

How should drivers' use of Automated Lane Keeping Systems (ALKS) be assessed? A study with experienced driving assessors in a Wizard of Oz vehicle

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Abstract

This study aims to contribute to guidelines for driver licensing organizations on assessing driver competence in using Level 3 Automated Lane Keeping Systems (ALKS), based on an on-road experiment with eight professional driving assessors (i.e., expert driving examiners who train experienced drivers to become driving examiners of their own) in a Wizard of Oz vehicle. Using a think-aloud protocol, we captured cognitive processes during system supervision and take-over requests (TORs) in real-world traffic jams. An LLM-based thematic analysis of transcripts revealed four themes: (1) Continuous situational awareness as a prerequisite for trust and action, (2) The need for system transparency and predictability, (3) Proactive manual control to ensure safety and traffic flow, and (4) The take-over action as an immediate, reflexive response. These results suggest that safe ALKS operation requires active monitoring and anticipatory skills. This blurs the distinction between Level 2 and Level 3 automation, as the expert participants in our study generally remained attentive rather than adopting the 'mind-off' state that Level 3 theoretically allows. In conclusion, assessing ALKS usage involves not only evaluating a driver's reaction to a TOR but also judging their performance as a systems manager responsible for anticipating conflicts and smoothly executing control transitions.

Introduction

Car driving may undergo a transformation with the introduction of conditionally automated driving systems (ADS). Codified as Level 3 (Conditional Driving Automation) in the SAE International standard J3016 (SAE International, 2021), these systems represent a departure from Level 2 (Partial Driving Automation). While Level 2 systems entail that the driver remains responsible for the safe operation of the driving task throughout, Level 3 systems, such as the Automated Lane Keeping System (ALKS) recently approved under UN Regulation 157 (United Nations, 2022), allow the driver to disengage from the driving task and engage in non-driving-related tasks (NDRTs) under predefined circumstances known as the Operational Design Domain (ODD). An ALKS may be activated only on access-controlled roads with physical separation between opposing traffic, where pedestrians and cyclists are prohibited. While the original regulation limited operation to 60 km/h, an amendment adopted in 2022 permits operation up to 130 km/h, but only for systems that can perform a lane change during a Minimum Risk Manoeuvre¹.

This tendency for automation to shift the operator's role from one of continuous physical control to that of a higher-level supervisor focused on monitoring and decision-making is a long-studied concept in the field of human-vehicle systems (e.g., Johannsen, 1976). This change of role is becoming increasingly pertinent with Level 3 automation in which drivers are granted the freedom to divert their attention away from the road, yet are requested to intervene safely when prompted (e.g., Louw et al., 2015; Saffarian et al., 2012; Heikoop et al., 2019). This shift in the driver's role requires new competencies, such as comprehending system performance and managing control transitions, that are not covered by traditional training and examination. For a national licensing authority such as the Dutch Centraal Bureau Rijvaardigheidsbewijzen (CBR), in charge of assessing driver skill and fitness to drive, this presents a challenge. Establishing a framework of normative behaviors and assessment criteria for managing the critical aspects of Level 3 ADS is required to ensure these new competencies are properly evaluated.

Take-over requests (TORs) represent one such critical aspect of Level 3 ADS, where drivers must resume manual control from the ADS when they are being warned by the system that it reaches its operational limits. Numerous studies, primarily conducted in simulators, have examined factors influencing driver performance after TORs, including factors such as driver state, type of NDRT, and type of

¹ The regulation does not itself ban operation at night, in rain, in tunnels, or in roadworks; instead, each manufacturer's ODD must state its environmental and infrastructural constraints (including time-of-day and weather), and the system must request take-over and/or execute a Minimum Risk Manoeuvre when conditions exceed that ODD.

human-machine interaction. A meta-analysis of 129 studies found that shorter take-over response times are associated with higher situational urgency, absence of handheld devices, and multimodal TORs combining auditory or vibrotactile cues with visual ones, while driver age showed no consistent effect (Zhang et al., 2019). Similarly, a systematic review of 36 simulator-based experiments showed that situational urgency, NDRT engagement, and scenario complexity impact performance measures such as take-over response times and lateral/longitudinal control quality (Soares et al., 2021).

A limitation of the existing studies is that most evidence is based on simulator-based environments rather than real-world conditions. The use of simulators is due to the advantages they offer: simulators provide a safe environment to test potentially dangerous scenarios with novel (or non-existing) technology, allow for clear experimental control over variables such as traffic density and TOR timing, and facilitate accurate data collection. However, a limitation of simulators is their limited realism, particularly regarding the variability of naturally occurring road conditions and traffic situations, which cannot easily be programmed *a priori* into a virtual environment.

A growing body of on-road research is emerging to understand driver behavior when interacting with ADS in real-world conditions. Such research reveals various human-machine interaction challenges, including mode confusion after a transition from Level 3 automation (Kim et al., 2025). Other studies have shown that TORs consist of a sequence of actions, influenced by the driver's initial gaze and motoric demands of their NDRT (Berghöfer et al., 2018; Naujoks et al., 2019; Pipkorn et al., 2023). Wizard of Oz (WoZ) studies (i.e., studies where a system, in this case a vehicle, appears autonomous but is covertly controlled by a human) have also found that on-road response times were faster than those in simulators (Eriksson et al., 2017) and became faster across multiple rides (Dillmann et al., 2023; Rydström et al., 2023), and that it can take a considerable time of at least 15 seconds for the driver's visual attention to the forward road to return to the levels of normal manual driving (Pipkorn et al., 2024). In addition to WoZ studies, naturalistic driving studies, which observe drivers during their everyday travel (e.g., using Level 2 automation systems), are providing valuable data on the frequency and reasons behind driver-initiated take-overs (Gershon et al., 2021; Schwager et al., 2024; Yang et al., 2023).

The present experiment engaged professional driving assessors as expert participants. These participants possess a deep understanding of safe driving practices and are highly skilled in assessing driver behavior, which makes their insights particularly valuable when evaluating novel in-vehicle technologies (Balassa et al., 2024; Driessen et al., 2021; Driessen et al., 2025). This study used a WoZ approach, where the automated system was simulated to expose participants to realistic take-over scenarios on public roads. In conjunction, a think-aloud protocol was used, which required the participants to verbalize their thoughts. This approach was chosen to gain insight into the cognitive processes and decision-making strategies of these expert drivers.

Methods

Participants

The participant group consisted of eight professional driving assessors employed by the Dutch Central Office of Driving Certification (CBR). All participants possessed extensive experience in assessing driving behavior and training new examiners. They were recruited via professional networks, and informed consent was obtained from each individual prior to the study. Although ten participants originally took part in the experiment, two participants (1 and 6) were excluded from the analysis due to technical issues with the think-aloud audio recordings. The final sample of 8 participants consisted of 2 females and 6 males. Four of the eight participants reported driving more than 30,000 km per year, and the other four reported driving between 20,000 and 30,000 km per year. Seven participants reported driving daily, and one reported driving 4 to 6 days a week.

Ethical approval was obtained from the institutional review board at Eindhoven University of Technology (TU/e), Reference ERB2024ID465. Participants were debriefed at the end of the session about the simulation nature of the ALKS.

Apparatus

The experiment was conducted in a modified Renault Espace configured as a WoZ setup, where a hidden human driver (the real driver) controlled the car while creating the illusion for the participant that the car was operating automatically by means of an ALKS. The participant was located in the rear left seat behind tinted windows, designed to replicate the driver's position and isolated from the front cabin by a plywood board and TV screen presenting a live windshield view as if from the driver's position to prevent visibility of the real driver (Detjen et al., 2020; Karjanto et al., 2018; Wang, 2023).

This specific setup of the present experiment included:

- A non-functional “secondary” steering wheel, clutch, and pedals, synchronized via Raspberry Pi and ESP modules to mimic movements from the real steering wheel. Participants engaged/disengaged ALKS or responded to TORs by pressing two white buttons on the steering wheel.
- A TV screen, positioned to simulate the windshield view, displaying a live forward feed from a GoPro HERO 12 camera mounted on the windshield.
- Two 7-inch Full HD monitors simulated side mirrors. These monitors presented the camera input fed by GoPro HERO 13 cameras, which were mounted on the car’s exterior mirrors.
- Two more GoPro cameras were mounted inside the vehicle and were used to capture participant behavior and audio.
- A central tablet (Surface Pro) serving as the human-machine interface. It could display five system states: (1) manual mode (white screen), (2) ALKS ready for activation (purple screen), (3) ALKS active (blue screen), (4) non-urgent take-over request (TOR; orange screen with auditory cue), (5) urgent TOR (red screen with auditory cue), see Figure 1. The design followed ISO standards for ADS (e.g., ISO 2575:2021; International Organization for Standardization, 2021). A Bluetooth keyboard was used by the experimenter to trigger state changes.
- Navigation: A phone with Google Maps in a rear holder for participant visibility, guiding the route. It also displayed vehicle speed, and served as a reminder that ALKS does not follow navigation, requiring manual intervention for exits.
- The dashboard of the car was equipped with a display which mirrored the ALKS display available to the participant. This way, the real driver was informed of the ALKS system status.



Figure 1. The five possible human-machine interface states

Figure 2 depicts the experimental setup during a TOR.



Figure 2. The Wizard of Oz (WoZ) setup. The figure shows an urgent take-over request (TOR).

Instructions for Participants

Participants were informed that the experiment would take place in a WoZ vehicle and were seated in a simulated driver's station in the left-rear of the car. They were told they would be interacting with a simulated ALKS capable of automated driving in traffic jams. Their primary task was to monitor the system and take over control whenever they felt it was necessary or when specifically instructed. When the vehicle speed dropped below 60 km/h in a traffic jam, the "ALKS ready" screen appeared. Participants were informed that they could choose to activate the ALKS at that point if they wished, by placing both hands on the steering wheel and pressing the top two buttons with their thumbs. A blue screen on a tablet confirmed when the ALKS was active. Participants were also told that they could deactivate the ALKS at any time using the same button press, which returned the system to "manual mode" as indicated by a white screen. The system could issue a TOR indicated by the tablet screen turning orange (non-urgent) or red (urgent) together with an auditory alert. For urgent (red) TORs, participants were instructed to take control immediately. Participants were also told they were responsible for taking over when the navigation system indicated an upcoming highway exit, as the ALKS would only follow the main roadway. They could choose to take control at any other moment they deemed appropriate. A key component of the experiment involved participants verbalizing their thoughts, observations, and decision-making processes, especially before, during, and after taking control.

Experimenter's Role

The experimenter, using the concealed keyboard, controlled the ALKS status according to a predefined set of rules. The study was conducted by four experimenters. When the vehicle entered a traffic jam and its speed dropped to 60 km/h or below, the experimenter activated the ALKS-ready screen, and the participant could activate the ALKS if they wished. If the participant chose to do so by pressing the two top steering wheel buttons with their thumbs, the experimenter switched the display to the blue "ALKS active" mode. The experimenter triggered TORs in specific situations. An urgent TOR (red screen) was issued if the time gap to the lead vehicle increased to over 5 seconds, as estimated by the experimenter. Urgent or non-urgent TORs could also be initiated in response to scenarios that would be challenging for a real system, such as unusual shapes of nearby vehicles, erratic or dangerous behavior from other

drivers, the presence of motorcycles, upcoming or ongoing road works, or approaching tunnels. In the case of tunnels, a non-urgent TOR (orange screen) was given first, escalating to an urgent TOR if the participant did not take control. Additionally, the experimenter could issue urgent or non-urgent TORs at random to simulate unexpected system events. When a take-over occurred, whether initiated by the participant or prompted by a TOR, the experimenter pressed "A" to confirm the switch to manual mode (white screen). The experimenter provided reminders to think-aloud as needed throughout the drive.

Real Driver's Role

For the purpose of this experiment, a professional driver was hired. This 'real driver' was instructed to drive in a manner that mimicked a real ALKS when the system was active. This involved maintaining a speed of no more than 60 km/h, staying within the lane, and keeping an appropriate distance from the car ahead, even if surrounding traffic was faster. Safety was the highest priority, with the driver instructed to deviate from the protocol if any situation became risky. In manual mode, the driver would drive normally to navigate to the next scenario. As mentioned, the real driver was equipped with a special display which mirrored the participant's ALKS screen so that the real driver could see the ALKS status and act accordingly. To further limit the need for verbal communication with the real driver during the experiment, as much of the route as possible was set before the experiment started, based on the presence of traffic jams.

Procedure

The experiment was conducted from Monday, November 25, 2024, to Friday, November 29, 2024, on roads in the Netherlands with frequent congestion, including provincial roads (N-roads) and highways. Participants were assigned to either a morning or afternoon session and informed that the entire process would take approximately two to three hours. Before each session, traffic congestion was checked using Google Maps, and the nearest, most suitable highway or provincial road with a traffic jam was selected for the experiment. Upon arrival, participants received an information letter and provided written informed consent before the experiment started. They were then briefed about the overall aim of the experiment.

Before the main experiment began, the drive to the designated road served as a training period. During this phase, the experimenter, seated next to the participant, explained the system's functions and the different modes shown on the central screen. The experimenter guided the participant through the process of activating and deactivating the ALKS using the two top white buttons on the steering wheel. Participants were also instructed to practice the think-aloud protocol, vocally communicating what they were doing and observing during these simulated transfers of control. Participants were occasionally nudged to speak, especially regarding their thoughts and behaviors regarding a transition of control. This training phase allowed participants to become familiar with the digital displays, and the physical actions required for a safe take-over before encountering a live traffic jam scenario.

The main experiment commenced once the vehicle entered a traffic jam on the highway, with the system's ODD being limited to speeds of 60 km/h or less, and the procedures and roles as described above would be followed.

Upon completion of the driving session, a debrief was conducted with the participant to discuss their experience.

Analysis

This research focused on the analysis of the think-aloud data. The audio files were transcribed using WhisperV3 (Radford et al., 2023), a state-of-the-art transcription tool that ran locally on a Dell XPS laptop. The transcripts were then programmatically stripped of hallucinations (i.e., repetitive, meaningless text) that could occur when neither the experimenter nor the participant was speaking. Subsequently, all recordings were manually reviewed and corrected where necessary. All data falling outside the experimental phase, including the training phase, have been removed. Furthermore, names, private details, and conversations about non-driving-related topics have been removed, as well as logistical interactions (such as about the route) with the real driver. Only the utterances of the participant and the experimenter were retained.

Next, a thematic analysis was performed on these anonymous transcripts, using a large language model (LLM; Gemini 2.5 Pro; Google DeepMind, 2025) for theme generation and quote selection. The quotes selected by the LLM were translated to English, again using Gemini 2.5 Pro. The following prompt was used:

This experiment used a Wizard-of-Oz implementation of the Automated Lane-Keeping System (ALKS, UNECE Regulation R157). The participant, an experienced driving examiner, sat in the rear seat, while a confederate driver in the front seat actually controlled the vehicle. A large forward-view screen gave the participant the illusion of being behind the wheel. A secondary display showed the ALKS status: Manual mode (white), ALKS ready (purple), ALKS active (blue), Non-urgent take-over request (TOR) with chime (orange), Urgent TOR with chime (red).

The experimenter encouraged the participant to think aloud and at times discussed ALKS or broader topics such as the driving test. The participant could engage ALKS or retake control by pressing two white buttons on the steering wheel.

Using the attached transcripts of eight participants, perform a thematic analysis of "human requirements during transitions of control". Focus on recurring themes reported by participants, supported by quotations. Make sure that the quotes are from diverse participants.

Results

Across the eight participants, the mean duration of the training phase (from the start of the drive to the first "ALKS ready" screen) was 11.5 minutes ($SD = 10.7$). The experimental phase, defined as the time from the "ALKS ready" screen to the last moment the ALKS was switched to manual or the end of the recording, averaged 72.6 minutes ($SD = 32.9$). This average includes one trial (Participant 4) that ended prematurely at 11 minutes because of equipment failure.

In total, the eight participants experienced 54 non-urgent (orange) and 34 urgent (red) TORs, four of which were escalations from non-urgent TORs. Additionally, the participants performed 43 discretionary automated-to-manual transitions, i.e., without a TOR. A difference was observed between experimenters and/or driving conditions, where one experimenter (who ran Participants 2 and 3) offered a non-urgent TOR relatively often, while the three other experimenters (who ran Participants 7, 8, 9, & 10) more often escalated the situation (e.g., a large following distance), which led to a high number of discretionary take-overs.

The thematic analysis of their think-aloud reports reveals which cognitive processes, evaluation criteria, and action strategies these experts discussed. Each theme is illustrated with quotations².

Theme 1: Continuous Situational Awareness as a Prerequisite for Trust and Action

Even when the ALKS was active, participants did not become passive occupants. They consistently maintained a high level of situational awareness by monitoring the vehicle's surroundings. This constant scanning was a fundamental requirement for both activating the system and being prepared to take over. Participants needed to feel they had a complete picture of the traffic environment—their "ruimtekussen" or space cushion—before ceding or retaking control.

- "Suppose a takeover is required, then of course you need to know your 'space cushion,' as it's called—your free spaces and your room to maneuver." – Participant 05
- "I did take a quick look in the mirror to see if there was anything unusual that would require me to intervene myself." – Participant 10

²As a robustness check, the same prompt was also tried for two other large language models. Although the level of granularity differed (four themes for Grok vs. eight themes for ChatGPT), the main results were similar to those obtained with Gemini:

SuperGrok Expert (11 September 2025): 1) Sustained Vigilance and Environmental Scanning, 2) Anticipation and Proactive Decision-Making, 3) Physical Readiness and Actions, 4) Trust Calibration with the System.

ChatGPT 5 Thinking (11 September 2025): 1) Continuous 360° situational awareness—especially at (and just before) TOR, 2) Clear, timely, and trustworthy handover cues + responsive controls, 3) A need to understand why a TOR happens, 4) Agency to preserve traffic flow and visibility (proactive takeovers), 5) Managing merges and "space-cushion courtesy" 6) Early TORs for special actors/situations (motorbikes, emergency lanes, tapers, tunnels), 7) Maintain readiness: posture, hands, glance strategy, 8) Calibrated trust without complacency; secondary-task boundaries.

- "As a driver, a legally responsible driver at the CBR, yes; look, in this lane it feels safe, but what are the lanes to my left and right doing, you know?" - Participant 07

This vigilance extended to anticipating potential conflicts, such as merging traffic or vehicles on adjacent lanes, demonstrating that drivers feel a continuous responsibility to monitor the situation, even when the system is nominally in control.

Theme 2: The Need for System Transparency and Predictability

A recurring theme was the participants' desire to understand the system's behavior, especially during take-over requests. When a TOR was issued, a primary and immediate cognitive action was to search for the cause. Unexpected or seemingly unprompted requests created confusion and surprise, whereas anticipated requests (e.g., approaching a tunnel or exceeding the speed limit) were handled with more confidence. This highlights a critical need for the system's actions to be predictable and its "reasoning" transparent to the user.

- "It asked me to take over, but I don't know why, because we're just staying in the line of traffic." - Participant 04
- "Yeah, I don't know why it did that, you immediately start looking for a reason. Well, I found no reason... But you immediately search, when that red ALKS display appeared, you immediately start looking for: how, what, what is the cause?" - Participant 07
- "I was surprised that it requested a takeover, as there wasn't really much going on. So maybe I missed something, but the only thing I could think of was, indeed, a motorcyclist..." - Participant 05

This search for a reason indicates that drivers are not just passively obeying a command; they are actively trying to build and refine a mental model of the system's capabilities and limitations to anticipate its future behavior.

Theme 3: Proactive Manual Control to Ensure Safety and Traffic Flow

Participants frequently chose to manually override the ALKS not just in response to a TOR, but proactively based on their own assessment of the situation. A primary driver for this was to maintain proper traffic flow. When the ALKS drove too slowly or left a large gap that invited other cars to cut in, experienced drivers found this "onwenselijk" (undesirable) and took control to drive more assertively and match the speed of surrounding traffic.

- "A very large gap is forming, and this vehicle is also driving exceptionally slowly compared to the surrounding traffic... And that is a potentially dangerous situation. And in that case, I do indeed take over" - Participant 10
- "I would take over here. I don't feel we are flowing well with the traffic, in the interest of traffic flow." - Participant 07

Furthermore, participants took manual control to perform strategic maneuvers the system was not designed for, such as changing lanes to allow others to merge or to take a highway exit. This shows a clear requirement for the driver to act as a strategic manager, intervening when the system's tactical execution conflicts with broader driving goals.

- "If here were space-right now it's a traffic jam, so it's going very slowly—but I would move to the left lane in time, so then I would override [the system]" - Participant 08

Theme 4: The Take-Over Action as an Immediate, Reflexive Response

When faced with an urgent (red) or non-urgent (orange) take-over request, the participants' initial action was almost universally to immediately press the buttons to regain control. The analysis of the situation often occurred simultaneously or immediately after the action was initiated. This suggests that the visual and auditory cues of the TOR trigger a trained, almost reflexive, response to take back authority first and ask questions later.

- "It lights up red, takeover, so I initiate the takeover as quickly as possible, and then, while I'm taking over, I try to quickly look again at everything that's happening around me." - Participant 05
- "Well, it's an emergency call, so to speak, to take over the controls, and I do that as quickly as possible to use the time it might still grant me to get out of a difficult situation and have it under my own control." - Participant 10
- "But it's more the reaction to that thing..." - Participant 08
"So it was actually just a startle reaction, that takeover?" - Experimenter
"Yes, yes, poof." - Participant 08

This highlights the importance of clear, unambiguous TOR signals and an ergonomic interface that allows for a rapid, instinctual transition of control back to the human driver.

Taken together, these four themes depict the participants as active supervisors rather than passive occupants when overseeing a Level 3 system on public roads. Participants appeared to strive for continuous situational awareness (Theme 1) in order to be prepared to intervene at any time. Additionally, the participants sought system transparency and predictability (Theme 2) to understand the rationale behind TORs. They also engaged in proactive manual control (Theme 3) to maintain safety, optimize traffic flow, or execute maneuvers beyond the system's scope. Finally, TORs typically triggered an immediate, reflexive take-over action (Theme 4), with diagnosis of the situation occurring in parallel or immediately afterward. Together, these patterns reveal that safe ALKS supervision by our participants was not a matter of "waiting for instructions", but a continuous and anticipatory process of monitoring, interpreting, and managing both the system and the driving environment.

Discussion

The aim of this study was to examine how professional driver assessors manage the transition from automated to manual control in a WoZ setup of an ALKS. By hiding a human confederate driver and offering participants a relatively realistic driving experience, we could measure the cognitive and behavioral strategies that experts use when they need to resume driving. This allowed us to move beyond earlier simulator-based and test track studies that typically used scripted scenarios, and provide ecologically-valid insights from professionals who routinely judge safety on public roads.

Our LLM-based thematic analysis of the think-aloud data showed that the participants did not treat the take-over as a mere button-press but rather as a rapid yet multi-faceted activity comprising continuous situational awareness and monitoring, proactive intervention and assessment of system limitations, and an effort to understand the "why" behind any TOR. In other words, safe ALKS supervision hinges not just on raw reaction time but also on the driver's ability to combine attentive monitoring, causal reasoning, and decisive action into one routine, i.e., different information-processing stages are involved (cf. Parasuraman et al., 2000). These are skills that current training regimes rarely teach and that future certification tests must explicitly assess.

An implication of these findings is that the expert drivers, despite being told they were using a Level 3 system and were permitted to take their eyes off the road, effectively treated it as a Level 2 system. Although there were a small number of exceptions, such as a participant briefly checking his mobile phone when ALKS was active, overall, the proactive monitoring and discretionary interventions show that participants did not adopt a true 'mind-off' state but rather remained cognitively engaged, even if their hands and feet were off the controls. This behavior challenges the practical distinction between Level 2 and Level 3 automation. This finding is in line with other on-road studies where the ambiguity between automation levels led to mode confusion, such as drivers unnecessarily keeping their hands on the wheel during Level 3 operation or, conversely, incorrectly removing them during Level 2 (Kim et al., 2025).

If expert drivers feel compelled to remain 'in the loop' due to the potential need for a take-over, it questions the feasibility of achieving the full cognitive and legal disengagement that theoretically defines Level 3 (cf., Hancock & Parasuraman, 1992). The true user experience of ALKS might therefore be less about cognitive offloading and more about managing a persistent, low-level supervision, blurring the idealized lines between automation levels.

This study has several limitations. The most apparent limitation is the small sample size of eight participants. However, this may be less concerning than in quantitative research for two reasons. First, thematic saturation (i.e., the point at which new data no longer yield new themes) can be reached with small and homogeneous samples (Hennink & Kaiser, 2022). Second, we recruited experienced driving assessors as a specific sample of experts to help establish rules of thumb for supervising ADS; their professional training likely results in less variable behavioral patterns compared to the general population. Third, the WoZ method meant participants were aware they were in an experimental simulation, and the think-aloud protocol itself may have prompted participants to be more analytical than they would be in a naturalistic driving situation (Dahlbäck et al., 1993). Simulating a real ALKS in a consistent manner also proved to be difficult in this regard, for example, regarding the criteria for triggering of a non-urgent TOR. Future research should validate our findings with larger populations of expert and non-expert drivers.

Ideally, commercially available Level 3 vehicles should be used to confirm the behaviors in a non-experimental context and over longer periods of time.

In conclusion, this study found that expert examiners supervising a simulated Level 3 automation system (ALKS) maintained situational awareness, akin to supervising a Level 2 system. What do these findings imply for the examination of candidates on the driving test?

The experts' cautious approach (essentially treating the ALKS as a Level 2 system) may not reflect the behavior of average drivers prone to over-trust (Wintersberger & Riener, 2016). We argue that the experts' behavior reveals a principle for driver assessment: even if the ALKS technology permits driver disengagement, the licensing of the driver should require a demonstration of more foundational skills first. That is, although a Level 3 system is engineered to be responsible for the driving task within its ODD, the assessment of a driver's competence should follow a tiered approach. An effective way to verify that a driving test candidate possesses the situational awareness and vehicle control skills for this transition is to require them to demonstrate these skills during the test. A parallel can be drawn from aviation: pilots must first demonstrate mastery of manual flight to earn their foundational pilot certificate, which is a prerequisite for being trained to safely manage the advanced autopilot systems in more complex aircraft (Federal Aviation Administration, 2021). Following this logic, demonstrating the competence of an *active* supervisor should be a prerequisite for earning the privilege to use a Level 3 system that allows for disengagement. Further research is needed to establish how, and to what degree, testing agencies should assess a driver's skills in continuous monitoring, causal reasoning, and decisive action.

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Supplementary material

The Unity project used to run the human-machine interface is available at

<https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fo/cojlmto3wlzpiih0omtp8/ALEX3oPYuRPkftE1of8AvY4?rlkey=boggm3hvva7o23g1cq186agn7>.

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