#### Agents

- A Alice
- M Webauthn authenticator (passkey manager)
- B Browser with Session storage, SubtleCrypto API, and libsodium library
- S Quick Crypt server
- R https://www.random.org/cgi-bin/randbyte?nbytes=48
- D Insecure persistent storage system

#### Browser and Libsodium Functions

- $E_a$  Symmetric cipher using AEAD algorithm a. One of:
  - 1. AES-256 in Galois/Counter mode from SubtleCrypto
  - 2. XChaCha20 with Poly1305 MAC from libsodium
  - 3. AEGIS 256 from libsodium
- $D_H$  HKDF key derivation using SHA-512 FIPS-180-4 from SubtleCrypto
- $D_{P}\,$  PBKDF2 key derivation using SHA-512 FIPS-180-4 from SubtleCrypto
- H BLAKE2b keyed hash (MAC) generator from libsodium
- V BLAKE2b keyed hash (MAC) validator from libsodium
- G Cryptographic pseudorandom generator from SubtleCrypto

## Cipher Variables

- N Block number
- m Clear text message
- $m_0$  Clear text block 0
- $m_N$  Clear text block N
- $m_E$  Block of encrypted message
- p Password text
- h Password hint text
- $u_c$  256 bit user credential
- a Symmetric AEAD cipher and mode: [1, 2, 3]
- *i* PBKDF2 iteration count, minimum 400,000
- $k_M$  256 bit message cipher key
- $k_H$  256 bit hint cipher key
- $k_S$  256 bit MAC key
- $kp_S$  Key purpose text: "cipherdata signing key"
- $kp_H$  Key purpose text: "hint encryption key"
- r 384 bits of either true or pseudo random data
- $n_{IV}$  True or pseudo random initialization vector
- $n_{IV}l$   $n_{IV}$  bit length: [96, 192, 256]
- $n_S$  128 bit true or pseudo random salt
- lp Loop count (0-15)
- *le* Loop end (0-15)
- ad Additional data
- v Cipher data version
- $h_E$  Encrypted hint
- $h_E l$  Encrypted hint length
- t 256 bit MAC tag
- l Payload length
- b Valid or invalid MAC tag
- cd Cipher data
- $cd_0$  Cipher data block 0
- $cd_N$  Cipher data block N
- $err\,$  Error message and exit

## Message Encryption by A

```
A \stackrel{\text{webauthn}}{\leftrightarrow} B.M \stackrel{\text{webauthn}}{\leftrightarrow} S
B \leftarrow S : u_c
A \rightarrow B: m, i, le
v = 4
lp = 0
LOOP: B \text{ compute}
      A \rightarrow B: p, h, a
      r \in \{G(384), B \stackrel{\text{https}}{\leftarrow} R : r\}
      n_S = r[0:128)
      n_{IV} = r[128 : 128 + n_{IV}l)
      k_M = D_P(p \parallel u_c, n_S, i)
      k_S = D_H(u_c, n_S, kp_S)
      cd = cd_0 \parallel ... \parallel cd_N
      m = cd
      lp = lp + 1
      goto LOOP if lp < le
A \leftarrow B : cd
```

# Block 0 Encryption by B

```
\begin{split} k_{H} &= D_{H}(u_{c}, n_{S}, kp_{H}) \\ h_{E} &= E_{a}(h, n_{IV}, k_{H}) \\ h_{E}l &= len(h_{E}) \\ ad &= a \parallel n_{IV} \parallel n_{S} \parallel i \parallel le \parallel lp \parallel h_{E}l \parallel h_{E} \\ m_{E} &= E_{a}(m_{0}, n_{IV}, ad, k_{M}) \\ l &= len(ad \parallel m_{E}) \\ t &= H(v, l, ad, m_{E}, k_{S}) \\ cd_{0} &= t \parallel v \parallel l \parallel ad \parallel m_{E} \end{split}
```

## Block N Encryption by B

```
r \in \{G(384), B \stackrel{\text{https}}{\leftarrow} R : r\}
n_{IV} = r[0 : n_{IV}l)
ad = a \parallel n_{IV}
m_E = E_a(m_N, n_{IV}, ad, k_M)
l = len(ad \parallel m_E)
t = H(v, l, ad, m_E, k_S)
cd_N = t \parallel v \parallel l \parallel ad \parallel m_E
```

## Message Storage by A

 $A \rightarrow D : cd$ 

## Message Retrieval by A

```
A \leftarrow D : cd
```

## Message Decryption by A

```
A \stackrel{\text{webauthn}}{\longleftrightarrow} B, M \stackrel{\text{webauthn}}{\longleftrightarrow} S
B \leftarrow S : u_c
A \to B : cd
lp = 0
LOOP: B \text{ compute}
      t, v, l, ad, m_E = cd_0
      a, n_{IV}, n_S, i, le, lp, h_E l, h_E = ad
      k_S = D_H(u_c, n_S, kp_S)
      b = V(v, l, ad, m_E, k_S, t)
      if !b:
           A \leftarrow B : err
      k_H = D_H(u_c, n_S, kp_H)
      h = E_a^{-1}(h_E, n_{IV}, k_H)
 B \to A : h
      B \leftarrow A:p
      k_M = D_P(p \parallel u_c, n_S, i)
      m=m_0\parallel m_N\parallel \dots
      cd = m
      lp = lp + 1
      go
to LOOP if lp < le
A \leftarrow B : m
```

## Block 0 Decryption by B

$$m_o = E_a^{-1}(m_E, n_{IV}, ad, k_M)$$

## Block N Decryption by B

```
\begin{split} &t, v, l, ad, m_E = cd_N \\ &a, n_{IV} = ad \\ &b = V(v, l, ad, m_E, k_S, t) \\ &\text{if } !b: \\ &A \leftarrow B : err \\ &m_N = E_a^{-1}(m_E, n_{IV}, ad, k_M) \end{split}
```

### Webauthn Variables

- $u_n$  A's chosen user name
- $u_i$  128 bit user id guaranteed to be unique
- $u_c$  256 bit user credential
- o Quick Crypt origin "https://quickcrypt.org"
- ch 256 bit challenge value
- ro Registration options, including  $o, ch, u_i$
- rr Registration response, including signed ch
- ao Authentication options, including o, ch
- ar Authentication response, including signed ch
- cw Alice's we bauthn authenticator credentials

### Registration by A

```
A \to B : u_n
```

 $B \to S: u_n, o$ 

S create and store:

 $u_i = G(128)$ 

 $u_c = G(256)$ 

ch = G(256)

 $B \leftarrow S : ro$ 

 $B \to M : ro$ 

 $A \to M : cw$ 

M create and store passkey, sign ch

 $B \leftarrow M : rr$ 

 $B \rightarrow S: rr, u_i, ch$ 

S verify signature, store rr, remove ch

 $B \leftarrow S : u_i, u_n, u_c$ 

 $A \leftarrow B : u_i, u_c$ 

## Authentication by A

 $B \to S : o[, u_i]$ 

S create and store:

ch = G(256)

 $B \leftarrow S : ao$ 

 $B \rightarrow M : ao$ 

 $A \to M : cw$ 

M sign ch

 $B \leftarrow M : ar$ 

 $B \to S : ar, ch$ 

S verify signature, remove ch

 $B \leftarrow S : u_i, u_n, u_c$ 

### Recovery from Lost Passkey by A

 $A \rightarrow B: u_i, u_c$ 

 $B \to S: u_i, u_c, o$ 

S delete existing rr, create and store:

ch = G(256)

 $B \leftarrow S : ro$ 

 $B \to M : ro$ 

 $A \to M : cw$ 

M create and store passkey, sign ch

 $B \leftarrow M : rr$ 

 $B \rightarrow S: rr, u_i, ch$ 

S verify signature, store rr, remove ch

 $B \leftarrow S: u_i, u_n, u_c$