Document the caveat structure

DESIGN.md

@@ -61,8 +61,90 @@ specific authorizations
 - capabilities: a request carries a token that contains a set of rights
 that will be used for authorization, instead of deploying ACLs on every node
 
+
+## Structure and semantics
+
+A biscuit is structured as a cryptographic, append-only list; its elements are
+called *caveats*, and describe authorization properties.  As with Macaroons,
+an operation must comply with all caveats in order to be allowed by the biscuit.
+
+Caveats describe which operations are authorized by providing predicates over
+the operation's attributes.
+
+Attributes are data, associated with the operation,
+that is known when the policy is evaluated, such as an identifier for the
+ressource being accessed, the type of the operation (read, write, append, ...),
+the operation's parameters (if any), the client's IP address or a
+channel-binding value (like the TLS transcript hash).
+
+Available attributes, and their type, are known ahead of time by the verifier.
+Some of those attributes are *critical*, and all caveats must provide a *bound*
+for each critical attribute.
+
+Bounds are a subset of predicates, that only allow the following:
+- `any`: all values match;
+- `in <subset>`: only elements in `subset` match; this can be an explicit
+  enumeration, or a (non-infinite) range in the case of numeric types.
+
+
+### Rationale
+
+Some attributes grant authority (such as ressource identifiers, operation type,
+...), and failing to include a caveat limiting acceptable values is a common
+failure with Macaroons, resulting in authority being accidentally granted.
+
+By marking them critical, two things are achieved:
+- They must be bound by caveats, preventing accidental authority grants when new
+  values are added.
+- Their presence is required in all caveats for a biscuit to be valid; as such:
+  - if developers accidentally fail to provide a bound, the biscuit is invalid;
+  - biscuits issued before the attribute was defined are implicitely revoked.
+
+For example, consider a data store, which initially only provides read access.
+Assume I was granted a biscuit for ressources in it, before a developper
+implemented read-write access, along with a `type` attribute (which can be
+`Read` or `Write`).  My biscuit suddenly grants me read-write access.
+
+Marking the `type` attribute as critical means that I must request a new
+biscuit, that properly specifies whether my access is read and/or write.
+
+Now, if I was to be issued a biscuit with the caveat `type != Write`, before the
+types `Append`, `Create`, and `Delete` were added, my the biscuit would again go
+from granting read-only access to granting write access; this is why critical
+attributes must use bounds.
+
+
+By requiring that all caveats provide a bound for each critical attribute, we
+can guarantee that a biscuit does not gain unintended authority when new
+attributes, or new values for them, are added in the system.  (The use of `any`
+is considered intentional.)
+
+
+### Interpretation
+
+Given an operation's `attributes`, the set of `critical` attributes, a given
+`biscuit` is evaluated as follows:
+
+```python3
+for caveat in biscuit:
+  bounds = set()
+  for predicate in caveat:
+    if not predicate.eval(attributes):
+      return False
+    if predicate.isbound:
+      bounds.add(predicate.attribute)
+
+  if not bounds.contains(critical):
+    return False
+
+return True
+```
+
+
 ## Format
 
+XXXTODO: Update for caveats
+
 A biscuit token is an ordered list of key and value tuples, stored in HPACK
 format. HPACK was chosen to avoid specifying yet another serialization format,
 and reusing its data compression features to make tokens small enough to
@@ -139,33 +221,6 @@ the token):
 
 Those common keys and values will be present in the HPACK static table
 
-## Rights management
-
-The rules are defined to allow flexibility in rules verification. The default token
-will start with all the rights, and restrict them with the "rights" field in each
-new block. But what those restrictions mean will depend on which service verifies
-the token, as they might care (or even know) about different sets of capabilities.
-
-Starting from a set of rights `R`, that contains a list of namespaces. Each namespace
-has a list of tuples `(tag, feature, [options])`. Tags and features can appear in
-multiple tuples.
-A `rights` field contains a list of namespaces, and for each namespace,
-a list of right patterns matching `(tag, feature, [options])` tuples,
-and a `+` or `-` tag indicating if it should be added or removed.
-
-Appying rights attenuation:
-
-- for each namespace `N`:
-  - load the current set of rights `R`
-    - either the original set of rights for the verifier
-    - or the set of rights after attenuation by the previous block
-  - all rights in `R` are marked as `+` (active)
-  - for each right pattern ( `RP = (+|-) tag : feature(options)` ):
-    - for each right tuple `r = (tag, feature, [options])` in `R` matched by `RP`:
-      - if r is active ( `+` ) but `RP` contains `-`, mark r as inactive ( `-` )
-      - if r is inactive ( `-` ) but `RP` contains `+`, mark r as active ( `+` )
-  - filter `R` to keep only the tuples marked as active
-  - store `R` as the newt rights for `N`
 
 ## Cryptography