

Types, Tableaus and Gödel's God in Isabelle/HOL

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April 20, 2017

Abstract

A computer-formalisation of the most essential parts of Fitting's textbook *Types, Tableaus and Gödel's God* in Isabelle/HOL is presented. In particular, Fitting's variant of the ontological argument is verified and confirmed. This variant avoids the modal collapse, which has been criticised as an undesirable side-effect of Kurt Gödel's (and Dana Scott's) versions of the ontological argument. Fitting's work is employing an intensional higher-order modal logic, which we shallowly embed here in classical higher-order logic. We then utilize the embedded logic for the formalisation of Fitting's argument.

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1 Introduction

We present a study in Computational Metaphysics: a computer-formalisation and verification of Fitting's emendation of the ontological argument (for the existence of God) as presented in his well known textbook *Types, Tableaus and Gödel's God* [?]. Fitting's argument is an emendation of Kurt Gödel's modern variant [?] (resp. Dana Scott's variant [?]) of the ontological argument.

The motivation is to avoid the modal collapse [?, ?], which has been criticised as an undesirable side-effect of the axioms of Gödel resp. Scott. The modal collapse essentially states that there are no contingent truths and that everything is determined. Several authors (see e.g. [?, ?, ?, ?] have proposed emendations of the argument with the aim of maintaining the essential result (the necessary existence of God) while at the same time avoiding the modal collapse. Related work has formalised several of these variants on the computer and verified or falsified them. For example, Gödel's axioms [?] have been shown inconsistent [?, ?] while Scott's version has been verified [?]. Further experiments, contributing amongst others to the clarification of a related debate between Hajek and Anderson, are presented and discussed in [?]. The enabling technique that has been employed in all of these experiments has been shallow semantical embeddings of (extensional) higher-order modal logics in classical higher-order logic (see [?, ?] and the references therein).

Fitting's emendation also intends to avoid the modal collapse. In contrast to the above emendations, Fitting's solution is based on the use of an intensional as opposed to an extensional higher-order modal logic. For our work this imposed the additional challenge to provide an shallow embedding of this more advanced logic. The experiments presented below confirm that Fitting's argument as presented in [?] is valid and that it indeed avoids the modal collapse as a side effect.

2 Embedding of Intensional Higher-Order Modal Logic

The following shallow embedding of Intensional Higher-Order Modal Logic (IHOML) in Isabelle/HOL is inspired by the work of [?]. We expand this approach to allow for intensional types and actualist quantifiers as employed in Fitting's textbook ([?]).

2.1 Declarations

typeddecl i — Type for possible worlds
type-synonym $io = (i \Rightarrow bool)$ — Type for formulas whose truth-value is world-dependent
typeddecl $e \ (0)$ — Type for individuals

Aliases for common unary predicate types:

type-synonym $ie = (i \Rightarrow 0)$ $(\uparrow 0)$
type-synonym $se = (0 \Rightarrow bool)$ $(\langle 0 \rangle)$
type-synonym $ise = (0 \Rightarrow io)$ $(\uparrow \langle 0 \rangle)$
type-synonym $sie = (\uparrow 0 \Rightarrow bool)$ $(\langle \uparrow 0 \rangle)$
type-synonym $isie = (\uparrow 0 \Rightarrow io)$ $(\uparrow \langle \uparrow 0 \rangle)$

type-synonym *sise* = $(\uparrow\langle 0 \rangle \Rightarrow \text{bool})$ $(\langle \uparrow\langle 0 \rangle \rangle)$
type-synonym *isise* = $(\uparrow\langle 0 \rangle \Rightarrow \text{io})$ $(\uparrow\langle \uparrow\langle 0 \rangle \rangle)$
type-synonym *sisise* = $(\uparrow\langle \uparrow\langle 0 \rangle \rangle \Rightarrow \text{bool})$ $(\langle \uparrow\langle \uparrow\langle 0 \rangle \rangle \rangle)$
type-synonym *isisise* = $(\uparrow\langle \uparrow\langle 0 \rangle \rangle \Rightarrow \text{io})$ $(\uparrow\langle \uparrow\langle \uparrow\langle 0 \rangle \rangle \rangle)$
type-synonym *sse* = $\langle 0 \rangle \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ $(\langle \langle 0 \rangle \rangle)$
type-synonym *isse* = $\langle 0 \rangle \Rightarrow \text{io}$ $(\uparrow\langle \langle 0 \rangle \rangle)$

Aliases for common binary relation types:

type-synonym *see* = $(0 \Rightarrow 0 \Rightarrow \text{bool})$ $(\langle 0, 0 \rangle)$
type-synonym *isee* = $(0 \Rightarrow 0 \Rightarrow \text{io})$ $(\uparrow\langle 0, 0 \rangle)$
type-synonym *sieie* = $(\uparrow 0 \Rightarrow \uparrow 0 \Rightarrow \text{bool})$ $(\langle \uparrow 0, \uparrow 0 \rangle)$
type-synonym *isieie* = $(\uparrow 0 \Rightarrow \uparrow 0 \Rightarrow \text{io})$ $(\uparrow\langle \uparrow 0, \uparrow 0 \rangle)$
type-synonym *sese* = $(\langle 0 \rangle \Rightarrow \langle 0 \rangle \Rightarrow \text{bool})$ $(\langle \langle 0 \rangle, \langle 0 \rangle \rangle)$
type-synonym *isese* = $(\langle 0 \rangle \Rightarrow \langle 0 \rangle \Rightarrow \text{io})$ $(\uparrow\langle \langle 0 \rangle, \langle 0 \rangle \rangle)$
type-synonym *ssee* = $(\langle 0 \rangle \Rightarrow 0 \Rightarrow \text{bool})$ $(\langle \langle 0 \rangle, 0 \rangle)$
type-synonym *issee* = $(\langle 0 \rangle \Rightarrow 0 \Rightarrow \text{io})$ $(\uparrow\langle \langle 0 \rangle, 0 \rangle)$
type-synonym *isisee* = $(\uparrow\langle 0 \rangle \Rightarrow 0 \Rightarrow \text{io})$ $(\uparrow\langle \uparrow\langle 0 \rangle, 0 \rangle)$
type-synonym *isiseise* = $(\uparrow\langle 0 \rangle \Rightarrow \uparrow\langle 0 \rangle \Rightarrow \text{io})$ $(\uparrow\langle \uparrow\langle 0 \rangle, \uparrow\langle 0 \rangle \rangle)$
type-synonym *isiseisise* = $(\uparrow\langle 0 \rangle \Rightarrow \uparrow\langle \uparrow\langle 0 \rangle \rangle \Rightarrow \text{io})$ $(\uparrow\langle \uparrow\langle 0 \rangle, \uparrow\langle \uparrow\langle 0 \rangle \rangle \rangle)$

consts *aRel*:: $i \Rightarrow i \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ (**infixr** *r* 70) — Accessibility relation

2.2 Definition of Logical Operators

abbreviation *mnot* :: $\text{io} \Rightarrow \text{io}$ (\neg -[52]53)
where $\neg\varphi \equiv \lambda w. \neg(\varphi \ w)$
abbreviation *mand* :: $\text{io} \Rightarrow \text{io} \Rightarrow \text{io}$ (**infixr** \wedge 51)
where $\varphi \wedge \psi \equiv \lambda w. (\varphi \ w) \wedge (\psi \ w)$
abbreviation *mor* :: $\text{io} \Rightarrow \text{io} \Rightarrow \text{io}$ (**infixr** \vee 50)
where $\varphi \vee \psi \equiv \lambda w. (\varphi \ w) \vee (\psi \ w)$
abbreviation *xor*:: $\text{bool} \Rightarrow \text{bool} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ (**infixr** \oplus 50)
where $\varphi \oplus \psi \equiv (\varphi \vee \psi) \wedge \neg(\varphi \wedge \psi)$
abbreviation *mxor* :: $\text{io} \Rightarrow \text{io} \Rightarrow \text{io}$ (**infixr** \oplus 50)
where $\varphi \oplus \psi \equiv \lambda w. (\varphi \ w) \oplus (\psi \ w)$
abbreviation *mimp* :: $\text{io} \Rightarrow \text{io} \Rightarrow \text{io}$ (**infixr** \rightarrow 49)
where $\varphi \rightarrow \psi \equiv \lambda w. (\varphi \ w) \rightarrow (\psi \ w)$
abbreviation *mequ* :: $\text{io} \Rightarrow \text{io} \Rightarrow \text{io}$ (**infixr** \leftrightarrow 48)
where $\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi \equiv \lambda w. (\varphi \ w) \leftrightarrow (\psi \ w)$

Possibilist quantifiers:

abbreviation *mforall* :: $(t \Rightarrow \text{io}) \Rightarrow \text{io}$ (\forall)
where $\forall \Phi \equiv \lambda w. \forall x. (\Phi \ x \ w)$
abbreviation *mexists* :: $(t \Rightarrow \text{io}) \Rightarrow \text{io}$ (\exists)
where $\exists \Phi \equiv \lambda w. \exists x. (\Phi \ x \ w)$

Binder notation for quantifies:

abbreviation *mforallB* :: $(t \Rightarrow \text{io}) \Rightarrow \text{io}$ (**binder** \forall [8] 9)
where $\forall x. \varphi(x) \equiv \forall \varphi$
abbreviation *mexistsB* :: $(t \Rightarrow \text{io}) \Rightarrow \text{io}$ (**binder** \exists [8] 9)

where $\exists x. \varphi(x) \equiv \exists \varphi$

2.3 Definition of Actualist Quantifiers

No polymorphic types are needed in the definitions since actualist quantification only makes sense for individuals.

The following predicate is used to model actualist quantifiers by restricting domains of quantification. Note that since this is a meta-logical concept we never use it in our object language.

consts $Exists::\uparrow\langle 0 \rangle$ ($existsAt$)

Actualist quantifiers

abbreviation $mforallAct :: \uparrow\langle \uparrow\langle 0 \rangle \rangle$ (\forall^E)
where $\forall^E \Phi \equiv \lambda w. \forall x. (existsAt\ x\ w) \longrightarrow (\Phi\ x\ w)$
abbreviation $mexistsAct :: \uparrow\langle \uparrow\langle 0 \rangle \rangle$ (\exists^E)
where $\exists^E \Phi \equiv \lambda w. \exists x. (existsAt\ x\ w) \wedge (\Phi\ x\ w)$

Binder notation for quantifiers:

abbreviation $mforallActB :: \uparrow\langle \uparrow\langle 0 \rangle \rangle$ (**binder** $\forall^E[8]9$)
where $\forall^E x. \varphi(x) \equiv \forall^E \varphi$
abbreviation $mexistsActB :: \uparrow\langle \uparrow\langle 0 \rangle \rangle$ (**binder** $\exists^E[8]9$)
where $\exists^E x. \varphi(x) \equiv \exists^E \varphi$

2.4 Definition of Modal Operators

abbreviation $mbox :: io \Rightarrow io$ (\Box -[52]53)
where $\Box \varphi \equiv \lambda w. \forall v. (w\ r\ v) \longrightarrow (\varphi\ v)$
abbreviation $mdia :: io \Rightarrow io$ (\Diamond -[52]53)
where $\Diamond \varphi \equiv \lambda w. \exists v. (w\ r\ v) \wedge (\varphi\ v)$

2.5 Definition of the *extension-of* Operator

In contrast to the approach taken in the book (p. 88), the \downarrow operator is embedded as a binary operator applying to (world-dependent) atomic formulas whose first argument is a ‘relativized’ term (preceded by \downarrow). Depending on the types involved we need to define this operator differently to ensure type correctness.

(a) Predicate φ takes an (intensional) individual concept as argument:

abbreviation $mextIndiv::\uparrow\langle 0 \rangle \Rightarrow \uparrow 0 \Rightarrow io$ (**infix** \downarrow 60)
where $\varphi \downarrow c \equiv \lambda w. \varphi\ (c\ w)\ w$

(b) Predicate φ takes an intensional predicate as argument:

abbreviation $mextPredArg::('t \Rightarrow io) \Rightarrow io \Rightarrow ('t \Rightarrow io) \Rightarrow io$ (**infix** \downarrow 60)
where $\varphi \downarrow P \equiv \lambda w. \varphi\ (\lambda x\ u. P\ x\ w)\ w$

(c) Predicate φ takes an extensional predicate as argument:

abbreviation $extPredArg :: ((t \Rightarrow bool) \Rightarrow io) \Rightarrow (t \Rightarrow io) \Rightarrow io$ (**infix** $\downarrow 60$)
where $\varphi \downarrow P \equiv \lambda w. \varphi (\lambda x. P x w) w$

(d) Predicate φ takes an extensional predicate as first argument:

abbreviation $extPredArg1 :: ((t \Rightarrow bool) \Rightarrow b \Rightarrow io) \Rightarrow (t \Rightarrow io) \Rightarrow b \Rightarrow io$ (**infix** $\downarrow_1 60$)
where $\varphi \downarrow_1 P \equiv \lambda z. \lambda w. \varphi (\lambda x. P x w) z w$

2.6 Definition of Equality

abbreviation $meq :: t \Rightarrow t \Rightarrow io$ (**infix** ≈ 60) — normal equality (for all types)
where $x \approx y \equiv \lambda w. x = y$
abbreviation $meqC :: \uparrow \langle 0, \uparrow 0 \rangle$ (**infixr** $\approx^C 52$) — eq. for individual concepts
where $x \approx^C y \equiv \lambda w. \forall v. (x v) = (y v)$
abbreviation $meqL :: \uparrow \langle 0, 0 \rangle$ (**infixr** $\approx^L 52$) — Leibniz eq. for individuals
where $x \approx^L y \equiv \forall \varphi. \varphi(x) \rightarrow \varphi(y)$

2.7 Miscellaneous

abbreviation $negpred :: \langle 0 \rangle \Rightarrow \langle 0 \rangle$ (\rightarrow -[52]53)
where $\rightarrow \Phi \equiv \lambda x. \neg(\Phi x)$
abbreviation $mnegpred :: \uparrow \langle 0 \rangle \Rightarrow \uparrow \langle 0 \rangle$ (\rightarrow -[52]53)
where $\rightarrow \Phi \equiv \lambda x. \lambda w. \neg(\Phi x w)$
abbreviation $mandpred :: \uparrow \langle 0 \rangle \Rightarrow \uparrow \langle 0 \rangle \Rightarrow \uparrow \langle 0 \rangle$ (**infix** $\& 53$)
where $\Phi \& \varphi \equiv \lambda x. \lambda w. (\Phi x w) \wedge (\varphi x w)$

2.8 Meta-logical Predicates

abbreviation $valid :: io \Rightarrow bool$ ($\lfloor - \rfloor$ [8]) **where** $\lfloor \psi \rfloor \equiv \forall w. (\psi w)$
abbreviation $satisfiable :: io \Rightarrow bool$ ($\lfloor - \rfloor^{sat}$ [8]) **where** $\lfloor \psi \rfloor^{sat} \equiv \exists w. (\psi w)$
abbreviation $countersat :: io \Rightarrow bool$ ($\lfloor - \rfloor^{csat}$ [8]) **where** $\lfloor \psi \rfloor^{csat} \equiv \exists w. \neg(\psi w)$
abbreviation $invalid :: io \Rightarrow bool$ ($\lfloor - \rfloor^{inv}$ [8]) **where** $\lfloor \psi \rfloor^{inv} \equiv \forall w. \neg(\psi w)$

2.9 Verifying the Embedding

Verifying K Principle and Necessitation:

lemma $K: \lfloor (\Box(\varphi \rightarrow \psi)) \rightarrow (\Box\varphi \rightarrow \Box\psi) \rfloor$ **by** *simp* — K Schema
lemma $NEC: \lfloor \varphi \rfloor \Rightarrow \lfloor \Box\varphi \rfloor$ **by** *simp* — Necessitation

Barcan and Converse Barcan Formulas are satisfied for standard (possibilist) quantifiers:

lemma $\lfloor (\forall x. \Box(\varphi x)) \rightarrow \Box(\forall x. (\varphi x)) \rfloor$ **by** *simp*
lemma $\lfloor \Box(\forall x. (\varphi x)) \rightarrow (\forall x. \Box(\varphi x)) \rfloor$ **by** *simp*

(Converse) Barcan Formulas not satisfied for actualist quantifiers:

lemma $\lfloor (\forall^E x. \Box(\varphi x)) \rightarrow \Box(\forall^E x. (\varphi x)) \rfloor$ **nitpick oops** — countersatisfiable
lemma $\lfloor \Box(\forall^E x. (\varphi x)) \rightarrow (\forall^E x. \Box(\varphi x)) \rfloor$ **nitpick oops** — countersatisfiable

Well known relations between meta-logical notions:

lemma $[\varphi] \longleftrightarrow \neg[\varphi]^{sat}$ **by** *simp*
lemma $[\varphi]^{sat} \longleftrightarrow \neg[\varphi]^{inv}$ **by** *simp*

Contingent truth does not allow for necessitation:

lemma $[\Diamond\varphi] \longrightarrow [\Box\varphi]$ **nitpick oops** — countersatisfiable
lemma $[\Box\varphi]^{sat} \longrightarrow [\Box\varphi]$ **nitpick oops** — countersatisfiable

Modal Collapse is countersatisfiable:

lemma $[\varphi \rightarrow \Box\varphi]$ **nitpick oops** — countersatisfiable

2.10 Useful Definitions for Axiomatization of Further Logics

The best known logics ($K4$, $K5$, KB , $K45$, $KB5$, D , $D4$, $D5$, $D45$, ...) are obtained through axiomatization of combinations of the following:

abbreviation M
where $M \equiv \forall\varphi. \Box\varphi \rightarrow \varphi$
abbreviation B
where $B \equiv \forall\varphi. \varphi \rightarrow \Box\Diamond\varphi$
abbreviation D
where $D \equiv \forall\varphi. \Box\varphi \rightarrow \Diamond\varphi$
abbreviation IV
where $IV \equiv \forall\varphi. \Box\varphi \rightarrow \Box\Box\varphi$
abbreviation V
where $V \equiv \forall\varphi. \Diamond\varphi \rightarrow \Box\Diamond\varphi$

Because the embedding is of a semantic nature, it is more efficient to instead make use of the well-known *Sahlqvist correspondence*, which links axioms to constraints on a model's accessibility relation: axioms M, B, D, IV, V impose reflexivity, symmetry, seriality, transitivity and euclideaness respectively.

lemma *reflexive aRel* $\implies [M]$ **by** *blast* — aka T
lemma *symmetric aRel* $\implies [B]$ **by** *blast*
lemma *serial aRel* $\implies [D]$ **by** *blast*
lemma *preorder aRel* $\implies [M] \wedge [IV]$ **by** *blast* — S4 - reflexive + transitive
lemma *equivalence aRel* $\implies [M] \wedge [V]$ **by** *blast* — S5 - preorder + symmetric

lemma *reflexive aRel* \wedge *euclidean aRel* $\implies [M] \wedge [V]$ **by** *blast* — S5

Using these definitions, we can derive axioms for the most common modal logics. Thereby we are free to use either the semantic constraints or the related *Sahlqvist* axioms. Here we provide both versions. In what follows we use the semantic constraints for improved performance.

3 Book Examples

In this section we verify that our embedded logic works as intended by proving the examples provided in the book. In many cases, for good measure, we

consider further theorems derived from the original ones. We were able to confirm that all results (proves or counterexamples) agree with our expectations.

3.1 Modal Logic - Syntax and Semantics (Chapter 7)

3.1.1 Considerations Regarding $\beta\eta$ -redex (p. 94)

$\beta\eta$ -redex is valid for non-relativized (intensional or extensional) terms (because they designate rigidly):

```
lemma [((λ α. φ α) (τ::↑0)) ↔ (φ τ)] by simp
lemma [((λ α. φ α) (τ::0)) ↔ (φ τ)] by simp
lemma [((λ α. □ φ α) (τ::↑0)) ↔ (□ φ τ)] by simp
lemma [((λ α. □ φ α) (τ::0)) ↔ (□ φ τ)] by simp
```

$\beta\eta$ -redex is valid for relativized terms as long as no modal operators occur inside the predicate abstract:

```
lemma [((λ α. φ α) ↓(τ::↑0)) ↔ (φ ↓τ)] by simp
```

$\beta\eta$ -redex is non-valid for relativized terms when modal operators are present:

```
lemma [((λ α. □ φ α) ↓(τ::↑0)) ↔ (□ φ ↓τ)] nitpick oops — countersatisfiable
lemma [((λ α. ◇ φ α) ↓(τ::↑0)) ↔ (◇ φ ↓τ)] nitpick oops — countersatisfiable
```

Example 7.13, p. 96:

```
lemma [(λ X. ◇ ∃ X) (P::↑0) → ◇((λ X. ∃ X) P)] by simp
lemma [(λ X. ◇ ∃ X) ↓(P::↑0) → ◇((λ X. ∃ X) ↓P)]
  nitpick[card 't=1, card i=2] oops — nitpick finds same counterexample as book
```

with other types for P :

```
lemma [(λ X. ◇ ∃ X) (P::↑(↑0)) → ◇((λ X. ∃ X) P)] by simp
lemma [(λ X. ◇ ∃ X) ↓(P::↑(↑0)) → ◇((λ X. ∃ X) ↓P)]
  nitpick[card 't=1, card i=2] oops — countersatisfiable
lemma [(λ X. ◇ ∃ X) (P::↑(⟨0⟩)) → ◇((λ X. ∃ X) P)] by simp
lemma [(λ X. ◇ ∃ X) ↓(P::↑(⟨0⟩)) → ◇((λ X. ∃ X) ↓P)]
  nitpick[card 't=1, card i=2] oops — countersatisfiable
lemma [(λ X. ◇ ∃ X) (P::↑(↑(↑0))) → ◇((λ X. ∃ X) P)] by simp
lemma [(λ X. ◇ ∃ X) ↓(P::↑(↑(↑0))) → ◇((λ X. ∃ X) ↓P)]
  nitpick[card 't=1, card i=2] oops — countersatisfiable
```

Example 7.14, p. 98:

```
lemma [(λ X. ◇ ∃ X) ↓(P::↑0) → (λ X. ∃ X) ↓P] by simp
lemma [(λ X. ◇ ∃ X) (P::↑0) → (λ X. ∃ X) P]
  nitpick[card 't=1, card i=2] oops — countersatisfiable
```

with other types for P :

```
lemma [(λ X. ◇ ∃ X) ↓(P::↑(↑0)) → (λ X. ∃ X) ↓P] by simp
```



```

lemma  $[(\lambda X. \Diamond \exists X) (P::\uparrow\langle 0 \rangle) \rightarrow (\lambda X. \exists X) P]$ 
  nitpick $[card \ 't=1, card \ i=2]$  oops — countersatisfiable
lemma  $[(\lambda X. \Diamond \exists X) \downarrow(P::\uparrow\langle 0 \rangle) \rightarrow (\lambda X. \exists X) \downarrow P]$  by simp
lemma  $[(\lambda X. \Diamond \exists X) (P::\uparrow\langle 0 \rangle) \rightarrow (\lambda X. \exists X) P]$ 
  nitpick $[card \ 't=1, card \ i=2]$  oops — countersatisfiable
lemma  $[(\lambda X. \Diamond \exists X) \downarrow(P::\uparrow\langle 0 \rangle) \rightarrow (\lambda X. \exists X) \downarrow P]$  by simp
lemma  $[(\lambda X. \Diamond \exists X) (P::\uparrow\langle 0 \rangle) \rightarrow (\lambda X. \exists X) P]$ 
  nitpick $[card \ 't=1, card \ i=2]$  oops — countersatisfiable

```

Example 7.15, p. 99:

```

lemma  $[\Box(P (c::\uparrow 0)) \rightarrow (\exists x::\uparrow 0. \Box(P x))]$  by auto

```

with other types for P :

```

lemma  $[\Box(P (c::0)) \rightarrow (\exists x::0. \Box(P x))]$  by auto
lemma  $[\Box(P (c::\langle 0 \rangle)) \rightarrow (\exists x::\langle 0 \rangle. \Box(P x))]$  by auto

```

Example 7.16, p. 100:

```

lemma  $[\Box(P \downarrow(c::\uparrow 0)) \rightarrow (\exists x::0. \Box(P x))]$ 
  nitpick $[card \ 't=2, card \ i=2]$  oops — counterexample with two worlds found

```

Example 7.17, p. 101:

```

lemma  $[\forall Z::\uparrow 0. (\lambda x::0. \Box((\lambda y::0. x \approx y) \downarrow Z)) \downarrow Z]$ 
  nitpick $[card \ 't=2, card \ i=2]$  oops — countersatisfiable
lemma  $[\forall z::0. (\lambda x::0. \Box((\lambda y::0. x \approx y) z)) z]$  by simp
lemma  $[\forall Z::\uparrow 0. (\lambda X::\uparrow 0. \Box((\lambda Y::\uparrow 0. X \approx Y) Z)) Z]$  by simp

```

3.1.2 Exercises (p. 101)

For Exercises 7.1 and 7.2 see variations on Examples 7.13 and 7.14 above.

Exercise 7.3:

```

lemma  $[\Diamond \exists (P::\uparrow\langle 0 \rangle) \rightarrow (\exists X::\uparrow 0. \Diamond(P \downarrow X))]$  by auto
lemma  $[\Diamond \exists (P::\uparrow\langle 0 \rangle) \rightarrow (\exists X::\uparrow\langle 0 \rangle. \Diamond(P \downarrow X))]$ 
  nitpick $[card \ 't=1, card \ i=2]$  oops — countersatisfiable

```

Exercise 7.4:

```

lemma  $[\Diamond(\exists x::0. (\lambda Y. Y x) \downarrow(P::\uparrow\langle 0 \rangle)) \rightarrow (\exists x. (\lambda Y. \Diamond(Y x)) \downarrow P)]$ 
  nitpick $[card \ 't=1, card \ i=2]$  oops — countersatisfiable

```

For Exercise 7.5 see Example 7.17 above.

3.2 Miscellaneous Matters (Chapter 9)

3.2.1 Equality Axioms (Subsection 1.1)

Example 9.1:

```

lemma  $[(\lambda X. \Box(X \downarrow(p::\uparrow 0))) \downarrow(\lambda x. \Diamond(\lambda z. z \approx x) \downarrow p)]$ 

```

by *auto* — using normal equality
lemma $\llbracket ((\lambda X. \Box(X \downarrow (p::\uparrow\mathbf{0}))) \downarrow (\lambda x. \Diamond(\lambda z. z \approx^L x) \downarrow p)) \rrbracket$
by *auto* — using Leibniz equality
lemma $\llbracket ((\lambda X. \Box(X \downarrow (p::\uparrow\mathbf{0}))) \downarrow (\lambda x. \Diamond(\lambda z. z \approx^C x) \downarrow p)) \rrbracket$
by *simp* — using equality as defined for individual concepts

3.2.2 Extensionality (Subsection 1.2)

In the book, extensionality is assumed (globally) for extensional terms. Extensionality is however already implicit in Isabelle/HOL as we can see:

lemma *EXT*: $\forall \alpha::\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle. \forall \beta::\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle. (\forall \gamma::\mathbf{0}. (\alpha \gamma \longleftrightarrow \beta \gamma)) \longrightarrow (\alpha = \beta)$ **by** *auto*
lemma *EXT-set*: $\forall \alpha::\langle\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle\rangle. \forall \beta::\langle\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle\rangle. (\forall \gamma::\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle. (\alpha \gamma \longleftrightarrow \beta \gamma)) \longrightarrow (\alpha = \beta)$
by *auto*

Extensionality for intensional terms is also already implicit in the HOL embedding:

lemma *EXT-int*: $\llbracket (\lambda x. ((\lambda y. x \approx y) \downarrow (\alpha::\uparrow\mathbf{0}))) \downarrow (\beta::\uparrow\mathbf{0}) \rrbracket \longrightarrow \alpha = \beta$ **by** *auto*
lemma *EXT-int-pred*: $\llbracket (\lambda x. ((\lambda y. x \approx y) \downarrow (\alpha::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle))) \downarrow (\beta::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle) \rrbracket \longrightarrow \alpha = \beta$
using *ext* **by** *metis*

3.2.3 De Re and De Dicto (Subsection 2)

De re is equivalent to *de dicto* for non-relativized (extensional or intensional) terms:

lemma $\llbracket \forall \alpha. ((\lambda \beta. \Box(\alpha \beta)) (\tau::\mathbf{0})) \leftrightarrow \Box((\lambda \beta. (\alpha \beta)) \tau) \rrbracket$ **by** *simp*
lemma $\llbracket \forall \alpha. ((\lambda \beta. \Box(\alpha \beta)) (\tau::\uparrow\mathbf{0})) \leftrightarrow \Box((\lambda \beta. (\alpha \beta)) \tau) \rrbracket$ **by** *simp*
lemma $\llbracket \forall \alpha. ((\lambda \beta. \Box(\alpha \beta)) (\tau::\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle)) \leftrightarrow \Box((\lambda \beta. (\alpha \beta)) \tau) \rrbracket$ **by** *simp*
lemma $\llbracket \forall \alpha. ((\lambda \beta. \Box(\alpha \beta)) (\tau::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle)) \leftrightarrow \Box((\lambda \beta. (\alpha \beta)) \tau) \rrbracket$ **by** *simp*

De re is not equivalent to *de dicto* for relativized (intensional) terms:

lemma $\llbracket \forall \alpha. ((\lambda \beta. \Box(\alpha \beta)) \downarrow (\tau::\uparrow\mathbf{0})) \leftrightarrow \Box((\lambda \beta. (\alpha \beta)) \downarrow \tau) \rrbracket$
nitpick[*card 't=2, card i=2*] **oops** — countersatisfiable
lemma $\llbracket \forall \alpha. ((\lambda \beta. \Box(\alpha \beta)) \downarrow (\tau::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle)) \leftrightarrow \Box((\lambda \beta. (\alpha \beta)) \downarrow \tau) \rrbracket$
nitpick[*card 't=1, card i=2*] **oops** — countersatisfiable

Proposition 9.6 - Equivalences between *de dicto* and *de re*:

abbreviation *deDictoEquDeRe*:: $\uparrow\langle\uparrow\mathbf{0}\rangle$
where *deDictoEquDeRe* $\tau \equiv \forall \alpha. ((\lambda \beta. \Box(\alpha \beta)) \downarrow \tau) \leftrightarrow \Box((\lambda \beta. (\alpha \beta)) \downarrow \tau)$
abbreviation *deDictoImplDeRe*:: $\uparrow\langle\uparrow\mathbf{0}\rangle$
where *deDictoImplDeRe* $\tau \equiv \forall \alpha. \Box((\lambda \beta. (\alpha \beta)) \downarrow \tau) \rightarrow ((\lambda \beta. \Box(\alpha \beta)) \downarrow \tau)$
abbreviation *deReImplDeDicto*:: $\uparrow\langle\uparrow\mathbf{0}\rangle$
where *deReImplDeDicto* $\tau \equiv \forall \alpha. ((\lambda \beta. \Box(\alpha \beta)) \downarrow \tau) \rightarrow \Box((\lambda \beta. (\alpha \beta)) \downarrow \tau)$

abbreviation *deDictoEquDeRe-pred*:: $(t \Rightarrow io) \Rightarrow io$
where *deDictoEquDeRe-pred* $\tau \equiv \forall \alpha. ((\lambda \beta. \Box(\alpha \beta)) \downarrow \tau) \leftrightarrow \Box((\lambda \beta. (\alpha \beta)) \downarrow \tau)$
abbreviation *deDictoImplDeRe-pred*:: $(t \Rightarrow io) \Rightarrow io$
where *deDictoImplDeRe-pred* $\tau \equiv \forall \alpha. \Box((\lambda \beta. (\alpha \beta)) \downarrow \tau) \rightarrow ((\lambda \beta. \Box(\alpha \beta)) \downarrow \tau)$

abbreviation $deReImplDeDicto\text{-}pred::('t \Rightarrow io) \Rightarrow io$
where $deReImplDeDicto\text{-}pred \tau \equiv \forall \alpha. ((\lambda \beta. \Box(\alpha \beta)) \downarrow \tau) \rightarrow \Box((\lambda \beta. (\alpha \beta)) \downarrow \tau)$

3.2.4 Rigidity (Subsection 3)

Rigidity for intensional individuals:

abbreviation $rigidIndiv::\uparrow\langle\uparrow\mathbf{0}\rangle$ **where**
 $rigidIndiv \tau \equiv (\lambda \beta. \Box((\lambda z. \beta \approx z) \downarrow \tau)) \downarrow \tau$

Rigidity for intensional predicates:

abbreviation $rigidPred::('t \Rightarrow io) \Rightarrow io$ **where**
 $rigidPred \tau \equiv (\lambda \beta. \Box((\lambda z. \beta \approx z) \downarrow \tau)) \downarrow \tau$

Proposition 9.8 - We can prove it using local consequence (global consequence follows directly).

lemma $[rigidIndiv (\tau::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle) \rightarrow deReImplDeDicto \tau]$ **by** *simp*
lemma $[deReImplDeDicto (\tau::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle) \rightarrow rigidIndiv \tau]$ **by** *auto*
lemma $[rigidPred (\tau::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle) \rightarrow deReImplDeDicto\text{-}pred \tau]$ **by** *simp*
lemma $[deReImplDeDicto\text{-}pred (\tau::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle) \rightarrow rigidPred \tau]$ **by** *auto*

3.2.5 Stability Conditions (Subsection 4)

axiomatization where

S5: equivalence aRel — We use the Sahlqvist correspondence for improved performance

Definition 9.10 - Stability:

abbreviation $stabilityA::('t \Rightarrow io) \Rightarrow io$ **where** $stabilityA \tau \equiv \forall \alpha. (\tau \alpha) \rightarrow \Box(\tau \alpha)$
abbreviation $stabilityB::('t \Rightarrow io) \Rightarrow io$ **where** $stabilityB \tau \equiv \forall \alpha. \Diamond(\tau \alpha) \rightarrow (\tau \alpha)$

Proposition 9.10 - Note it is valid only for global consequence.

lemma $[stabilityA (\tau::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle)] \longrightarrow [stabilityB \tau]$ **using** *S5* **by** *blast*
lemma $[stabilityA (\tau::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle) \rightarrow stabilityB \tau]$
nitpick $[card \ 't=1, card \ i=2]$ **oops** — countersatisfiable for local consequence

lemma $[stabilityB (\tau::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle)] \longrightarrow [stabilityA \tau]$ **using** *S5* **by** *blast*
lemma $[stabilityB (\tau::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle) \rightarrow stabilityA \tau]$
nitpick $[card \ 't=1, card \ i=2]$ **oops** — countersatisfiable for local consequence

Theorem 9.11 - Note that we can prove even local consequence.

theorem $[rigidPred (\tau::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle) \leftrightarrow (stabilityA \tau \wedge stabilityB \tau)]$ **by** *meson*
theorem $[rigidPred (\tau::\uparrow\langle\uparrow\mathbf{0}\rangle) \leftrightarrow (stabilityA \tau \wedge stabilityB \tau)]$ **by** *meson*
theorem $[rigidPred (\tau::\uparrow\langle\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle\rangle) \leftrightarrow (stabilityA \tau \wedge stabilityB \tau)]$ **by** *meson*

4 Gödel's Argument, Formally (Chapter 11)

"Gödel's particular version of the argument is a direct descendent of that of Leibniz, which in turn derives from one of Descartes. These arguments all have a two-part structure: prove God's existence is necessary, if possible; and prove God's existence is possible." [?] p. 138.

4.1 Part I - God's Existence is Possible

We divide Gödel's Argument as presented in the book in two parts. For the first one, while Leibniz provides some kind of proof for the compatibility of all perfections, Gödel goes on to prove an analogous result: (T1) "Every positive property is possibly instantiated", which together with (T2) "God is a positive property" directly implies the conclusion. In order to prove T1 Gödel assumes A2: "Any property entailed by a positive property is positive".

We are currently contemplating a follow-up analysis of the philosophical implications of these axioms, which may encompass some criticism of the notion of property entailment used by Gödel throughout the argument.

4.1.1 General Definitions

abbreviation *existencePredicate*:: $\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle$ (*E!*)

where $E! x \equiv \lambda w. (\exists^E y. y \approx x) w$ — existence predicate in the object-language

lemma $E! x w \longleftrightarrow existsAt x w$

by *simp* — safety check: correctly matches its meta-logical counterpart

consts *positiveProperty*:: $\uparrow\langle\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle\rangle$ (*P*) — Positiveness/Perfection

Definitions of God (later shown to be equivalent under axiom *A1b*):

abbreviation *God*:: $\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle$ (*G*) **where** $G \equiv (\lambda x. \forall Y. \mathcal{P} Y \rightarrow Y x)$

abbreviation *God-star*:: $\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle$ (*G**) **where** $G^* \equiv (\lambda x. \forall Y. \mathcal{P} Y \leftrightarrow Y x)$

Definitions needed to formalize *A3*:

abbreviation *appliesToPositiveProps*:: $\uparrow\langle\uparrow\langle\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle\rangle\rangle$ (*pos*) **where**

$pos Z \equiv \forall X. Z X \rightarrow \mathcal{P} X$

abbreviation *intersectionOf*:: $\uparrow\langle\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle, \uparrow\langle\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle\rangle\rangle$ (*intersec*) **where**

$intersec X Z \equiv \Box(\forall x. (X x \leftrightarrow (\forall Y. (Z Y) \rightarrow (Y x))))$ — quantifier is possibilist

abbreviation *Entailment*:: $\uparrow\langle\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle, \uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle\rangle$ (infix \Rightarrow 60) **where**

$X \Rightarrow Y \equiv \Box(\forall^E z. X z \rightarrow Y z)$

4.1.2 Axioms

axiomatization where

- $A1a$: $[\forall X. \mathcal{P} (\neg X) \rightarrow \neg(\mathcal{P} X)]$ and — Axiom 11.3A
 $A1b$: $[\forall X. \neg(\mathcal{P} X) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} (\neg X)]$ and — Axiom 11.3B
 $A2$: $[\forall X Y. (\mathcal{P} X \wedge (X \Rightarrow Y)) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} Y]$ and — Axiom 11.5
 $A3$: $[\forall Z X. (pos Z \wedge intersec X Z) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} X]$ — Axiom 11.10

lemma *True nitpick[satisfy] oops* — Model found: axioms are consistent

lemma $[D]$ **using** $A1a A1b A2$ **by** *blast* — axioms already imply D axiom

lemma $[D]$ **using** $A1a A3$ **by** *metis*

4.1.3 Theorems

lemma $[\exists X. \mathcal{P} X]$ **using** $A1b$ **by** *auto*

lemma $[\exists X. \mathcal{P} X \wedge \Diamond \exists^E X]$ **using** $A1a A1b A2$ **by** *metis*

Being self-identical is a positive property:

lemma $[(\exists X. \mathcal{P} X \wedge \Diamond \exists^E X) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} (\lambda x w. x = x)]$ **using** $A2$ **by** *fastforce*

Proposition 11.6

lemma $[(\exists X. \mathcal{P} X) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} (\lambda x w. x = x)]$ **using** $A2$ **by** *fastforce*

lemma $[\mathcal{P} (\lambda x w. x = x)]$ **using** $A1b A2$ **by** *blast*

lemma $[\mathcal{P} (\lambda x w. x = x)]$ **using** $A3$ **by** *metis*

Being non-self-identical is a negative property:

lemma $[(\exists X. \mathcal{P} X \wedge \Diamond \exists^E X) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} (\neg (\lambda x w. \neg x = x))]$
using $A2$ **by** *fastforce*

lemma $[(\exists X. \mathcal{P} X) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} (\neg (\lambda x w. \neg x = x))]$ **using** $A2$ **by** *fastforce*

lemma $[(\exists X. \mathcal{P} X) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} (\neg (\lambda x w. \neg x = x))]$ **using** $A3$ **by** *metis*

Proposition 11.7

lemma $[(\exists X. \mathcal{P} X) \rightarrow \neg \mathcal{P} ((\lambda x w. \neg x = x))]$ **using** $A1a A2$ **by** *blast*

lemma $[\neg \mathcal{P} (\lambda x w. \neg x = x)]$ **using** $A1a A2$ **by** *blast*

Proposition 11.8 (Informal Proposition 1) - Positive properties are possibly instantiated:

theorem $T1$: $[\forall X. \mathcal{P} X \rightarrow \Diamond \exists^E X]$ **using** $A1a A2$ **by** *blast*

Proposition 11.14 - Both defs (*God*/*God**) are equivalent. For improved performance we may prefer to use one or the other:

lemma *GodDefsAreEquivalent*: $[\forall x. G x \leftrightarrow G^* x]$ **using** $A1b$ **by** *force*

Proposition 11.15 - Possibilist existence of *God** directly implies *A1b*:

lemma $[\exists G^* \rightarrow (\forall X. \neg(\mathcal{P} X) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} (\neg X))]$ **by** *meson*

Proposition 11.16 - $A3$ implies $P(G)$ (local consequence):

lemma $A3implT2\text{-local}$: $\lfloor (\forall Z X. (pos Z \wedge intersec X Z) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} X) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} G \rfloor$

proof –

```

{
  fix w
  have 1: pos  $\mathcal{P}$  w by simp
  have 2: intersec G  $\mathcal{P}$  w by simp
  {
    assume  $(\forall Z X. (pos Z \wedge intersec X Z) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} X)$  w
    hence  $(\forall X. ((pos \mathcal{P}) \wedge (intersec X \mathcal{P})) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} X)$  w by (rule allE)
    hence  $((pos \mathcal{P}) \wedge (intersec G \mathcal{P})) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} G$  w by (rule allE)
    hence 3:  $((pos \mathcal{P}) \wedge intersec G \mathcal{P}) w \rightarrow \mathcal{P} G$  w by simp
    hence 4:  $((pos \mathcal{P}) \wedge (intersec G \mathcal{P})) w$  using 1 2 by simp
    from 3 4 have  $\mathcal{P} G$  w by (rule mp)
  }
  hence  $(\forall Z X. (pos Z \wedge intersec X Z) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} X)$  w  $\rightarrow \mathcal{P} G$  w by (rule impI)
}
thus ?thesis by (rule allI)
qed

```

$A3$ implies $P(G)$ (as global consequence):

lemma $A3implT2\text{-global}$: $\lfloor \forall Z X. (pos Z \wedge intersec X Z) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} X \rfloor \rightarrow \lfloor \mathcal{P} G \rfloor$
 using $A3implT2\text{-local}$ by smt

God is a positive property. Note that this theorem can be axiomatized directly (as proposed by Dana Scott according to [?] p. 152). We will do so for the second part.

theorem $T2$: $\lfloor \mathcal{P} G \rfloor$ using $A3implT2\text{-global}$ $A3$ by simp

Theorem 11.17 (Informal Proposition 3) - Possibly God exists:

theorem $T3$: $\lfloor \Diamond \exists^E G \rfloor$ using $T1$ $T2$ by simp

4.2 Part II - God's Existence is Necessary if Possible

We show here that God's necessary existence follows from its possible existence by adding some additional (potentially controversial) assumptions including, among others, an essentialist premise and the S5 axioms. A more detailed analysis of these rather philosophical issues is foreseen as follow-up work.

4.2.1 General Definitions

abbreviation $existencePredicate::\uparrow\langle 0 \rangle (E!)$ where

$E! x \equiv (\lambda w. (\exists^E y. y \approx x) w)$

consts $positiveProperty::\uparrow\langle \uparrow\langle 0 \rangle \rangle (\mathcal{P})$

abbreviation $God::\uparrow\langle 0 \rangle$ (G) **where** $G \equiv (\lambda x. \forall Y. \mathcal{P} Y \rightarrow Y x)$

abbreviation $God-star::\uparrow\langle 0 \rangle$ (G^*) **where**

$G^* \equiv (\lambda x. \forall Y. \mathcal{P} Y \leftrightarrow Y x)$

abbreviation $Entailment::\uparrow\langle \uparrow\langle 0 \rangle, \uparrow\langle 0 \rangle \rangle$ (**infix** $\Rightarrow 60$) **where**

$X \Rightarrow Y \equiv \Box(\forall^E z. X z \rightarrow Y z)$

4.2.2 Axioms from Part I

Note that the only use Gdel makes of axiom A3 is to show that being Godlike is a positive property ($T2$). We follow therefore Scott's proposal and take ($T2$) directly as an axiom ([?] p. 152):

axiomatization where

$A1a: [\forall X. \mathcal{P} (\neg X) \rightarrow \neg(\mathcal{P} X)]$ **and** — Axiom 11.3A

$A1b: [\forall X. \neg(\mathcal{P} X) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} (\neg X)]$ **and** — Axiom 11.3B

$A2: [\forall X Y. (\mathcal{P} X \wedge (X \Rightarrow Y)) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} Y]$ **and** — Axiom 11.5

$T2: [\mathcal{P} G]$ — Proposition 11.16

lemma *True nitpick[satisfy] oops* — Model found: axioms are consistent

4.2.3 Useful Results from Part I

lemma *GodDefsAreEquivalent*: $[\forall x. G x \leftrightarrow G^* x]$ **using** *A1b* **by** *fastforce*

theorem *T1*: $[\forall X. \mathcal{P} X \rightarrow \Diamond \exists^E X]$

using *A1a A2* **by** *blast* — Positive properties are possibly instantiated

theorem *T3*: $[\Diamond \exists^E G]$ **using** *T1 T2* **by** *simp* — God exists possibly

4.2.4 Axioms for Part II

\mathcal{P} satisfies so-called stability conditions (p. 124). This means it designates rigidly (an essentialist assumption).

axiomatization where

$A4a: [\forall X. \mathcal{P} X \rightarrow \Box(\mathcal{P} X)]$ — Axiom 11.11

lemma *A4b*: $[\forall X. \neg(\mathcal{P} X) \rightarrow \Box \neg(\mathcal{P} X)]$ **using** *A1a A1b A4a* **by** *blast*

lemma *True nitpick[satisfy] oops* — Model found: so far all axioms consistent

4.2.5 Theorems

abbreviation $essenceOf::\uparrow\langle \uparrow\langle 0 \rangle, 0 \rangle$ (\mathcal{E}) **where**

$\mathcal{E} Y x \equiv (Y x) \wedge (\forall Z. Z x \rightarrow Y \Rightarrow Z)$

abbreviation $beingIdenticalTo::0 \Rightarrow \uparrow\langle 0 \rangle$ (*id*) **where**

$id x \equiv (\lambda y. y \approx x)$ — note that *id* is a rigid predicate

Theorem 11.20 - Informal Proposition 5

theorem *GodIsEssential*: $[\forall x. G x \rightarrow (\mathcal{E} G x)]$ **using** *A1b A4a* **by** *metis*

Theorem 11.21

theorem $[\forall x. G * x \rightarrow (\mathcal{E} G * x)]$ **using** *A4a* **by** *meson*

Theorem 11.22 - Something can have only one essence:

theorem $[\forall X Y z. (\mathcal{E} X z \wedge \mathcal{E} Y z) \rightarrow (X \Rightarrow Y)]$ **by** *meson*

Theorem 11.23 - An essence is a complete characterization of an individual:

theorem *EssencesCharacterizeCompletely*: $[\forall X y. \mathcal{E} X y \rightarrow (X \Rightarrow (id y))]$

proof (*rule ccontr*)

assume $\neg [\forall X y. \mathcal{E} X y \rightarrow (X \Rightarrow (id y))]$

hence $\exists w. \neg((\forall X y. \mathcal{E} X y \rightarrow X \Rightarrow id y) w)$ **by** *simp*

then obtain *w* **where** $\neg((\forall X y. \mathcal{E} X y \rightarrow X \Rightarrow id y) w)$ **..**

hence $(\exists X y. \mathcal{E} X y \wedge \neg(X \Rightarrow id y)) w$ **by** *simp*

hence $\exists X y. \mathcal{E} X y w \wedge (\neg(X \Rightarrow id y)) w$ **by** *simp*

then obtain *P* **where** $\exists y. \mathcal{E} P y w \wedge (\neg(P \Rightarrow id y)) w$ **..**

then obtain *a* **where** $1: \mathcal{E} P a w \wedge (\neg(P \Rightarrow id a)) w$ **..**

hence $2: \mathcal{E} P a w$ **by** (*rule conjunct1*)

from *1* **have** $(\neg(P \Rightarrow id a)) w$ **by** (*rule conjunct2*)

hence $\exists x. \exists z. w r x \wedge existsAt z x \wedge P z x \wedge \neg(a = z)$ **by** *blast*

then obtain *w1* **where** $\exists z. w r w1 \wedge existsAt z w1 \wedge P z w1 \wedge \neg(a = z)$ **..**

then obtain *b* **where** $3: w r w1 \wedge existsAt b w1 \wedge P b w1 \wedge \neg(a = b)$ **..**

hence $w r w1$ **by** *simp*

from *3* **have** $existsAt b w1$ **by** *simp*

from *3* **have** $P b w1$ **by** *simp*

from *3* **have** $4: \neg(a = b)$ **by** *simp*

from *2* **have** $P a w$ **by** *simp*

from *2* **have** $\forall Y. Y a w \rightarrow ((P \Rightarrow Y) w)$ **by** *auto*

hence $(\neg(id b)) a w \rightarrow (P \Rightarrow (\neg(id b))) w$ **by** (*rule allE*)

hence $\neg(\neg(id b)) a w \vee ((P \Rightarrow (\neg(id b))) w)$ **by** *blast*

then show *False* **proof**

assume $\neg(\neg(id b)) a w$

hence $a = b$ **by** *simp*

thus *False* **using** *4* **by** *auto*

next

assume $((P \Rightarrow (\neg(id b))) w)$

hence $\forall x. \forall z. (w r x \wedge existsAt z x \wedge P z x) \rightarrow (\neg(id b)) z x$ **by** *blast*

hence $\forall z. (w r w1 \wedge existsAt z w1 \wedge P z w1) \rightarrow (\neg(id b)) z w1$

by (*rule allE*)

hence $(w r w1 \wedge existsAt b w1 \wedge P b w1) \rightarrow (\neg(id b)) b w1$ **by** (*rule allE*)

hence $\neg(w r w1 \wedge existsAt b w1 \wedge P b w1) \vee (\neg(id b)) b w1$ **by** *simp*

hence $(\neg(id b)) b w$ **using** *3* **by** *simp*

hence $\neg(b=b)$ **by** *simp*

thus *False* **by** *simp*

qed

qed

Definition 11.24 - Necessary Existence (Informal Definition 6):

abbreviation *necessaryExistencePred*:: $\uparrow\langle 0 \rangle$ (*NE*)

where $NE x \equiv (\lambda w. (\forall Y. \mathcal{E} Y x \rightarrow \Box^E Y) w)$

Axiom 11.25 (Informal Axiom 5)

axiomatization where

$A5: [\mathcal{P} \ NE]$

lemma *True* **nitpick**_[satisfy] **oops** — Model found: so far all axioms consistent

Theorem 11.26 (Informal Proposition 7) - Possibilist existence of God implies necessary actualist existence:

theorem *GodExistenceImpliesNecExistence*: $[\exists \ G \rightarrow \Box \exists^E \ G]$

proof —

```
{
  fix w
  {
    assume  $\exists x. \ G \ x \ w$ 
    then obtain g where 1:  $G \ g \ w \ ..$ 
    hence  $NE \ g \ w$  using A5 by auto — Axiom 11.25
    hence  $\forall Y. (\mathcal{E} \ Y \ g \ w) \rightarrow (\Box \exists^E \ Y) \ w$  by simp
    hence 2:  $(\mathcal{E} \ G \ g \ w) \rightarrow (\Box \exists^E \ G) \ w$  by (rule allE)
    have  $(\forall x. \ G \ x \rightarrow (\mathcal{E} \ G \ x)) \ w$  using GodIsEssential
      by (rule allE) — GodIsEssential follows from Axioms 11.11 and 11.3B
    hence  $(G \ g \rightarrow (\mathcal{E} \ G \ g)) \ w$  by (rule allE)
    hence  $G \ g \ w \rightarrow \mathcal{E} \ G \ g \ w$  by simp
    from this 1 have 3:  $\mathcal{E} \ G \ g \ w$  by (rule mp)
    from 2 3 have  $(\Box \exists^E \ G) \ w$  by (rule mp)
  }
  hence  $(\exists x. \ G \ x \ w) \rightarrow (\Box \exists^E \ G) \ w$  by (rule impI)
  hence  $(\exists x. \ G \ x) \rightarrow \Box \exists^E \ G \ w$  by simp
}
```

thus *?thesis* **by** (rule allI)

qed

Modal Collapse is countersatisfiable until we introduce S5 axioms:

lemma $[\forall \Phi. (\Phi \rightarrow (\Box \Phi))]$ **nitpick** **oops**

Axiomatizing semantic frame conditions for different modal logics. All axioms together imply an S5 logic:

axiomatization where

refl: reflexive aRel **and**

tran: transitive aRel **and**

symm: symmetric aRel

lemma *True* **nitpick**_[satisfy] **oops** — Model found: axioms still consistent

Using an S5 logic modal collapse ($[\forall \Phi. (\Phi \rightarrow (\Box \Phi))]$) is actually valid (see proof below)

Some useful rules:

lemma *modal-distr*: $[\Box(\varphi \rightarrow \psi)] \Rightarrow [(\Diamond \varphi \rightarrow \Diamond \psi)]$ **by** *blast*

lemma *modal-trans*: $([\varphi \rightarrow \psi] \wedge [\psi \rightarrow \chi]) \implies [\varphi \rightarrow \chi]$ **by** *simp*

Theorem 11.27 - Informal Proposition 8

theorem *possExistenceImpliesNecEx*: $[\Diamond \exists G \rightarrow \Box \exists^E G]$ — local consequence
proof —

have $[\exists G \rightarrow \Box \exists^E G]$ **using** *GodExistenceImpliesNecExistence*
 by *simp* — follows from Axioms 11.11, 11.25 and 11.3B
 hence $[\Box(\exists G \rightarrow \Box \exists^E G)]$ **using** *NEC* **by** *simp*
 hence 1: $[\Diamond \exists G \rightarrow \Diamond \Box \exists^E G]$ **by** (*rule modal-distr*)
 have 2: $[\Diamond \Box \exists^E G \rightarrow \Box \exists^E G]$ **using** *symm tran* **by** *metis*
 from 1 2 **have** $[\Diamond \exists G \rightarrow \Diamond \Box \exists^E G] \wedge [\Diamond \Box \exists^E G \rightarrow \Box \exists^E G]$ **by** *simp*
 thus *?thesis* **by** (*rule modal-trans*)
qed

lemma *T4*: $[\Diamond \exists G] \longrightarrow [\Box \exists^E G]$ **using** *possExistenceImpliesNecEx*
by *simp* — global consequence

Corollary 11.28 - Necessary (actualist) existence of God (for both definitions):

lemma *GodNecExists*: $[\Box \exists^E G]$ **using** *T3 T4* **by** *metis*

lemma *God-starNecExists*: $[\Box \exists^E G^*]$
using *GodNecExists GodDefsAreEquivalent* **by** *simp*

4.2.6 Monotheism

Monotheism for non-normal models (with Leibniz equality) follows directly from God having all and only positive properties:

theorem *Monotheism-LeibnizEq*: $[\forall x. G x \rightarrow (\forall y. G y \rightarrow (x \approx^L y))]$
using *GodDefsAreEquivalent* **by** *simp*

Monotheism for normal models is trickier. We need to consider some previous results (p. 162):

lemma *GodExistenceIsValid*: $[\exists^E G]$ **using** *GodNecExists refl*
by *auto* — Note that we hadn't needed frame reflexivity until now

Proposition 11.29

theorem *Monotheism-normalModel*: $[\exists x. \forall y. G y \leftrightarrow x \approx y]$

proof —

{
 fix *w*
 have $[\exists^E G]$ **using** *GodExistenceIsValid* **by** *simp* — follows from corollary 11.28

 hence $(\exists^E G) w$ **by** (*rule allE*)
 then obtain *g* **where** 1: *existsAt g w* $\wedge G g w$..
 hence 2: $\mathcal{E} G g w$ **using** *GodIsEssential* **by** *blast* — follows from ax. 11.11/11.3B
 {

```

fix y
have G y w  $\longleftrightarrow$  (g  $\approx$  y) w proof
  assume G y w
  hence  $\exists$ :  $\mathcal{E} \ G \ y \ w$  using GodIsEssential by blast
  have ( $\mathcal{E} \ G \ y \rightarrow (G \Rightarrow id \ y)$ ) w using EssencesCharacterizeCompletely
    by simp — follows from theorem 11.23
  hence  $\mathcal{E} \ G \ y \ w \rightarrow ((G \Rightarrow id \ y) \ w)$  by simp
  from this  $\exists$  have ( $G \Rightarrow id \ y$ ) w by (rule mp)
  hence ( $\Box(\forall^E z. \ G \ z \rightarrow z \approx y)$ ) w by simp
  hence  $\forall x. \ w \ r \ x \rightarrow ((\forall z. \ (existsAt \ z \ x \wedge G \ z \ x) \rightarrow z = y))$  by auto
  hence  $w \ r \ w \rightarrow ((\forall z. \ (existsAt \ z \ w \wedge G \ z \ w) \rightarrow z = y))$  by (rule allE)
  hence  $\forall z. \ (w \ r \ w \wedge existsAt \ z \ w \wedge G \ z \ w) \rightarrow z = y$  by auto
  hence  $\_4: (w \ r \ w \wedge existsAt \ g \ w \wedge G \ g \ w) \rightarrow g = y$  by (rule allE)
  have w r w using refl
    by simp — note that we rely explicitly on frame reflexivity (Axiom M)
  hence  $w \ r \ w \wedge (existsAt \ g \ w \wedge G \ g \ w)$  using 1 by (rule conjI)
  from  $\_4$  this have  $g = y$  by (rule mp)
  thus (g  $\approx$  y) w by simp
next
  assume (g  $\approx$  y) w
  from this 2 have  $\mathcal{E} \ G \ y \ w$  by simp
  thus G y w by (rule conjunct1)
qed
}
hence  $\forall y. \ G \ y \ w \longleftrightarrow (g \approx y) \ w$  by (rule allI)
hence  $\exists x. \ (\forall y. \ G \ y \ w \longleftrightarrow (x \approx y) \ w)$  by (rule exI)
hence ( $\exists x. \ (\forall y. \ G \ y \leftrightarrow (x \approx y))$ ) w by simp
}
thus ?thesis by (rule allI)
qed

```

Corollary 11.30

```

lemma GodImpliesExistence:  $[\forall x. \ G \ x \rightarrow E! \ x]$ 
  using GodExistenceIsValid Monotheism-normalModel by metis

```

4.2.7 Positive Properties are Necessarily Instantiated

```

lemma PosPropertiesNecExist:  $[\forall Y. \ \mathcal{P} \ Y \rightarrow \Box \exists^E \ Y]$  using GodNecExists A4a
  by meson — Proposition 11.31: follows from corollary 11.28 and axiom A4a

```

4.2.8 Objections and Criticism

```

lemma useful:  $(\forall x. \ \varphi \ x \rightarrow \psi) \implies ((\exists x. \ \varphi \ x) \rightarrow \psi)$  by simp

```

After introducing the S5 axioms Modal Collapse becomes valid (pp. 163-4):

```

lemma ModalCollapse:  $[\forall \Phi. (\Phi \rightarrow (\Box \Phi))]$ 
proof —
  {
  fix w

```

```

{
  fix Q
  have ( $\forall x. G\ x \rightarrow (\mathcal{E}\ G\ x)$ ) w using GodIsEssential
    by (rule allE) — follows from Axioms 11.11 and 11.3B
  hence  $\forall x. G\ x\ w \rightarrow \mathcal{E}\ G\ x\ w$  by simp
  hence  $\forall x. G\ x\ w \rightarrow (\forall Z. Z\ x \rightarrow \Box(\forall^{Ez}. G\ z \rightarrow Z\ z))\ w$  by force
  hence  $\forall x. G\ x\ w \rightarrow ((\lambda y. Q)\ x \rightarrow \Box(\forall^{Ez}. G\ z \rightarrow (\lambda y. Q)\ z))\ w$  by force
  hence  $\forall x. G\ x\ w \rightarrow (Q \rightarrow \Box(\forall^{Ez}. G\ z \rightarrow Q))\ w$  by simp
  hence 1: ( $\exists x. G\ x\ w$ )  $\rightarrow ((Q \rightarrow \Box(\forall^{Ez}. G\ z \rightarrow Q))\ w)$  by (rule useful)
  have  $\exists x. G\ x\ w$  using GodExistenceIsValid by auto
  from 1 this have ( $Q \rightarrow \Box(\forall^{Ez}. G\ z \rightarrow Q)$ ) w by (rule mp)
  hence ( $Q \rightarrow \Box((\exists^{Ez}. G\ z) \rightarrow Q)$ ) w using useful by blast
  hence ( $Q \rightarrow (\Box(\exists^{Ez}. G\ z) \rightarrow \Box Q)$ ) w by simp
  hence ( $Q \rightarrow \Box Q$ ) w using GodNecExists by simp
}
hence ( $\forall \Phi. \Phi \rightarrow \Box \Phi$ ) w by (rule allI)
}
thus ?thesis by (rule allI)
qed

```

5 Fitting's Solution

In this section we tackle Fitting's solution to the objections raised in his previous discussion of Gödel's Argument (pp. 164-9), especially the problem of Modal Collapse, which has been metaphysically interpreted as implying a rejection of free will. Since we are generally committed to the existence of free will (in a pre-theoretical sense), such a result is philosophically unappealing and rather seen as a problem in the argument's formalization.

This part of the book still leaves several details unspecified and the reader is thus compelled to fill in the gaps. As a result, we came across some premises and theorems allowing for different formalizations and therefore leading to disparate implications. Only some of those cases are shown here for illustrative purposes. The options chosen were those better suiting argument's validity.

5.1 Implicit Extensionality Assumptions

Since Isabelle/HOL is extensional, extensionality principles are valid directly out of the box:

lemma *EXT*: $\forall \alpha::\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle. \forall \beta::\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle. (\forall \gamma::\mathbf{0}. (\alpha\ \gamma \longleftrightarrow \beta\ \gamma)) \rightarrow (\alpha = \beta)$ **by** *auto*

lemma *EXT-set*: $\forall \alpha::\langle\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle\rangle. \forall \beta::\langle\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle\rangle. (\forall \gamma::\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle. (\alpha\ \gamma \longleftrightarrow \beta\ \gamma)) \rightarrow (\alpha = \beta)$ **by** *auto*

lemma *EXT-intensional*: $\lfloor (\lambda x. ((\lambda y. x \approx y) \downarrow (\alpha::\uparrow\mathbf{0}))) \downarrow (\beta::\uparrow\mathbf{0}) \rfloor \rightarrow \alpha = \beta$ **by** *auto*

lemma *EXT-int-pred*: $[(\lambda x. ((\lambda y. x \approx y) \downarrow (\alpha :: \uparrow \langle 0 \rangle))) \downarrow (\beta :: \uparrow \langle 0 \rangle)] \longrightarrow \alpha = \beta$ **using**
ext by metis

5.2 General Definitions

The following technical definitions are needed only for type correctness. They are used to convert extensional objects into rigid intensional ones.

abbreviation *trivialExpansion*::*bool*⇒*io* ($\llbracket - \rrbracket$) **where** $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket \equiv \lambda w. \varphi$

abbreviation *existencePredicate*:: $\uparrow \langle 0 \rangle$ (*E!*) **where**

$E! x \equiv (\lambda w. (\exists^E y. y \approx x) w)$

consts *positiveProperty*:: $\uparrow \langle \langle 0 \rangle \rangle$ (*P*)

abbreviation *God*:: $\uparrow \langle 0 \rangle$ (*G*) **where** $G \equiv (\lambda x. \forall Y. \mathcal{P} Y \rightarrow \llbracket Y x \rrbracket)$

abbreviation *God-star*:: $\uparrow \langle 0 \rangle$ (*G**) **where** $G* \equiv (\lambda x. \forall Y. \mathcal{P} Y \leftrightarrow \llbracket Y x \rrbracket)$

abbreviation *Entailment*:: $\uparrow \langle \langle 0 \rangle, \langle 0 \rangle \rangle$ (*infix* ⇒ *60*) **where**

$X \Rightarrow Y \equiv \Box (\forall^E z. \llbracket X z \rrbracket \rightarrow \llbracket Y z \rrbracket)$

5.3 Part I - God's Existence is Possible

axiomatization where

A1a: $[\forall X. \mathcal{P} (\neg X) \rightarrow \neg (\mathcal{P} X)]$ **and** — Axiom 11.3A

A1b: $[\forall X. \neg (\mathcal{P} X) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} (\neg X)]$ **and** — Axiom 11.3B

A2: $[\forall X Y. (\mathcal{P} X \wedge (X \Rightarrow Y)) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} Y]$ **and** — Axiom 11.5

T2: $[\mathcal{P} \downarrow G]$ — Proposition 11.16 (modified)

lemma *True nitpick[satisfy] oops* — Model found: axioms are consistent

lemma *GodDefsAreEquivalent*: $[\forall x. G x \leftrightarrow G* x]$ **using** *A1b* **by** *fastforce*

T1 (Positive properties are possibly instantiated) can be formalized in two different ways:

theorem *T1a*: $[\forall X :: \langle 0 \rangle. \mathcal{P} X \rightarrow \Diamond (\exists^E z. \llbracket X z \rrbracket)]$

using *A1a A2* **by** *blast* — this is the one used in the book

theorem *T1b*: $[\forall X :: \uparrow \langle 0 \rangle. \mathcal{P} \downarrow X \rightarrow \Diamond (\exists^E z. X z)]$

nitpick oops — this one is also possible but not valid so we won't use it

Some interesting (non-) equivalences:

lemma $[\Box \exists^E (Q :: \uparrow \langle 0 \rangle) \leftrightarrow \Box (\exists^E \downarrow Q)]$ **by** *simp*

lemma $[\Box \exists^E (Q :: \uparrow \langle 0 \rangle) \leftrightarrow ((\lambda X. \Box \exists^E X) Q)]$ **by** *simp*

lemma $[\Box \exists^E (Q :: \uparrow \langle 0 \rangle) \leftrightarrow ((\lambda X. \Box \exists^E \downarrow X) Q)]$ **by** *simp*

lemma $[\Box \exists^E (Q :: \uparrow \langle 0 \rangle) \leftrightarrow ((\lambda X. \Box \exists^E X) \downarrow Q)]$ **nitpick oops** — not equivalent!

T3 (God exists possibly) can be formalized in two different ways, using a *de re* or a *de dicto* reading.

theorem *T3-deRe*: $[(\lambda X. \Diamond \exists^E X) \downarrow G]$ **using** *T1a T2* **by** *simp*

theorem *T3-deDicto*: $[\Diamond \exists^E \downarrow G]$ **nitpick oops** — countersatisfiable

From the last two theorems, we think *T3-deRe* should be the version originally implied in the book, since *T3-deDicto* is not valid (unless *T1b* were valid but it isn't)

lemma assumes *T1b*: $[\forall X. \mathcal{P} \downarrow X \rightarrow \Diamond(\exists^E z. X z)]$
shows *T3-deDicto*: $[\Diamond \exists^E \downarrow G]$ **using** *assms T2 by simp*

5.4 Part II - God's Existence is Necessary if Possible

In this variant \mathcal{P} also designates rigidly.

axiomatization where

A4a: $[\forall X. \mathcal{P} X \rightarrow \Box(\mathcal{P} X)]$ — Axiom 11.11

lemma *A4b*: $[\forall X. \neg(\mathcal{P} X) \rightarrow \Box \neg(\mathcal{P} X)]$ **using** *A1a A1b A4a by blast*

lemma *True nitpick[satisfy] oops* — Model found: so far all axioms consistent

abbreviation *essenceOf*:: $\uparrow\langle\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle, \mathbf{0}\rangle (\mathcal{E})$ **where**

$\mathcal{E} Y x \equiv (\mathcal{Y} x) \wedge (\forall Z::\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle. (\mathcal{Z} x) \rightarrow Y \Rightarrow Z)$

Theorem 11.20 - Informal Proposition 5

theorem *GodIsEssential*: $[\forall x. G x \rightarrow ((\mathcal{E} \downarrow_1 G) x)]$ **using** *A1b by metis*

Theorem 11.21

theorem *God-starIsEssential*: $[\forall x. G^* x \rightarrow ((\mathcal{E} \downarrow_1 G^*) x)]$ **by meson**

abbreviation *necExistencePred*:: $\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle (NE)$ **where**

$NE x \equiv \lambda w. (\forall Y. \mathcal{E} Y x \rightarrow \Box(\exists^E z. (\mathcal{Y} z))) w$

Informal Axiom 5

axiomatization where

A5: $[\mathcal{P} \downarrow NE]$

lemma *True nitpick[satisfy] oops* — Model found: so far all axioms consistent

Reminder: We use the down-arrow notation because it is more explicit. See (non-) equivalences above.

lemma $[\exists G \leftrightarrow \exists \downarrow G]$ **by simp**

lemma $[\exists^E G \leftrightarrow \exists^E \downarrow G]$ **by simp**

lemma $[\Box \exists^E G \leftrightarrow \Box \exists^E \downarrow G]$ **by simp**

Theorem 11.26 (Informal Proposition 7) - (possibilist) existence of God implies necessary (actualist) existence.

There are two different ways of formalizing this theorem. Both of them are proven valid:

First version:

theorem *GodExImpliesNecEx-v1*: $[\exists \downarrow G \rightarrow \Box \exists^E \downarrow G]$

```

proof –
{
  fix  $w$ 
  {
    assume  $\exists x. G x w$ 
    then obtain  $g$  where  $1: G g w ..$ 
    hence  $NE g w$  using  $A5$  by auto
    hence  $\forall Y. (\mathcal{E} Y g w) \longrightarrow (\Box(\exists^E z. (\downarrow Y z))) w$  by simp
    hence  $(\mathcal{E} (\lambda x. G x w) g w) \longrightarrow (\Box(\exists^E z. (\downarrow (\lambda x. G x w) z))) w$  by (rule allE)
    hence  $2: ((\mathcal{E} \downarrow_1 G) g w) \longrightarrow (\Box(\exists^E G)) w$  using  $A4b$  by meson
    have  $(\forall x. G x \longrightarrow ((\mathcal{E} \downarrow_1 G) x)) w$  using GodIsEssential by (rule allE)
    hence  $(G g \longrightarrow ((\mathcal{E} \downarrow_1 G) g)) w$  by (rule allE)
    hence  $G g w \longrightarrow (\mathcal{E} \downarrow_1 G) g w$  by simp
    from this 1 have  $3: (\mathcal{E} \downarrow_1 G) g w$  by (rule mp)
    from 2 3 have  $(\Box \exists^E G) w$  by (rule mp)
  }
  hence  $(\exists x. G x w) \longrightarrow (\Box \exists^E G) w$  by (rule impI)
  hence  $((\exists x. G x) \longrightarrow \Box \exists^E G) w$  by simp
}
thus ?thesis by (rule allI)
qed

```

Second version (which can be proven directly by automated tools using last version):

theorem *GodExImpliesNecEx-v2*: $[\exists \downarrow G \longrightarrow ((\lambda X. \Box \exists^E X) \downarrow G)]$
using $A4a$ *GodExImpliesNecEx-v1* **by** *metis*

Compared to Goedel’s argument, the following theorems can be proven in K logic (note that S5 no longer needed):

Theorem 11.27 - Informal Proposition 8

theorem *possExImpliesNecEx-v1*: $[\Diamond \exists \downarrow G \longrightarrow \Box \exists^E \downarrow G]$
using *GodExImpliesNecEx-v1 T3-deRe* **by** *metis*
theorem *possExImpliesNecEx-v2*: $[(\lambda X. \Diamond \exists^E X) \downarrow G \longrightarrow ((\lambda X. \Box \exists^E X) \downarrow G)]$
using *GodExImpliesNecEx-v2* **by** *blast*

Corollaries:

lemma $T4-v1$: $[\Diamond \exists \downarrow G] \longrightarrow [\Box \exists^E \downarrow G]$
using *possExImpliesNecEx-v1* **by** *simp*
lemma $T4-v2$: $[(\lambda X. \Diamond \exists^E X) \downarrow G] \longrightarrow [(\lambda X. \Box \exists^E X) \downarrow G]$
using *possExImpliesNecEx-v2* **by** *simp*

5.5 Conclusion - Necessary Existence of God

Version I - *de dicto* reading:

lemma *GodNecExists-v1*: $[\Box \exists^E \downarrow G]$
using *GodExImpliesNecEx-v1 T3-deRe* **by** *fastforce* — Corollary 11.28
lemma *God-starNecExists-v1*: $[\Box \exists^E \downarrow G^*]$

```

using GodNecExists-v1 GodDefsAreEquivalent by simp
lemma  $\lfloor \Box(\lambda X. \exists^E X) \downarrow G^* \rfloor$ 
using God-starNecExists-v1 by simp — de dicto shown here explicitly

```

Version II - *de re* reading:

```

lemma GodNecExists-v2:  $\lfloor (\lambda X. \Box \exists^E X) \downarrow G \rfloor$ 
using T3-deRe T4-v2 by blast
lemma God-starNecExists-v2:  $\lfloor (\lambda X. \Box \exists^E X) \downarrow G^* \rfloor$ 
using GodNecExists-v2 GodDefsAreEquivalent by simp

```

5.6 Modal Collapse

Modal Collapse is countersatisfiable even in *S5*. Note that countermodels with a cardinality of one for the domain of ground-level objects are found by Nitpick (the countermodel shown in the book has cardinality of two).

```

lemma  $\lfloor \forall \Phi. (\Phi \rightarrow (\Box \Phi)) \rfloor$ 
nitpick[card 't=1, card i=2] oops — countermodel found in K

```

axiomatization where

S5: equivalence aRel — assume accessibility relation is an equivalence

```

lemma  $\lfloor \forall \Phi. (\Phi \rightarrow (\Box \Phi)) \rfloor$ 
nitpick[card 't=1, card i=2] oops — countermodel found in S5

```