### Agents

- A Alice
- M Webauthn authenticator (passkey manager)
- B Browser with Session storage, SubtleCrypto API, and libsodium library
- S Quick Crypt server

### Browser and Libsodium Functions

- $E_a$  Symmetric cipher using AEAD algorithm a. One of:
  - 1. AES-256 in Galois/Counter mode from SubtleCrypto
  - 2. XChaCha20 with Poly1305 MAC from libsodium
  - 3. AEGIS 256 from libsodium
- $D_H$  HKDF-SHA512 key derivation using FIPS-180-4 from SubtleCrypto
- $D_P$  PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512 key derivation FIPS-180-4 from SubtleCrypto
- H BLAKE2b keyed hash (MAC) generator from libsodium
- V Constant-time hash (MAC) validator from libsodium
- G Cryptographic pseudo-random generator from libsodium

### Cipher Variables

- N Block number
- m Clear text message
- $m_0$  Clear text block 0
- $m_N$  Clear text block N
- $m_E$  Block of encrypted message
- p Password text
- h Password hint text
- $u_c$  256 bit user credential
- a Symmetric AEAD cipher and mode: [1, 2, 3]
- *i* PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512 iteration count: min 420,000 max 4,294,000,000
- $k_{M}$  256 bit ephemeral message cipher key
- $k_H$  256 bit ephemeral hint cipher key
- $k_S$  256 bit ephemeral MAC key
- $kp_S$  Key purpose text: "cipherdata signing key"
- $kp_H$  Key purpose text: "hint encryption key"
- r 384 bits of pseudo random data
- $n_{IV}$  Pseudo random initialization vector
- $n_{IV}l$   $n_{IV}$  bit length: [96, 192, 256]
- $n_S$  128 bit pseudo random salt
- lp Loop count (0-15)
- le Loop end (0-15)
- ad Additional data
- v Cipher data version
- $h_E$  Encrypted hint
- $h_E l$  Encrypted hint length
- t 256 bit MAC tag
- $t_L$  Last 256 bit MAC tag
- l Payload length
- f Block flags
- b Valid or invalid MAC tag
- cd Cipher data
- $cd_0$  Cipher data block 0
- $cd_N$  Cipher data block N
- err Error message and exit

### Message Encryption by A

```
A \stackrel{\text{webauthn}}{\leftrightarrow} B.M \stackrel{\text{webauthn}}{\leftrightarrow} S
B \leftarrow S : u_c
A \rightarrow B: m, i, le
v = 5
lp = 0
t_L = \emptyset
LOOP: B compute
      A \to B: p, h, a
      r = G(384)
      n_S = r[0:128)
      n_{IV} = r[128:128 + n_{IV}l)
      k_M = D_P(p \parallel u_c, n_S, i)
      k_S = D_H(u_c, n_S, kp_S)
      cd = cd_0 \parallel \dots \parallel cd_N
      m = cd
      lp = lp + 1
      goto LOOP if lp < le
A \leftarrow B : cd
```

# Block 0 Encryption by B

```
\begin{split} k_{H} &= D_{H}(u_{c}, n_{S}, kp_{H}) \\ h_{E} &= E_{a}(h, n_{IV}, k_{H}) \\ h_{E}l &= len(h_{E}) \\ ad &= a \parallel n_{IV} \parallel n_{S} \parallel i \parallel le \parallel lp \parallel h_{E}l \parallel h_{E} \\ m_{E} &= E_{a}(m_{0}, n_{IV}, ad, k_{M}) \\ l &= len(ad \parallel m_{E}) \\ f &= 1 \text{ if } \boxed{\text{TERM}} \text{ else } 0 \\ t &= H(v, l, f, ad, m_{E}, t_{L}, k_{S}) \\ t_{L} &= t \\ cd_{0} &= t \parallel v \parallel l \parallel f \parallel ad \parallel m_{E} \end{split}
```

# Block N Encryption by B

```
\begin{split} r &= G(384) \\ n_{IV} &= r[0:n_{IV}l) \\ ad &= a \parallel n_{IV} \\ m_E &= E_a(m_N,n_{IV},ad,k_M) \\ l &= len(ad \parallel m_E) \\ f &= 1 \text{ if } \boxed{\text{TERM}} \text{ else } 0 \\ t &= H(v,l,f,ad,m_E,t_L,k_S) \\ t_L &= t \\ cd_N &= t \parallel v \parallel l \parallel f \parallel ad \parallel m_E \end{split}
```

# Message Decryption by A

```
A \stackrel{\text{webauthn}}{\leftrightarrow} B, M \stackrel{\text{webauthn}}{\leftrightarrow} S
B \leftarrow S : u_c
A \to B : cd
lp = 0
t_L = \emptyset
LOOP: B compute
     t, v, l, f, ad, m_E = cd_0
     a, n_{IV}, n_S, i, le, lp, h_E l, h_E = ad
     k_S = D_H(u_c, n_S, kp_S)
     b = V(v, l, f, ad, m_E, t_L, k_S, t)
     t_L = t
     if !b:
           A \leftarrow B : err
     k_H = D_H(u_c, n_S, kp_H)
     h = E_a^{-1}(h_E, n_{IV}, k_H)
      B \to A:h
      B \leftarrow A:p
      k_M = D_P(p \parallel u_c, n_S, i)
     m=m_0\parallel\ldots\parallel m_N
     cd = m
     lp = lp + 1
     go
to LOOP if lp < le
A \leftarrow B : m
```

# Block 0 Decryption by B

$$m_o = E_a^{-1}(m_E, n_{IV}, ad, k_M)$$

### Block N Decryption by B

$$\begin{split} &t, v, l, f, ad, m_E = cd_N \\ &a, n_{IV} = ad \\ &b = V(v, l, f, ad, m_E, t_L, k_S, t) \\ &t_L = t \\ &\text{if } !b : \\ &A \leftarrow B : err \\ &m_N = E_a^{-1}(m_E, n_{IV}, ad, k_M) \end{split}$$

#### Authentication Variables

- A's chosen user name
- 128 bit user id guaranteed to be unique
- 128 bit recovery id
- 256 bit user credential
- Quick Crypt origin "https://quickcrypt.org"
- 256 bit challenge value ch
- Registration options, including  $o, ch, u_i$
- Registration response, including signed ch
- Authentication options, including o, ch
- Authentication response, including signed ch
- Alice's webauthn authenticator credentials

### Registration by A

```
A \to B : u_n
```

 $B \to S: u_n, o$ 

S create and store:

 $u_i = G(128)$ 

 $u_c = G(256)$ 

ch = G(256)

 $B \leftarrow S : ro$ 

 $B \to M : ro$ 

 $A \to M : cw$ 

M create and store passkey, sign ch

 $B \leftarrow M : rr$ 

 $B \to S : rr, u_i, ch$ 

S verify signature, store rr, remove ch

 $B \leftarrow S : u_i, u_n, u_r, u_c$ 

 $A \leftarrow B : u_r \parallel u_i \text{ as BIP39}$ 

#### Authentication by A

 $B \to S : o[, u_i]$ 

S create and store:

ch = G(256)

 $B \leftarrow S : ao$ 

 $B \to M : ao$ 

 $A \to M : cw$ 

 $M \operatorname{sign} ch$ 

 $B \leftarrow M : ar$ 

 $B \rightarrow S : ar, ch$ 

S verify signature, remove ch

 $B \leftarrow S : u_i, u_n, u_c$ 

#### Recovery from Lost Passkey by A

 $A \to B : u_r \parallel u_i$  as BIP39

 $B \to S: u_i, u_r, o$ 

S delete existing rr, create and store:

ch = G(256)

 $B \leftarrow S : ro$ 

 $B \to M : ro$ 

 $A \to M : cw$ 

M create and store passkey, sign ch

 $B \leftarrow M : rr$ 

 $B \rightarrow S: rr, u_i, ch$ 

S verify signature, store rr, remove ch

 $B \leftarrow S : u_i, u_n, u_c$