


### 3 Symmetric Cryptography

#### Symmetric Cryptography



Symmetric cryptography uses the same **secret** key  $k$  for encryption and decryption.

#### Symmetric Ciphers

- Typically the same (**reversible**) algorithm is used for encryption and decryption.
- The algorithm(s) used may or may not be kept secret, but in either case, the **strength** of the algorithm should rest on the **size** of the keys and the **design** of the algorithm.
  - In theory, we can recover a symmetric key by performing an **exhaustive search**.
  - For a secure symmetric cipher, there should not be a more **efficient** algorithm for finding a key.
- There are numerous symmetric ciphers in use.
  - DES, triple-DES, IDEA, Skipjack, CAST, Blowfish, AES, ...
  - They have different key sizes (e.g., DES - 56 bits, IDEA - 128 bits, AES - 128, 192 or 256 bits).
  - Some are subject to **patents** in some countries.

#### Symmetric Ciphers

There are two types of symmetric cipher:


- **Block ciphers** that encrypt one block of data at a time.
  - Typically, blocks consist of 64 bits (8 bytes) or 128 bits (16 bytes) of data.
  - The same plaintext block always encrypts to the **same** ciphertext block.

- In certain circumstances, this is a weakness and we need to use some sort of **feedback** to disguise patterns in the plaintext. This leads to different **modes** of operation.
- **Stream ciphers** that encrypt an arbitrary stream of data.
  - Depending on the cipher, the data may consist of a **stream** of bits or a stream of bytes.
  - Each plaintext bit (or byte) encrypts to a **different** cipher text bit (or byte) depending on what data occurred earlier in the stream.
  - It is possible to use a block cipher to implement a stream cipher.

### 3.1 Stream Ciphers

#### Stream Ciphers

**Basic idea:** **replace** the **random key** in the one-time pad by a **pseudo-random sequence**, generated by a cryptographic **pseudo-random generator (PRG)** that is ‘seeded’ with the key.



#### PRGs

PRG requirements:

- **Randomness**
  - Uniformity, scalability, consistency
- **Unpredictability**
  - Cannot determine what next bit will be despite knowledge of the algorithm and all previous bits.
- **Unreproducible**
  - Cannot be reliably reproduced.

Characteristics of the [seed](#):

- Must be kept secret
- If known, adversary can determine output
- Must be random or pseudorandom number

### Linear Congrentual Generator

Common iterative technique using:

$$X_{n+1} = (aX_n + c) \bmod m$$

Given suitable values of parameters can produce a long [random-like](#) sequence

Suitable criteria to have are:

- Function generates a [full period](#)
- Generated sequence should [appear random](#)
- [Efficient](#) implementation with 32-bit arithmetic

Note that an attacker can reconstruct sequence given a small number of values - this can be made harder in practice.

### Blum Blum Shub Generator

Find two [large primes](#)  $p, q$  congruent to 3 (mod 4) where  $m = p \times q$

Seed:  $X_0 = k^2 \bmod m$  ( $k$  relatively prime to  $m$ )

Use least significant bit from [iterative](#) equation:

$$X_{n+1} = X_n^2 \bmod m$$

- [Unpredictable](#) given any run of bits
  - Passes next-bit test
- [Security](#) rests on difficulty of factoring  $m$
- [Slow](#) since very large numbers must be used
  - Too slow for cipher use, but good for key generation

### Real Random Numbers


In some cryptographic implementations, [real random numbers](#) are used.

Such numbers can be generated from [random physical events](#).

- Measuring radioactive decay.
- Measuring the time to read blocks of data from a disk - this is affected by air turbulence and has a random component.
- Measuring the time between key strokes on a key board.
- Using the least significant bits of a computers clock.

Using real random numbers is not usually a [practical](#) option.

## Stream Ciphers



Finite state machine with output filter.

Keys determine state update ( $k_1$ ), initial state ( $k_2$ ) and output filter ( $k_3$ )

## Stream Ciphers

Thus we have  $c_i = m_i \oplus k_i$ , where:

- $m_i$  are the plaintext bits/bytes.
- $k_i$  are the keystream bits/bytes.
- $c_i$  are the ciphertext bits/bytes.

This means  $m_i = c_i \oplus k_i$  and thus decryption is the same as encryption.

Encryption/decryption can be **very fast**.

**No error propagation**: one error in ciphertext gives one error in plaintext.

**Loss of synchronisation** means decryption fails for remaining ciphertext.

No protection against **message manipulation**.

**Same key** used twice gives **same keystream**.

## Stream Ciphers

For the stream cipher to be **secure**, the keystream must:

- **Look random**, i.e. pass pseudo-random tests.
- Be **unpredictable**, i.e. have a long period.
- Have **large linear complexity** (see textbooks).
- Have **low correlation** between **key bits** and **keystream bits**.

Furthermore, the keystream should be efficient to generate.


Most stream ciphers are based on a non-linear combination of **LFSRs** (Linear Feedback Shift Registers).

## 3.2 Block Ciphers

### Block Ciphers

Plaintext is divided into blocks of **fixed length** and every block is encrypted **one at a time**.

A block cipher is a set of ‘**code books**’ and every key produces a **different** code book. The encryption of a plaintext block is the **corresponding** ciphertext block entry in the code book.



### Block Ciphers


We have  $c = e_k(m)$  where:

- $m$  is the plaintext block
- $k$  is the secret key
- $e$  is the encryption function
- $c$  is the ciphertext

In addition we have a decryption function  $d$  such that:

$$m = d_k(c)$$

### Symmetric Key Cryptography



$m$  = plaintext,  $c$  = ciphertext,  $k$  = key, KG = key generator.

### Symmetric Key Cryptography

We write  $c = e_k(m)$ , where:

- $m$  is the plaintext,
- $e$  is the encryption function,
- $k$  is the secret key,
- $c$  is the ciphertext.

Decryption is given by  $m = d_k(c)$ .

Both sides need to know the key  $k$ , but  $k$  needs to be kept secret.

- secret-key, single-key or one-key algorithms.

### Iterated Block Ciphers

An iterated block cipher involves repeated use of a round function.

The idea is to make a strong encryption function out of a weaker round function (easy to implement) by repeatedly using it.

The round function takes an  $n$ -bit block to an  $n$ -bit block.

Parameters: number of rounds  $r$ , blocksize  $n$ , keysize  $s$ .

Each use of the round function employs a subkey:

$$k_i \text{ for } 1 \leq i \leq r$$

derived from the key  $k$ .

For every subkey the round function must be invertible; if not decryption is impossible.

**Data Encryption Standard (DES)**

First published in 1977 as a US Federal standard.

Known as Data Encryption Algorithm [DEA](#) (ANSI) or [DEA-1](#) (ISO).

- A de-facto international standard for banking security.
- An example of a [Feistel Cipher](#).
- Most analyzed cryptographic algorithm.

Short history of DES:

- Work started in early 1970s by [IBM](#).
- Based on IBMs Lucifer, but amended by [NSA](#).
- Design criteria were kept secret for more than 20 years.
- Supposed to be reviewed every 5 years.

**Data Encryption Standard (DES)**

[Block](#) length is [64 bits](#), [key](#) length [56 bits](#).


[Feistel Cipher](#):

- Initial permutation of bits.
- Split into left and right half.
- 16 rounds of identical operations, depending on round key.
- Inverse initial permutation.

[Round transformation](#):

- Linear expansion: 32 bits  $\rightarrow$  48 bits.
- XOR with subkey of 48 bits (key schedule selects 48 bits of key [k](#)).
- 8 parallel non-linear S-boxes (6 input bits, 4 output bits).
- Permutation of the 32 bits.

### Data Encryption Standard (DES)



### Data Encryption Standard (DES)

Each DES round consists of the following six stages:

1. **Expansion Permutation:**

- Right half (32 bits) is expanded (and permuted) to 48 bits.
- Diffuses relationship of input bits to output bits.
- Means one bit of input affects two substitutions in output.
- Spreads dependencies.

2. **Use of Round Key:**

- 48 bits are XOR-ed with the round key (48 bits).

3. **Splitting:**

- Result is split into eight lots of six bit values.

### Data Encryption Standard (DES)

4. **S-Box:**

- Each six bit value is passed into an S-box to produce a four bit result in a non-linear way. (S = Substitution)

5. **P-Box:**


- 32 bits of output are combined and permuted. (P = Permutation)



### 6. Feistel Part:

- Output of  $f$  is XOR-ed with the left half resulting in new right half.
- New left half is the old right half.

### Data Encryption Standard (DES)



### Data Encryption Standard (DES)

S-Boxes represent the **non-linear** component of DES.


There are eight different S-boxes.

The original S-boxes proposed by IBM were **modified by NSA**.

Each S-box is a table of **4 rows and 16 columns**

- The 6 input bits specify which row and column to use.
- Bits 1 and 6 generate the row.
- Bits 2-5 generate the column.

### Feistel Cipher



### Feistel Cipher

The round function is **invertible** regardless of the choice of  $f$ .

**Encryption** round is:

- $L_i = R_{i-1}$
- $R_i = L_{i-1} \oplus f(R_{i-1}, k_i)$

**Remark:** in last step, the left half and right half are swapped:

- Decryption is achieved using the **same**  $r$ -round process.
- But with round keys used in **reverse** order, i.e.  $k_r$  first and  $k_1$  last.

### Feistel Cipher

**Same** algorithm can be used for decryption since we are using the Feistel structure:

$$L_{i-1} \oplus f(R_{i-1}, k_i) \oplus f(R_{i-1}, k_i) = L_{i-1}$$

**Remark:** for decryption the subkeys are used in the **reverse** order.

Note that the effect of  $IP^{-1}$  is cancelled by  $IP$ .

Also note that  $R_{16}, L_{16}$  is the input of encryption since halves were **swapped** and that swapping is necessary.

### Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

January 1997: **NIST** call for algorithms to **replace** DES.

- **Block cipher:** 128-bit blocks, 128/192/256-bit keys.
- Strength  $\approx 3 \times$  DES, much more efficient.
- Documentation, reference C code, optimised C and JAVA code, test vectors.

- Designers give up all intellectual rights.

**Open process:** public comments, international submissions.

Website: <http://www.nist.gov/aes/>

### Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

Standard **FIPS-197** approved by NIST in November 2001.

Official scope was **limited**:

- US Federal Administration used AES as Government standard from 26 May 2002.
- Documents that are ‘**sensitive** but not classified’.
- 2003: NSA has approved AES-128 also for **secret** information, and AES with key sizes larger than 128 for **top secret** information.
- Significance is huge: AES is the successor of DES.
- Major factors for quick **acceptance**:
  - No royalties.
  - High quality.
  - Low resource consumption.

### Rijndael

**Block length, key length:** vary between **128 - 256 bits**.

**Number of rounds** is **10/12/14** depending on block and key length.

Uniform and parallel **round transformation**, composed of:

- Byte substitution.
- Shift rows.
- Mix columns.
- Round key addition.

Sequential and light-weight **key schedule**.

No arithmetic operations.

### Rijndael

**Plaintext** block normally is 128 bits or **16 bytes**  $m_0, \dots, m_{15}$ .

**Key** normally is 128/192/256 bits or **16/24/32 bytes**  $k_0, \dots, k_{31}$ .

Both are represented as **rectangular array of bytes**.

$m_0$	$m_4$	$m_8$	$m_{12}$
$m_1$	$m_5$	$m_9$	$m_{13}$
$m_2$	$m_6$	$m_{10}$	$m_{14}$
$m_3$	$m_7$	$m_{11}$	$m_{15}$


$k_0$	$k_4$	$k_8$	$k_{12}$	$k_{16}$	$k_{20}$
$k_1$	$k_5$	$k_9$	$k_{13}$	$k_{17}$	$k_{21}$
$k_2$	$k_6$	$k_{10}$	$k_{14}$	$k_{18}$	$k_{22}$
$k_3$	$k_7$	$k_{11}$	$k_{15}$	$k_{19}$	$k_{23}$

**Rijndael: Byte Substitution**

State matrix is transformed **byte by byte**.


S-box is **invertible**, else decryption would not work.

Only **one** S-box for the whole cipher (simplicity).

**Rijndael: Shift Rows**


Rows shifted over different **offsets** (depending on block length).

Purpose: **diffusion** over the columns.




### Rijndael: Mix Columns


- Bytes in columns are combined **linearly**.
- Good **diffusion** properties over **rows**.



### Rijndael: Round Key Addition

Round key is simply **XOR**-ed with **state matrix**.




**Rijndael: Round Function****Rijndael: Pseudo-code**

Rijndael with 10 rounds is described by the following code:

```
AddRoundKey(S, K[0]);
for (i = 1; i <= 9; i++)
{
    SubBytes(S);
    ShiftRows(S);
    MixColumns(S);
    AddRoundKey(S, K[i]);
}
SubBytes(S);
ShiftRows(S);
AddRoundKey(S, K[10]);
```

**Rijndael: Key Schedule**

**Example:** key of 192 bits or 6 words of 32 bits.



$$W_k^{6n} = W_k^{6n-6} \oplus f(W_k^{6n-1})$$

$$W_k^i = W_k^{i-6} \oplus W_k^{i-1}$$

Cipher key expansion can be done **just-in-time**: no extra storage required.

### Comparing AES and DES

#### DES:

- S-P Network, iterated cipher, Feistel structure
- 64-bit block size, 56-bit key size
- 8 different S-boxes
- non-invertible round
- design optimised for hardware implementations
- closed (secret) design process

#### AES:

- S-P Network, iterated cipher
- 128-bit block size, 128-bit (192, 256) key size
- one S-box
- invertible round
- design optimised for byte-orientated implementations
- open design and evaluation process

## 3.3 Symmetric Cipher Security

### Attacks on Symmetric Ciphers

Modern cryptography operates under **Kerckhoff's principle**: attacker knows everything about the algorithm, only the keys are assumed to be secret.

The typical goal of an attacker is to find the key given a pair of plaintext and ciphertext (**known-plaintext attack**).

Hence, the first observation is that we must make sure that **exhaustive keysearch** does not succeed:

- Given a few plaintext/ciphertext pairs, search through **all possible keys** until the correct key is found.
- The number of keys must be **large enough**.

**Time-memory trade-off**: pre-compute a list consisting of pairs of plaintexts and ciphertexts and the associated (random) keys. During an attack this leads to a speed-up: given the plaintext, the attacker looks for it in the pre-computed list.

**Attacks on Symmetric Ciphers****Ciphertext-only attack:**

- Adversary **only** has **ciphertext** of several messages.
- Recover the plaintext or deduce the keys used during encryption.

**Known-plaintext attack:**

- Adversary has several **ciphertexts and corresponding plaintexts**.
- Deduce keys used to encrypt messages or decrypt new messages.

**Chosen-plaintext attack:**

- Adversary can **choose the plaintexts** that get encrypted.
- More powerful than known-plaintext attack, because specific plaintexts can be chosen.

**Block Size**

The block size  $n$  needs to be reasonably large,  $n > 64$  bits, to avoid:

- **Text dictionary attacks**: plaintext-ciphertext pairs for fixed key.
- **Matching ciphertext attacks**: uncover patterns in plaintext.

**Structural Attacks**

Attacks such as exhaustive key-search do not exploit any properties of the encryption algorithm.

In contrast, structural attacks such as **linear or differential cryptanalysis** do exploit structural weaknesses.

These attacks lead to important design criteria (go back to Shannon):

- Nonlinearity (in plaintext and in key input): ‘**confusion**’
- Spreading of statistics over all bits: ‘**diffusion**’

**Structural Attacks**

If ciphers are ‘**too linear**’, the following known plaintext attacks can succeed:


$$\left. \begin{array}{l} P_1 \rightarrow C_1 \\ P_2 \rightarrow C_2 \end{array} \right\} \Rightarrow (P_1 + P_2) \rightarrow (C_1 + C_2)$$

Also dangerous:

- if  $(P_1 + P_2) \rightarrow C_3 \approx (C_1 + C_2)$
- if  $(P_1 + P_2) \rightarrow (C_1 + C_2)$  with large probability.



### Structural Attacks



If  $C[1]$  is only function of  $P[1]$ ,  $K[1]$ , then the cryptanalyst can solve separate ‘sub-ciphers’.

If  $C[1]$  depends only very weakly on  $K[i]$ ,  $P[j]$ , then the cryptanalyst can solve separate problems.

### Structural Attacks

**Differential cryptanalysis:** propagation of differences:

$$\begin{array}{lcl} P_1 & \rightarrow & C_1 \\ P_1 + \delta & \rightarrow & C_1 + \epsilon \end{array}$$

Look for special values of  $\epsilon$

- Probabilistic attack.

**Linear cryptanalysis:** exploit input-output correlations

- Estimation of data complexity.

### Security of DES

**Exhaustive key search** (1 or 2 known plaintext/ciphertext pairs).

- Number of possibilities for DES is  $2^{56} = 7.2 \times 10^{16}$ .

**Software** (PC with 3.2 GHz Processor):  $2^{48}$  encryptions per year.

- $2^{23}$  keys per second,  $2^{16.4}$  seconds per day,  $2^{8.5}$  days per year.
- 1 PC: 125 years, 125 PC's: 1 year, 1500 PC's: 1 month.

**Hardware** (ASIC), Cost = \$250,000, ‘Deep Crack’ (EFF, 1998).

- 1 key in 50 hours, less than \$500 per key.
- Time halved by working in conjunction with distributed.net
- For \$1M: 1 key in 1/2 hour.

**Hardware** (FPGA), Cost = \$10,000, 'COPACABANA', 2006

- 9 days (later reduced to 6 days)
- Reduced to less than one day by successor machine 'RIVYERA'

### Security of DES

**Export from US:** 40-bit keys (SSL, Lotus Notes, S/MIME).

- Obviously much less secure.

**Moore's 'law':**

- Computing power doubles every 18 months.
- After 21 years the effective key size is reduced by **14 bits**.

**Long term:** key length and block length of **128 bits**.

### Multiple Encryption

DES is a 'standard': neither key size nor block size nor number of rounds can be changed (easily).


**Remember:** more rounds bring more security.

**Idea:** iterating the entire cipher might bring more security.

Double encryption, triple encryption, quadruple encryption, etc.

What makes most sense?


### Double Encryption



Time-memory trade-off via a **meet-in-the-middle** attack is possible:

- Pre-compute for all keys  $k_1 : C_1 = E_{k_1}(P)$ .
- Given a ciphertext  $C$ : invert  $C$  and compare with list of  $C_1$ . Hit indicates  $k_2$  and gives  $k_1$ . Check with one more  $C$ .
- Double encryption does not provide double security.

### Triple DES



Invented to get around the problem of a [short key](#).

Involves use of [2 or 3 DES keys](#).

## 3.4 Modes of Operation

### Modes of Operation

If message is longer than blocksize, block cipher can be used in a [variety of ways](#) to encrypt the plaintext.

Soon after DES was made a US Federal standard, another US standard appeared giving four [recommended ways](#) of using DES for data encryption.

These [modes of operation](#) have since been standardised internationally and can be used with any block cipher.

### ECB Mode

[ECB = Electronic Code Book](#)

[Simplest](#) approach to using a block cipher.


Plaintext  $m$  is divided into  $t$  blocks of  $n$  bits  $m_1, m_2, \dots, m_t$  (the last block is [padded](#) if necessary).

Ciphertext blocks  $c_1, \dots, c_t$  are defined as follows:


$$c_i = e_k(m_i)$$

Note that if  $m_i = m_j$  then we have  $c_i = c_j$ ; thus patterns in plaintext reappear in ciphertext.

### ECB Encipherment



### ECB Decipherment



### ECB Mode

#### Properties:

- Blocks are **independent**.
- Does not hide **patterns** or **repetitions**.
- **Error propagation**: expansion within one block.
- **Reordering** of blocks is possible without too much distortion.
- **Stereotyped beginning/ends** of messages are common.
- Susceptible to **block replay**.

**Block Replay**

Block replay:

- Extracting ciphertext corresponding to a **known** piece of plaintext.
- **Amending** other transactions to contain this known block of text.

Countermeasures against block replay:

- Extra **checksums** over a number of plaintext blocks.
- **Chaining** the cipher; this adds **context** to a block.

**CBC Mode**

CBC = Cipher Block Chaining


Plaintext  $m$  is divided into  $t$  blocks of  $n$  bits  $m_1, m_2, \dots, m_t$  (the last block is **padded** if necessary).


Encryption:

- $c_1 = e_k(m_1 \oplus IV)$ .
- $c_i = e_k(m_i \oplus c_{i-1})$  for  $i > 1$ .

Decryption:

- $m_1 = d_k(c_1) \oplus IV$ .
- $m_i = d_k(c_i) \oplus c_{i-1}$  for  $i > 1$ .

**CBC Encipherment**

**CBC Decipherment****CBC Mode****Properties:**

- Ciphertext depends on all **previous** plaintext blocks (internal memory).
- Different **IV** hides **patterns** and **repetitions**.
- **Error propagation**: expansion in one block, copied in next block.
- Decryption of one block requires only ciphertext of previous block, so CBC is **self-synchronizing**.
- Rearranging order of blocks affects decryption (not if previous ciphertext block is correct).
- **Default** mode to use.


**Padding**

**Problem**: suppose length of plaintext is not multiple of block length.


- Last block  $m_t$  only contains  $k < n$  bits.

**Padding schemes:**

- Append  $n - k$  zeroes to last block. Problem is that trailing **0**-bits of plaintext cannot be distinguished from padding.
- Append **1** and  $n - k - 1$  **0**-bits. If  $k = n$ , then create extra block starting with **1** and remaining  $n - 1$  bits **0**.
- As above, but add an extra block which contains the length of the message in bits.

**Example**


Plaintext : original picture

**Example**

Ciphertext: ECB Encryption

**Example**

Geoff Hamilton



Ciphertext: CBC Encryption

### OFB Mode


OFB = Output FeedBack

This mode enables a block cipher to be used as a [stream cipher](#).


- The block cipher creates the keystream.
- Block length for block cipher is  $n$ .
- Can choose to use keystream blocks of  $j \leq n$  bits only.
- Divide plaintext into a series of  $j$ -bit blocks  $m_1, \dots, m_t$ .
- **Encryption:**  $c_i = m_i \oplus e_i$ , where  $e_i$  is selection of  $j$  bits of 'ciphertext' generated by block cipher, starting with  $IV$  in shift register.

### OFB Encryption





### OFB Decryption



### OFB Mode

#### Properties:

- Synchronous stream cipher.
- No linking between subsequent blocks.
- Different IV necessary; otherwise insecure.
- Only uses encryption (no decryption algorithm necessary).
- If  $j < n$ : more effort per bit.

- Key stream **independent of plaintext**: can be precomputed.
- **No error propagation**: errors are only copied.

### CFB Mode

CFB = Cipher FeedBack


In **OFB Mode** the keystream is generated by:

- Encrypting the **IV**.
- Encrypting the **output** from this encryption.

In **CFB Mode** the keystream is generated by:

- Encrypting the **IV**.
- Encrypting  **$n$  bits** of ciphertext.

### CFB Encryption



### CFB Mode

Properties:

- **Self-synchronizing** stream cipher.
- Ciphertext **depends on all previous** plaintext blocks (internal memory).
- Different **IV** hides patterns and repetitions.
- Only uses **encryption** (no decryption algorithm necessary).
- If  $j < n$ : **more effort** per bit.

- **Error propagation**: propagates over  $\lceil n/j \rceil + 1$  blocks.
- **No synchronisation needed** between sender and receiver; synchronisation if  $n$  bits have been received correctly.
- Often used with  $j = 1, 8$  because of synchronisation.

### Mode Summary

	ECB	CBC	OFB	CFB
Patterns	-	+	+	+
Repetitions	-	IV	IV	IV
Block length	$n$	$n$	$j$	$j$
Error prop.	1 block	1 block + 1 bit	1 bit	$n$ bits + 1 bit
Synch.	block	block	exact	$j$ bits
Application	key enc.	default	no error prop.	synch.


Modes of operation can be used to construct other symmetric primitives based on block ciphers.

### CTR Mode

CTR = Counter

- Proposed more recently.
- Also turns the block cipher into a stream cipher.
- Enables blocks to be processed in **parallel**.
- Combines many of the advantages of ECB Mode, but with none of the disadvantages.
- Need to select a public **IV** and a different **counter  $i$**  for each message encrypted under the fixed key **k**.
- Encryption:  $c_i = m_i \oplus e_k(IV + i)$
- Unlike ECB Mode two equal blocks will **not** encrypt to the same ciphertext value.
- Also unlike ECB Mode each ciphertext block corresponds to a **precise position** within the ciphertext, as its position information is needed to be able to decrypt it successfully.

### CTR Encipherment



### Block vs Stream Ciphers

Which is best?

Block ciphers:

- **More versatile:** can be used as stream cipher.
- **Standardisation:** DES and AES + modes of operation.
- Very well studied and accepted.

Stream ciphers:

- **Easier** to do the maths.
- Either makes them easier to break or easier to study.
- Supposedly **faster** than block ciphers (less flexible).