Proposal: Make OCSP Optional, Require CRLs, and Incentivize Automatio… (

#441)

* Proposal: Make OCSP Optional, Require CRLs, and Incentivize Automation / Short-Lived Certificates (#414)

* Profiles WIP

* Clarify AIA based on 2021-06-12 call

AIA allows multiple methods, and multiple instances of each method.
However, client implementations use the ordering to indicate priority,
as per RFC 5280, so clarify the requirements for multiple
AccessDescriptions with the same accessMethod.

* Address basicConstraints for OCSP Responder feedback

Rather than make basicConstraints MUST, make it a MAY, to allow
omission (plus v3) or presence (but empty) to indicate that it is not
a CA certificate.

* Address the "any other value" situations with 7.1.2.4 language

This adopts the language from 7.1.2.4 to the various extensibility
points, by trying to explicitly clarify as appropriate as to what is
permitted.

* Fix the certificatePolicies mismatched highlighted by Corey

* Change SHOULD NOT to NOT RECOMMENDED

While RFC 2119 establishes that these two phrases are semantically
equivalent, it's been suggested that this may resolve some anxiety
around misinterpretations of SHOULD NOT as SHALL NOT, particularly
by auditors.

By changing this to NOT RECOMMENDED, the same guidance is preserved,
but it hopefully makes it more palatable to CAs.

See https://github.com/sleevi/cabforum-docs/pull/36/files#r856429830
for related discussion.

* Remove dnsSRV and cleanup otherName handling

This removes the (buggy) description of DNS SRV and leaves it overall
as a SHOULD NOT and in scope of the (existing) 7.1.4.2 requirements.
It also fixes up a typo (extension OID -> type-id)

* Formatting fix

* Move the Non-TLS EKU requirement into the Non-TLS profile

Originally it was part of the common fields, when there were multiple
variations of non-TLS CAs. However, as there is only a single
reference to this section, fold it in to the non-TLS profile.

This hopefully makes it clearer about the EKU requirements for
non-TLS CAs (being what defines something as non-TLS), and reduces
some confusion around non-TLS and TLS common sections.

* Redo Certificate Policies for Non-TLS CAs

The existing language was buggy, in that a link target was updated, but
not the section heading. However, it was further buggy due to the
interactions between Affiliated and Non-Affiliated CAs.

This overhauls it in line with the November and F2F discussions; unlike
many of the other extensions in this section (which are dictated by RFC
5280 as being mandatory for certain situations), certificatePolicies is
not, so this is demoted to a MAY.

However, the language from RFC 5280 does set out some guidance - such
as not recommending that a policyQualifier be present - and so that
requirement is preserved, under the argument that a non-TLS CA should
still align with RFC 5280 if issued under a BR CA.

This does *remove* an existing BR requirement, namely those inherited
from Section 7.1.6.3, but since that seemed to align with the intent
of the SCWG, this should be a positive change.

* Naming Cleanup

This moves the metadata prohibition and domain name prohibition from
applying to all certificates to only applying to Subscriber certificates
(and in particular, to IV/OV/EV).

This also corrects the organizationalUnit name to reflect SC47v2.

* Formatting & Section Heading fixes

This fixes a few unnumbered sections (around validity periods)
and adjusts the formatting for several tables to better accomodate
the text.

* Fix a bug in non-TLS technically constrained CAs

For non-TLS CAs, don't allow them to assert the BR's CP OIDs,
as the certificates will not be BR compliant.

* Redo Certificate Policies

This reworks the presentation and format of the certificatePolicies
extensions, better aligning to the BRs, and hopefully providing
sufficient clarity:

Relaxations:

- Reserved Policy OID is * no longer* required to be first, but is
  RECOMMENDED (SHOULD).
- The separation of "Affiliated" and "Unaffiliated" for certificate
  policies is removed. This was introduced for Cross-Certified
  Sub-CAs, but resulted in some ambiguity about what happens when a
  Technically Constrained (non-TLS or nameConstraints) Sub-CA is
  operated by a non-Affiliated entity. The requirements around
  Affiliation are now folded into a common section, rather than being
  two sections.
- Although not permitted by the current BRs, the cPSuri is now
  explicitly allowed for all certificate policies (_including_ for
  anyPolicy).
- anyPolicy is now explicitly permitted (but NOT RECOMMENDED) for
  OCSP Responders
- Reserved CABF OIDs are now explicitly permitted (but NOT RECOMMENDED)
  for OCSP Responders.

Clarifications:
- A note is added to the OCSP Responder section explaining that
  because CPs limit the validity and purposes of a certificate, it
  becomes possible to create an "invalid" responder that clients will
  reject (and thus also reject responses), and that this is part of
  the reason for forbidding.
- For TLS certificates, the requirements for CPs for sub-CAs versus
  leaf certificates had a slightly different wording: whether a given
  CP needed to be documented by the CA (e.g. could be any policy,
  including a reserved CP or anyPolicy) or needed to be _defined_ and
  documented by the CA (i.e. must be from the CA's own OID arc). This
  harmonizes the language for TLS ("defined by"), while still leaving a
  fairly large carveout for non-TLS ("documented").

* Minor fixes and cleanups (#399)

* Add order and encoding requirement for DC attribute

* Remove overly specific Cross-cert requirement; fix serialNumber encoding

* Clarify NC exclusion

* Remove "Domain Name or IP Address" validation requirement for now

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>

* Integrate newer ballots (#406)

* Update README (#294)

Co-authored-by: Jos Purvis <jopurvis@cisco.com>

* Adjust the workflow file to build the actions (#296)

This addresses a few requests that recently came up from the certificate
profiles work:

- Remove the explicit retention period (of 21 days) to allow the GitHub
  default of 90 days.
- Change the generated ZIP file from being "BR.md-hash" to being
  "BR-hash".
- Allow manually invoking the workflow (via workflow_dispatch), in the
  event folks want to re-run for a particular branch (e.g. profiles)
- Attempt to resolve the "non-deterministic redline" noted by Jos. When
  a given commit is on cabforum/servercert, it may be both a commit (to
  a branch) and part of a pull request (to main). We want the pull
  request redline to be against main, while the commit redline to be
  against the previous commit. Because both jobs run, and both upload
  the same file name, this results in a non-deterministic clobbering,
  where the commit-redline may clobber the pr-redline. This changes
  the generated zip file to be "file-hash-event_type", so that it
  will generate redlines for both PRs and commits and attach both.

* SC47 Sunset subject:organizationalUnitName (#282) (#290)

* SC47 Sunset subject:organizationalUnitName (#282)

* Deprecation of subject:organizationalUnitName

* Update language to avoid confusion on the effective date

This version updates SC47 to state "issued on or after September 1, 2022" and makes the EV Guidelines reference the BRs as suggested by Ryan Sleevi from Google.

Co-authored-by: Paul van Brouwershaven <vanbroup@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ryan Sleevi <ryan.sleevi@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Jos Purvis <jopurvis@cisco.com>

* SC47 datefix (#298)

* Update dates table

* Update EVG.md

Add SC47 reference to relevant dates table

* Fixup section number in prior commit

Co-authored-by: Jos Purvis <jopurvis@cisco.com>
Co-authored-by: Wayne Thayer <wthayer@gmail.com>

* SC48 - Domain Name and IP Address Encoding (#285) (#302)

* SC48 - Domain Name and IP Address Encoding (#285)

* First pass

* Add more RFC references, some wordsmithing

* Another few fixes

* Switch to use "LDH Labels"

* Propose concrete effective date

* Clarification about root zone trailing dot

* Replace "label" with "Domain Label" throughout (#1)

Replace "label" with "Domain Label" and "domain name" with "Domain Name" throughout

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>
Co-authored-by: Ryan Sleevi <ryan.sleevi@gmail.com>

* Fix double negative

* Fix redundant "if the"

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>
Co-authored-by: Ryan Sleevi <ryan.sleevi@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Jos <castillar@melete.org>

* Wrap xn-- to prevent ligaturization

* SC48 - Domain Name and IP Address Encoding (#285)

* First pass

* Add more RFC references, some wordsmithing

* Another few fixes

* Switch to use "LDH Labels"

* Propose concrete effective date

* Clarification about root zone trailing dot

* Replace "label" with "Domain Label" throughout (#1)

Replace "label" with "Domain Label" and "domain name" with "Domain Name" throughout

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>
Co-authored-by: Ryan Sleevi <ryan.sleevi@gmail.com>

* Fix double negative

* Fix redundant "if the"

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>
Co-authored-by: Ryan Sleevi <ryan.sleevi@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Jos <castillar@melete.org>

* Wrap xn-- to prevent ligaturization

* Update dates and version numbers

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.j.bonnell@outlook.com>
Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>
Co-authored-by: Ryan Sleevi <ryan.sleevi@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Jos Purvis <jopurvis@cisco.com>

* Ballot SC50 - Remove the requirements of 4.1.1 (#328)

* SC50 - Remove the requirements of 4.1.1 (#323)

* Bump cairosvg from 1.0.20 to 2.5.1

Bumps [cairosvg](https://github.com/Kozea/CairoSVG) from 1.0.20 to 2.5.1.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/Kozea/CairoSVG/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/Kozea/CairoSVG/blob/master/NEWS.rst)
- [Commits](Kozea/CairoSVG@1.0.20...2.5.1)

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>

* Bump kramdown from 2.3.0 to 2.3.1

Bumps [kramdown](https://github.com/gettalong/kramdown) from 2.3.0 to 2.3.1.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/gettalong/kramdown/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/gettalong/kramdown/blob/master/doc/news.page)
- [Commits](https://github.com/gettalong/kramdown/commits)

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>

* Remove 4.1.1; persist compromised keys in 6.1.1.3

Remove section 4.1.1 from the BRs
Explicitly require persistent access to compromised keys

* Rebase based on upstream/main

* Move System requirement to 6.1.1.3

* Add 4.1.1 as blank

* Remove capitalization from 6.1.1.3 where terms are not defined

* Re-add 'No stipulation.' to 4.1.1

* Remove change to 6.1.1.3

Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Clint Wilson <clintw@apple.com>

* Update version and date table

Co-authored-by: Clint Wilson <clint@wilsonovi.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Clint Wilson <clintw@apple.com>
Co-authored-by: Jos Purvis <jopurvis@cisco.com>

* Ballot SC53: Sunset SHA-1 for OCSP signing (#330) (#338)

* Sunset SHA-1 for OCSP signing (#330)

* Sunset SHA-1 OCSP signing

* Clarify necessity of both items

* Standardize date format, fix year in effective date table

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>

* Update version, table, and date

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.j.bonnell@outlook.com>
Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>
Co-authored-by: Jos Purvis <jopurvis@cisco.com>

* Bump actions/checkout from 2 to 3 (#342)

Bumps [actions/checkout](https://github.com/actions/checkout) from 2 to 3.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/checkout/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/actions/checkout/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](actions/checkout@v2...v3)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: actions/checkout
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>

Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* Ballot SC51: Reduce and Clarify Log and Records Archival Retention Requirements (#347)

* Ballot SC51: Reduce and Clarify Audit Log and Records Archival Retention Requirements  (#336)

* Bump cairosvg from 1.0.20 to 2.5.1

Bumps [cairosvg](https://github.com/Kozea/CairoSVG) from 1.0.20 to 2.5.1.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/Kozea/CairoSVG/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/Kozea/CairoSVG/blob/master/NEWS.rst)
- [Commits](Kozea/CairoSVG@1.0.20...2.5.1)

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>

* Bump kramdown from 2.3.0 to 2.3.1

Bumps [kramdown](https://github.com/gettalong/kramdown) from 2.3.0 to 2.3.1.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/gettalong/kramdown/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/gettalong/kramdown/blob/master/doc/news.page)
- [Commits](https://github.com/gettalong/kramdown/commits)

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>

* Restructure  parts of 5.4.x and 5.5.x

* Use 'events' consistently in 5.4.1

* Forgot to remove "revocation" as condition for start of retention period of Subscriber Certificates.

* Introduce possessive in 5.4.1 and 5.5.1 to better deliniate responsiblities of CAs using DTPs

* Remove WIP title;

* re-order list in 5.5.2; add 'or' clause to validation documentation archival list entry.

* Incorporate feedback from Aaron and Dimitris in Servercert-wg Discussion Period

Based on the feedback from Aaron here (https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2022-January/003115.html) and here (https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2022-January/003125.html), update 5.5.1 and 5.5.2.
Based on the feedback from Dimitris here (https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2022-January/003110.html), update 5.4.3 and 5.5.2.

* Update link formatting in 5.4.1

The "Section" links throughout include the word "Section" in the link, except for in 5.4.1; this fixes that inconsistency.

Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Clint Wilson <clintw@apple.com>

* Update effective date and version number

* Update ballot table in document

* Fix date string

Co-authored-by: Clint Wilson <clint@wilsonovi.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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Co-authored-by: Jos Purvis <jopurvis@cisco.com>

* Ballot SC54: Onion Cleanup (#369)

* SC-54: Onion cleanup (#348)

The voting on ballot SC54 has completed, and the ballot has passed.

Voting Results
Certificate Issuers
votes total, with no abstentions:
18 Yes votes: Amazon, Buypass, DigiCert, eMudhra, Entrust, GDCA, GlobalSign, GoDaddy, HARICA, Izenpe, JPRS, NAVER, OISTE, Sectigo, SwissSign, TrustCor, SecureTrust, Visa
0 No Votes
0 Abstentions
Certificate Consumers
6 votes total, with no abstentions:
6 Yes votes: 360, Apple, Cisco, Google, Microsoft, Mozilla
0 No votes
0 Abstentions

Bylaw Requirements
1.     Bylaw 2.3(f) requires:
·      A "yes" vote by two-thirds of Certificate Issuer votes and by 50%-plus-one of Certificate Consumer votes. Votes to abstain are not counted for this purpose.
This requirement was MET for Certificate Issuers and MET for Certificate Consumers.
·      At least one Certificate Issuer and one Certificate Consumer Member must vote in favor of a ballot for the ballot to be adopted.
This requirement was MET.
2.    Bylaw 2.3(g) requires that a ballot result only be considered valid when “more than half of the number of currently active Members has participated”. Votes to abstain are counted in determining quorum. Half of the currently active members at the start of voting was 14, so the quorum was 15 for this ballot.
This requirement was MET.

This ballot now enters the IP Rights Review Period to permit members to review the ballot for relevant IP rights issues.

——

* Addresses #270 allowing method 3.2.2.4.20 for `.onion` domains.

* Addresses #242 creating an exception for `.onion` domains, using existing language from the opening section of 3.2.2.4.

* Addresses #241 removing the currently deprecated Domain validation method 3.2.2.4.6.

* Addresses #240. Things are signed using private, not public keys.

* Addresses #190, #191. According to #191 (comment),  effectively 2021-10-15 is when v2 stops working everywhere. We could proceed without an effective date, remove most of Appendix F in the EV Guidelines and point to Appendix B of the Baseline Requirements directly. No strong feelings either way.

* This is a mitigation against a malicious CA but the Applicant ultimately creates the Nonce.
We agreed with Corey and Wayne to propose the removal of the  requirement for the CA to *confirm* entropy.

* Update language to deprecate legacy Appendix F validation method with "immediate" effect, after the ballot clears IPR (30 days after voting).

* remove double space

* Remove EVG Appendix F, introduce Onion Domain Name term

* A few more minor tweaks

* Fix numbering

* Update for easier read.

* Revert "Update for easier read."

This reverts commit 1bac785.

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>

* SC-54: Onion cleanup (#348)

The voting on ballot SC54 has completed, and the ballot has passed.

Voting Results
Certificate Issuers
votes total, with no abstentions:
18 Yes votes: Amazon, Buypass, DigiCert, eMudhra, Entrust, GDCA, GlobalSign, GoDaddy, HARICA, Izenpe, JPRS, NAVER, OISTE, Sectigo, SwissSign, TrustCor, SecureTrust, Visa
0 No Votes
0 Abstentions
Certificate Consumers
6 votes total, with no abstentions:
6 Yes votes: 360, Apple, Cisco, Google, Microsoft, Mozilla
0 No votes
0 Abstentions

Bylaw Requirements
1.     Bylaw 2.3(f) requires:
·      A "yes" vote by two-thirds of Certificate Issuer votes and by 50%-plus-one of Certificate Consumer votes. Votes to abstain are not counted for this purpose.
This requirement was MET for Certificate Issuers and MET for Certificate Consumers.
·      At least one Certificate Issuer and one Certificate Consumer Member must vote in favor of a ballot for the ballot to be adopted.
This requirement was MET.
2.    Bylaw 2.3(g) requires that a ballot result only be considered valid when “more than half of the number of currently active Members has participated”. Votes to abstain are counted in determining quorum. Half of the currently active members at the start of voting was 14, so the quorum was 15 for this ballot.
This requirement was MET.

This ballot now enters the IP Rights Review Period to permit members to review the ballot for relevant IP rights issues.

——

* Addresses #270 allowing method 3.2.2.4.20 for `.onion` domains.

* Addresses #242 creating an exception for `.onion` domains, using existing language from the opening section of 3.2.2.4.

* Addresses #241 removing the currently deprecated Domain validation method 3.2.2.4.6.

* Addresses #240. Things are signed using private, not public keys.

* Addresses #190, #191. According to #191 (comment),  effectively 2021-10-15 is when v2 stops working everywhere. We could proceed without an effective date, remove most of Appendix F in the EV Guidelines and point to Appendix B of the Baseline Requirements directly. No strong feelings either way.

* This is a mitigation against a malicious CA but the Applicant ultimately creates the Nonce.
We agreed with Corey and Wayne to propose the removal of the  requirement for the CA to *confirm* entropy.

* Update language to deprecate legacy Appendix F validation method with "immediate" effect, after the ballot clears IPR (30 days after voting).

* remove double space

* Remove EVG Appendix F, introduce Onion Domain Name term

* A few more minor tweaks

* Fix numbering

* Update for easier read.

* Revert "Update for easier read."

This reverts commit 1bac785.

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>

* Update version numbers and dates

Co-authored-by: Dimitris Zacharopoulos <dzacharo@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>
Co-authored-by: Jos Purvis <jopurvis@cisco.com>

* Integrate SC-48 CN requirements

Co-authored-by: Jos <castillar@melete.org>
Co-authored-by: Jos Purvis <jopurvis@cisco.com>
Co-authored-by: Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com>
Co-authored-by: Paul van Brouwershaven <vanbroup@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ryan Sleevi <ryan.sleevi@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Wayne Thayer <wthayer@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>
Co-authored-by: Clint Wilson <clint@wilsonovi.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Clint Wilson <clintw@apple.com>
Co-authored-by: Dimitris Zacharopoulos <dzacharo@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update BR.md

Create dedicated branch and sync with "profiles" branch (as of Jan 17, 2023).

* Update BR.md

Address Comments:
- #402 (comment) (added "CRL")
- #414 (comment) (as suggested)

* Align with BRs

Inadvertent numbering change.

* Update BR.md

Add consideration for a phased reduction of short-lived subscriber certificate validity. 

(in response to #414 (comment))

* Update BR.md

Cleaning-up proposal in advance of discussion.

* Update EVG.md

[clean-up diff, this file was not intentionally modified in the PR]

* Update BR.md

[clean-up]

* Update BR.md

[cleanup]

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

begin integrating SC-61 language.

* integrate sc61

* Update BR.md

continue tweaking to include sc61

* Update BR.md

improve readability

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

correct spelling error

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

typo

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Improve specificity of CRL issuance frequency

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

Typo (thanks, Wendy!)

* Update docs/BR.md

Editorial

Co-authored-by: Aaron Gable <aaron@aarongable.com>

* Update docs/BR.md

Editorial

Co-authored-by: Aaron Gable <aaron@aarongable.com>

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

Address comment from Aaron: "I'm not in favor of allowing CRLs to remain non-updated for 7 days because that is a regression from current OCSP behavior. Section 4.9.10.(4) makes it so that updated revocation information is always available "no later than four days after the thisUpdate". Therefore, a CA operating in a CRLs-only mode should be required to update their CRLs at least once every 4 days."

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update docs/BR.md

Co-authored-by: Dimitris Zacharopoulos <dzacharo@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update docs/BR.md

Co-authored-by: Dimitris Zacharopoulos <dzacharo@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update BR.md

"twenty four" -> "twenty-four"

* Update BR.md

* Add provision to handle nonces per RFC8954

* Update BR.md

Improve readability.

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

CAs issuing CA certificates should publish a new CRL if _any_ certificate is revoked, not just CA certificates.

This change is intended to force CRL publication in the event that a delegated OCSP responder's certificate was revoked (for example, due to key compromise).

* Address comment from Rob

* Clean up language

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Address formatting nits

* Address table formatting nits.

* Remove redundant language re: nextUpdate

* Clarify use of "unspecified" CRL Reason Code

* Clarify IDP

* (Further) Clarify IDP

* Update BR.md

Make sure that where the word "Certificate" was introduced in this proposal, it is capitalized correctly.

* Update BR.md

Nits.

---------

Co-authored-by: Ryan Sleevi <rsleevi@chromium.org>
Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.j.bonnell@outlook.com>
Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>
Co-authored-by: Jos <castillar@melete.org>
Co-authored-by: Jos Purvis <jopurvis@cisco.com>
Co-authored-by: Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com>
Co-authored-by: Paul van Brouwershaven <vanbroup@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ryan Sleevi <ryan.sleevi@gmail.com>
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Co-authored-by: Aaron Gable <aaron@aarongable.com>

* Update BR.md

---------

Co-authored-by: Ryan Dickson <ryan.dickson@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Ryan Sleevi <rsleevi@chromium.org>
Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.j.bonnell@outlook.com>
Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>
Co-authored-by: Jos <castillar@melete.org>
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