

**The Relationship between Diffuse Support for Democracy and Governing Party Support
in a Hybrid Regime: Evidence with Four Representative Samples from Turkey**

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Abstract

Political culture is congruent with the regime form in stable democracies as well as autocracies. In contrast, hybrid regimes are unstable by nature, and the relationship between political culture and regime legitimacy remains ambiguous. How does diffuse support for democracy influence the vote for the governing party in a hybrid regime? By employing the Turkish case as an example and using four nationally representative samples, we discover that being an active citizen and adopting the civic political engagement decrease the probability of voting for the governing party. Preferring a strong leader and a stable government over a democratic one and feeling satisfied with the current level of democracy have the opposite effect. Previous literature suggested the lack of a democratic political culture in Turkey. In contrast to these findings, the results show traces of civic culture and the presence of democratic notions.

Keywords: diffuse support, hybrid regimes, political culture, support for democracy, citizenship, Turkey.

Introduction

Turkey's road to consolidating democracy has been rocky. Through interruptions by military interventions and the Constitutional Court decisions on party closures, the Turkish experience of democracy hit a barrier constituted by political Islam. Many scholars concur that conservatives, political Islamists, and seculars exist side by side in Turkish politics, forming social and political cleavages.¹ In this sense, one of the biggest challenges for democratic consolidation in Turkey has been mainly constituted by the divergent values in society, which have been the main component of political culture.² The survival of democracy 'depends on the values and beliefs of ordinary citizens' rather than 'elite-level' introduced 'institutional changes.'³ However, ordinary citizens' beliefs and values are diverse and may lead to a clash of political attitudes within the political system, and that in return could impede democratic consolidation.

The findings based on the World Values Survey in the 1990s and early 2000s on the political culture in Turkey reveal that the majority of Turkish citizens support democracy.⁴ Yet, the importance attributed to political liberty was found to be limited. Also, the high level of political trust in the military and the low level of tolerance, compared to Western democracies, indicates the absence of an internalized democratic political culture.⁵

The political regime in Turkey has taken a new route under the presidency of Erdoğan since 2014, whose regime is considered competitive authoritarian. The unfair elections, a systematic violation of civil liberties, and the highly skewed playing field in favour of the incumbent party constitute the typical characteristics of a competitive authoritarian regime.⁶ Given the absence of democratic institutions and the political struggles among the two polarized camps, no research has analysed the political culture orientations, specifically the diffuse support for democracy, under the Justice and Development Party [AKP] governments. Therefore, the most pressing question in the present study focuses on the relationship between diffuse support for democracy (deep-seated political values regarding the regime or political

institutions) and regime legitimacy. We reveal the effect of the clashing diffuse support for democracy in a hybrid regime with the example of Turkey.

Using four representative samples from 2015 and 2017, we check whether there are significant political attitude differences in Turkish society. We examine potential differences with the notions of good citizenship, conceptions of democracy, and support for a strong leader and autocracy, and the level of satisfaction with democracy. Our results reveal that being an active citizen and adopting civic political engagement decrease the probability of voting for the governing party. Preferring a strong leader and a stable government over a democratic one and satisfaction with the current level of democracy have the opposite effect. In contrast to the previous findings on the absence of a democratic political culture in Turkey, our results show traces of civic culture and the presence of democratic notions. The differences in Turkish political culture orientations are manifested through the unsettled diffuse support for democracy.

This article begins by discussing the political culture orientation and its relevance for democracy, exploring the presence of democratic values in hybrid regimes, and explaining the conceptualization and operationalization of diffuse support for democracy. It then examines the diffuse support in Turkey and derives hypotheses from the previous findings. After introducing the empirical strategy, the results and analysis section provides outlines and discusses the implications of the diffuse support for democracy and political culture.

Political Culture and Diffuse Support for Democracy in Turkey

Political culture and democratic values in hybrid regimes

The central assumption in the previous literature suggests that a stable regime is more likely if the political culture is congruent with the regime form.⁷ A political regime should be consistent with the citizens' values: otherwise, the political system cannot function properly and stably.⁸ In other words, authoritarian regimes tend to prevail when most citizens promote a strong leader; and, in the case of democratic regimes, when there is 'popular control of political

power’, since most citizens support this notion.⁹ Although such a clear differentiation of values in democratic and authoritarian regimes can be empirically supported, the hybrid regimes bring a novel case, in which both democratic and non-democratic values in the political culture transpire adversely.

Political culture orientations in a political system can be identified in several ways. Almond and Verba’s pathbreaking civic culture study classifies three ideal types: (1) parochial culture, in which citizens are apolitical; (2) subject culture, in which citizens follow orders as an object of mobilization; and (3) participant culture, in which citizens are not only well aware of their civic duties of voting but also abide by the law.¹⁰ Based on these ideal types, ‘the civic culture is most conducive to democracy as a mixture of the subject and participant orientation.’ In this sense, in civic culture, the majority of citizens are composed of allegiant citizens, as well as ‘a substantial number of subjects and a small group of parochial.’¹¹

The aforementioned typology was criticized for certain limitations, such as ‘its failure to examine subcultures’¹² and the underemphasized post-materialist values.¹³ As an alternative, to emphasize the values’ influence on the political culture, a new typology is proposed: (1) the legitimacy approach, i.e., support for governmental systems and trust in political institutions; (2) the communitarian approach; the importance of a vibrant civil society; and (3) the human development approach, i.e. the post-materialist aspirations for personal and political liberty.¹⁴ In this sense, authors’ analysis of the World Values Survey data show that ‘self-expression values have an inherently anti-authoritarian thrust that undermines autocratic rule’ and the *subject orientation* that Almond and Verba considered as ‘an integral part of a democratic civic culture.’¹⁵

The influence of the individual-level attitudes and mass orientations on sustaining democratic institutions has been empirically tested in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America.¹⁶ For instance, while post-material values shape Soviet politics in much the same way they have affected Western politics, the Russian culture is also

characterized by politically relevant interpersonal networks.¹⁷ Therefore, the emergence of post-materialist values and traces of a civil culture can also be observed in hybrid regimes.

Debates about sub-political cultures or the ideal types of political culture orientations notwithstanding, there is a general agreement that the prevalence of post-materialist values and democratic orientations in a society guarantee a robust and consolidated democratic system. However, the question is how prevalent should these values be so that one can conclude there is a high enough demand for a democratic system. One approach is to introduce a continuum of political culture orientation based on two dimensions: pluralism and involvement. The analysis on Jordan, Algeria, and the Palestinian Territories based on representative national surveys (2003-2004) reveals that, in Jordan and the Palestinian territories, only 11-12 percent of respondents have a democratic orientation, i.e. having high involvement in civic and associational life and being highly tolerant of diverse political views.¹⁸ Almost half of the respondents have a parochial cultural orientation, which means a low level of civic participation and tolerance. In this regard, the regime and the political culture or the supply and demand for democracy are almost congruent, which in return stabilizes the authoritarian regime in these countries. However, the picture becomes complex in hybrid regimes. Thus, the main challenge that the hybrid regimes face is not related to building a democratic political culture, but to strengthening and disseminating the democratic notions within the society.

The political culture of a society changes over time, and Turkey witnessed significant political developments in the last two decades. According to various democracy indices¹⁹, Turkey's democratic performance was ranked relatively high – especially on political rights, until 2016. Nevertheless, since 2007, the impartiality of the judiciary has been curbed and the independence of the media has been severely compromised. The 2007 constitutional amendments introduced the direct election of the president with increased executive powers. Similarly, the 2010 constitutional referendum brought public scepticism about the independence of judiciary by changing the composition and powers of the Constitutional Court

and of the High Council Judges and Public Prosecutors.²⁰ The most important change has been the introduction of the presidential system under the rule of a strong leader with the 2017 constitutional referendum. Besides the abolishment of the office of prime minister, the most critical changes in the system were the following; (1) the appointment and dismissal of deputies, ministers by the president without parliamentary oversight; (2) the introduction of presidential decrees; (3) the limited oversight of the legislation over the executive; and (4) the limited power of the legislation over the fiscal budget proposed by the President.²¹ These political transformations signal the democratic backsliding of the regime. To the best of our knowledge, no research has examined the diffuse support for democracy in Turkey during the democratic backsliding.

Political culture and diffuse support: Conceptualization and operationalization

The political support in advanced democracies has fluctuated and shown the signs of erosion.²² In order to explain the main source of the problem, the following question is posed by scholars: whether fluctuations in political support are due to a change in political culture or if they are a short-term reaction to a government's low performance. By taking both possibilities into account, Easton identifies two types of objects of support – diffuse and specific support – and examines their manifestations at the political culture level.²³ Diffuse support is related to the deep-seated political values regarding the 'constitutional order' or 'political institutions',²⁴ while specific support 'reflects the immediate performance of government.'²⁵ For instance, a person who adheres to democratic values may lose trust in the institutions and withdraw support from a regime as a response to the short- or medium-term political factors, such as the performance of a government or an economic crisis.

Diffuse support functions as a general reservoir of people's trust. For example, people with high levels of diffuse support are more likely to tolerate the policies of the government for which they may not have voted, because they respect the democratic choice of fellow citizens.²⁶ In this sense, diffuse support is closely linked to the concept of regime legitimacy. Regime

legitimacy is ‘the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society.’²⁷ This sort of belief about the regimes is a ‘more or less fixed element in the political culture of a country.’²⁸

Turkey constitutes a good example of a hybrid regime that experienced a significant regime change recently.²⁹ The legitimacy of this change has been extensively debated. In this research, we focus on the relationship between the diffuse support for democracy and the governing party support to reveal the associations between these variables in a hybrid regime. We rely on the governing party support as the outcome variable, since this party has been in government for over 18 years now and is the main political actor responsible for the regime change.

We operationalize the diffuse support for democracy with two ways: (1) the post-materialist values – freedoms, rights, and duties, and (2) judgments about the practices and processes of political regimes, namely democracy and authoritarianism. The first includes notions of democracy (i.e., the government’s role in protecting minority rights, respecting democratic rights under any circumstances, and having the rights for civil disobedience), and the notions of good citizenship (i.e., vote in elections, obey laws and regulations, to be active in social or political associations). The second operationalization is related to support for a strong leader, preferring a stable government with the risk of not being fully democratic compared to a democratic government with the risk of not being stable, and satisfaction with the current level of democracy in the country (see the details in the Online Appendix).

As an important note, it can be argued that supporters of the incumbent party are more likely to be satisfied with the level of democracy in Turkey. Therefore, this indicator does not necessarily need to be included in the model. However, the main determinant of the specific support – government party support – in Turkey has always been the economy. In other words, Turkish people are economic voters, and all kinds of economic voting variables are significant determinants of the party preferences of voters.³⁰ Additionally, the longitudinal and cross-

country analyses reveal that citizens mostly rely on the economy to assess their level of satisfaction with democracy.³¹ In this sense, one cannot jump to the conclusion that the supporters or sympathizers of the AKP would blindly follow the policies regarding democratization. Therefore, notions of good citizenship and democracy need to be scrutinized to explain whether this perception affects citizens' satisfaction with democracy.

By using these two dimensions of diffuse support for democracy, we lay out the good citizen and democracy outlooks in Turkey and examine which of these are related to voting for the AKP. **Table 1** illustrates our theoretical and empirical models.

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Diffuse Support in Turkish politics

Democratic Notions and Political Cleavages. The two dominant approaches that identify political cleavages in Turkey can be identified as centre-periphery³² and *left-right alla Turca*.³³ While centre-periphery focuses on a cultural cleavage between a modernizing military-bureaucratic centre and a traditionalist periphery, the *left-right alla Turca* approach explains a two-cleavages system: a secular versus Islamist cleavage and Turkish versus Kurdish nationalism. However, we argue that, since the polarization level has increased in society since the 2007 elections³⁴, the centre-periphery cleavage cannot explain the current dynamics of Turkish politics. This cleavage has been transformed into polarized political camps, whose political positions are solely defined on the support of the AKP or lack thereof.³⁵

Multiple sources of polarization can be observed in Turkish politics. On the societal level, citizens' values are driven by the centre-periphery cleavage. On the political level, both secular and political Islamist elites also contributed to the polarization of these cleavages, instead of constructing a democratic centre with democratic state institutions and political actors.³⁶ As a result, the moderation of the political Islamists and/or the rise of the AKP only

reproduced the centre's undemocratic attributes.³⁷ Now the question of who constitutes the centre in Turkish politics becomes relevant.

The alliance between the AKP and the Turkish Nationalist Action Party [*MHP*] during the Constitutional Referendum process and the allied resistance between the Republican People's Party [*CHP*] and the People's Democratic Party [*HDP*] against the AKP's policies have overthrown the rules of politics in Turkey. Although *left-right alla Turca* still retains its influence on explaining the political dimensionality in Turkey, the current alliances among different political parties have introduced a new type of political polarization. Different political actors, such as seculars, Kurds, and the Good Party [*IYI Parti*], have positioned themselves against the AKP and its electoral partner party, the MHP, in a loose alliance for political survival.

Given the saliency of such political polarization, we expect to find polarization in Turkish public opinion as well. In summary, we argue that the previous cleavages in Turkish society are now manifesting themselves in the ongoing political polarization. We expect to observe significant associations between the variety in diffuse support and voting behaviour. Therefore, we hypothesize

H1: The variety in the diffuse support for democracy (differences in notions of citizenship and democracy) will have different predictive effects on voting for the AKP.

The polarization level in Turkish politics has specifically skyrocketed during the period before the introduction of the presidential system. The *yes* camp as the 'stalwart defenders' of the presidential system and the *no* camp as a 'strong opposition' were divided based on partisanship.³⁸ The studies that analysed the public opinion and vote-recall before and after the 2017 Constitutional Referendum reveal that the political fault line between Turkish nationalist bloc (*AKP and MHP*) and the opposition (*CHP, HDP, and IYI Parti*) was reproduced.³⁹ During the campaigns, while the nationalist bloc intensively defended the need for a strong leader to increase economic growth and political survival at the international political level, the

opposition bloc emphasized democratic legitimacy and a preference of a democratic government over a stable government. Moreover, due to the importance of the state tradition, having a strong leader or an increased role for government has a positive impact on the specific support in Turkey.⁴⁰ We expect the evaluations of political regime support as a component of diffuse support to reflect this polarization. Therefore, we hypothesize that

H2: The support for a strong leader is positively associated with AKP support.

H3: A preference for a stable government over democracy is positively associated with AKP support.

Notions of Citizenship. The global change in political culture since the 1980s has brought up new conceptions of citizenship. In civic cultures, the allegiant citizenry has turned itself into an assertive one. Besides the conventional forms of political participation, in which allegiant citizens are expected to abide by the law and fulfil their duties of voting, unconventional forms of political participation, such as signing petitions and attending demonstrations, have become essential for democracies to survive. As a result of the rise of post-materialist values that have ‘strained the principles of representative democracies’, the assertive citizenry⁴¹ has found a voice and taken the duties and responsibilities of a citizen on to a whole new level, beyond the regular civic duty of voting.⁴² Therefore, a shift from duty based on engaged citizenship can be observed in democratic political cultures.⁴³

In this context, Turkey does not constitute an exception. Although civil society organizations still face challenges imposed by the state⁴⁴, these organizations have also become more active and visible.⁴⁵ Both right- and obligation-based civil society organizations constitute important sites for learning active citizenship in Turkey.⁴⁶ Similarly, highlighting the positive role of civil society in the democratization process has opened up a space for pluralism, by extending identity claims in Turkey.⁴⁷ However, the possible negative role of civil society in democratization should also be a concern. A civil society that paves the way for pluralism can be abused by ‘fundamentalist discourses to strengthen their communitarian visions of

society.⁴⁸ Thus, while civil society organizations have burgeoned, especially since 2007 in Turkey, it can be observed that secular organizations have been under state pressure. Such secular entities are continuously threatened by the state and replaced by their Islamist counterparts.

On the one hand, in light of political transformations and the rise of the AKP, we argue that the periphery's political attitudes and citizenship perspective have shifted from subject culture to participant culture with duty-based citizenship. Such a shift was also achieved through the AKP's success in mobilizing its supporters, as well as President Erdoğan's discourse and style of leadership. Right after Erdoğan's election in 2014, he focused on implementing majoritarian politics. He argued that his main aim is to serve the interests of the 'black Turks', who had been ignored and humiliated under the tutelage regimes by the political elite. To achieve this aim, he called people to actively support the AKP.⁴⁹ Claiming to represent the overlooked and humiliated people, President Erdoğan has managed to create an allegiant citizenry in the AKP's voter base by providing more welfare subsidies to the poor and mobilizing the local neighbourhoods. Accordingly, we hypothesize the following:

H4: AKP support is predicted by the diffuse support that emphasizes voting duty.

These political transformations have also had an impact on non-AKP supporters. The shrinking political and social space for non-AKP supporters has strengthened their resistance capacity. With the Gezi Protests in 2013, not only the impoverished middle class but also those who felt discontent with the authoritarian policies of the AKP government showed the remnants of the democratic political culture in Turkey and put assertive citizenship into practice to 'enlarge the liberal democratic space in Turkish politics.'⁵⁰ The Gezi Protests were harshly crushed by the regime, and such a large-scale assertive citizenry act has not happened in Turkey since. Although the anti-regime dissent and the capacity of the assertive citizenship still exist, it cannot be realized without serious costs, due to the restrictions on rights.

In short, the AKP government's authoritarian policies have provided the grounds for non-AKP supporters to get engaged in active citizenship. Therefore, we hypothesize the following:

H5a: Diffuse support that emphasizes assertive citizenship is negatively associated with voting for the AKP.

H5b: The higher the level of satisfaction with the current level of democracy, the higher the probability of feeling closer to the AKP.

Table 2 below summarizes our hypotheses and displays the study numbers that the hypotheses are tested in.

[--- TABLE 2 GOES AROUND HERE ---]

Data and Methods

Using four representative samples, we adopt multiple empirical strategies for exploration and inference. In the first study, we utilize ISSP's Citizenship module II - 2015 data, which has multiple items on good citizenship and democracy; here, we start with an exploratory analysis to reveal the distinct notions of good citizenship and democracy. To this end, we use exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis to investigate the tenability of the theoretical dimensional structure of political culture in Turkey.⁵¹

The approach we adopt here has two assets on theoretical and empirical grounds. On theoretical grounds, we do not assume a uniform concept and look for the evidence for different notions of good citizenship and democracy to reflect political culture. On empirical grounds, confirmatory factor analysis helps minimize measurement error and the negative effect of multicollinearity. After discovering the distinct notions of citizenship and democracy, we test their effects on voting for the AKP in a series of logistic regression models.

In further analyses, we turn to data from PEW Global Attitudes for studies 2a & 3 and Comparative Election Studies 4 (CES) for study 2b. In all these studies, we proceed directly with logistic regression because the number of survey-items is limited. The outcome variable in studies 2a & 3 is feeling close to the AKP vs. other parties; in study 2b, the outcome variable is vote-recall (having voted for the AKP vs. any other party).

We use three samples from 2015 ($N_{\text{Study 1: ISSP}} = 1509$, $N_{\text{Study 2a: PEW}} = 947$, $N_{\text{Study 2b: CES}} = 1086$) and one sample from 2017 ($N_{\text{Study 3: PEW}} = 1050$). We report the sample characteristics of each study in Tables 2 - 5. All samples are similar in terms of gender, age-group, education, and household income. Descriptive statistics for the survey-items can be found in the Online Appendix.

Adopting a multi-sample strategy has at least three advantages. (1) We overcome possible sampling bias: although the samples are all nationally representative, there is no perfect sample and every sample has flaws when it comes to matching the population of interest. Therefore, using multiple representative samples decreases the chances of biased results. (2) We operationalize the constructs of interest in multiple ways, which improves the design. Our dependent variable is support for the AKP, which we operationalize as voting for the AKP vs. any other party (vote-recall) and feeling close to AKP vs. any other party. Thus, we have both attitude and behaviour as our outcome. The same is true for one of our main explanatory variables – having authoritarian tendencies. We operationalize and test this tendency's influence on support for the AKP in two ways. First, with a binary survey-item that asks whether respondents prefer a strong leader over a democratic government; second, with a survey-item (two years later) that asks whether it is good or bad to have an autocratic system in which a strong leader is free from the interference of parliament and judiciary. (3) We trace the relationship trend over time with samples from 2015 and 2017.

Results and Discussion

Study 1

In the first study, confirmatory factor analysis results reveal that there are three notions of being a good citizen in Turkish public opinion: an *active citizen*, a *dutiful citizen*, and a *helpful citizen*. *Active citizen* reflects political engagement by being socially and politically active and environment-friendly, as well as keeping an eye on government actions and trying to understand different opinions. *Dutiful citizen* is the notion of being a law-abiding, tax-paying, and voting citizen. *Helpful citizen* is being helpful to fellow citizens and non-citizens.

We also find that citizens in Turkey perceive democracy in two distinct ways. While one notion is about the *state's duties*, the second is about *civic political engagement*. The former reflects citizens' expectations of the state. The latter is the perception of civil society and how this entity can act. For example, this notion of democracy is about the importance attributed to showing discontent with civil disobedience and the importance given to abstaining from voting to protest. This notion of democracy influences the importance given to the idea of what qualifies people to exercise these democratic rights. Next, we used these discovered notions in two separate logistic regression models, together with variables on socio-demographics as controls. We used the normalized factor scores (range = 0-1) in the regression analyses. The results are displayed in Table 3.

[--- TABLE 3 GOES AROUND HERE ---]

We observe a negative effect of education and income in both models. These findings confirm some of the previous findings based on socio-demographics and economic voting models. Furthermore, women are more likely to vote for the AKP compared to men, which again confirms the latest findings in the literature.⁵² In 2015, the AKP still seems to be popular for women (especially those who are confined to the domestic sphere) due to its perceived performance in social services, economy, and democracy.

Among our main explanatory variables, the association between being an *active citizen* is negative and statistically significant. *Civic political engagement* has the same effect; however, the level of statistical significance is at 10 % ($p = .077$). These results confirm **H1**. Different notions of citizenship and democracy have different predictive effects on voting for the AKP. We did not find evidence to confirm **H4**. The notion that comes closest to a political culture that emphasizes voting duty is *dutiful citizenship*. Although this notion has a positive association with voting for the AKP, the relationship is not statistically significant.

To further interpret the results, we computed and plotted the marginal effects. Figure 1 displays the marginal effects of being an *active citizen* and adopting the *civic political engagement* notion of democracy on the probability of voting for the AKP. The average marginal effect of being an *active citizen* on the probability of voting for the AKP is 37 percentage points (confidence interval [CI]: $-.66 - -.08$). In other words, higher scores on being an *active citizen* are on average predicted to be 37 percentage points less likely to vote for the AKP than lower scores of being an active citizen; all control variables are held at their observed values.

[--- FIGURE 1 GOES AROUND HERE ---]

As for the effect of adopting the *civic political engagement* notion of democracy, the average marginal effect on the probability of voting for the AKP is 19 percentage points (CI: $-.40 - .02$); all control variables are held at their observed values. That means people with higher scores of this notion are on average predicted to be 19 percentage points less likely to vote for the AKP, compared to people with lower scores on this notion.

These results confirm **H5a**. The political culture that emphasizes assertive citizenship, which is related to the *civic political engagement*, negatively predicts voting for the AKP. However, we remain cautious here since the level of statistical significance is at the 10 % level.

Study 2a

Here, we predict another binary outcome: reporting feeling closer to the AKP vs. feeling closer to any other party. The first explanatory variable is binary: the choice of preferring either a democratic form of government or a strong leader to solve Turkey's problems. The second independent variable has ordered categories. The survey-item asks the level of satisfaction with the way democracy works in Turkey. The response categories are being not at all satisfied, not too satisfied, somewhat satisfied, and very satisfied. We have the same socio-demographic variables as the controls in the model. The results are displayed in Table 4.

[--- TABLE 4 GOES AROUND HERE ---]

Similar to the results in Study 1, having a university degree or higher is negatively associated with feeling closer to the governing party. Preferring a strong leader over parliamentary democracy is positively and significantly associated with feeling closer to the AKP. Additionally, all three categories of level of satisfaction with democracy have positive and significant associations, compared to the baseline category (not being at all satisfied with the way democracy works in Turkey).

We computed and plotted the marginal effects for this model as well to further interpret the results. Figure 2 displays the effects of the ordered independent variables on the probability of feeling closer to the AKP than any other party. People who express their preference for a strong leader over a democratic form of government to solve Turkey's problems are on average predicted to be 21 percentage points more likely to feel closer to the AKP (CI .10 – .31); all control variables are held at their observed values. This finding provides the first line of evidence for **H2**: preferring a strong leader is positively associated with voting for the governing party.

[--- FIGURE 2 GOES AROUND HERE ---]

On the other hand, being not too satisfied with the current level of democracy increases the probability of feeling closer to the AKP by 32 (CI .17 – .47) percentage points. Being somewhat satisfied with democracy increases the probability by 52 percentage points (CI .40 – .63). People who are very satisfied with the level of democracy are on average predicted to be 79 percentage points more likely to feel closer to the AKP, compared to those who are not satisfied at all with the democracy level in Turkey (CI .66 – .91); all control variables are held at their observed values. These findings provide evidence to *H5b*: higher levels of satisfaction with the level of democracy is associated with feeling close to the AKP. In other words, those who are not satisfied with the level of democracy in Turkey are less likely to feel close to the AKP.

Study 2b

This is the third sample from 2015 that includes vote-recall. We again have voting for the AKP vs. voting for any other party as the outcome variable; however, this time, we have only satisfaction with the level of democracy as the main predictor (besides the socio-demographics). Table 5 shows all the coefficients from the regression models. Figure 3 displays the effect of the main independent variable at the level of each ordered response category.

[--- TABLE 5 GOES AROUND HERE ---]

[--- FIGURE 3 GOES AROUND HERE ---]

In the full model that includes the socio-demographics and the main predictor, the strongest and statistically significant association is again between satisfaction with the level of democracy and voting for the AKP. Results from the marginal effects are also very similar to study 2a. Being not too satisfied increases the probability of voting for the AKP by 29

percentage points (CI .21 – .37). Being somewhat satisfied with the level of democracy increases the probability by 77 percentage points (CI .70 – .83). People who are very satisfied with the level of democracy are on average predicted to be 90 percentage points (CI .85 – .95) more likely to vote for the AKP, compared to those who are not satisfied at all with the democracy level in Turkey; all control variables are held at their observed values. This additional evidence provides further support to *H5*.

Study 3

In the final study, we use a sample from 2017 with the dependent variable being feeling close to AKP vs. any other party. With this study, we (1) trace the results over time; (2) test the effect of preferring a strong leader with a question that has four response categories (instead of two); and (3) test *H3*: preferring a stable and possibly not very democratic government over a democratic government with possible instability is positively associated with AKP support. Here, we also look for further evidence to confirm support for a strong leader with a question formulated as support for an autocratic system. Table 6 displays the results and Figure 4 shows the effects of attitudes toward autocracy at each level of the ordered response categories.

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Like in all previous studies, we observe the negative effect of education on AKP support. Results also reveal that backing a strong leader is still relevant for AKP support. Endorsing a political system in which a strong leader is free from parliament and judicial inference is positively associated with AKP support. However, we find no evidence that suggests preferring

a stable government with the risk of not being fully democratic over a democratic government with the risk of political instability is related to AKP support. Therefore, **H3** is unconfirmed.

Thinking an autocratic system is somewhat bad instead of very bad increases the probability of voting for the AKP by 23 (CI .12 – .33) percentage points. Evaluating autocracy as somewhat good increases the probability by 49 percentage points (CI .40 – .57). People who think autocracy is very good are on average predicted to be 50 percentage points more likely to feel closer to the AKP, compared to those who think autocracy is very bad (CI .41 – .59); all control variables are held at their observed values. These findings provide additional evidence to **H2**.

Implications

Overall, the results reveal the variety in diffuse support between the AKP and non-AKP voters on the political regime change. The high polarization level in Turkish politics manifests itself through diffuse political support: the heterogeneity in the notions of citizenship and democracy are significantly associated with political choices. Defining democracy based on *civic political engagement*, by attributing importance to self-expression or direct participation in politics, by signing petitions, attending protests, and engaging actions of civil disobedience predicts not voting for the AKP. In this sense, *civil political engagement* and *active citizenship* in non-AKP voters' diffuse support signal traces of civic culture and the presence of democratic notions. However, Turkey must still disseminate the democratic notions and strengthen them within society.

Those who favour a strong leader, prefer a stable government with the risk of not being democratic, and feel satisfied with the level of democracy in Turkey have a higher probability of feeling closer to or voting for the AKP. Preferring a strong leader to make important decisions on behalf of the electorate is an indicator of right-wing authoritarianism.⁵³ In this sense, it can be argued that AKP supporters juxtapose authoritarian elements and political culture; they tend

to delegate democracy to the political actors, rather than to civil society. In other words, those who support a strong leader perceive politics from a top-down approach. Moreover, since the AKP voters' notion of democracy is represented by the regime and reflected in the institutional design, i.e. presidentialism, one political camp in Turkey is satisfied with the current level of democracy. However, non-AKP supporters declare their preference for a parliamentary system and dissatisfaction with the AKP's performance on democracy.

Since we do not have panel data on diffuse support and regime legitimacy, we cannot make any conclusion regarding the effects of change or stability on the political culture in Turkey. However, it can be argued that the higher the polarization level in a political regime, the more likely one is to observe clashing political values within a society. In the absence of democratic state institutions and political parties, politics revolve around the hegemonic power struggles between the two political camps.

It is not the short-term reactions of the citizens to the low government performance that determines either the stability of the political regime or the regime legitimacy. On the contrary, the deep-seated values within the society and affective evaluations guide change at the system level. The results show that two political camps and their values in Turkey exist side by side and theoretically varieties of diffuse support for democracy within a society always pose a challenge for the hybrid regime stability. Turkey has not become a consolidated democracy due to the hegemonic dominance of the secular establishment at the system level.⁵⁴ One may propose that Turkey also cannot be turned into a resilient authoritarian regime due to the clashing norms of diffuse support for democracy, which needs to be tested empirically in another study.

The results of the relationship between diffuse support for democracy and the governing party support in Turkey brings up a new question: How dominant is diffuse support for democracy among the factions within Turkish society? A profile analysis of the voters can enable the researchers to make a solid claim on the prevalence of democratic political culture

orientations and make predictions on the possibility of a resilient authoritarian regime in Turkey. On a broader scale, further research based on diffuse support could examine the influence that the rising right-wing populist regimes and hybrid regimes have on the reshaping of political culture. It begs the question whether the rise of such regimes can be attributed to short- or mid-term responses to societal grievances on the global political, social, and economic conditions or if it is rather due to the long-term political value change.

Endnotes

1. Çavdar, “Islamist ‘New Thinking’”; Tezcür, “The Moderation Theory Revisited”; Somer, “Conquering versus Democratizing”.
2. Esmer, “Revolution, Evolution”.
3. Inglehart, *Culture Matters*, 96.
4. Inglehart, “How Solid is Mass Support”; Toros, “The Relationship”; Çiftçi, “Modernization, Islam?”
5. Tessler and Altınoğlu, “Democracy”.
6. Özbudun, “Turkey’s Judiciary”; Esen and Gümüşçü, “Rising Competitive Authoritarianism”.
7. Dalton and Welzel, “Political Culture”.
8. Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*.
9. Welzel and Inglehart, “Political Culture”.
10. Ibid.
11. Dalton and Welzel, 14.
12. Tessler and Gao, “Democracy”.
13. Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization* 248.
14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., 286.
16. Gibson and Duch, “Postmaterialism”.
17. Gibson, “Social Networks”.
18. Tessler and Gao, “Democracy”.
19. Turkey’s Freedom House Index scores had always been either 3 or 4 out of 7 in political rights (7 indicating the worst category). Civil liberties scores were always lower than political rights. These scores were consistent except the military intervention periods. Similarly, in the Polity IV dataset, Turkey had always been scored high in the regulation of participation and the competitiveness of participation until 2016.
20. Özbudun, “Turkey’s Judiciary”.
21. Esen and Gümüşçü, “Rising Competitive Authoritarianism”.
22. Dalton, *Democratic Challenges*.
23. Easton, “A Re-assessment”.
24. Teixeira, Tsatsanis and Belchior, “Support for Democracy”, 503.
25. Dalton, *Democratic Challenges*, 8.
26. Norris, *Democratic Deficit*.
27. Lipset, “Some Social Requisites”, 86-87.
28. Dahl, *Polyarchy*, 144.
29. Hybrid regimes are the regimes that are neither fully democratic nor authoritarian (see Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes”, and Levitsky and Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism”. Although we acknowledge that there are procedural differences between competitive authoritarian and hybrid regimes, the convention in political culture studies is to refer to the regime type as hybrid.

30. Çarkoğlu, “Macroeconomic”; Başlevent et al., “Party Preferences”; Başlevent and Kirmanoğlu, “Economic Voting”.

Although Çarkoğlu, “Economic Evaluations” argues the influence of economic evaluations has declined in 2011, and the ideology became the dominant factor in Turkey, Başlevent and Kirmanoğlu’s analysis of the 2014 electoral tendency survey reveals that economic factors (perceptions and expectations regarding the economy) have a significant impact on the party choice.

31. Daoust and Nadeau, “Context Matters”.

32. Mardin, “Center-Periphery”.

33. Çarkoğlu and Hinich, “A Spatial Analysis”.

34. KONDA. “Polarization”.

35. KONDA, “Analysis”.

36. Somer, “Moderation”, 260–261.

37. Başlevent, “Evidence in Polarization”; Somer, “Conquering versus Democratizing”.

38. Özsoy-Boyunsuz, “The AKP’s Proposal”; Aytac, Çarkoğlu and Yıldırım., “Taking Sides”.

39. Ibid.

40. Çiftçi, 1459.

41. We use assertive and active citizenry/citizenship interchangeably in this study.

42. Dalton and Welzel, 8.

43. Dalton, *Citizen Politics*.

44. Bikmen and Meydanoğlu, *Civil Society*.

45. İçduygu, Meydanoğlu and Sert, *Civil Society*.

46. Çakmaklı, “Rights and Obligations”.

47. Keyman and İçduygu, “Globalization”.

48. Ibid., 232.
49. Presidential Speeches.
50. Özel, “A Moment of Elation”, 7.
51. See Online Appendix.
52. Başlevent Kirmanoğlu and Şenatalar, “Party Preferences”; Gidengil and Karakoç, “Which Matters”.
53. Altemeyer, *Right-Wing*.
54. Somer, “Conquering versus Democratizing”.

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Table 1 Summary of the theoretical model and empirical model

Theoretical level	Independent Variable				Dependent Variable	
	<i>Diffuse Support</i>				<i>Support for the ruling party</i>	
	Study 1 (ISPP 2016)	Study 2a (PEW 2015)	Study 2b (CES 4 - 2015)	Study 3 (PEW 2017)	Study 1 + Study 2b	Study 2a + Study 3
Empirical level	Conceptions of good citizenship	Preferring a strong leader	Level of satisfaction with democracy	Endorsing a strong leader free of parliamentary and judicial interference	Voting for the AKP vs. any other party	Feeling closer to the AKP vs. any other party
	Conceptions of democracy	Level of satisfaction with democracy		Preferring a stable government over a democratic government		



Table 2 Summary of Hypotheses

Hypotheses tested in	Study 1	Study 2a	Study 2b	Study 3
H1 Differences in notions of citizenship & democracy have different predictive effects on voting for the AKP	X			
H2 Support for a strong leader is positively associated with AKP support		X		X
H3 A preference for a stable government over democracy is positively associated with AKP support				X
H4 AKP support is predicted by the diffuse support that emphasizes voting duty	X			
H5a A notion of assertive citizenship is negatively associated with voting for the AKP	X			
H5b Higher level of satisfaction with the level of democracy is positively associated with AKP support		X	X	

Table 3 Binary Logistic Regression Results from Study 1. Diffuse Support - Dimension 1: Support for Regime Principles and Values explaining Vote-Recall

<i>Dependent variable: Voting for the AKP</i>	Socio-demographics model				Citizenship model				Democracy model			
<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Log-Odds</i>	<i>std. Error</i>	<i>CI (95%)</i>	<i>P-Value</i>	<i>Log-Odds</i>	<i>std. Error</i>	<i>CI (95%)</i>	<i>P-Value</i>	<i>Log-Odds</i>	<i>std. Error</i>	<i>CI (95%)</i>	<i>P-Value</i>
Intercept	-0.20	0.38	-0.94 – 0.54	0.597	-1.02	0.63	-2.26 – 0.21	0.106	0.77	0.64	-0.48 – 2.04	0.232
Gender ^a	0.31	0.14	0.04 – 0.58	0.026	0.35	0.14	0.07 – 0.62	0.014	0.33	0.14	0.06 – 0.60	0.018
Age Group	0.01	0.01	-0.00 – 0.02	0.142	0.01	0.01	-0.00 – 0.02	0.126	0.01	0.01	-0.00 – 0.02	0.159
Mid-Level Income ^b	0.22	0.15	-0.08 – 0.52	0.147	0.21	0.15	-0.09 – 0.51	0.176	0.20	0.15	-0.10 – 0.50	0.202
High-Level Income	0.34	0.27	-0.19 – 0.87	0.209	0.32	0.27	-0.21 – 0.85	0.241	0.29	0.27	-0.24 – 0.82	0.288
Some primary school completed ^c	0.14	0.24	-0.34 – 0.61	0.570	0.09	0.24	-0.40 – 0.56	0.722	0.11	0.24	-0.37 – 0.58	0.653
Some high school completed	-0.21	0.26	-0.72 – 0.29	0.405	-0.27	0.26	-0.78 – 0.23	0.300	-0.23	0.26	-0.74 – 0.27	0.367
University degree & higher	-0.88	0.32	-1.51 – -0.27	0.005	-0.89	0.32	-1.51 – -0.27	0.005	-0.86	0.32	-1.49 – -0.24	0.007
Helpful Citizen					1.16	0.88	-0.57 – 2.90	0.190				
Dutiful Citizen					1.23	0.99	-0.70 – 3.18	0.212				
Active Citizen					-1.59	0.64	-2.86 – -0.35	0.013				
State's Duties									-0.36	0.69	-1.72 – 0.99	0.605
Political Civic Engagement									-0.80	0.45	-1.69 – 0.08	0.077
Observations	956				954				955			
Nagelkerke's R ²	0.046				0.059				0.054			

^a Base category is male; ^b Base category is low-level income < 1500TL; ^c Base category is no formal education



Note: All other variables held at their observed values

Source: ISSP Citizenship Module II

Figure 1

Table 4 Binary Logistic Regression Results from Study 2a. Diffuse Support – Dimension 2: Evaluation of Regime Performance explaining Governing Party Support

<i>Dependent variable: Feeling Close to AKP</i>	Socio-demographics model				Full model			
<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Log-Odds</i>	<i>std. Error</i>	<i>CI (95%)</i>	<i>P-Value</i>	<i>Log-Odds</i>	<i>std. Error</i>	<i>CI (95%)</i>	<i>P-Value</i>
Intercept	0.31	0.70	-1.05 – 1.71	0.654	-3.02	1.13	-5.44 – -0.91	0.008
Gender ^a	-0.01	0.25	-0.50 – 0.48	0.965	0.01	0.31	-0.60 – 0.63	0.967
Age Group	-0.00	0.01	-0.02 – 0.02	0.927	-0.01	0.01	-0.04 – 0.01	0.434
Medium-level Income ^b	0.31	0.29	-0.26 – 0.88	0.291	0.21	0.35	-0.48 – 0.89	0.550
High-level Income	0.33	0.35	-0.37 – 1.03	0.358	-0.23	0.45	-1.13 – 0.65	0.606
Some primary school completed ^c	-0.03	0.48	-1.00 – 0.90	0.944	0.12	0.63	-1.15 – 1.35	0.853
Some high school completed	-0.73	0.51	-1.74 – 0.25	0.151	-0.24	0.66	-1.55 – 1.05	0.715
University degree & higher	-1.33	0.60	-2.53 – -0.18	0.026	-1.00	0.77	-2.54 – 0.51	0.198
Preferring a strong leader (Authoritarianism) ^d					1.29	0.34	0.63 – 1.97	<0.001
Being not too satisfied with the way democracy is working in TR ^e					2.51	0.80	1.14 – 4.41	0.002
Being somewhat satisfied with the way democracy is working in TR					3.42	0.76	2.16 – 5.27	<0.001
Being very satisfied with the way democracy is working in TR					4.91	0.83	3.47 – 6.87	<0.001
Observations	296				294			
Nagelkerke's R ²	0.068				0.49			

^a Base category is male; ^b Base category is low-level income < 1000TL; ^c Base category is no formal education; ^d compared to preferring a democratic form of government;

^e Base category is being not at all satisfied with the way democracy is working in TR




Figure 2

Table 5 Binary Logistic Regression Results from Study 2b Diffuse Support – Dimension 2: Evaluation of Regime Performance explaining Vote Recall

<i>Dependent variable: Voting for the AKP</i>		Socio-demographics model				Full model			
<i>Coefficient</i>		<i>Log-Odds</i>	<i>std. Error</i>	<i>CI (95%)</i>	<i>P-Value</i>	<i>Log-Odds</i>	<i>std. Error</i>	<i>CI (95%)</i>	<i>P-Value</i>
Intercept		0.27	0.43	-0.58 – 1.12	0.534	-2.48	0.69	-3.87 – -1.15	<0.001
Gender ^a		0.49	0.15	0.19 – 0.79	0.002	0.39	0.22	-0.04 – 0.83	0.076
Age		-0.01	0.01	-0.02 – -0.00	0.040	-0.01	0.01	-0.02 – 0.01	0.416
Medium-level Income ^b		-0.15	0.18	-0.49 – 0.20	0.398	-0.29	0.25	-0.78 – 0.20	0.253
High-level Income		-0.31	0.22	-0.75 – 0.11	0.151	-0.63	0.32	-1.25 – -0.01	0.049
Some primary school completed ^c		0.29	0.29	-0.27 – 0.86	0.310	0.78	0.43	-0.05 – 1.63	0.068
Some high school completed		-0.28	0.31	-0.88 – 0.33	0.366	0.16	0.46	-0.74 – 1.07	0.735
University degree & higher		-0.79	0.38	-1.55 – -0.04	0.039	-0.12	0.57	-1.24 – 1.00	0.828
Being not too satisfied with the way democracy is working in TR ^d						1.94	0.28	1.41 – 2.50	<0.001
Being somewhat satisfied with the way democracy is working in TR						4.30	0.31	3.72 – 4.93	<0.001
Being very satisfied with the way democracy is working in TR						6.59	1.04	4.99 – 9.49	<0.001
Observations		744				728			
Nagelkerke's R ²		0.068				0.62			

^a Base category is male; ^b Base category is low-level income (lowest + second quintile); ^c Base category is no formal education; ^d Base category is being not at all satisfied with the way democracy is working in TR




Figure 3


Table 6 Binary Logistic Regression Results from Study 3 Diffuse Support – Dimension 2: Evaluation of Regime Performance explaining Governing Party Support

<i>Dependent variable: Feeling Close to AKP</i>		Socio-demographics model			Full model			
<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Log-Odds</i>	<i>std. Error</i>	<i>CI (95%)</i>	<i>P-Value</i>	<i>Log-Odds</i>	<i>std. Error</i>	<i>CI (95%)</i>	<i>P-Value</i>
Intercept	3.17	0.71	1.90 – 4.75	<0.001	1.59	0.80	0.10 – 3.31	0.048
Gender ^a	-0.21	0.15	-0.50 – 0.08	0.155	-0.15	0.18	-0.51 – 0.20	0.403
Age	-0.01	0.01	-0.02 – 0.00	0.079	-0.01	0.01	-0.03 – 0.00	0.083
Medium-level Income ^b	0.19	0.17	-0.15 – 0.54	0.267	0.01	0.21	-0.41 – 0.43	0.966
High-level Income	-0.05	0.22	-0.48 – 0.39	0.835	0.03	0.27	-0.51 – 0.56	0.921
Some primary school completed ^c	-2.13	0.62	-3.58 – -1.06	0.001	-1.56	0.67	-3.08 – -0.37	0.020
Some high school completed	-2.80	0.64	-4.27 – -1.69	<0.001	-2.50	0.69	-4.04 – -1.27	<0.001
University degree & higher	-3.28	0.66	-4.78 – -2.13	<0.001	-2.85	0.71	-4.43 – -1.56	<0.001
Preferring a stable government with risk of not being fully democratic ^d					0.14	0.19	-0.23 – 0.50	0.464
Autocracy Somewhat Bad ^e					1.07	0.25	0.58 – 1.57	<0.001
Autocracy Somewhat Good					2.28	0.24	1.81 – 2.76	<0.001
Autocracy Very Good					2.36	0.26	1.86 – 2.88	<0.001
Observations	797				693			
Nagelkerke's R ²	0.09				0.33			

^a Base category is male; ^b Base category is low-level income < 1000TL; ^c Base category is no formal education; ^d compared to preferring a democratic government with risk of political instability ^e Base category is thinking autocracy is very bad

Probability of feeling closer to AKP by Supporting Autocracy

Note: All other variables held at their mean values



Source: Pew Global Attitudes 2017

Figure 4

Appendix:

Descriptive Statistics:

Survey-Items from Study 1: ISSP's Citizenship II Module 2015		
Abbreviations		Mean(SD)
	<i>There are different opinions as to what it takes to be a good citizen. As far as you are concerned personally on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is not at all important and 7 is very important, how important is it:</i>	
AIV	Always to vote in elections	6.55(1.04)
NvT	Never to try to evade taxes	6.56(0.90)
ObL	Always to obey laws and regulations	6.41(1.02)
WAG	To keep watch on the actions of government	5.82(1.50)
ASP	To be active in social or political associations	5.27(1.80)
URO	To try to understand the reasoning of people with other opinions	5.87(1.33)
EnF	To choose products for political, ethical or environmental reasons, even if they cost a bit more.	5.73(1.44)
HLC	To help people in Turkey who are worse off than yourself	6.35(1.05)
HLW	To help people in the rest of the world who are worse off than yourself	5.98(1.44)
	<i>There are different opinions about people's rights in a democracy. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is not at all important and 7 is very important, how important is it:</i>	
SSL	That all citizens have an adequate standard of living	6.59(0.90)
GPM	That government authorities respect and protect the rights of minorities	6.37(1.07)
PPD	That people be given more opportunities to participate in public decision-making	6.30(1.06)
CvD	That citizens may engage in acts of civil disobedience when they oppose government actions	5.38(1.72)
GRD	That governments respect democratic rights whatever the circumstances	6.26(1.15)
PLC	That people convicted of serious crimes lose their citizen rights	5.19(1.91)
LTR	That long-term residents of a country, who are not citizens, have the right to vote in that country's national elections	5.07(2.06)
CtV	That citizens have the right not to vote	5.96(1.56)
HIC	That health care be provided for everyone	6.66(0.84)

Study 2a: PEW Global Attitudes 2015				
Cross-Tabulation: feeling close to AKP vs. any other party & preferring a strong leader over a democratic government				
Some feel that we should rely on a democratic form of government to solve our country's problems. Others feel that we should rely on a leader with a strong hand to solve our country's problems. Which comes closer to your opinion?	Feeling Close to any other Party	Feeling Close to the AKP	Missing	Total
Democratic form of government	37.08% (211)	17.93% (102)	44.99% (256)	100.00% (569)
Strong leader	19.00% (61)	46.42% (149)	34.58% (111)	100.00% (321)
Missing	19.30% (11)	14.04% (8)	66.67% (38)	100.00% (57)
Total	29.88% (283)	27.35% (259)	42.77% (405)	100.00% (947)


Study 2a: PEW Global Attitudes 2015 Cross-Tabulation: feeling close to AKP vs. any other party & level of satisfaction with democracy				
How satisfied are you with the way democracy is working in our country?	Feeling Close to any other Party	Feeling Close to the AKP	Missing	Total
Not at all satisfied	72.62% (305)	6.67% (28)	20.71% (87)	100.00% (420)
Not too satisfied	46.71% (135)	25.95% (75)	27.34% (79)	100.00% (289)
Somewhat satisfied	11.87% (33)	73.02% (203)	15.11% (42)	100.00% (278)
Very satisfied	1.49% (1)	92.54% (62)	5.97% (4)	100.00% (67)
Missing	18.75% (6)	50.00% (16)	31.25% (10)	100.00% (32)
Total	44.20% (480)	35.36% (384)	20.44% (222)	100.00% (1086)

Study 2b: comparative Election Studies 4 2015 Cross-Tabulation: voting for AKP vs. any other party & level of satisfaction with democracy				
How satisfied are you with the way democracy is working in our country?	Non AKP voter	AKP voter	Missing	Total
Not at all satisfied	72.62% (305)	6.67% (28)	20.71% (87)	100.00% (420)
Not too satisfied	46.71% (135)	25.95% (75)	27.34% (79)	100.00% (289)
Somewhat satisfied	11.87% (33)	73.02% (203)	15.11% (42)	100.00% (278)
Very satisfied	1.49% (1)	92.54% (62)	5.97% (4)	100.00% (67)
Missing	18.75% (6)	50.00% (16)	31.25% (10)	100.00% (32)
Total	44.20% (480)	35.36% (384)	20.44% (222)	100.00% (1086)

Study 3: PEW Global Attitudes 2017 Cross-Tabulation: feeling close to AKP vs. any other party & preferring a stable government with risk of not being fully democratic over a democratic government with potential instability				
Which is more important to you? That Turkey has a democratic government, even if there is some risk of political instability OR that Turkey has a stable government, even if there is a risk that it will not be fully democratic	Feeling Close to any other Party	Feeling Close to the AKP	Missing	Total
Democratic government with risk of political instability	40.79% (228)	38.82% (217)	20.39% (114)	100.00% (559)
Stable government with risk that it will not be fully democratic	30.86% (108)	56.00% (196)	13.14% (46)	100.00% (350)
Missing	37.59% (53)	35.46% (50)	26.95% (38)	100.00% (141)
Total	37.05% (389)	44.10% (463)	18.86% (198)	100.00% (1050)

Study 3: PEW Global Attitudes 2017 Cross-Tabulation: feeling close to AKP vs. any other party & supporting an autocratic political system				
I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing our country. For each one, would it be a very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad way of governing this country? A system in which a strong leader can make decisions without interference from parliament or the courts	Feeling Close to any other Party	Feeling Close to the AKP	Missing	Total
Very bad	59.73% (218)	20.55% (75)	19.73% (72)	100.00% (365)
Somewhat bad	34.87% (68)	35.38% (69)	29.74% (58)	100.00% (195)
Somewhat good	21.28% (50)	65.11% (153)	13.62% (32)	100.00% (235)
Very good	19.17% (37)	73.58% (142)	7.25% (14)	100.00% (193)
Missing	25.81% (16)	38.71% (24)	35.48% (22)	100.00% (62)
Total	37.05% (389)	44.10% (463)	18.86% (198)	100.00% (1050)

Sample Characteristics:










Source: ISSP Citizenship Module 3

<https://www.gesis.org/issp/modules/issp-modules-by-topic/citizenship/2014/>

Data Collection: 2015

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









Source: Pew Global Attitudes 2015

<https://www.pewresearch.org/global/datasets/2015/>

Data Collection: 2015

Sample characteristics in Study 2b










Source: Comparative Election Studies 4 2015

<https://ceses.org/data-download/module-4-2011-2016/>

Data Collection: 2015

Sample characteristics in Study 3



Source: Pew Global Attitudes 2017


<https://www.pewresearch.org/global/dataset/spring-2017-survey-data/>

Data Collection: 2017

Exploratory analyses:


We adopted the following procedure while conducting our exploratory analyses. In the first step, to decide on the number of factors to retain, we ran parallel analysis [PA]¹, very simple structure analysis [VSS]² and exploratory factor analysis [EFA] on the theoretical constructs' (conceptions of good citizenship & conceptions of democracy) items separately. In the second step, we fitted confirmatory factor analyses [CFA] models and compared solutions with two and three factors. In the CFAs, we included the whole sample and used the robust maximum likelihood estimator with the full information maximum likelihood to account for the missing data³. We chose the CFA model with the better goodness of fit statistics. We adopted the guidelines suggested in Kline, "Principles and Practice of SEM" to assess the goodness of fit statistics of the models.⁴

Conceptions of good citizenship:



Parallel analysis [PA] suggests 3 factors. The very simple structure [VSS] shows that the explanatory gain decreases by adding more number of factors, however judging by RMSEA and eBIC 2 or 3 factor solutions are likely. The goodness of fit statistics of a two-factor exploratory

factor analysis solution is worse than a three-factor EFA solution. Given the results, we test confirmatory factor solutions with two and three latent constructs.



Goodness of fit statistics, N=1509			
Missingness patterns: 41			
	One-Factor	Two-Factors	Three-Factors
Robust χ^2 (df)	428.128*** (27)	263.531*** (26)	146.308*** (24)
Robust CFI	.779	.880	.939
Robust TLI	.706	.833	.909
Robust RMSEA (90 % CI)	.140*** (.129-.152)	.105*** (.094-.117)	.078* (.066-.090)
SRMR	.075	.054	.040
df = degrees of freedom; CFI = comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; CI = confidence intervals; SRMR = standardized root mean square residual			
All the factor loadings are *** p < .001			


	Df	AIC	BIC	χ^2	$\Delta\chi^2$	ΔDf	p-value	
Two-Factors	26	34617	34766	482.78	97.946	2	***	Significantly worse than model with three-factors
Three-Factors	24	34401	34561	263.01				

On empirical grounds, the goodness of fit statistics for the three-factor CFA is significantly better than two and one factor CFAs. On theoretical grounds, the three-factor CFA makes more sense than two. Factor one is influencing the responses to the items about a good citizen emphasizing the importance of helpfulness; we label this latent construct as the *helpful citizen*. Factor two is influencing the items on the importance given to paying taxes, always voting, and obeying the laws; we label this latent construct the *dutiful citizen*. The final factor is influencing the responses to items asking the importance of being active socially and politically, watching the actions of the


government, being environment-friendly, and understanding the reasoning of others; we label this latent construct as the *active citizen*.

We think these latent constructs reflect the latent attitudes and orientations of the general population in Turkey. The reliabilities of these latent constructs are acceptable. We report the reliabilities as McDonald's (1999) omega (ω).⁵ Omega total is .86; ω Helpful citizen: .72; ω Dutiful citizen: .69; ω Active citizen: .76.


After we decided on the measurement model, we computed the factor scores of the discovered latent constructs. Since there is uncertainty in the factor scores (Devlieger and Rosseel 2017; Estabrook and Neale 2013; Grice 2001), we made them range between 0 and 1 before using the scores in the logistic regressions. Below we show the ridge plots of the factor scores by vote recall.



Conceptions of democracy:



All the heuristics we explain above applies here as well. PA of the items on democracy suggests three factors. The very simple structure VSS shows that the explanatory gain decreases by adding more number of factors, however judging by RMSEA and eBIC a 2-factor solutions is very likely. The goodness of fit statistics of a two-factor EFA solution is worse than a three-factor EFA solution. Given the results, again, we test confirmatory factor solutions with two and three latent constructs.



Goodness of fit statistics, N=1509			
Missingness patterns: 76			
	One-Factor	Two-Factors	Three-Factors
Robust χ^2 (df)	400.865*** (27)	203.513*** (26)	218.707*** (24)
Robust CFI	.782	.903	.894
Robust TLI	.709	.865	.841
Robust RMSEA (90 % CI)	.128*** (.117-.139)	.087*** (.076-.098)	.095*** (.083-.106)
SRMR	.087	.063	.071
df = degrees of freedom; CFI = comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; CI = confidence intervals; SRMR = standardized root mean square residual			
All the factor loadings are *** p < .001			

	Df	AIC	BIC	χ^2	$\Delta\chi^2$	ΔDf	p-value	
Two-Factors	26	33746	33933	339.19			Not significant	Not significantly worse than model with three-factors
Three-Factors	24	33773	33895	362.61	-13.217	2		


On empirical grounds, the goodness of fit statistics for the two-factor CFA is the most acceptable.

On theoretical grounds, the two-factor CFA makes more sense as well. Factor one is influencing the items that have got something to do with state's duties towards its citizens in a democracy.

Here, the items are the importance given to government protecting minority rights, people being involved in public decision-making, all citizens having an adequate standard of living, the government respecting democratic rights under any circumstances, and health care being provided to everyone. We label this latent construct *state's duties*. The other latent construct is

influencing the items about the importance of long-term residents being able to vote, people convicted of serious crimes losing their citizenship, civil disobedience, and having the right not to vote. In our opinion, this latent construct reflects a civic political engagement strategy. How civil society should be able to interact with the state and what are the rights of this entity are. Thus, we label this construct as *political civic engagement*.

Again, we think these constructs on democracy are the latent attitudes and orientations of the Turkish public. Omega total for the measurement model is .78; ω State's Duties : .72; ω Political Civic Engagement: .68. The ridge plots of the factor scores are displayed below.



Marginal Effects Tables:

Study 1: ISSP's Citizenship II Module 2015 – Citizenship Model						
<i>factor</i>	<i>AME</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>lower</i>	<i>upper</i>
Active Citizen	-0.375	0.149	-2.526	0.012	-0.666	-0.084
Age Group	0.002	0.001	1.536	0.124	-0.001	0.004
Some primary school completed	-0.064	0.061	-1.050	0.294	-0.184	0.056
Some high school completed	0.020	0.057	0.354	0.724	-0.092	0.132
University degree & higher	-0.214	0.075	-2.869	0.004	-0.360	-0.068
Dutiful Citizen	0.291	0.232	1.252	0.210	-0.164	0.745
Gender	0.082	0.033	2.474	0.013	0.017	0.146
Mid-Level Income	0.073	0.061	1.202	0.230	-0.046	0.193
High-Level Income	0.049	0.036	1.367	0.171	-0.021	0.119
Helpful Citizen	0.273	0.207	1.316	0.188	-0.133	0.679

Study 1: ISSP's Citizenship II Module 2015 – Democracy Model						
<i>factor</i>	<i>AME</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>lower</i>	<i>upper</i>
Age Group	0.002	0.001	1.415	0.157	-0.001	0.004
Some primary school completed	-0.056	0.061	-0.911	0.362	-0.176	0.064
Some high school completed	0.026	0.057	0.446	0.655	-0.087	0.138
University degree & higher	-0.208	0.075	-2.777	0.005	-0.355	-0.061
Political Civic Engagement	-0.189	0.106	-1.777	0.076	-0.398	0.019
State's Duties	-0.084	0.163	-0.518	0.605	-0.404	0.235
Gender	0.078	0.033	2.368	0.018	0.013	0.143
Mid-Level Income	0.067	0.062	1.085	0.278	-0.054	0.188
High-Level Income	0.046	0.036	1.286	0.198	-0.024	0.116

Study 2a: PEW Global Attitudes 2015						
<i>factor</i>	<i>AME</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>lower</i>	<i>upper</i>
Age Group	- 0.002	0.002	-0.786	0.432	- 0.005	0.002
Some high school completed	- 0.037	0.101	-0.368	0.713	- 0.236	0.161
Some primary school completed	0.018	0.097	0.185	0.853	- 0.172	0.208
University degree & higher	- 0.156	0.119	-1.313	0.189	- 0.389	0.077
Preferring a strong leader	0.208	0.053	3.893	0.000	0.103	0.312
Gender	0.002	0.048	0.042	0.967	- 0.092	0.096
High-Level Income	- 0.036	0.070	-0.518	0.605	- 0.173	0.101
Mid-Level Income	0.032	0.053	0.595	0.552	- 0.073	0.136
Being not too satisfied with the way democracy is working in TR e	0.317	0.076	4.171	0.000	0.168	0.465
Being somewhat satisfied with the way democracy is working in TR	0.517	0.058	8.927	0.000	0.404	0.631
Being very satisfied with the way democracy is working in TR	0.786	0.064	12.307	0.000	0.661	0.911

Study 2b: comparative Election Studies 4 2015						
<i>factor</i>	<i>AME</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>lower</i>	<i>upper</i>
Age Group	- 0.001	0.001	-0.814	0.416	- 0.003	0.001
Some high school completed	0.018	0.053	0.341	0.733	- 0.085	0.121
Some primary school completed	0.093	0.049	1.888	0.059	- 0.004	0.189
University degree & higher	- 0.014	0.065	-0.217	0.828	- 0.141	0.113
Gender	0.047	0.027	1.760	0.078	- 0.005	0.100
High-Level Income	- 0.073	0.037	-1.997	0.046	- 0.145	- 0.001
Mid-Level Income	- 0.034	0.030	-1.146	0.252	- 0.092	0.024
Being not too satisfied with the way democracy is working in TR e	0.288	0.039	7.332	0.000	0.211	0.365
Being somewhat satisfied with the way democracy is working in TR	0.765	0.031	24.697	0.000	0.704	0.826
Being very satisfied with the way democracy is working in TR	0.898	0.025	36.088	0.000	0.849	0.946

Study 3: PEW Global Attitudes 2017						
<i>factor</i>	<i>AME</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>lower</i>	<i>upper</i>
Age Group	- 0.002	0.001	-1.744	0.081	- 0.005	0.000
Some high school completed	- 0.389	0.069	-5.620	0.000	- 0.525	- 0.254
Some primary school completed	- 0.216	0.068	-3.159	0.002	- 0.350	- 0.082
University degree & higher	- 0.457	0.078	-5.838	0.000	- 0.610	- 0.303
Preferring a Stable Government with Risk of not being Fully Democratic	0.025	0.034	0.728	0.467	- 0.042	0.093
Gender	- 0.028	0.033	-0.835	0.404	- 0.092	0.037
High-Level Income	0.005	0.050	0.099	0.921	- 0.092	0.102
Mid-Level Income	0.002	0.039	0.043	0.966	- 0.075	0.078
Autocracy Somewhat Bad	0.228	0.054	4.249	0.000	0.123	0.333
Autocracy Somewhat Good	0.488	0.043	11.368	0.000	0.404	0.572
Autocracy Very Good	0.501	0.046	10.951	0.000	0.412	0.591

Endnotes

¹ Horn, “A rationale and test”.

² Revelle and Condon, “Reliability from alpha to omega”.

³ Graham, “Adding missing-data-relevant variables”.

⁴ Likelihood Ratio χ^2 (baseline vs saturated models): good fit indicated by p-value > .05 (sample size sensitive, hard to achieve with large *N*);

CFI & TLI: good fit indicated by > .95, .90 is acceptable;

RMSEA: good fit indicated by < .05, adequate fit is between .05 & .08, p-value > .05;

SRMR: good fit indicated by < .06.

⁵ McDonald, R.P. “*Test theory : a unified treatment*”. Similar to Cronbach’s alpha, higher omegas correspond to higher reliabilities; values exceeding .8 indicate good reliability: Crutzen and Peters "Scale quality"; Revelle and Condon "Reliability from alpha to omega" ; Zinbarg et al., "Cronbach's alpha".

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