual, what exactly is the relation that is established between
the name and the individual? Details aside, what seems undeniable is
that the naming relation has a certain <u>normative</u> force. If 'Nirak'

names a particular girl, then any speaker <u>may</u> legitimately use the name 'Nirak' for the girl and expect to be understood in public where the name is in circulation. Furthermore, suppose that the girl has just two other names. Then 'Nirak' is one of the three names any speaker <u>should</u> use for the girl if s/he expects to be understood in public. Naming is thus a socially normative relation.

When we want to call the girl by name, we <u>may</u> do so by using 'Nirak', and we <u>should</u> do so by using either one of her three names. This invites an obvious question: "What does it mean to <u>call</u> an individual <u>by name</u>?" I can think of three ways to understand the notion. First, when we want to greet a particular person verbally, we may call her by name: e.g., "Hello, Nirak". Second, when we want to attract a particular person's attention, we may do so by calling her by name: e.g., "Hey, Nirak!"[3] These two varieties of calling by name are straightforward and not directly relevant to our discussion. The third variety is more interesting. When we want to say something about a particular person, we may try to do so by calling her by name: e.g., "Nirak plays softball".[4] When we do so, we are referring to the girl in uttering 'Nirak'. Thus, let us say that the central feature of the naming relation is this:

For any proper name $j"k$ and any individual x, $j"k$ <u>names</u> x if and only if (i) anyone who wants to say something about x may try to

do so by referring to x in uttering j"k, and (ii) j"k belongs to the

group of names such that anyone who wants to say something about x

by name should try to do so by referring to x in uttering one of

the names in the group.

It is very important to note that the reference mentioned here is not

name's reference but speaker's reference. This makes naming a

pragmatic notion, i.e., a notion pertaining to language use. When

Nad knows that 'Nirak' names a particular girl, and as a result says,

"Nirak plays softball", intending to say of her that she plays

softball, Nad is acting in accordance with the obtainment of the

naming relation between the name and the girl.

   Does this have any implications about matters of the name's

reference? Not directly. In uttering the sentence 'Nirak plays

softball', Nad legitimately tries to say of the girl that she plays

softball. But from this it does not follow that Nad says what he

tries to say. Thus, even if we plausibly identify what Nad says with

the truth condition for his utterance, it does not follow that Nad's

utterance is true if and only if the girl plays softball. Trying to

say something does not entail saying that thing, even if the

utterance is successful in other ways. What the speaker says is a

matter of what the uttered sentence says, rather than what he tries

to say. We may put this as follows: Nad says of the girl that she is

thus-and-so in uttering **j"** is Nk in context C if and only if **j"** is Nk in C says of the girl that she is thus-and-so.

  To obtain "Nad says of the girl that she plays softball, in uttering 'Nirak plays softball'" from "Nad tries to say of the girl that she plays softball, in uttering 'Nirak plays softball'", we at least need an extra premise to the effect that "If Nad tries to say of the girl that she plays softball, in uttering 'Nirak plays softball', then Nad's utterance is true if and only if the girl plays softball". But this extra premise is unwarranted, for there is a logical gap between the speaker's specific intention accompanying his utterance and the truth condition for his utterance. I see this as a special case of a more general gap between two branches of theory of language, namely, pragmatics (theory of use) and semantics (theory of truth conditions). For a name to name something is for potential users of the name to be allowed to use it to call that thing by name. When a particular user uses it that way, he <u>has</u> that thing <u>in mind</u>. We may say that he <u>associates</u> that thing to the name he utters. We may also say that <u>he refers to</u> that thing in uttering the name. But those notions, "having in mind", "association", and "<u>speaker's</u> reference", are all pragmatic notions.[5] Naming belongs to pragmatics, and as such, it cannot be used in the correct analysis of <u>name's</u> reference. In fact, as we shall see shortly, the truth is the other way around: naming is to be analyzed in terms of a certain

semantic notion underlying name's reference.[6]

Someone might say that whenever a name refers to an object, it names that object and its naming the object makes the name refer to it. For example, suppose we say, "Let us call her <u>Arual</u>. She does not want us to use her real name. Arual is a philosophy major." The name 'Arual' is used as a name of the woman under discussion and that makes 'Arual' refer to the woman. That is, naming determines reference.

Is this right? I think not. First of all, even if it is correct to say that 'Arual' is used as a name of the woman in question in some sense of 'used as a name of', it does not follow that the name's being so used makes it refer to her. At best, it only follows that the name's being so used makes the speaker's reference to her public. As a result, we may understand the speaker's utterance of 'Arual' as referring to the woman. But this does not make the name's being so used logically responsible for its reference. Rather, it merely makes our understanding of the word's reference dependent on our consideration of the speaker's reference. I shall have more to say on this in the next section. Second, it is incorrect to say that the name 'Arual' is used as a name of the woman. If it were genuinely so used, 'Arual' would <u>be</u> her name (at least for the duration of the utterance), but then her wish would not be respected. The fact of the matter is rather that 'Arual' is used <u>as if</u> it <u>were</u> her name.

Even if we said explicitly, "Let 'Arual' be her name", our pronouncement would not necessarily make 'Arual' a name of the woman, any more than our pronouncement "Let her be the Queen" would make her the Queen. It is false to say that whenever a name is understood as referring to x, it is x's name. We may understand 'Cassius Clay' uttered by Susan in C1 as referring to Ali, but that does not mean that it is Ali's name. Ali has dropped that name and has not reclaimed it.

  In response, it might be tempting to say that 'Cassius Clay' is a name of Ali in Susan's idiolect at the time of C1. But this would be piling one mistake upon another. The naming relation holds inter-idiolectically, not just intra-idiolectically. When Ali decided to change his name, he did not change his name only in his idiolect. Anyone else's use of 'Cassius Clay' as Ali's name was thereby rendered illegitimate. Name changes have an inter-idiolectic force because naming is a socially normative relation. Of course, nothing can prevent a speaker from deciding to interpret 'Cassius Clay is ...' in her own mouth as true if and only if Ali is ..., any more than she can be prevented from deciding to use a couch to sleep on. But such a use of the name would not make 'Cassius Clay' Ali's name, even in her own idiolect, any more than such a use of the couch would make the couch a bed, even in her own living room. She would merely be using the name as if it were Ali's name, just as she would be

using the couch as if it were a bed.

III. Reference

If (name's) reference is not to be understood in terms of naming, how

should it be understood?   The proposal I endorse is quite simple.

Reference should be understood in terms of <u>assignment</u>: j"k refers to

x if and only if x is assigned to j"k.   Reference of a proper name is

the converse of the assignment relation.   The assignment relation is

primitive: it is not subject to analysis in terms of more basic

notions.   It is, however, not entirely mysterious.   We are familiar

with it from elementary logic.   Alfred Tarski used assignment to

define truth in first-order logic.   For quantified sentences,

individuals were assigned to free variables.[7]   For singular

sentences, individuals were assigned to individual constants.[8]   Since

individual constants are formal representations of proper names, the

proposal I endorse may be termed <u>Tarskian</u>.

   It is sometimes said that there are two kinds of (purely)

referential expressions, namely, proper names and free variables.

The Tarskian proposal I endorse makes this strictly true.   They are

both objects of assignment, and therefore they both refer in the same

sense.   <u>Semantically</u> names are indistinguishable from variables.[9]

This, however, does not mean that names <u>are</u> variables.   There are

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non-semantic, pragmatic differences. To begin with, names are

different from variables in being used for four further purposes.

First, names, not variables, may be used to attract someone's

attention: e.g., "Hey, Nirak!"[10] Second, names, not variables, stand

in the naming relation to what is named: e.g., 'Nirak' names the

girl.[11] Third, names, not variables, are used as nominal predicates:

e.g., "There are two P. Churchlands. Which P. Churchland did you

mean? I meant the P. Churchland at UCSD. Both P. Churchlands are at

UCSD".[12] In this usage, 'is a P. Churchland' means is named 'P.

Churchland'. Fourth, names, not variables, are used as general

predicates: e.g., "He is no Einstein". In this usage, which may be

said to be metaphorical, 'is an Einstein' means something like is a

genius in physics.

  But the most important difference between names and variables is

the way pragmatics regulates semantics. Reference is the converse of

assignment, and assignment is semantically arbitrary. But for names,

and not for variables, assignment is typically under heavy pragmatic

pressure. Given a context of utterance, some assignments are

pragmatically reasonable, while others are not. The context of

utterance provides pragmatic guidelines for pragmatically reasonable

assignments:

  Assign to the name the individual the speaker refers to, or else

the individual that is otherwise pragmatically most relevant as

the assignee in order to make the speaker's utterance as

reasonable as possible.

We should observe some such guidelines if we want to match, as much

as we can, what the sentence says with what the speaker tries to say.

But again, I emphasize, nothing in the semantics tells us to do

so. It is a mistake to <u>analyze</u> name's reference in terms of

speaker's reference. It belongs to the same type of mistake as

analyzing name's reference in terms of a causal chain. These and

other mistakes are often (though not always) based on the general

misconception of name's reference as a so-called "natural" relation.

It is a mistake to assume that the "natural" or "scientific" facts

surrounding a given utterance of a name determine the name's

reference as uttered. It is also a mistake to assume that if such

"natural" or "scientific" facts do not determine the name's

reference, the name's reference remains indeterminate. Either way,

the mistake consists in the "naturalistic" conception of name's

reference. Name's reference is not a "naturalistic" notion. It is a

"logical" notion.

IV. Important Applications

(A) The notion of assignment can be used to define not only name's

reference but also speaker's reference:

  A speaker S refers to an individual x by name **j"k** (in uttering **j"**

  is **Nk**) if and only if S intends that x be assigned to (her

  utterance of) **j"k** (in uttering **j"** is **Nk**).

I said earlier that it was a mistake to define name's reference in

terms of naming. I can now add that the truth is radically

different. Both name's reference and speaker's reference can be

defined in terms of assignment. Since naming can be defined in terms

of speaker's reference (plus social normativity), it follows that

naming can be defined in terms of assignment (plus speaker's

intention and social normativity). Thus, the relationship between

name's reference and naming is this: both are definable in terms of

assignment, and naming has additional pragmatic ingredients.

(B) There are two ways to understand the claim that naming is

arbitrary. One way is the obvious way: John's parents might have

picked the name 'George' for their baby instead. This is

straightforwardly true. The other way is to (mis)understand the

claim as saying that reference is arbitrary. This is a

misunderstanding because the arbitrariness of name's reference is a

direct consequence of the arbitrariness of assignment, whereas the arbitrariness of naming results from the arbitrariness of social conventions.

(C) The problem of so-called reference shift (e.g., 'Madagascar', 'Santa Clause')[13] is really a problem of naming change, not reference shift. Genuine reference shift is not problematic, for reference is as arbitrary as assignment. On the other hand, naming is a psychologically initiated and socially sanctioned relation, so it may shift according to psycho-socio-linguistic vagaries. To articulate the ways such a shift can occur is an interesting project, but its merits are more psycho-socio-linguistic than philosophical.

(D) In <u>Naming and Necessity</u> Saul Kripke concludes his criticism of William Kneale's metalinguistic version of the description theory of names with the following remarks:

Someone uses the name 'Socrates'. How are we supposed to know to whom he refers? By using the description which gives the sense of it. According to Kneale, the description is 'the man called "Socrates"'. And here, (presumably, since this is supposed to be so trifling!) it tells us nothing at all. We ask, 'To whom does he refer by "Socrates"?' And then the answer is given, 'Well, he

refers to the man to whom he refers.' If this were all there was

to the meaning of a proper name, then no reference would get off

the ground at all.

So there's a condition to be satisfied; in the case of this

particular theory it's obviously unsatisfied. The paradigm,

amazingly enough, is even sometimes used by Russell as the

descriptive sense, namely: 'the man called "Walter Scott"'.

Obviously if the only descriptive senses of names we can think of

are of the form 'the man called such and such', 'the man called

"Walter Scott"', 'the man called "Socrates"', then whatever this

relation of <u>calling</u> is really what determines the reference and

not any description like 'the man called "Socrates"'.[14]

I agree with Kripke that any metalinguistic description theory of

names like Kneale's is unsatisfactory. But I do not share Kripke's

reason for the unsatisfactoriness. I take issue with his reasoning

in the above passage on two counts.

First, Kripke fails to make a clear distinction here between

speaker's reference and name's reference. What a given speaker

refers to on a particular occasion of utterance (or non-utterance,

for that matter) is a matter of speaker's reference, whereas what a

given name refers to on a particular occasion of its use is a matter

of name's reference. In fact throughout <u>Naming and Necessity</u> Kripke

often shifts back and forth between speaker's reference and name's

reference rather freely almost as if they were one and the same.[15]

Although they share a common ingredient, as we have seen, viz.,

assignment, they are two distinct phenomena and should not be

conflated.

   Second, I do not agree with Kripke's statement that "whatever this

relation of <u>calling</u> is is really what determines the reference". The

idea seems to be that to be called, say, 'Socrates' just <u>is</u> to be

referred to by 'Socrates' so that it is as trivial to say that

'Socrates' refers to x if and only if x is called 'Socrates' as it is

to say that 'Socrates' refers to x if and only if 'Socrates' refers

to x. If this is the idea, it ignores the important distinction

between referring, a semantic notion, and what Kripke--following

Kneale--calls 'calling', a pragmatic notion.

   Kent Bach is another philosopher who has proposed a similar

metalinguistic description theory:

   ... a name 'N' is semantically equivalent to the description 'the

   bearer of "N"'.[16]

In a footnote Bach explains why he avoids the locution 'called "N"':

   This is my wording, which I prefer to the usual 'the individual

called "N"'. The latter is unfortunate because 'is called'

suggests not only 'is named' but 'is referred to by', thereby

provoking the charge ... that description theories cannot avoid

being viciously circular.[17]

I think Bach is too charitable to the Kripkean charge of vicious

circularity. I do not think 'is called' suggests 'is referred to by'

in a viciously circular way. I suspect that Bach's charity stems

from the conflation he shares with Kripke of speaker's reference and

name's reference. Yet I do believe Bach is right in avoiding the

locution 'is called'; he does so for the wrong reason. The right

reason is that 'is called' belongs to the discourse concerning

speaker's reference, not name's reference. It is speakers who call

individuals one way or another. Names do not call anything any way.

'Nad calls her "Nirak"' is intelligible and may even be true, while

'"Nirak" calls her "Nirak"' is not. Since a description theory of

name's reference is not eo ipso a description theory of speaker's

reference, it is wise to avoid locutions indicative of the latter.

It is clear from elsewhere in his book that Bach's meaning of 'the

bearer of "N"' is such that x is the bearer of "N" if and only if "N"

is a name of x. Thus, without loss or distortion of content, we may

say that "N" is a name of x whenever Bach says that x bears "N".

Couched in this new locution, Kripke's accusation says that the kind

of metalinguistic description theory like Kneale's or Bach's makes reference not "get off the ground at all" because such a theory makes naming determine reference. For this Kripkean criticism of circularity to be effective, it must be the case that reference determines naming. But it does not. Thus, I reject the above Kripkean criticism of the Kneale-Bach type metalinguistic description theory, even though I do oppose any theory that makes naming determine reference.

(E) Sydney Shoemaker writes:

> If someone says "De Gaulle intends to remove France from NATO," and is using "De Gaulle" to refer to himself, his <u>statement</u> is in the relevant sense immune to error through misidentification, regardless of whether his is right in thinking his name is "De Gaulle" and that he is the President of France.[18]

Here the speaker assigns himself to the token of the name 'De Gaulle' he himself utters and for that reason, Shoemaker says, his utterance cannot be false through misidentification. This is plausible, and the Tarskian theory of reference I endorse explains it. Under the assignment of the speaker to 'De Gaulle', his utterance is true if and only if he intends to remove France from NATO.

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1.   <u>Naming and Necessity</u> (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 25, note 3.

2. In "A Semantic Solution to Frege's Puzzle", J. Tomberlin (ed.) <u>Philosophical Perspectives</u> 7 (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing, 1993), 135-54 and "Logic Purified", <u>Nous</u> 27 (1993), 484, note 12, I argued that such inferences are not valid in indexical logic, but my misgivings are irrelevant here.

3. Of course, we need not call her by name. We may call her by pronoun: e.g., "Hey, you!" Or we may call her by description: e.g., "Hey, the girl in a red shirt!" Mixed cases are also possible: "Hey, you in a red shirt!" Greeting may work in a similar, if somewhat awkward, way: "Hello, you", "Hello, the (pretty) girl in a red shirt".

4. Again, we need not use a name. We may use a pronoun: e.g., "She plays softball". Or we may use a description: e.g. "The girl in a red shirt plays softball".

5. See Saul Kripke, "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference", P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein (eds.) <u>Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language</u> (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979), 6-27.

6. I believe this in general: the correct analyses of most pragmatic notions must use some semantic notion, but the correct analyses of most semantic notions need not use any pragmatic notion. In this sense, semantics is more basic than pragmatics.

7. Tarski defined such an assignment in terms of a sequence of individuals. But this was a purely technical maneuver and does nothing to undermine the conceptual primitiveness of assignment.

8. For individual constants, Tarski reduced assignment to a list on which all cases of assignment are simply enumerated. Again, no philosophically interesting analysis of assignment is offered.

9. This might or might not be reminiscent of some of Ruth Barcan Marcus's writings. See her <u>Modalities: Philosophical Essays</u> (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

10. As we observed in note 3, we may also say, "Hey, you!" So, someone who equates pronouns with variables might not be convinced. Even so, it remains that all names are subject to this use, whereas not all pronouns are. For example, "Hey, she!" is unacceptable.

11. An example of confusing a name with a variable in this regard is cited by Kripke on page 107 of <u>Naming and Necessity</u>, where he mentions J. B. Rosser's mistake of saying "that x = y if and only if 'x' and 'y' are names for the same object". Kripke mocks, "As far as I know, outside the militant black nationalist movement no one has ever been named 'x'".

12. Gabriel M. A. Segal, "Proper Names and Indeterminacy of Semantic Theory", presented at the Karlovy Vary Conference on Davidson, September 10, 1996.

13. See Kripke, <u>Naming and Necessity</u>, 93, 96-97, 163.

14. Saul Kripke, <u>Naming and Necessity</u>, 70; his emphasis.

15. A glaring exception is note 3 on page 25, where he criticizes Keith Donnellan for not making the distinction with respect to descriptions.

16. Kent Bach, <u>Thought and Reference</u> (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 135.

17. <u>Ibid</u>., 135, note 5.

18. "Persons and Their Pasts," <u>American Philosophical Quarterly</u> 7 (1970), 270, note 5; my emphasis.