AIA allows multiple methods, and multiple instances of each method.
However, client implementations use the ordering to indicate priority,
as per RFC 5280, so clarify the requirements for multiple
AccessDescriptions with the same accessMethod.

Rather than make basicConstraints MUST, make it a MAY, to allow
omission (plus v3) or presence (but empty) to indicate that it is not
a CA certificate.

As captured on
https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/validation/2021-July/001675.html
provide better guidance for the encoding of cRLDistributionPoints and
the permitted protocols.

Non-TLS CAs MUST NOT include id-kp-OCSPSigning, since this would
potentially make them OCSP signers for the issuing CA. Similarly,
with respect to non-TLS CAs, it's fine (and useful!) to use other
EKUs, so this is a MAY (or possibly SHOULD), not a SHOULD NOT.

A Precertificate Signing CA, ontologically, a type of Technically
Constrained Non-TLS Sub-CA, by virtue of the Extended Key Usage. To
avoid ambiguity, this introduces a profile specific for Precert Signing
CAs that make it clear that the Precert Signing EKU MUST be the only EKU
present, to avoid a situation similar to that seen with OCSP responders.

RFC 6962 is somewhat fast and loose with respect to whether or not
"CA:true" is required in the profile for these, but in practice,
implementations of logs, and existing CAs, do expect CA:true.

Although not meant to be a normative change from the existing practices
and consequences of existing requirements, it does make explicit that
such CAs MUST only sign Precertificates; although this is less critical
given the EKU constraint (to being a singular EKU), it represents a
defense in depth approach consistent with existing practice.

As pointed out by DigiCert, postal code represents a greater enclosing
area than the street address, and thus hierarchically should appear
first.

They were accidentally a MUST, when they should have been a MAY. Bad
copy/paste.

Move the effective date to 6 months from now; will likely continue to
move as we finalize things, but offers a placeholder to handling
effective dates.

As pointed out by Corey, an id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck should be expected to
disable all revocation checking (not just recursive OCSP revocation
checking), so it makes sense to MUST NOT the cRLDP for the OCSP
Responder, since we MUST nocheck.

This introduces the notion of Precertificates and Precertificate
Signing CAs as part of the Profiles, and captures the existing
requirements from RFC 6962. It defines a Precertificate as based
on a transformation of an existing Certificate conforming to one
of the profiles, as opposed to attempting to define variants for
every version or how to construct a Precertificate for a given
profile.

This attempts to similarly capture that, for purposes of compliance,
a Precertificate is treated as if there is an equivalent Certificate,
by reflecting that Precertificates need to match a Certificate based
on the transformations defined, and that the Certificates need to
match the profiles defined.

This attempts to clarify when/how backdating is allowed, particularly
since it may affect path building. It gives a generous period for CA
backdating when the distinguishedName remains the same, but may be
imperfect if the keys are changing.

This adopts the language from 7.1.2.4 to the various extensibility
points, by trying to explicitly clarify as appropriate as to what is
permitted.

While RFC 2119 establishes that these two phrases are semantically
equivalent, it's been suggested that this may resolve some anxiety
around misinterpretations of SHOULD NOT as SHALL NOT, particularly
by auditors.

By changing this to NOT RECOMMENDED, the same guidance is preserved,
but it hopefully makes it more palatable to CAs.

See https://github.com/sleevi/cabforum-docs/pull/36/files#r856429830
for related discussion.

This restructures the naming rules to try to clarify:
- That technically constrained non-TLS sub-CAs are in-scope, but the
  certificates they issue are not
- That the rules about byte-for-byte apply for all certificates in
  scope
- That the requirements for the ordering and sequencing of names is
  a forward-dated requirement. Although it can be argued that some
  of these are existing requirements, avoid any messiness by
  structuring it holistically.
- Adds a note to 7.1.4 to call out that 7.1.2.2.1 provides an
  exception
- State the exception in 7.1.2.2.1 both normatively and informatively,
  to try and avoid misinterpretation.

This was based on Corey's feedback in
https://github.com/sleevi/cabforum-docs/pull/36/files#r689880007

This removes the (buggy) description of DNS SRV and leaves it overall
as a SHOULD NOT and in scope of the (existing) 7.1.4.2 requirements.
It also fixes up a typo (extension OID -> type-id)

Originally it was part of the common fields, when there were multiple
variations of non-TLS CAs. However, as there is only a single
reference to this section, fold it in to the non-TLS profile.

This hopefully makes it clearer about the EKU requirements for
non-TLS CAs (being what defines something as non-TLS), and reduces
some confusion around non-TLS and TLS common sections.

The existing language was buggy, in that a link target was updated, but
not the section heading. However, it was further buggy due to the
interactions between Affiliated and Non-Affiliated CAs.

This overhauls it in line with the November and F2F discussions; unlike
many of the other extensions in this section (which are dictated by RFC
5280 as being mandatory for certain situations), certificatePolicies is
not, so this is demoted to a MAY.

However, the language from RFC 5280 does set out some guidance - such
as not recommending that a policyQualifier be present - and so that
requirement is preserved, under the argument that a non-TLS CA should
still align with RFC 5280 if issued under a BR CA.

This does *remove* an existing BR requirement, namely those inherited
from Section 7.1.6.3, but since that seemed to align with the intent
of the SCWG, this should be a positive change.

This makes the requirement for the Reserved Policy Identifier
to be the first policyIdentifier optional, while explaining with
a note the basis for that logic. To avoid confusion, it makes it
clear that only one instance of a Reserved Policy Identifier may
be present (e.g. can't be simultaneously OV and EV)

This incorporates Corey's
sleevi@04c55a4

The approach to SKI uniqueness was flagged as ambigous, and two options
were presented:
  - Option 1, mandate the SKI generation algorithm
  - Option 2, clarify that it's only unique "for the CA"

Option 2 still has security risks with respect to denial of service,
but CAs were unsure about when Option 1 would b eimplementable (e.g.
if mandating SHA-2, CA software that uses SHA-1 would need to be
updated).

For now, this goes with Option 2, although a mandatory algorithm would
resolve the issues wholesale.

This is adapted from Corey Bonnell's
sleevi@41cb306

This adopts a 48 hour window, as proposed in
sleevi@816ad7a

This moves the metadata prohibition and domain name prohibition from
applying to all certificates to only applying to Subscriber certificates
(and in particular, to IV/OV/EV).

This also corrects the organizationalUnit name to reflect SC47v2.

This only affects the certificatePolicies for OCSP Responders and
the naming rules (for all certificates), but shifts to a harmonized
date.

This fixes a few unnumbered sections (around validity periods)
and adjusts the formatting for several tables to better accomodate
the text.

Fixup the OU field

For non-TLS CAs, don't allow them to assert the BR's CP OIDs,
as the certificates will not be BR compliant.

In order for the precertificate signing CA to be considered
technically constrained, restrict its EKU to only permitting it
to issue precertificates.

Additionally, add a cross-reference and tweak a MAY to a may, as the
paragraph that follows the MAY contains the actual normative
requirement, and this is just an informative explainer.

rfc822Name is allowed, and described, in 7.1.2.10.9, as its a
translation of the requirements of 3.2.2.4/3.2.2.5/7.1.2.4 of the
existing BRs, and there are some CA profiles that allow non-TLS
EKUs to be present (for ex, cross-certification).

For technically constrained TLS sub-CAs, it was originally present
because of Mozilla Root Store Policy, Section 1.1, which requires
out-of-scope CAs to constrain on that name type. However, since
a TCSC TLS CA MUST NOT include EKUs other than serverAuth &
clientAuth, it was seen as unnecessary to even allow rfc822Name.

This clarifies the language around precerts by:

* harmonizing on 'corresponding Certificate' instead of 'equivalent
  Certificate'
* changing 'byte-for-byte equivalent' to 'byte-for-byte identical'
  to avoid any ambiguity
* Rewording the AKI section when using a Precert Signing CA, to avoid
  stating the same requirement several ways that might be read as
  giving conflicting or different guidance, and RECOMMENDING/SHOULD
  harmonizing on the AKI containing the Precert Signing CA's SKI,
  as the Log is expected to transform and substitute (and all
  observed logs appear to do so).

This reworks the presentation and format of the certificatePolicies
extensions, better aligning to the BRs, and hopefully providing
sufficient clarity:

Relaxations:

- Reserved Policy OID is * no longer* required to be first, but is
  RECOMMENDED (SHOULD).
- The separation of "Affiliated" and "Unaffiliated" for certificate
  policies is removed. This was introduced for Cross-Certified
  Sub-CAs, but resulted in some ambiguity about what happens when a
  Technically Constrained (non-TLS or nameConstraints) Sub-CA is
  operated by a non-Affiliated entity. The requirements around
  Affiliation are now folded into a common section, rather than being
  two sections.
- Although not permitted by the current BRs, the cPSuri is now
  explicitly allowed for all certificate policies (_including_ for
  anyPolicy).
- anyPolicy is now explicitly permitted (but NOT RECOMMENDED) for
  OCSP Responders
- Reserved CABF OIDs are now explicitly permitted (but NOT RECOMMENDED)
  for OCSP Responders.

Clarifications:
- A note is added to the OCSP Responder section explaining that
  because CPs limit the validity and purposes of a certificate, it
  becomes possible to create an "invalid" responder that clients will
  reject (and thus also reject responses), and that this is part of
  the reason for forbidding.
- For TLS certificates, the requirements for CPs for sub-CAs versus
  leaf certificates had a slightly different wording: whether a given
  CP needed to be documented by the CA (e.g. could be any policy,
  including a reserved CP or anyPolicy) or needed to be _defined_ and
  documented by the CA (i.e. must be from the CA's own OID arc). This
  harmonizes the language for TLS ("defined by"), while still leaving a
  fairly large carveout for non-TLS ("documented").

Changing dataEncipherment for RSA and KeyAgreement for ECC to not recommended.

* Add single all-encompassing effective date

* Integrate discussion from 2022-08-25 VSC call

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>

* Update to allow multiple instances of subject attributes

To allow for multiple instances of the domainContact attributes until we can address at an upcoming ballot.

* Specific exceptions for attributes with multiple instances

Allow multiple instances of the same attribute for `streetAddress` and `domainComponent`.
For the latter, language from [ballot 102](https://cabforum.org/2013/05/31/ballot-102-br-9-2-3-domaincomponent/) was used.

* Correct IV streetAddress multiple instances

For consistency allow multiple instances for the `streetAddress` attribute in IV Certificates.

* Update docs/BR.md

Improved language for the domainComponent

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.j.bonnell@outlook.com>

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.j.bonnell@outlook.com>

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>

* Clarify that OUs are not allowed for CA Certificates described in section 7.1.2.3 per conversation in https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/validation/2022-October/001812.html.

Added an effective date of 2022-12-12 which can be updated as needed.

* Fix typo with quotes

* Update based on F2F 57

- Removal of OU validation rules prior to 2022-12-12 because it includes non-TLS Issuing CAs
- Clarification that the "MUST NOT" for OUs after 2022-12-12 also applies to Root CA Certificates and TLS Subordinate CA Certificates

* fix effective date

* Fix references and adding the two types of TLS CAs

* Improve language around OUs in CA Certificates

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.j.bonnell@outlook.com>

* Capitalize "CA certificates" for consistency

* Fix typo

Fix typo based on #398 (comment)

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.j.bonnell@outlook.com>

* Add order and encoding requirement for DC attribute

* Remove overly specific Cross-cert requirement; fix serialNumber encoding

* Clarify NC exclusion

* Remove "Domain Name or IP Address" validation requirement for now

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>

* Update README (#294)

Co-authored-by: Jos Purvis <jopurvis@cisco.com>

* Adjust the workflow file to build the actions (#296)

This addresses a few requests that recently came up from the certificate
profiles work:

- Remove the explicit retention period (of 21 days) to allow the GitHub
  default of 90 days.
- Change the generated ZIP file from being "BR.md-hash" to being
  "BR-hash".
- Allow manually invoking the workflow (via workflow_dispatch), in the
  event folks want to re-run for a particular branch (e.g. profiles)
- Attempt to resolve the "non-deterministic redline" noted by Jos. When
  a given commit is on cabforum/servercert, it may be both a commit (to
  a branch) and part of a pull request (to main). We want the pull
  request redline to be against main, while the commit redline to be
  against the previous commit. Because both jobs run, and both upload
  the same file name, this results in a non-deterministic clobbering,
  where the commit-redline may clobber the pr-redline. This changes
  the generated zip file to be "file-hash-event_type", so that it
  will generate redlines for both PRs and commits and attach both.

* SC47 Sunset subject:organizationalUnitName (#282) (#290)

* SC47 Sunset subject:organizationalUnitName (#282)

* Deprecation of subject:organizationalUnitName

* Update language to avoid confusion on the effective date

This version updates SC47 to state "issued on or after September 1, 2022" and makes the EV Guidelines reference the BRs as suggested by Ryan Sleevi from Google.

Co-authored-by: Paul van Brouwershaven <vanbroup@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ryan Sleevi <ryan.sleevi@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Jos Purvis <jopurvis@cisco.com>

* SC47 datefix (#298)

* Update dates table

* Update EVG.md

Add SC47 reference to relevant dates table

* Fixup section number in prior commit

Co-authored-by: Jos Purvis <jopurvis@cisco.com>
Co-authored-by: Wayne Thayer <wthayer@gmail.com>

* SC48 - Domain Name and IP Address Encoding (#285) (#302)

* SC48 - Domain Name and IP Address Encoding (#285)

* First pass

* Add more RFC references, some wordsmithing

* Another few fixes

* Switch to use "LDH Labels"

* Propose concrete effective date

* Clarification about root zone trailing dot

* Replace "label" with "Domain Label" throughout (#1)

Replace "label" with "Domain Label" and "domain name" with "Domain Name" throughout

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>
Co-authored-by: Ryan Sleevi <ryan.sleevi@gmail.com>

* Fix double negative

* Fix redundant "if the"

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>
Co-authored-by: Ryan Sleevi <ryan.sleevi@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Jos <castillar@melete.org>

* Wrap xn-- to prevent ligaturization

* SC48 - Domain Name and IP Address Encoding (#285)

* First pass

* Add more RFC references, some wordsmithing

* Another few fixes

* Switch to use "LDH Labels"

* Propose concrete effective date

* Clarification about root zone trailing dot

* Replace "label" with "Domain Label" throughout (#1)

Replace "label" with "Domain Label" and "domain name" with "Domain Name" throughout

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>
Co-authored-by: Ryan Sleevi <ryan.sleevi@gmail.com>

* Fix double negative

* Fix redundant "if the"

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>
Co-authored-by: Ryan Sleevi <ryan.sleevi@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Jos <castillar@melete.org>

* Wrap xn-- to prevent ligaturization

* Update dates and version numbers

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.j.bonnell@outlook.com>
Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>
Co-authored-by: Ryan Sleevi <ryan.sleevi@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Jos Purvis <jopurvis@cisco.com>

* Ballot SC50 - Remove the requirements of 4.1.1 (#328)

* SC50 - Remove the requirements of 4.1.1 (#323)

* Bump cairosvg from 1.0.20 to 2.5.1

Bumps [cairosvg](https://github.com/Kozea/CairoSVG) from 1.0.20 to 2.5.1.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/Kozea/CairoSVG/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/Kozea/CairoSVG/blob/master/NEWS.rst)
- [Commits](Kozea/CairoSVG@1.0.20...2.5.1)

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>

* Bump kramdown from 2.3.0 to 2.3.1

Bumps [kramdown](https://github.com/gettalong/kramdown) from 2.3.0 to 2.3.1.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/gettalong/kramdown/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/gettalong/kramdown/blob/master/doc/news.page)
- [Commits](https://github.com/gettalong/kramdown/commits)

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>

* Remove 4.1.1; persist compromised keys in 6.1.1.3

Remove section 4.1.1 from the BRs
Explicitly require persistent access to compromised keys

* Rebase based on upstream/main

* Move System requirement to 6.1.1.3

* Add 4.1.1 as blank

* Remove capitalization from 6.1.1.3 where terms are not defined

* Re-add 'No stipulation.' to 4.1.1

* Remove change to 6.1.1.3

Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Clint Wilson <clintw@apple.com>

* Update version and date table

Co-authored-by: Clint Wilson <clint@wilsonovi.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Clint Wilson <clintw@apple.com>
Co-authored-by: Jos Purvis <jopurvis@cisco.com>

* Ballot SC53: Sunset SHA-1 for OCSP signing (#330) (#338)

* Sunset SHA-1 for OCSP signing (#330)

* Sunset SHA-1 OCSP signing

* Clarify necessity of both items

* Standardize date format, fix year in effective date table

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>

* Update version, table, and date

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.j.bonnell@outlook.com>
Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>
Co-authored-by: Jos Purvis <jopurvis@cisco.com>

* Bump actions/checkout from 2 to 3 (#342)

Bumps [actions/checkout](https://github.com/actions/checkout) from 2 to 3.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/checkout/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/actions/checkout/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](actions/checkout@v2...v3)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: actions/checkout
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>

Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* Ballot SC51: Reduce and Clarify Log and Records Archival Retention Requirements (#347)

* Ballot SC51: Reduce and Clarify Audit Log and Records Archival Retention Requirements  (#336)

* Bump cairosvg from 1.0.20 to 2.5.1

Bumps [cairosvg](https://github.com/Kozea/CairoSVG) from 1.0.20 to 2.5.1.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/Kozea/CairoSVG/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/Kozea/CairoSVG/blob/master/NEWS.rst)
- [Commits](Kozea/CairoSVG@1.0.20...2.5.1)

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>

* Bump kramdown from 2.3.0 to 2.3.1

Bumps [kramdown](https://github.com/gettalong/kramdown) from 2.3.0 to 2.3.1.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/gettalong/kramdown/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/gettalong/kramdown/blob/master/doc/news.page)
- [Commits](https://github.com/gettalong/kramdown/commits)

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>

* Restructure  parts of 5.4.x and 5.5.x

* Use 'events' consistently in 5.4.1

* Forgot to remove "revocation" as condition for start of retention period of Subscriber Certificates.

* Introduce possessive in 5.4.1 and 5.5.1 to better deliniate responsiblities of CAs using DTPs

* Remove WIP title;

* re-order list in 5.5.2; add 'or' clause to validation documentation archival list entry.

* Incorporate feedback from Aaron and Dimitris in Servercert-wg Discussion Period

Based on the feedback from Aaron here (https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2022-January/003115.html) and here (https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2022-January/003125.html), update 5.5.1 and 5.5.2.
Based on the feedback from Dimitris here (https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2022-January/003110.html), update 5.4.3 and 5.5.2.

* Update link formatting in 5.4.1

The "Section" links throughout include the word "Section" in the link, except for in 5.4.1; this fixes that inconsistency.

Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Clint Wilson <clintw@apple.com>

* Update effective date and version number

* Update ballot table in document

* Fix date string

Co-authored-by: Clint Wilson <clint@wilsonovi.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Clint Wilson <clintw@apple.com>
Co-authored-by: Jos Purvis <jopurvis@cisco.com>

* Ballot SC54: Onion Cleanup (#369)

* SC-54: Onion cleanup (#348)

# Voting Results 

The voting on ballot SC54 has completed, and the ballot has passed.
 
Voting Results
Certificate Issuers
votes total, with no abstentions:
18 Yes votes: Amazon, Buypass, DigiCert, eMudhra, Entrust, GDCA, GlobalSign, GoDaddy, HARICA, Izenpe, JPRS, NAVER, OISTE, Sectigo, SwissSign, TrustCor, SecureTrust, Visa
0 No Votes
0 Abstentions
Certificate Consumers
6 votes total, with no abstentions:
6 Yes votes: 360, Apple, Cisco, Google, Microsoft, Mozilla
0 No votes
0 Abstentions
 
Bylaw Requirements
1.     Bylaw 2.3(f) requires:
·      A "yes" vote by two-thirds of Certificate Issuer votes and by 50%-plus-one of Certificate Consumer votes. Votes to abstain are not counted for this purpose.
This requirement was MET for Certificate Issuers and MET for Certificate Consumers.
·      At least one Certificate Issuer and one Certificate Consumer Member must vote in favor of a ballot for the ballot to be adopted.
This requirement was MET.
2.    Bylaw 2.3(g) requires that a ballot result only be considered valid when “more than half of the number of currently active Members has participated”. Votes to abstain are counted in determining quorum. Half of the currently active members at the start of voting was 14, so the quorum was 15 for this ballot.
This requirement was MET.
 
This ballot now enters the IP Rights Review Period to permit members to review the ballot for relevant IP rights issues.

——

# Commit History

* Addresses #270 allowing method 3.2.2.4.20 for `.onion` domains.

* Addresses #242 creating an exception for `.onion` domains, using existing language from the opening section of 3.2.2.4.

* Addresses #241 removing the currently deprecated Domain validation method 3.2.2.4.6.

* Addresses #240. Things are signed using private, not public keys.

* Addresses #190, #191. According to #191 (comment),  effectively 2021-10-15 is when v2 stops working everywhere. We could proceed without an effective date, remove most of Appendix F in the EV Guidelines and point to Appendix B of the Baseline Requirements directly. No strong feelings either way.

* This is a mitigation against a malicious CA but the Applicant ultimately creates the Nonce.
We agreed with Corey and Wayne to propose the removal of the  requirement for the CA to *confirm* entropy.

* Update language to deprecate legacy Appendix F validation method with "immediate" effect, after the ballot clears IPR (30 days after voting).

* remove double space

* Remove EVG Appendix F, introduce Onion Domain Name term

* A few more minor tweaks

* Fix numbering

* Update for easier read.

* Revert "Update for easier read."

This reverts commit 1bac785.

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>

* SC-54: Onion cleanup (#348)

# Voting Results 

The voting on ballot SC54 has completed, and the ballot has passed.
 
Voting Results
Certificate Issuers
votes total, with no abstentions:
18 Yes votes: Amazon, Buypass, DigiCert, eMudhra, Entrust, GDCA, GlobalSign, GoDaddy, HARICA, Izenpe, JPRS, NAVER, OISTE, Sectigo, SwissSign, TrustCor, SecureTrust, Visa
0 No Votes
0 Abstentions
Certificate Consumers
6 votes total, with no abstentions:
6 Yes votes: 360, Apple, Cisco, Google, Microsoft, Mozilla
0 No votes
0 Abstentions
 
Bylaw Requirements
1.     Bylaw 2.3(f) requires:
·      A "yes" vote by two-thirds of Certificate Issuer votes and by 50%-plus-one of Certificate Consumer votes. Votes to abstain are not counted for this purpose.
This requirement was MET for Certificate Issuers and MET for Certificate Consumers.
·      At least one Certificate Issuer and one Certificate Consumer Member must vote in favor of a ballot for the ballot to be adopted.
This requirement was MET.
2.    Bylaw 2.3(g) requires that a ballot result only be considered valid when “more than half of the number of currently active Members has participated”. Votes to abstain are counted in determining quorum. Half of the currently active members at the start of voting was 14, so the quorum was 15 for this ballot.
This requirement was MET.
 
This ballot now enters the IP Rights Review Period to permit members to review the ballot for relevant IP rights issues.

——

# Commit History

* Addresses #270 allowing method 3.2.2.4.20 for `.onion` domains.

* Addresses #242 creating an exception for `.onion` domains, using existing language from the opening section of 3.2.2.4.

* Addresses #241 removing the currently deprecated Domain validation method 3.2.2.4.6.

* Addresses #240. Things are signed using private, not public keys.

* Addresses #190, #191. According to #191 (comment),  effectively 2021-10-15 is when v2 stops working everywhere. We could proceed without an effective date, remove most of Appendix F in the EV Guidelines and point to Appendix B of the Baseline Requirements directly. No strong feelings either way.

* This is a mitigation against a malicious CA but the Applicant ultimately creates the Nonce.
We agreed with Corey and Wayne to propose the removal of the  requirement for the CA to *confirm* entropy.

* Update language to deprecate legacy Appendix F validation method with "immediate" effect, after the ballot clears IPR (30 days after voting).

* remove double space

* Remove EVG Appendix F, introduce Onion Domain Name term

* A few more minor tweaks

* Fix numbering

* Update for easier read.

* Revert "Update for easier read."

This reverts commit 1bac785.

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>

* Update version numbers and dates

Co-authored-by: Dimitris Zacharopoulos <dzacharo@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>
Co-authored-by: Jos Purvis <jopurvis@cisco.com>

* Integrate SC-48 CN requirements

Co-authored-by: Jos <castillar@melete.org>
Co-authored-by: Jos Purvis <jopurvis@cisco.com>
Co-authored-by: Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com>
Co-authored-by: Paul van Brouwershaven <vanbroup@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ryan Sleevi <ryan.sleevi@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Wayne Thayer <wthayer@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>
Co-authored-by: Clint Wilson <clint@wilsonovi.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Clint Wilson <clintw@apple.com>
Co-authored-by: Dimitris Zacharopoulos <dzacharo@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update README (#294)

Co-authored-by: Jos Purvis <jopurvis@cisco.com>

* Adjust the workflow file to build the actions (#296)

This addresses a few requests that recently came up from the certificate
profiles work:

- Remove the explicit retention period (of 21 days) to allow the GitHub
  default of 90 days.
- Change the generated ZIP file from being "BR.md-hash" to being
  "BR-hash".
- Allow manually invoking the workflow (via workflow_dispatch), in the
  event folks want to re-run for a particular branch (e.g. profiles)
- Attempt to resolve the "non-deterministic redline" noted by Jos. When
  a given commit is on cabforum/servercert, it may be both a commit (to
  a branch) and part of a pull request (to main). We want the pull
  request redline to be against main, while the commit redline to be
  against the previous commit. Because both jobs run, and both upload
  the same file name, this results in a non-deterministic clobbering,
  where the commit-redline may clobber the pr-redline. This changes
  the generated zip file to be "file-hash-event_type", so that it
  will generate redlines for both PRs and commits and attach both.

* SC47 Sunset subject:organizationalUnitName (#282) (#290)

* SC47 Sunset subject:organizationalUnitName (#282)

* Deprecation of subject:organizationalUnitName

* Update language to avoid confusion on the effective date

This version updates SC47 to state "issued on or after September 1, 2022" and makes the EV Guidelines reference the BRs as suggested by Ryan Sleevi from Google.

Co-authored-by: Paul van Brouwershaven <vanbroup@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ryan Sleevi <ryan.sleevi@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Jos Purvis <jopurvis@cisco.com>

* SC47 datefix (#298)

* Update dates table

* Update EVG.md

Add SC47 reference to relevant dates table

* Fixup section number in prior commit

Co-authored-by: Jos Purvis <jopurvis@cisco.com>
Co-authored-by: Wayne Thayer <wthayer@gmail.com>

* SC48 - Domain Name and IP Address Encoding (#285) (#302)

* SC48 - Domain Name and IP Address Encoding (#285)

* First pass

* Add more RFC references, some wordsmithing

* Another few fixes

* Switch to use "LDH Labels"

* Propose concrete effective date

* Clarification about root zone trailing dot

* Replace "label" with "Domain Label" throughout (#1)

Replace "label" with "Domain Label" and "domain name" with "Domain Name" throughout

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>
Co-authored-by: Ryan Sleevi <ryan.sleevi@gmail.com>

* Fix double negative

* Fix redundant "if the"

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>
Co-authored-by: Ryan Sleevi <ryan.sleevi@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Jos <castillar@melete.org>

* Wrap xn-- to prevent ligaturization

* SC48 - Domain Name and IP Address Encoding (#285)

* First pass

* Add more RFC references, some wordsmithing

* Another few fixes

* Switch to use "LDH Labels"

* Propose concrete effective date

* Clarification about root zone trailing dot

* Replace "label" with "Domain Label" throughout (#1)

Replace "label" with "Domain Label" and "domain name" with "Domain Name" throughout

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>
Co-authored-by: Ryan Sleevi <ryan.sleevi@gmail.com>

* Fix double negative

* Fix redundant "if the"

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>
Co-authored-by: Ryan Sleevi <ryan.sleevi@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Jos <castillar@melete.org>

* Wrap xn-- to prevent ligaturization

* Update dates and version numbers

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.j.bonnell@outlook.com>
Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>
Co-authored-by: Ryan Sleevi <ryan.sleevi@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Jos Purvis <jopurvis@cisco.com>

* Ballot SC50 - Remove the requirements of 4.1.1 (#328)

* SC50 - Remove the requirements of 4.1.1 (#323)

* Bump cairosvg from 1.0.20 to 2.5.1

Bumps [cairosvg](https://github.com/Kozea/CairoSVG) from 1.0.20 to 2.5.1.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/Kozea/CairoSVG/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/Kozea/CairoSVG/blob/master/NEWS.rst)
- [Commits](Kozea/CairoSVG@1.0.20...2.5.1)

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>

* Bump kramdown from 2.3.0 to 2.3.1

Bumps [kramdown](https://github.com/gettalong/kramdown) from 2.3.0 to 2.3.1.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/gettalong/kramdown/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/gettalong/kramdown/blob/master/doc/news.page)
- [Commits](https://github.com/gettalong/kramdown/commits)

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>

* Remove 4.1.1; persist compromised keys in 6.1.1.3

Remove section 4.1.1 from the BRs
Explicitly require persistent access to compromised keys

* Rebase based on upstream/main

* Move System requirement to 6.1.1.3

* Add 4.1.1 as blank

* Remove capitalization from 6.1.1.3 where terms are not defined

* Re-add 'No stipulation.' to 4.1.1

* Remove change to 6.1.1.3

Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Clint Wilson <clintw@apple.com>

* Update version and date table

Co-authored-by: Clint Wilson <clint@wilsonovi.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Clint Wilson <clintw@apple.com>
Co-authored-by: Jos Purvis <jopurvis@cisco.com>

* Ballot SC53: Sunset SHA-1 for OCSP signing (#330) (#338)

* Sunset SHA-1 for OCSP signing (#330)

* Sunset SHA-1 OCSP signing

* Clarify necessity of both items

* Standardize date format, fix year in effective date table

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>

* Update version, table, and date

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.j.bonnell@outlook.com>
Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>
Co-authored-by: Jos Purvis <jopurvis@cisco.com>

* Bump actions/checkout from 2 to 3 (#342)

Bumps [actions/checkout](https://github.com/actions/checkout) from 2 to 3.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/checkout/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/actions/checkout/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](actions/checkout@v2...v3)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: actions/checkout
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>

Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* Ballot SC51: Reduce and Clarify Log and Records Archival Retention Requirements (#347)

* Ballot SC51: Reduce and Clarify Audit Log and Records Archival Retention Requirements  (#336)

* Bump cairosvg from 1.0.20 to 2.5.1

Bumps [cairosvg](https://github.com/Kozea/CairoSVG) from 1.0.20 to 2.5.1.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/Kozea/CairoSVG/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/Kozea/CairoSVG/blob/master/NEWS.rst)
- [Commits](Kozea/CairoSVG@1.0.20...2.5.1)

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>

* Bump kramdown from 2.3.0 to 2.3.1

Bumps [kramdown](https://github.com/gettalong/kramdown) from 2.3.0 to 2.3.1.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/gettalong/kramdown/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/gettalong/kramdown/blob/master/doc/news.page)
- [Commits](https://github.com/gettalong/kramdown/commits)

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>

* Restructure  parts of 5.4.x and 5.5.x

* Use 'events' consistently in 5.4.1

* Forgot to remove "revocation" as condition for start of retention period of Subscriber Certificates.

* Introduce possessive in 5.4.1 and 5.5.1 to better deliniate responsiblities of CAs using DTPs

* Remove WIP title;

* re-order list in 5.5.2; add 'or' clause to validation documentation archival list entry.

* Incorporate feedback from Aaron and Dimitris in Servercert-wg Discussion Period

Based on the feedback from Aaron here (https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2022-January/003115.html) and here (https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2022-January/003125.html), update 5.5.1 and 5.5.2.
Based on the feedback from Dimitris here (https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2022-January/003110.html), update 5.4.3 and 5.5.2.

* Update link formatting in 5.4.1

The "Section" links throughout include the word "Section" in the link, except for in 5.4.1; this fixes that inconsistency.

Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Clint Wilson <clintw@apple.com>

* Update effective date and version number

* Update ballot table in document

* Fix date string

Co-authored-by: Clint Wilson <clint@wilsonovi.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Clint Wilson <clintw@apple.com>
Co-authored-by: Jos Purvis <jopurvis@cisco.com>

* Ballot SC54: Onion Cleanup (#369)

* SC-54: Onion cleanup (#348)

# Voting Results 

The voting on ballot SC54 has completed, and the ballot has passed.
 
Voting Results
Certificate Issuers
votes total, with no abstentions:
18 Yes votes: Amazon, Buypass, DigiCert, eMudhra, Entrust, GDCA, GlobalSign, GoDaddy, HARICA, Izenpe, JPRS, NAVER, OISTE, Sectigo, SwissSign, TrustCor, SecureTrust, Visa
0 No Votes
0 Abstentions
Certificate Consumers
6 votes total, with no abstentions:
6 Yes votes: 360, Apple, Cisco, Google, Microsoft, Mozilla
0 No votes
0 Abstentions
 
Bylaw Requirements
1.     Bylaw 2.3(f) requires:
·      A "yes" vote by two-thirds of Certificate Issuer votes and by 50%-plus-one of Certificate Consumer votes. Votes to abstain are not counted for this purpose.
This requirement was MET for Certificate Issuers and MET for Certificate Consumers.
·      At least one Certificate Issuer and one Certificate Consumer Member must vote in favor of a ballot for the ballot to be adopted.
This requirement was MET.
2.    Bylaw 2.3(g) requires that a ballot result only be considered valid when “more than half of the number of currently active Members has participated”. Votes to abstain are counted in determining quorum. Half of the currently active members at the start of voting was 14, so the quorum was 15 for this ballot.
This requirement was MET.
 
This ballot now enters the IP Rights Review Period to permit members to review the ballot for relevant IP rights issues.

——

# Commit History

* Addresses #270 allowing method 3.2.2.4.20 for `.onion` domains.

* Addresses #242 creating an exception for `.onion` domains, using existing language from the opening section of 3.2.2.4.

* Addresses #241 removing the currently deprecated Domain validation method 3.2.2.4.6.

* Addresses #240. Things are signed using private, not public keys.

* Addresses #190, #191. According to #191 (comment),  effectively 2021-10-15 is when v2 stops working everywhere. We could proceed without an effective date, remove most of Appendix F in the EV Guidelines and point to Appendix B of the Baseline Requirements directly. No strong feelings either way.

* This is a mitigation against a malicious CA but the Applicant ultimately creates the Nonce.
We agreed with Corey and Wayne to propose the removal of the  requirement for the CA to *confirm* entropy.

* Update language to deprecate legacy Appendix F validation method with "immediate" effect, after the ballot clears IPR (30 days after voting).

* remove double space

* Remove EVG Appendix F, introduce Onion Domain Name term

* A few more minor tweaks

* Fix numbering

* Update for easier read.

* Revert "Update for easier read."

This reverts commit 1bac785.

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>

* SC-54: Onion cleanup (#348)

# Voting Results 

The voting on ballot SC54 has completed, and the ballot has passed.
 
Voting Results
Certificate Issuers
votes total, with no abstentions:
18 Yes votes: Amazon, Buypass, DigiCert, eMudhra, Entrust, GDCA, GlobalSign, GoDaddy, HARICA, Izenpe, JPRS, NAVER, OISTE, Sectigo, SwissSign, TrustCor, SecureTrust, Visa
0 No Votes
0 Abstentions
Certificate Consumers
6 votes total, with no abstentions:
6 Yes votes: 360, Apple, Cisco, Google, Microsoft, Mozilla
0 No votes
0 Abstentions
 
Bylaw Requirements
1.     Bylaw 2.3(f) requires:
·      A "yes" vote by two-thirds of Certificate Issuer votes and by 50%-plus-one of Certificate Consumer votes. Votes to abstain are not counted for this purpose.
This requirement was MET for Certificate Issuers and MET for Certificate Consumers.
·      At least one Certificate Issuer and one Certificate Consumer Member must vote in favor of a ballot for the ballot to be adopted.
This requirement was MET.
2.    Bylaw 2.3(g) requires that a ballot result only be considered valid when “more than half of the number of currently active Members has participated”. Votes to abstain are counted in determining quorum. Half of the currently active members at the start of voting was 14, so the quorum was 15 for this ballot.
This requirement was MET.
 
This ballot now enters the IP Rights Review Period to permit members to review the ballot for relevant IP rights issues.

——

# Commit History

* Addresses #270 allowing method 3.2.2.4.20 for `.onion` domains.

* Addresses #242 creating an exception for `.onion` domains, using existing language from the opening section of 3.2.2.4.

* Addresses #241 removing the currently deprecated Domain validation method 3.2.2.4.6.

* Addresses #240. Things are signed using private, not public keys.

* Addresses #190, #191. According to #191 (comment),  effectively 2021-10-15 is when v2 stops working everywhere. We could proceed without an effective date, remove most of Appendix F in the EV Guidelines and point to Appendix B of the Baseline Requirements directly. No strong feelings either way.

* This is a mitigation against a malicious CA but the Applicant ultimately creates the Nonce.
We agreed with Corey and Wayne to propose the removal of the  requirement for the CA to *confirm* entropy.

* Update language to deprecate legacy Appendix F validation method with "immediate" effect, after the ballot clears IPR (30 days after voting).

* remove double space

* Remove EVG Appendix F, introduce Onion Domain Name term

* A few more minor tweaks

* Fix numbering

* Update for easier read.

* Revert "Update for easier read."

This reverts commit 1bac785.

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>

* Update version numbers and dates

Co-authored-by: Dimitris Zacharopoulos <dzacharo@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>
Co-authored-by: Jos Purvis <jopurvis@cisco.com>

* SC-56: 2022 Cleanup (#401)

* SC-56: 2022 Cleanup (#385)

Ballot has passed; moving to SC56 branch for IPR

* #340

* #339

* #333

* #318

* #315

* #312

* #309

* #275

* #344

* #345

* #378

* #380

* #287

* #300

* #259

* #284

* #277

* #311

* #310

* Remove historical effective dates

* #196

* #251

* #212

* #386

* Grammatical improvement suggested by Wendy Brown

* Remove text for retired methods

* Switch to new tables tooling

* Fix broken section references

* Bump upload-artifact version

* Linkify US denied persons/entities list URLs

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>

* Update effective dates and tables

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.j.bonnell@outlook.com>
Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>

* SC-58: Require distributionPoint in sharded CRLs (#396) (#403)

* SC-58: Require distributionPoint in sharded CRLs (#396)

* SC-XX: Require distributionPoint in sharded CRLs

The language in RFC 5280 regarding the interaction between the
distributionPoint field of the Issuing Distribution Point CRL extension
and the existence of sharded CRLs has led to significant debate on
interpretation, and appears to contradict X.509.

To protect against replacement attacks, make it explicitly clear that
the Issuing Distribution Point extension and distributionPoint field are
required for sharded or partitioned CRLs.

* Remind readers that the IDP must be critical

* Change effective date to Jan 15

* Change effective date in Section 1.2 table, too

* Update BR.md

Co-authored-by: Aaron Gable <aaron@letsencrypt.org>

Co-authored-by: Jos <castillar@melete.org>
Co-authored-by: Jos Purvis <jopurvis@cisco.com>
Co-authored-by: Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com>
Co-authored-by: Paul van Brouwershaven <vanbroup@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ryan Sleevi <ryan.sleevi@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Wayne Thayer <wthayer@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.bonnell@digicert.com>
Co-authored-by: Clint Wilson <clint@wilsonovi.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Clint Wilson <clintw@apple.com>
Co-authored-by: Dimitris Zacharopoulos <dzacharo@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Iñigo Barreira <92998585+barrini@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Aaron Gable <aaron@letsencrypt.org>

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Add policyQualifiers Note

Added explanation of rationale for NOT RECOMMENDED to section 7.1.2.10.5

* Update docs/BR.md

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.j.bonnell@outlook.com>

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.j.bonnell@outlook.com>

* Use unicode figure space for table indentation

* Use unicode superscript for exponentiation

* Fix surname_givenname footnote link

* Use approx instead of e.g. for approximate years

* Include profile name in subsection titles

* Reduce table duplication in 7.1.2.2.3

* Explain criticality of Subscriber SAN in-line

* Unify language in 7.1.2.7.12

* Unify language around NULL extension values

* Simplify CRL Distribution Point tables

* Cross-Certification establishes trust between any two CAs

* Fix AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax name

* More flexible Certificate Policy OID definitions

* Close two precertificates with same serial loophole

* fix basicConstraints empty value

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.j.bonnell@outlook.com>

* Fix upper bound for organizational-unit-name

[RFC 5280](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280#:~:text=ub%2Dorganizational%2Dunit%2Dname%20INTEGER%20%3A%3A%3D%2064) defines 64 characters as the upper bound for ub-organizational-unit-name.

* Fix typo: "committment" --> "commitment" (#2)

* Clarify Cross-Certificate EKU Requirements  (#3)

---------

Co-authored-by: Corey Bonnell <corey.j.bonnell@outlook.com>
Co-authored-by: Ryan Dickson <ryan.dickson@gmail.com>

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md

* Update BR.md