/
conn.go
1310 lines (1164 loc) · 37 KB
/
conn.go
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// Copyright (c) 2019 The BFE Authors.
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// TLS low level connection and record layer
package bfe_tls
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/cipher"
"crypto/subtle"
"crypto/x509"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"sync"
"time"
)
type ConnParam interface {
// Get virtual ip for current conn
GetVip() net.IP
}
// A Conn represents a secured connection.
// It implements the net.Conn interface.
type Conn struct {
// constant
conn net.Conn
isClient bool
// constant after initial
param ConnParam
// constant after handshake; protected by handshakeMutex
handshakeMutex sync.Mutex // handshakeMutex < in.Mutex, out.Mutex, errMutex
handshakeErr error // error resulting from handshake
vers uint16 // TLS version
haveVers bool // version has been negotiated
config *Config // configuration passed to constructor
handshakeTime time.Duration // TLS handshake time
handshakeComplete bool
didResume bool // whether this connection was a session resumption
cipherSuite uint16
ocspStaple bool // use ocsp stapling (in server side)
ocspResponse []byte // stapled OCSP response
peerCertificates []*x509.Certificate
// verifiedChains contains the certificate chains that we built, as
// opposed to the ones presented by the server.
verifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate
// serverName contains the server name indicated by the client, if any.
serverName string
grade string // tls security grade, usually is "A", "B", "C"
clientAuth ClientAuthType // tls client auth type
clientCAs *x509.CertPool
clientCAName string // tls client CA name
clientCRLPool *CRLPool // tls client CRL pool
enableDynamicRecord bool // enable dynamic record size or not
clientRandom []byte // random in client hello msg
serverRandom []byte // random in server hello msg
masterSecret []byte // master secret for conn
clientCiphers []uint16 // ciphers supported by client
ja3Raw string // JA3 fingerprint string for TLS Client
ja3Hash string // JA3 fingerprint hash for TLS Client
clientProtocol string
clientProtocolFallback bool
// input/output
in, out halfConn // in.Mutex < out.Mutex
rawInput *block // raw input, right off the wire
input *block // application data waiting to be read
hand bytes.Buffer // handshake data waiting to be read
// total bytes of application data sent recently
// byteOut will be reset to zero after inactivity
byteOut int
//readFromUntilLen len
readFromUntilLen int
// finish time of last writeRecord()
lastOut time.Time
tmp [16]byte
// for sslv2 client hello
sslv2Data []byte
}
// Access to net.Conn methods.
// Cannot just embed net.Conn because that would
// export the struct field too.
// LocalAddr returns the local network address.
func (c *Conn) LocalAddr() net.Addr {
return c.conn.LocalAddr()
}
// RemoteAddr returns the remote network address.
func (c *Conn) RemoteAddr() net.Addr {
return c.conn.RemoteAddr()
}
// GetNetConn returns the underlying connection.
func (c *Conn) GetNetConn() net.Conn {
return c.conn
}
// GetVip return the vip for underlying connection.
func (c *Conn) GetVip() net.IP {
if c.param == nil {
return nil
}
return c.param.GetVip()
}
// GetServerName returns server name indicated by the client, if any.
func (c *Conn) GetServerName() string {
return c.serverName
}
func (c *Conn) SetConnParam(param ConnParam) {
c.param = param
}
// SetDeadline sets the read and write deadlines associated with the connection.
// A zero value for t means Read and Write will not time out.
// After a Write has timed out, the TLS state is corrupt and all future writes will return the same error.
func (c *Conn) SetDeadline(t time.Time) error {
return c.conn.SetDeadline(t)
}
// SetReadDeadline sets the read deadline on the underlying connection.
// A zero value for t means Read will not time out.
func (c *Conn) SetReadDeadline(t time.Time) error {
return c.conn.SetReadDeadline(t)
}
// SetWriteDeadline sets the write deadline on the underlying connection.
// A zero value for t means Write will not time out.
// After a Write has timed out, the TLS state is corrupt and all future writes will return the same error.
func (c *Conn) SetWriteDeadline(t time.Time) error {
return c.conn.SetWriteDeadline(t)
}
func (c *Conn) getClientCAs() *x509.CertPool {
clientCAs := c.config.ClientCAs
if c.clientCAs != nil {
clientCAs = c.clientCAs
}
return clientCAs
}
// A halfConn represents one direction of the record layer
// connection, either sending or receiving.
type halfConn struct {
sync.Mutex
err error // first permanent error
version uint16 // protocol version
cipher interface{} // cipher algorithm
mac macFunction
seq [8]byte // 64-bit sequence number
bfree *block // list of free blocks
nextCipher interface{} // next encryption state
nextMac macFunction // next MAC algorithm
// used to save allocating a new buffer for each MAC.
inDigestBuf, outDigestBuf []byte
}
func (hc *halfConn) setErrorLocked(err error) error {
hc.err = err
return err
}
func (hc *halfConn) error() error {
hc.Lock()
err := hc.err
hc.Unlock()
return err
}
// prepareCipherSpec sets the encryption and MAC states
// that a subsequent changeCipherSpec will use.
func (hc *halfConn) prepareCipherSpec(version uint16, cipher interface{}, mac macFunction) {
hc.version = version
hc.nextCipher = cipher
hc.nextMac = mac
}
// changeCipherSpec changes the encryption and MAC states
// to the ones previously passed to prepareCipherSpec.
func (hc *halfConn) changeCipherSpec() error {
if hc.nextCipher == nil {
return alertInternalError
}
hc.cipher = hc.nextCipher
hc.mac = hc.nextMac
hc.nextCipher = nil
hc.nextMac = nil
for i := range hc.seq {
hc.seq[i] = 0
}
return nil
}
// incSeq increments the sequence number.
func (hc *halfConn) incSeq() {
for i := 7; i >= 0; i-- {
hc.seq[i]++
if hc.seq[i] != 0 {
return
}
}
// Not allowed to let sequence number wrap.
// Instead, must renegotiate before it does.
// Not likely enough to bother.
panic("TLS: sequence number wraparound")
}
// resetSeq resets the sequence number to zero.
func (hc *halfConn) resetSeq() {
for i := range hc.seq {
hc.seq[i] = 0
}
}
// removePadding returns an unpadded slice, in constant time, which is a prefix
// of the input. It also returns a byte which is equal to 255 if the padding
// was valid and 0 otherwise. See RFC 2246, section 6.2.3.2
func removePadding(payload []byte) ([]byte, byte) {
if len(payload) < 1 {
return payload, 0
}
paddingLen := payload[len(payload)-1]
t := uint(len(payload)-1) - uint(paddingLen)
// if len(payload) >= (paddingLen - 1) then the MSB of t is zero
good := byte(int32(^t) >> 31)
toCheck := 255 // the maximum possible padding length
// The length of the padded data is public, so we can use an if here
if toCheck+1 > len(payload) {
toCheck = len(payload) - 1
}
for i := 0; i < toCheck; i++ {
t := uint(paddingLen) - uint(i)
// if i <= paddingLen then the MSB of t is zero
mask := byte(int32(^t) >> 31)
b := payload[len(payload)-1-i]
good &^= mask&paddingLen ^ mask&b
}
// We AND together the bits of good and replicate the result across
// all the bits.
good &= good << 4
good &= good << 2
good &= good << 1
good = uint8(int8(good) >> 7)
toRemove := good&paddingLen + 1
return payload[:len(payload)-int(toRemove)], good
}
// removePaddingSSL30 is a replacement for removePadding in the case that the
// protocol version is SSLv3. In this version, the contents of the padding
// are random and cannot be checked.
func removePaddingSSL30(payload []byte) ([]byte, byte) {
if len(payload) < 1 {
return payload, 0
}
paddingLen := int(payload[len(payload)-1]) + 1
if paddingLen > len(payload) {
return payload, 0
}
return payload[:len(payload)-paddingLen], 255
}
func roundUp(a, b int) int {
return a + (b-a%b)%b
}
// cbcMode is an interface for block ciphers using cipher block chaining.
type cbcMode interface {
cipher.BlockMode
SetIV([]byte)
}
// decrypt checks and strips the mac and decrypts the data in b. Returns a
// success boolean, the number of bytes to skip from the start of the record in
// order to get the application payload, and an optional alert value.
func (hc *halfConn) decrypt(b *block) (ok bool, prefixLen int, alertValue alert) {
// pull out payload
payload := b.data[recordHeaderLen:]
macSize := 0
if hc.mac != nil {
macSize = hc.mac.Size()
}
paddingGood := byte(255)
explicitIVLen := 0
// decrypt
if hc.cipher != nil {
switch c := hc.cipher.(type) {
case cipher.Stream:
c.XORKeyStream(payload, payload)
case aead:
explicitIVLen = c.explicitNonceLen()
if len(payload) < explicitIVLen {
return false, 0, alertBadRecordMAC
}
nonce := payload[:explicitIVLen]
payload = payload[explicitIVLen:]
if len(nonce) == 0 {
nonce = hc.seq[:]
}
var additionalData [13]byte
copy(additionalData[:], hc.seq[:])
copy(additionalData[8:], b.data[:3])
n := len(payload) - c.Overhead()
additionalData[11] = byte(n >> 8)
additionalData[12] = byte(n)
var err error
payload, err = c.Open(payload[:0], nonce, payload, additionalData[:])
if err != nil {
return false, 0, alertBadRecordMAC
}
b.resize(recordHeaderLen + explicitIVLen + len(payload))
case cbcMode:
blockSize := c.BlockSize()
if hc.version >= VersionTLS11 {
explicitIVLen = blockSize
}
if len(payload)%blockSize != 0 || len(payload) < roundUp(explicitIVLen+macSize+1, blockSize) {
return false, 0, alertBadRecordMAC
}
if explicitIVLen > 0 {
c.SetIV(payload[:explicitIVLen])
payload = payload[explicitIVLen:]
}
c.CryptBlocks(payload, payload)
if hc.version == VersionSSL30 {
payload, paddingGood = removePaddingSSL30(payload)
} else {
payload, paddingGood = removePadding(payload)
}
b.resize(recordHeaderLen + explicitIVLen + len(payload))
// note that we still have a timing side-channel in the
// MAC check, below. An attacker can align the record
// so that a correct padding will cause one less hash
// block to be calculated. Then they can iteratively
// decrypt a record by breaking each byte. See
// "Password Interception in a SSL/TLS Channel", Brice
// Canvel et al.
//
// However, our behavior matches OpenSSL, so we leak
// only as much as they do.
default:
panic("unknown cipher type")
}
}
// check, strip mac
if hc.mac != nil {
if len(payload) < macSize {
return false, 0, alertBadRecordMAC
}
// strip mac off payload, b.data
n := len(payload) - macSize
b.data[3] = byte(n >> 8)
b.data[4] = byte(n)
b.resize(recordHeaderLen + explicitIVLen + n)
remoteMAC := payload[n:]
localMAC := hc.mac.MAC(hc.inDigestBuf, hc.seq[0:], b.data[:recordHeaderLen], payload[:n])
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(localMAC, remoteMAC) != 1 || paddingGood != 255 {
return false, 0, alertBadRecordMAC
}
hc.inDigestBuf = localMAC
}
hc.incSeq()
return true, recordHeaderLen + explicitIVLen, 0
}
// padToBlockSize calculates the needed padding block, if any, for a payload.
// On exit, prefix aliases payload and extends to the end of the last full
// block of payload. finalBlock is a fresh slice which contains the contents of
// any suffix of payload as well as the needed padding to make finalBlock a
// full block.
func padToBlockSize(payload []byte, blockSize int) (prefix, finalBlock []byte) {
overrun := len(payload) % blockSize
paddingLen := blockSize - overrun
prefix = payload[:len(payload)-overrun]
finalBlock = make([]byte, blockSize)
copy(finalBlock, payload[len(payload)-overrun:])
for i := overrun; i < blockSize; i++ {
finalBlock[i] = byte(paddingLen - 1)
}
return
}
// encrypt encrypts and macs the data in b.
func (hc *halfConn) encrypt(b *block, explicitIVLen int) (bool, alert) {
// mac
if hc.mac != nil {
mac := hc.mac.MAC(hc.outDigestBuf, hc.seq[0:], b.data[:recordHeaderLen], b.data[recordHeaderLen+explicitIVLen:])
n := len(b.data)
b.resize(n + len(mac))
copy(b.data[n:], mac)
hc.outDigestBuf = mac
}
payload := b.data[recordHeaderLen:]
// encrypt
if hc.cipher != nil {
switch c := hc.cipher.(type) {
case cipher.Stream:
c.XORKeyStream(payload, payload)
case aead:
payloadLen := len(b.data) - recordHeaderLen - explicitIVLen
b.resize(len(b.data) + c.Overhead())
nonce := b.data[recordHeaderLen : recordHeaderLen+explicitIVLen]
if len(nonce) == 0 {
nonce = hc.seq[:]
}
payload := b.data[recordHeaderLen+explicitIVLen:]
payload = payload[:payloadLen]
var additionalData [13]byte
copy(additionalData[:], hc.seq[:])
copy(additionalData[8:], b.data[:3])
additionalData[11] = byte(payloadLen >> 8)
additionalData[12] = byte(payloadLen)
c.Seal(payload[:0], nonce, payload, additionalData[:])
case cbcMode:
blockSize := c.BlockSize()
if explicitIVLen > 0 {
c.SetIV(payload[:explicitIVLen])
payload = payload[explicitIVLen:]
}
prefix, finalBlock := padToBlockSize(payload, blockSize)
b.resize(recordHeaderLen + explicitIVLen + len(prefix) + len(finalBlock))
c.CryptBlocks(b.data[recordHeaderLen+explicitIVLen:], prefix)
c.CryptBlocks(b.data[recordHeaderLen+explicitIVLen+len(prefix):], finalBlock)
default:
panic("unknown cipher type")
}
}
// update length to include MAC and any block padding needed.
n := len(b.data) - recordHeaderLen
b.data[3] = byte(n >> 8)
b.data[4] = byte(n)
hc.incSeq()
return true, 0
}
// A block is a simple data buffer.
type block struct {
data []byte
off int // index for Read
link *block
}
// resize resizes block to be n bytes, growing if necessary.
func (b *block) resize(n int) {
if n > cap(b.data) {
b.reserve(n)
}
b.data = b.data[0:n]
}
// reserve makes sure that block contains a capacity of at least n bytes.
func (b *block) reserve(n int) {
if cap(b.data) >= n {
return
}
m := cap(b.data)
if m == 0 {
m = 1024
}
for m < n {
m *= 2
}
data := make([]byte, len(b.data), m)
copy(data, b.data)
b.data = data
}
// readFromUntil reads from r into b until b contains at least n bytes
// or else returns an error.
func (b *block) readFromUntil(c *Conn, n int) error {
r := c.conn
// quick case
if len(b.data) >= n {
return nil
}
// read until have enough.
b.reserve(n)
for {
m, err := r.Read(b.data[len(b.data):cap(b.data)])
b.data = b.data[0 : len(b.data)+m]
c.readFromUntilLen += m
if len(b.data) >= n {
// TODO(bradfitz,agl): slightly suspicious
// that we're throwing away r.Read's err here.
break
}
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
func (b *block) Read(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
n = copy(p, b.data[b.off:])
b.off += n
return
}
// newBlock allocates a new block, from hc's free list if possible.
func (hc *halfConn) newBlock() *block {
b := hc.bfree
if b == nil {
return new(block)
}
hc.bfree = b.link
b.link = nil
b.resize(0)
return b
}
// freeBlock returns a block to hc's free list.
// The protocol is such that each side only has a block or two on
// its free list at a time, so there's no need to worry about
// trimming the list, etc.
func (hc *halfConn) freeBlock(b *block) {
b.link = hc.bfree
hc.bfree = b
}
// splitBlock splits a block after the first n bytes,
// returning a block with those n bytes and a
// block with the remainder. the latter may be nil.
func (hc *halfConn) splitBlock(b *block, n int) (*block, *block) {
if len(b.data) <= n {
return b, nil
}
bb := hc.newBlock()
bb.resize(len(b.data) - n)
copy(bb.data, b.data[n:])
b.data = b.data[0:n]
return b, bb
}
/* convertSSLv2ClientHello - convert SSLv2 ClientHello to TLS ClientHello
*
* Note:
* 1. TLS clients that wish to support SSLv2 servers must send
* SSLv2 CLIENT-HELLO messages.
* 2. Even TLS servers that do not support SSLv2 may accept SSLv2
* CLIENT-HELLO messages.
* 3. For negotiation purposes, SSLv2 CLIENT-HELLO is interpreted
* the same way as a TLS ClientHello
*
* For more details, see:
* - tls1.2 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#appendix-E
* - tls1.1 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4346#appendix-E
* - tls1.0 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2246#appendix-E
* - sslv3 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-ssl-version3-00
* - sslv2 http://www-archive.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/ssl/draft02.html
*
* SSLv2 compatible CLIENT-HEELO message
*
* 0 16 bit
* +----------------------------------+
* | MsgLength | (Highest bit MUST be 1)
* +----------------+-----------------+
* | MsgType | (Must be 1, ClientHello)
* +----------------+-----------------+
* | MajorVersion | MinorVersion |
* +----------------+-----------------+
* | CipherSpecLen | (Must be multiply of 3)
* +----------------+-----------------+
* | SessionIdLen | (Must be zero or 16 bytes for tls1.0 client,
* +----------------+-----------------+ Must be zero for tls1.1/tls1.2 client)
* | ChallengeLen |
* +----------------+-----------------+
* | CipherSpec |
* . (CipherSpecLen bytes) .
* . .
* +----------------+-----------------+
* | Session Id |
* . (SessionIdLen bytes) .
* . .
* +----------------------------------+
* | Challenge | (Client Hello random)
* . (ChallengeLen bytes) .
* . .
* +----------------------------------+
*/
func convertSSLv2ClientHello(c *Conn, b *block) error {
// high bit must be 1 for SSLv2 compatible client hello
if (uint8(b.data[0]) & 128) != 128 {
return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
}
msgLength := (uint16(b.data[0]&0x7f) << 8) | uint16(b.data[1])
if msgLength < 12 {
return c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
}
// check if this is an SSLv2 client-hello but TLS is supported
msgType := uint8(b.data[2])
majorVer := uint8(b.data[3])
minorVer := uint8(b.data[4])
version := uint16(majorVer)<<8 | uint16(minorVer)
if !(msgType == typeClientHello && version >= VersionSSL30) {
c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
state.TlsHandshakeSslv2NotSupport.Inc(1)
return c.in.setErrorLocked(errors.New("tls: unsupported SSLv2 handshake received"))
}
state.TlsHandshakeAcceptSslv2ClientHello.Inc(1)
// read the rest of the bytes for client hello
if err := b.readFromUntil(c, int(2+msgLength)); err != nil {
if err == io.EOF {
err = io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
if e, ok := err.(net.Error); !ok || !e.Temporary() {
c.in.setErrorLocked(err)
}
return err
}
// get the cipher spec length
cipherSpecLength := uint16(b.data[5])<<8 | uint16(b.data[6])
if cipherSpecLength <= 0 || (cipherSpecLength%3) != 0 {
return c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
}
// get the session id length
sessionIdLength := uint16(b.data[7])<<8 | uint16(b.data[8])
if sessionIdLength != 0 && sessionIdLength != 16 {
return c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
}
if len(b.data) < 11+int(cipherSpecLength+sessionIdLength) {
return c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
}
// read the cipher specs
cipherSpecs := b.data[11 : 11+cipherSpecLength]
// read the rest of the data
challengeData := b.data[11+cipherSpecLength+sessionIdLength:]
// mark this data as read?
b, c.rawInput = c.in.splitBlock(b, int(2+msgLength))
b.off = 2
// create tls clientHello message
helloMsg := clientHelloMsg{}
helloMsg.vers = version
helloMsg.sessionId = []byte{0}
helloMsg.compressionMethods = []uint8{compressionNone}
if len(challengeData) >= 32 {
helloMsg.random = challengeData[:32]
} else {
helloMsg.random = make([]byte, 32-len(challengeData))
helloMsg.random = append(helloMsg.random, challengeData...)
}
helloMsg.cipherSuites = make([]uint16, 0)
for i := 0; i < len(cipherSpecs); i += 3 {
// we can only support cipher specs starting with a high bit
if cipherSpecs[i] == 0 {
cipher := uint16(cipherSpecs[i+1])<<8 | uint16(cipherSpecs[i+2])
helloMsg.cipherSuites = append(helloMsg.cipherSuites, cipher)
}
}
// write clientHello message to the handshake buffer
c.hand.Write(helloMsg.marshal())
c.sslv2Data = b.data[2:]
c.in.freeBlock(b)
return nil
}
// readRecord reads the next TLS record from the connection
// and updates the record layer state.
// c.in.Mutex <= L; c.input == nil.
func (c *Conn) readRecord(want recordType) error {
// Caller must be in sync with connection:
// handshake data if handshake not yet completed,
// else application data. (We don't support renegotiation.)
switch want {
default:
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return c.in.setErrorLocked(errors.New("tls: unknown record type requested"))
case recordTypeHandshake, recordTypeChangeCipherSpec:
if c.handshakeComplete {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return c.in.setErrorLocked(errors.New("tls: handshake or ChangeCipherSpec requested after handshake complete"))
}
case recordTypeApplicationData:
if !c.handshakeComplete {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return c.in.setErrorLocked(errors.New("tls: application data record requested before handshake complete"))
}
}
Again:
if c.rawInput == nil {
c.rawInput = c.in.newBlock()
}
b := c.rawInput
// Read header, payload.
if err := b.readFromUntil(c, recordHeaderLen); err != nil {
// RFC suggests that EOF without an alertCloseNotify is
// an error, but popular web sites seem to do this,
// so we can't make it an error.
// if err == io.EOF {
// err = io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
// }
if e, ok := err.(net.Error); !ok || !e.Temporary() {
c.in.setErrorLocked(err)
}
return err
}
typ := recordType(b.data[0])
// No valid TLS record has a type of 0x80, however SSLv2 handshakes
// start with a uint16 length where the MSB is set and the first record
// is always < 256 bytes long. Therefore typ == 0x80 strongly suggests
// an SSLv2 client.
if want == recordTypeHandshake && typ == 0x80 {
// if this is an SSLv2 header, lets see if we can upgrade to TLS
if c.config.EnableSslv2ClientHello {
return convertSSLv2ClientHello(c, b)
} else {
c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
state.TlsHandshakeSslv2NotSupport.Inc(1)
return c.in.setErrorLocked(errors.New("tls: unsupported SSLv2 handshake received"))
}
}
vers := uint16(b.data[1])<<8 | uint16(b.data[2])
n := int(b.data[3])<<8 | int(b.data[4])
if c.haveVers && vers != c.vers {
c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
return c.in.setErrorLocked(fmt.Errorf("tls: received record with version %x when expecting version %x", vers, c.vers))
}
if n > maxCiphertext {
c.sendAlert(alertRecordOverflow)
return c.in.setErrorLocked(fmt.Errorf("tls: oversized record received with length %d", n))
}
if !c.haveVers {
// First message, be extra suspicious:
// this might not be a TLS client.
// Bail out before reading a full 'body', if possible.
// The current max version is 3.1.
// If the version is >= 16.0, it's probably not real.
// Similarly, a clientHello message encodes in
// well under a kilobyte. If the length is >= 12 kB,
// it's probably not real.
if (typ != recordTypeAlert && typ != want) || vers >= 0x1000 || n >= 0x3000 {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return c.in.setErrorLocked(fmt.Errorf("tls: first record does not look like a TLS handshake"))
}
}
if err := b.readFromUntil(c, recordHeaderLen+n); err != nil {
if err == io.EOF {
err = io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
if e, ok := err.(net.Error); !ok || !e.Temporary() {
c.in.setErrorLocked(err)
}
return err
}
// Process message.
b, c.rawInput = c.in.splitBlock(b, recordHeaderLen+n)
ok, off, err := c.in.decrypt(b)
if !ok {
c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(err))
}
b.off = off
data := b.data[b.off:]
if len(data) > maxPlaintext {
err := c.sendAlert(alertRecordOverflow)
c.in.freeBlock(b)
return c.in.setErrorLocked(err)
}
switch typ {
default:
c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage))
case recordTypeAlert:
if len(data) != 2 {
c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage))
break
}
if alert(data[1]) == alertCloseNotify {
c.in.setErrorLocked(io.EOF)
break
}
switch data[0] {
case alertLevelWarning:
// drop on the floor
c.in.freeBlock(b)
goto Again
case alertLevelError:
c.in.setErrorLocked(&net.OpError{Op: "remote error", Err: alert(data[1])})
default:
c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage))
}
case recordTypeChangeCipherSpec:
if typ != want || len(data) != 1 || data[0] != 1 {
c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage))
break
}
err := c.in.changeCipherSpec()
if err != nil {
c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(err.(alert)))
}
case recordTypeApplicationData:
if typ != want {
c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage))
break
}
c.input = b
b = nil
case recordTypeHandshake:
// TODO(rsc): Should at least pick off connection close.
if typ != want {
return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertNoRenegotiation))
}
c.hand.Write(data)
}
if b != nil {
c.in.freeBlock(b)
}
return c.in.err
}
// sendAlert sends a TLS alert message.
// c.out.Mutex <= L.
func (c *Conn) sendAlertLocked(err alert) error {
switch err {
case alertNoRenegotiation, alertCloseNotify:
c.tmp[0] = alertLevelWarning
default:
c.tmp[0] = alertLevelError
}
c.tmp[1] = byte(err)
c.writeRecord(recordTypeAlert, c.tmp[0:2])
// closeNotify is a special case in that it isn't an error:
if err != alertCloseNotify {
return c.out.setErrorLocked(&net.OpError{Op: "local error", Err: err})
}
return nil
}
// sendAlert sends a TLS alert message.
// L < c.out.Mutex.
func (c *Conn) sendAlert(err alert) error {
c.out.Lock()
defer c.out.Unlock()
return c.sendAlertLocked(err)
}
/* choosePlaintextSize - choose size of record plaintext
*
* Note:
* 1. We use small TLS records that fit into a single TCP segment for the
* first `bytesThreshold` Byte of data,
* 2. increase record size to maxPlaintext after that to optimize throughput,
* 3. and then reset record size back to a single segment
* after `inactiveSeconds` second of inactivity,
* 4. lather, rinse, repeat
*/
func (c *Conn) choosePlaintextSize() int {
if !c.enableDynamicRecord {
return initPlaintext
}
if c.byteOut < bytesThreshold {
return initPlaintext
}
if time.Since(c.lastOut) < inactiveSeconds {
return maxPlaintext
}
// reset bytes sent recently
c.byteOut = 0
return initPlaintext
}
// writeRecord writes a TLS record with the given type and payload
// to the connection and updates the record layer state.
// c.out.Mutex <= L.
func (c *Conn) writeRecord(typ recordType, data []byte) (n int, err error) {
// choose appropriate size for record
// Note: Some IE browsers fail to parse fragmented TLS/SSL handshake message,
// we just choose dynamic record size for application data message. For more information,
// see https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/2541763
plaintextSize := maxPlaintext
if typ == recordTypeApplicationData {
plaintextSize = c.choosePlaintextSize()
}
b := c.out.newBlock()
for len(data) > 0 {
m := len(data)
// split data into segment of size 'plaintextSize'
if m > plaintextSize {
m = plaintextSize
}
explicitIVLen := 0
explicitIVIsSeq := false
var cbc cbcMode
if c.out.version >= VersionTLS11 {
var ok bool
if cbc, ok = c.out.cipher.(cbcMode); ok {
explicitIVLen = cbc.BlockSize()
}
}
if explicitIVLen == 0 {
if c, ok := c.out.cipher.(aead); ok {
explicitIVLen = c.explicitNonceLen()
// The AES-GCM construction in TLS has an
// explicit nonce so that the nonce can be
// random. However, the nonce is only 8 bytes
// which is too small for a secure, random
// nonce. Therefore we use the sequence number
// as the nonce.
explicitIVIsSeq = explicitIVLen > 0
}
}
b.resize(recordHeaderLen + explicitIVLen + m)
b.data[0] = byte(typ)
vers := c.vers
if vers == 0 {
// Some TLS servers fail if the record version is
// greater than TLS 1.0 for the initial ClientHello.
vers = VersionTLS10
}
b.data[1] = byte(vers >> 8)
b.data[2] = byte(vers)
b.data[3] = byte(m >> 8)
b.data[4] = byte(m)