

1. Recap Like You (see [E])

2. What is the thing that is like you? a subject of experience, an agent of actions

— it can't be a mental self, because this is a  $\emptyset$  of the construction of a mental self

— it must be a body, ~~or even a mm~~

3. But doesn't this conflict with accepting Husserl's idea about experiencing hearing a tone ('the hearer who hears

must be entailed: the act' of hearing (Rp 13)?

4. It seems there are two options

→ 2.1) The 'Like You'  $\emptyset$  starts from a subject of

experience and shows how this becomes a mental self in a ~~self~~ other sense, particularly int.

The self extended over time where the idea that this self is a consequence of how it thinks of itself is governing phenomena

OR  
→ 1)

Even phenomenological aspects of our experience, such as the implicit presence of a subject are really on "order" made by humans

What to say about this?

It's hard to understand how this could be a consequence of intentionality. More work needs to be done.

Bring out this idea by saying that some form of awareness, eg. vision, are perspectival. Self is not represented, but its representation is the specification of the location of the subject of experience.

I

See p

G2

can you separate awareness from

a) subject &amp; b) content?

P2 P13 challenges (a). I want to suggest

a challenge to (b).



(idea is categorical in shades

seeing hearing & c are modes  
of awareness so the addition  
picture may not work)

G2 picture is additive

have seeing, hearing or what?

then kind 'awareness' to object &amp;

get the aware-seeing

Q. Can the addition picture accommodate  
the idea that phenomenology has structure?Basic contrast: being a friend is  
not a matter of being a part with some  
additional feature(could contrast Merleau-Ponty's art & use  
Duchamp images)

II

see p 16

Like you

What is like you?

This body (could be a subject, a mental self)

But doesn't this conflict with the interpretation

of Brentano on which the subject is implicitly

present?

Is this Merleau-Ponty's that even the phenomenal character  
of our experience is "an artifact made by humans"?

So that the implicit mental self in experience is

only possible because of social interaction?

III


Which might be brought  
out by saying that  
some experience, e.g.  
typical visual experience  
are perspectival?Self not represented but  
pov is specified

G2 meets John Campbell

don't explicit like this

See p 11  
11-13  
14-16

## PRELIMINARIES



1.  $C^*$  is a model of



2. The model may not be accurate, but it is causally influential

3. The model self & answer are consequences of the existence of these models

4. The model's ~~act~~ look in two directions: others & self (They are agnostic about who they describe).

-2.  $P_2$  &  $G_2$  emphasize we need to what it is for (use  $G_2$  figure).

-1. Two ways of coming to be able to think about things

- a) seeing the apple enables you to think about it (but not when you see it w/o awareness)
- b) having a theory or being told about it, enables you to think about it.

Q How could seeing & merely being aware of it enable you to think about it?

5 Now you might say this is a virtue of the theory —

it explains many ~~good~~ dispositions to say things about awareness including the disposition to say that it looks our thoughts to particular objects. → The "beautiful ghost" is indeed something that ~~as~~ makes it possible for our thoughts to be anchored to the world; but in cold, hard material terms there are just layers upon layers of information processing.

6. I contrasted things like

the feeling of familiarity, the sensation that someone is looking at you from behind  
the sting of a nettle

with  
seeing a rock is green upon, or  
hearing a tone

The contrast was that the former only acquainted with objects via a theory of some kind, whereas the latter involve no such theory

I think this is (a) not a contrast that is typically

featured in everyday, commonsense thinking about awareness, but (b) a contrast in the nature of the states themselves

Also (c) you can't get this contrast

Why Categorical vs shades — diff in nature of experience entails diff in ability to do things like match samples  
from memory that "awareness" is an attention relation. (After all, you can attend to both ~~extraneous~~ feeling of familiarity and the object etc.)

So there is a difference between the above use of awareness and its actual nature



[9]

- 1.
- 0

Feeling of familiarity; being stung by a nettle  
 i.e. seeing a rock in the ordinary way

Toad — whether it's right or wrong is relative to  
 selection of each. There is not possibility of error  
 from the toad's point of view; everything depends on  
 the point of view of an interpreter.

*The toad's connection to this world is merely causal*

Two ways of being able to  
 think about things  
 1. I saw the apple  
 so can think about it;  
 you only know it causally,  
 via my descriptions of it  
 but  
 how could seeing  
 an apple enable us  
 to think about it?

Awareness is involved in both cases, but only in one case is it  
 revelatory — only in one case does it enable us to  
 think about things.

-2. Both emphasize we  
 need to know what  
 awareness is for?  
 3. Ge's picture: p. 47. 'Strictly speaking you are not deciding and  
 reporting on the role itself. You are deciding and reporting on  
 the information in your visual system.'

1. This highlights a disconnection. On Ge's G, (a) awareness does  
 give us the sense of a relation between object and our thought (because  
 the model involves us standing in a relation to things; but (b) this is, in a  
 sense, an illusion. Awareness of objects does not seem to anchor thought  
 to the world, it is just a matter of outer layers of information processing.

So on this view we are like the toad: our connection to this world is merely  
 causal; we would not be mistaken if we thought our world is false, if we were transported to a good material  
 fragment of the universe

What is the contact?

To get to the nettle we need a theory!  
 Experience is not enough, likewise  
 in the case of familiarity. There is  
 a sensation and a guess concerning  
 what it is a sensation of

But seeing the rock or the apple or hearing  
 the tone, we are related to the object in  
 a way that makes thought possible.

Campbell's G: How could experience of  
 'spots' enable us to think about them?

Mirror 'affords' "that the self can emerge from this"

How Like you?

Start with self-0.1 as physical object

You act, and mirror my actions ... I act

self 0.2 - an agent

You think, and mirror my thoughts ... I think

self 0.3 - a thinker

Regulation, social regulation of the self

i) the same faculties are constructed

ii) construction depends on mirroring - so  
on how your mind appears to reflect mine (21)

Where they put company? The subject

Greisano (p30) answers second  
specify who's aware



Prinz (p. 14) : Q's about "mental  
experience" because q's about the mental  
act — i.e. the issue is all about getting  
the self into the picture.

He also claims his Q is "about  
the know Q's just the know" (Grp. 135)  
— but why? What justifies this?



Example II

You can talk the talk but you don't understand what you are talking about  
— you are merely playing games with symbols

Chess is what makes the difference; its function is to anchor thought to the world

Graziano awareness of a green object


1. information about colour
2. attention to colour
3. information about (2), the act of attending
4. The information in (1) & (2) is bound to the object (feature binding)
5. That this occurs constitutes the awareness of the greenness

What could go wrong? No self — Prinz! (See p 30).  
But maybe we can fix that in by ref to Prinz later.

What else could go wrong?

(There's a nice puzzle about why my being aware of something differs phenomenologically ~~from~~ from my being aware of you being aware of it — see chapter)

Categorical vs shades. There is awareness in both cases but it is different.



Why do you see the  $\bigcirc$  as green?  
Because it's bound to that feature

Why are you aware of  $\bigcirc$ ?

Because it's bound to ATTENDED, the feature (relational feature) as object has when an agent attends to it.

What are the questions? What are they seeking to explain?

P2 p. xiii: How does a mental reference and what may it be good for

What ~~does~~ is subjectivity or awareness ~~experience~~ <sup>for</sup>?

a) self- and other-control

P2: to enable social control (P. 12)

b) prediction and explanation


These are both "more & better" views - conscious experience enables humans to do things better with than without

Broad common feature of the theories:

We have a model, or family of models;

these can be used to predict & explain Shui behaviour

When they are turned inward, we get subjectivity or awareness.



Graziano

p44 we can decide whether we are aware

Both theories imply that we must be able to make it the case that we are aware.

But can we? Doesn't the point about categorical colour properties show precisely that we can't?

No because we are aware of the categorical colour properties in some sense. What's shown is maybe a difference between modes of awareness — one can be gained by fiat, the other not.

~~The subject?~~

## 2] Budapest conference

④ What is the artefact or description

What constitutes subjectivity or awareness?

Prinz

~~How does a mental self emerge~~

Graziano

A description of attention

⑤ Graziano ( & Prinz ) assume there is one thing, a unifying principle to find. But is

there? Modes of even - visually aware

is self-consciously thinking about the awareness of action ...

Cf perception + sensory modalities

Gr. p. 110

S + A + X

What's missing here exactly is the mode of awareness. The focus on


attention makes it hard to see how there could ever be such a thing. How does mode of awareness get into the model?

⑥

What is awareness or subjectivity for? Both stress the importance of this? (Prinz, Gr.)

Prinz

Graziano





## ② Prinz

"subjectivity is an artifact made by humans" (2013, p. 1111)  
"People have a self in the same sense..."

## Gratziano

"awareness is a constructed feature" (p. 34)  
"awareness is information" (p. 19)  
"described, not produced" (p. 60)  
"There is no subjective feeling inside..." (p. 70-1)  
"The brain constructs a description of awareness, not the thing itself" (p. 25)

## ③

Both Mermin face a challenge: aren't you running out on the awareness itself, rather than the and only describing how we come to talk or have beliefs about it?  
& Both give roughly the same response:

"You can decide what you have... an awareness of something" (Gratziano p. 45)  
"except when nuanced, open claim: p. 57 — doesn't make relative awareness exist."

## ④ What is to be explained?

Might compare Prinz' on having a form is

Gratziano on experiencing

Gratziano (p. 20)

But I'm worried the driving questions are different (Prinz is about the self, Gratziano is about awareness) see [4]

— maybe the cog about not experiencing green rather than maybe it shows Merri something arising from one or another act

Prinz says he is an essential component aware  
Gratziano p. 30: awareness classifies specificity who is aware

(an agent...)

(p. 35) How possible that talking makes it so?