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# Features of mental state attribution — three Q's for this discussion

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- have correctness conditions + inferential relations; although there may be some exceptions. We shd not discuss types of content.
- Bart's list:
1. they are props attitudes (and relational attitudes?)
  - 1.b form a narrative structure — talking about individual states is an abstraction (it's not like placing objects on a scale; its like mixing chemicals)
  2. associated with behavioural dispositions
  3. private but ~~fully communicable~~ (et. pain)   
 ~~no~~ — you have thoughts you can't express
  4. normative and/or normativity   
 ~~no~~ — in the sense that any one can be fully communicated; not in the sense that all can.

no magic boundary  
where you say now  
there's mental state attribution

I add: 5. regulative ideal — live it out?

6. associated with legal notions of responsibility + culpability
7. linked to, or even entirely bound up with ethical qualities (and therefore emotion)
8. according to philosophers, there is some kind of first person authority.
9. play a role in partner choice + partner selection (mention this because it's unclear where to stop — functions of m.s. attribution are endless)

type shifting:

belief attribution  
vs. what is being attributed?

10. functional role / direction of fit. = behavioral disposition.

Sources of complexity   
 Inertial principle for belief.

certificans of normativity

② Bart 2020-04-07 chd

1. mental states are somewhere (e.g. in the gut) (Discussed in the paper by Borg on polysemy in pain in M&L journal).
  2. can have higher-order beliefs and intuitions (linked to the idea that they have content).
  3. aspectuality — linked to inferential things.
- Variation between cultures indicates that it may not matter where you put them.

Commentary is model  
on the model itself.

Next Time

- Q1. Is mental state attribution a set of ideas the attributor have?
- Q2. Can we impose a partial order on these things?