

# Types, Tableaus and Gödel’s God in Isabelle/HOL

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## Abstract

A computer-formalisation of the most essential parts of Fitting’s textbook *Types, Tableaus and Gödel’s God* in Isabelle/HOL is presented. In particular, Fitting’s variant of the ontological argument is verified and confirmed. This variant avoids the modal collapse, which has been criticised as an undesirable side-effect of Kurt Gödel’s (and Dana Scott’s) versions of the ontological argument. Fitting’s work is employing an intensional higher-order modal logic, which we shallowly embed here in classical higher-order logic. We then utilize the embedded logic for the formalisation of Fitting’s argument.

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## 1 Introduction

We present a study in Computational Metaphysics: a computer-formalisation and verification of Fitting's emendation of the ontological argument (for the

existence of God) as presented in his well-known textbook *Types, Tableaux and Gödel's God* [8]. Fitting's argument is an emendation of Kurt Gödel's modern variant [9] (resp. Dana Scott's variant [10]) of the ontological argument.

The motivation is to avoid the modal collapse [11, 12], which has been criticised as an undesirable side-effect of the axioms of Gödel resp. Scott. The modal collapse essentially states that there are no contingent truths and that everything is determined. Several authors (see e.g. [2, 1, ?, ?]) have proposed emendations of the argument with the aim of maintaining the essential result (the necessary existence of God) while at the same time avoiding the modal collapse. Related work has formalised several of these variants on the computer and verified or falsified them. For example, Gödel's axioms [9] have been shown inconsistent [3, 7] while Scott's version has been verified [5]. Further experiments, contributing amongst others to the clarification of a related debate between Hajek and Anderson, are presented and discussed in [6]. The enabling technique that has been employed in all of these experiments has been shallow semantical embeddings of (extensional) higher-order modal logics in classical higher-order logic (see [6, 4] and the references therein).

Fitting's emendation also intends to avoid the modal collapse. In contrast to the above emendations, Fitting's solution is based on the use of an intensional as opposed to an extensional higher-order modal logic. For our work this imposed the additional challenge to provide an shallow embedding of this more advanced logic. The experiments presented below confirm that Fitting's argument as presented in [8] is valid and that it avoids the modal collapse as intended.

The work presented here originates from the *Computational Metaphysics* lecture course held at FU Berlin in Summer 2016.

## 2 Embedding of Intensional Higher-Order Modal Logic

The following shallow embedding of Intensional Higher-Order Modal Logic (IHOML) in Isabelle/HOL is inspired by the work of [6]. We expand this approach to allow for intensional types and actualist quantifiers as employed in Fitting's textbook ([8]).

### 2.1 Declarations

**typedec1**  $i$  — Type for possible worlds  
**type-synonym**  $io = (i \Rightarrow bool)$  — Type for formulas whose truth-value is world-dependent  
**typedec1**  $e$  (0) — Type for individuals

Aliases for common unary predicate types:

**type-synonym**  $ie = (i \Rightarrow \mathbf{0}) \quad (\uparrow \mathbf{0})$   
**type-synonym**  $se = (\mathbf{0} \Rightarrow bool) \quad (\langle \mathbf{0} \rangle)$   
**type-synonym**  $ise = (\mathbf{0} \Rightarrow io) \quad (\uparrow \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle)$   
**type-synonym**  $sie = (\uparrow \mathbf{0} \Rightarrow bool) \quad (\langle \uparrow \mathbf{0} \rangle)$   
**type-synonym**  $isie = (\uparrow \mathbf{0} \Rightarrow io) \quad (\uparrow \langle \uparrow \mathbf{0} \rangle)$   
**type-synonym**  $sise = (\uparrow \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle \Rightarrow bool) \quad (\langle \uparrow \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle \rangle)$   
**type-synonym**  $isise = (\uparrow \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle \Rightarrow io) \quad (\uparrow \langle \uparrow \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle \rangle)$   
**type-synonym**  $sisise = (\uparrow \langle \uparrow \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle \rangle \Rightarrow bool) \quad (\langle \uparrow \langle \uparrow \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle \rangle \rangle)$   
**type-synonym**  $isisise = (\uparrow \langle \uparrow \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle \rangle \Rightarrow io) \quad (\uparrow \langle \uparrow \langle \uparrow \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle \rangle \rangle)$   
**type-synonym**  $sse = \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle \Rightarrow bool \quad (\langle \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle \rangle)$   
**type-synonym**  $isse = \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle \Rightarrow io \quad (\uparrow \langle \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle \rangle)$

Aliases for common binary relation types:

**type-synonym**  $see = (\mathbf{0} \Rightarrow \mathbf{0} \Rightarrow bool) \quad (\langle \langle \mathbf{0}, \mathbf{0} \rangle \rangle)$   
**type-synonym**  $isee = (\mathbf{0} \Rightarrow \mathbf{0} \Rightarrow io) \quad (\uparrow \langle \langle \mathbf{0}, \mathbf{0} \rangle \rangle)$   
**type-synonym**  $sieie = (\uparrow \mathbf{0} \Rightarrow \uparrow \mathbf{0} \Rightarrow bool) \quad (\langle \langle \uparrow \mathbf{0}, \uparrow \mathbf{0} \rangle \rangle)$   
**type-synonym**  $isieie = (\uparrow \mathbf{0} \Rightarrow \uparrow \mathbf{0} \Rightarrow io) \quad (\uparrow \langle \langle \uparrow \mathbf{0}, \uparrow \mathbf{0} \rangle \rangle)$   
**type-synonym**  $sese = (\langle \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle \rangle \Rightarrow \langle \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle \rangle \Rightarrow bool) \quad (\langle \langle \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle, \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle \rangle \rangle)$   
**type-synonym**  $isese = (\langle \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle \rangle \Rightarrow \langle \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle \rangle \Rightarrow io) \quad (\uparrow \langle \langle \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle, \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle \rangle \rangle)$   
**type-synonym**  $ssee = (\langle \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle \rangle \Rightarrow \mathbf{0} \Rightarrow bool) \quad (\langle \langle \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle, \mathbf{0} \rangle \rangle)$   
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**type-synonym**  $isiseisise = (\uparrow \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle \Rightarrow \uparrow \langle \uparrow \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle \rangle \Rightarrow io) \quad (\uparrow \langle \uparrow \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle, \uparrow \langle \uparrow \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle \rangle \rangle \rangle)$

**consts**  $aRel::i \Rightarrow i \Rightarrow bool$  (**infixr**  $r$  70) — Accessibility relation

## 2.2 Definition of Logical Operators

**abbreviation**  $mnot :: io \Rightarrow io$  ( $\neg$ -[52]53)  
**where**  $\neg \varphi \equiv \lambda w. \neg(\varphi w)$   
**abbreviation**  $mand :: io \Rightarrow io \Rightarrow io$  (**infixr**  $\wedge$  51)  
**where**  $\varphi \wedge \psi \equiv \lambda w. (\varphi w) \wedge (\psi w)$   
**abbreviation**  $mor :: io \Rightarrow io \Rightarrow io$  (**infixr**  $\vee$  50)  
**where**  $\varphi \vee \psi \equiv \lambda w. (\varphi w) \vee (\psi w)$   
**abbreviation**  $mimp :: io \Rightarrow io \Rightarrow io$  (**infixr**  $\rightarrow$  49)  
**where**  $\varphi \rightarrow \psi \equiv \lambda w. (\varphi w) \longrightarrow (\psi w)$   
**abbreviation**  $mequ :: io \Rightarrow io \Rightarrow io$  (**infixr**  $\leftrightarrow$  48)  
**where**  $\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi \equiv \lambda w. (\varphi w) \longleftrightarrow (\psi w)$   
**abbreviation**  $xor:: bool \Rightarrow bool \Rightarrow bool$  (**infixr**  $\oplus$  50)  
**where**  $\varphi \oplus \psi \equiv (\varphi \vee \psi) \wedge \neg(\varphi \wedge \psi)$   
**abbreviation**  $mxor :: io \Rightarrow io \Rightarrow io$  (**infixr**  $\oplus$  50)  
**where**  $\varphi \oplus \psi \equiv \lambda w. (\varphi w) \oplus (\psi w)$

## 2.3 Definition of Posibilist Quantifiers

**abbreviation**  $mforall :: (t \Rightarrow io) \Rightarrow io$  ( $\forall$ )  
**where**  $\forall \Phi \equiv \lambda w. \forall x. (\Phi x w)$

**abbreviation**  $mexists :: ('t \Rightarrow io) \Rightarrow io \ (\exists)$   
**where**  $\exists \Phi \equiv \lambda w. \exists x. (\Phi \ x \ w)$

**abbreviation**  $mforallB :: ('t \Rightarrow io) \Rightarrow io \ (\text{binder} \forall [8] 9)$  — Binder notation  
**where**  $\forall x. \varphi(x) \equiv \forall \varphi$   
**abbreviation**  $mexistsB :: ('t \Rightarrow io) \Rightarrow io \ (\text{binder} \exists [8] 9)$   
**where**  $\exists x. \varphi(x) \equiv \exists \varphi$

## 2.4 Definition of Actualist Quantifiers

The following predicate is used to model actualist quantifiers by restricting domains of quantification. Note that since this is a meta-logical concept we never use it in our object language.

**consts**  $Exists :: \uparrow \langle 0 \rangle \ (existsAt)$

Note that no polymorphic types are needed in the definitions since actualist quantification only makes sense for individuals.

**abbreviation**  $mforallAct :: \uparrow \langle \uparrow \langle 0 \rangle \rangle \ (\forall^E)$   
**where**  $\forall^E \Phi \equiv \lambda w. \forall x. (existsAt \ x \ w) \longrightarrow (\Phi \ x \ w)$   
**abbreviation**  $mexistsAct :: \uparrow \langle \uparrow \langle 0 \rangle \rangle \ (\exists^E)$   
**where**  $\exists^E \Phi \equiv \lambda w. \exists x. (existsAt \ x \ w) \wedge (\Phi \ x \ w)$

**abbreviation**  $mforallActB :: \uparrow \langle \uparrow \langle 0 \rangle \rangle \ (\text{binder} \forall^E [8] 9)$  — Binder notation  
**where**  $\forall^E x. \varphi(x) \equiv \forall^E \varphi$   
**abbreviation**  $mexistsActB :: \uparrow \langle \uparrow \langle 0 \rangle \rangle \ (\text{binder} \exists^E [8] 9)$   
**where**  $\exists^E x. \varphi(x) \equiv \exists^E \varphi$

## 2.5 Definition of Modal Operators

**abbreviation**  $mbox :: io \Rightarrow io \ (\Box - [52] 53)$   
**where**  $\Box \varphi \equiv \lambda w. \forall v. (w \ r \ v) \longrightarrow (\varphi \ v)$   
**abbreviation**  $mdia :: io \Rightarrow io \ (\Diamond - [52] 53)$   
**where**  $\Diamond \varphi \equiv \lambda w. \exists v. (w \ r \ v) \wedge (\varphi \ v)$

## 2.6 Definition of the *extension-of* Operator

In contrast to the approach taken in Fitting's book (p. 88), the  $\downarrow$  operator is embedded as a binary operator applying to (world-dependent) atomic formulas whose first argument is a 'relativized' term (preceded by  $\downarrow$ ). Depending on the types involved we need to define this operator differently to ensure type correctness.

(a) Predicate  $\varphi$  takes an (intensional) individual concept as argument:

**abbreviation**  $mextIndiv :: \uparrow \langle 0 \rangle \Rightarrow \uparrow 0 \Rightarrow io \ (\text{infix} \ \downarrow \ 60)$   
**where**  $\varphi \ \downarrow \ c \equiv \lambda w. \varphi \ (c \ w) \ w$

(b) Predicate  $\varphi$  takes an intensional predicate as argument:

**abbreviation**  $mextPredArg :: ('t \Rightarrow io) \Rightarrow io \Rightarrow ('t \Rightarrow io) \Rightarrow io$  (**infix**  $\downarrow 60$ )  
**where**  $\varphi \downarrow P \equiv \lambda w. \varphi (\lambda x u. P x w) w$

(c) Predicate  $\varphi$  takes an extensional predicate as argument:

**abbreviation**  $extPredArg :: ('t \Rightarrow bool) \Rightarrow io \Rightarrow ('t \Rightarrow io) \Rightarrow io$  (**infix**  $\downarrow 60$ )  
**where**  $\varphi \downarrow P \equiv \lambda w. \varphi (\lambda x. P x w) w$

(d) Predicate  $\varphi$  takes an extensional predicate as first argument:

**abbreviation**  $extPredArg1 :: ('t \Rightarrow bool) \Rightarrow 'b \Rightarrow io \Rightarrow ('t \Rightarrow io) \Rightarrow 'b \Rightarrow io$  (**infix**  $\downarrow_1 60$ )  
**where**  $\varphi \downarrow_1 P \equiv \lambda z. \lambda w. \varphi (\lambda x. P x w) z w$

## 2.7 Definition of Equality

**abbreviation**  $meq :: 't \Rightarrow 't \Rightarrow io$  (**infix**  $\approx 60$ ) — normal equality (for all types)  
**where**  $x \approx y \equiv \lambda w. x = y$   
**abbreviation**  $meqC :: \uparrow \langle \uparrow \mathbf{0}, \uparrow \mathbf{0} \rangle$  (**infixr**  $\approx^C 52$ ) — eq. for individual concepts  
**where**  $x \approx^C y \equiv \lambda w. \forall v. (x v) = (y v)$   
**abbreviation**  $meqL :: \uparrow \langle \mathbf{0}, \mathbf{0} \rangle$  (**infixr**  $\approx^L 52$ ) — Leibniz eq. for individuals  
**where**  $x \approx^L y \equiv \forall \varphi. \varphi(x) \rightarrow \varphi(y)$

## 2.8 Miscellaneous

**abbreviation**  $negpred :: \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle \Rightarrow \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle \rightarrow \neg [52] 53$   
**where**  $\neg \Phi \equiv \lambda x. \neg(\Phi x)$   
**abbreviation**  $mnegpred :: \uparrow \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle \Rightarrow \uparrow \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle \rightarrow \neg [52] 53$   
**where**  $\neg \Phi \equiv \lambda x. \lambda w. \neg(\Phi x w)$   
**abbreviation**  $mandpred :: \uparrow \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle \Rightarrow \uparrow \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle \Rightarrow \uparrow \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle$  (**infix**  $\& 53$ )  
**where**  $\Phi \& \varphi \equiv \lambda x. \lambda w. (\Phi x w) \wedge (\varphi x w)$

## 2.9 Meta-logical Predicates

**abbreviation**  $valid :: io \Rightarrow bool$  ( $[-] [8]$ ) **where**  $[\psi] \equiv \forall w. (\psi w)$   
**abbreviation**  $satisfiable :: io \Rightarrow bool$  ( $[-]^{sat} [8]$ ) **where**  $[\psi]^{sat} \equiv \exists w. (\psi w)$   
**abbreviation**  $countersat :: io \Rightarrow bool$  ( $[-]^{csat} [8]$ ) **where**  $[\psi]^{csat} \equiv \exists w. \neg(\psi w)$   
**abbreviation**  $invalid :: io \Rightarrow bool$  ( $[-]^{inv} [8]$ ) **where**  $[\psi]^{inv} \equiv \forall w. \neg(\psi w)$

## 2.10 Verifying the Embedding

Verifying K Principle and Necessitation:

**lemma**  $K$ :  $[(\Box(\varphi \rightarrow \psi)) \rightarrow (\Box\varphi \rightarrow \Box\psi)]$  **by** *simp* — K Schema  
**lemma**  $NEC$ :  $[\varphi] \Rightarrow [\Box\varphi]$  **by** *simp* — Necessitation

Barcan and Converse Barcan Formulas are satisfied for standard (possibilist) quantifiers:

**lemma**  $[(\forall x. \Box(\varphi x)) \rightarrow \Box(\forall x. (\varphi x))]$  **by** *simp*  
**lemma**  $[\Box(\forall x. (\varphi x)) \rightarrow (\forall x. \Box(\varphi x))]$  **by** *simp*

(Converse) Barcan Formulas not satisfied for actualist quantifiers:

**lemma**  $[(\forall^E x. \Box(\varphi x)) \rightarrow \Box(\forall^E x. (\varphi x))]$  **nitpick oops** — countersatisfiable  
**lemma**  $[\Box(\forall^E x. (\varphi x)) \rightarrow (\forall^E x. \Box(\varphi x))]$  **nitpick oops** — countersatisfiable

Well known relations between meta-logical notions:

**lemma**  $[\varphi] \longleftrightarrow \neg[\varphi]^{csat}$  **by simp**  
**lemma**  $[\varphi]^{sat} \longleftrightarrow \neg[\varphi]^{inv}$  **by simp**

Contingent truth does not allow for necessitation:

**lemma**  $[\Diamond\varphi] \rightarrow [\Box\varphi]$  **nitpick oops** — countersatisfiable  
**lemma**  $[\Box\varphi]^{sat} \rightarrow [\Box\varphi]$  **nitpick oops** — countersatisfiable

Modal Collapse is countersatisfiable:

**lemma**  $[\varphi \rightarrow \Box\varphi]$  **nitpick oops** — countersatisfiable

## 2.11 Useful Definitions for Axiomatization of Further Logics

The best known logics ( $K4$ ,  $K5$ ,  $KB$ ,  $K45$ ,  $KB5$ ,  $D$ ,  $D4$ ,  $D5$ ,  $D45$ , ...) are obtained through axiomatization of combinations of the following:

**abbreviation**  $M$   
**where**  $M \equiv \forall \varphi. \Box\varphi \rightarrow \varphi$   
**abbreviation**  $B$   
**where**  $B \equiv \forall \varphi. \varphi \rightarrow \Box\Diamond\varphi$   
**abbreviation**  $D$   
**where**  $D \equiv \forall \varphi. \Box\varphi \rightarrow \Diamond\varphi$   
**abbreviation**  $IV$   
**where**  $IV \equiv \forall \varphi. \Box\varphi \rightarrow \Box\Box\varphi$   
**abbreviation**  $V$   
**where**  $V \equiv \forall \varphi. \Diamond\varphi \rightarrow \Box\Diamond\varphi$

Because the embedding is of a semantic nature, it is more efficient to instead make use of the well-known *Sahlqvist correspondence*, which links axioms to constraints on a model's accessibility relation: axioms  $M, B, D, IV, V$  impose reflexivity, symmetry, seriality, transitivity and euclideaness respectively.

**lemma**  $reflexive\ aRel \implies [M]$  **by blast** — aka T  
**lemma**  $symmetric\ aRel \implies [B]$  **by blast**  
**lemma**  $serial\ aRel \implies [D]$  **by blast**  
**lemma**  $preorder\ aRel \implies [M] \wedge [IV]$  **by blast** — S4 - reflexive + transitive  
**lemma**  $equivalence\ aRel \implies [M] \wedge [V]$  **by blast** — S5 - preorder + symmetric  
  
**lemma**  $reflexive\ aRel \wedge euclidean\ aRel \implies [M] \wedge [V]$  **by blast** — S5

Using these definitions, we can derive axioms for the most common modal logics. Thereby we are free to use either the semantic constraints or the related *Sahlqvist* axioms. Here we provide both versions. In what follows we use the semantic constraints for improved performance.

### 3 Textbook Examples

In this section we verify that our embedded logic works as intended by proving the examples provided in the book. In many cases, for good measure, we consider further theorems derived from the original ones. We were able to confirm that all results (proofs or counterexamples) agree with our expectations.

#### 3.1 Modal Logic - Syntax and Semantics (Chapter 7)

##### 3.1.1 Considerations Regarding $\beta\eta$ -redex (p. 94)

$\beta\eta$ -redex is valid for non-relativized (intensional or extensional) terms (because they designate rigidly):

**lemma**  $[((\lambda\alpha. \varphi \alpha) (\tau::\uparrow\mathbf{0})) \leftrightarrow (\varphi \tau)]$  **by simp**

**lemma**  $[((\lambda\alpha. \varphi \alpha) (\tau::\mathbf{0})) \leftrightarrow (\varphi \tau)]$  **by simp**

**lemma**  $[((\lambda\alpha. \Box\varphi \alpha) (\tau::\uparrow\mathbf{0})) \leftrightarrow (\Box\varphi \tau)]$  **by simp**

**lemma**  $[((\lambda\alpha. \Box\varphi \alpha) (\tau::\mathbf{0})) \leftrightarrow (\Box\varphi \tau)]$  **by simp**

$\beta\eta$ -redex is valid for relativized terms as long as no modal operators occur inside the predicate abstract:

**lemma**  $[((\lambda\alpha. \varphi \alpha) \downarrow(\tau::\uparrow\mathbf{0})) \leftrightarrow (\varphi \downarrow\tau)]$  **by simp**

$\beta\eta$ -redex is non-valid for relativized terms when modal operators are present:

**lemma**  $[((\lambda\alpha. \Box\varphi \alpha) \downarrow(\tau::\uparrow\mathbf{0})) \leftrightarrow (\Box\varphi \downarrow\tau)]$  **nitpick oops** — countersatisfiable

**lemma**  $[((\lambda\alpha. \Diamond\varphi \alpha) \downarrow(\tau::\uparrow\mathbf{0})) \leftrightarrow (\Diamond\varphi \downarrow\tau)]$  **nitpick oops** — countersatisfiable

Example 7.13, p. 96:

**lemma**  $[(\lambda X. \Diamond\exists X) (P::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle) \rightarrow \Diamond((\lambda X. \exists X) P)]$  **by simp**

**lemma**  $[(\lambda X. \Diamond\exists X) \downarrow(P::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle) \rightarrow \Diamond((\lambda X. \exists X) \downarrow P)]$

**nitpick** $[card \ 't=1, card \ i=2]$  **oops** — nitpick finds same counterexample as book

with other types for  $P$ :

**lemma**  $[(\lambda X. \Diamond\exists X) (P::\uparrow\langle\uparrow\mathbf{0}\rangle) \rightarrow \Diamond((\lambda X. \exists X) P)]$  **by simp**

**lemma**  $[(\lambda X. \Diamond\exists X) \downarrow(P::\uparrow\langle\uparrow\mathbf{0}\rangle) \rightarrow \Diamond((\lambda X. \exists X) \downarrow P)]$

**nitpick** $[card \ 't=1, card \ i=2]$  **oops** — countersatisfiable

**lemma**  $[(\lambda X. \Diamond\exists X) (P::\uparrow\langle\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle\rangle) \rightarrow \Diamond((\lambda X. \exists X) P)]$  **by simp**

**lemma**  $[(\lambda X. \Diamond\exists X) \downarrow(P::\uparrow\langle\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle\rangle) \rightarrow \Diamond((\lambda X. \exists X) \downarrow P)]$

**nitpick** $[card \ 't=1, card \ i=2]$  **oops** — countersatisfiable

**lemma**  $[(\lambda X. \Diamond\exists X) (P::\uparrow\langle\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle\rangle) \rightarrow \Diamond((\lambda X. \exists X) P)]$  **by simp**

**lemma**  $[(\lambda X. \Diamond\exists X) \downarrow(P::\uparrow\langle\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle\rangle) \rightarrow \Diamond((\lambda X. \exists X) \downarrow P)]$

**nitpick** $[card \ 't=1, card \ i=2]$  **oops** — countersatisfiable

Example 7.14, p. 98:

**lemma**  $[(\lambda X. \Diamond\exists X) \downarrow(P::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle) \rightarrow (\lambda X. \exists X) \downarrow P]$  **by simp**

**lemma**  $[(\lambda X. \Diamond\exists X) (P::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle) \rightarrow (\lambda X. \exists X) P]$



**nitpick**[*card 't=1, card i=2*] **oops** — countersatisfiable

with other types for  $P$ :

**lemma**  $[(\lambda X. \Diamond \exists X) \downarrow (P::\uparrow\langle\uparrow\mathbf{0}\rangle) \rightarrow (\lambda X. \exists X) \downarrow P]$  **by simp**

**lemma**  $[(\lambda X. \Diamond \exists X) (P::\uparrow\langle\uparrow\mathbf{0}\rangle) \rightarrow (\lambda X. \exists X) P]$

**nitpick**[*card 't=1, card i=2*] **oops** — countersatisfiable

**lemma**  $[(\lambda X. \Diamond \exists X) \downarrow (P::\uparrow\langle\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle\rangle) \rightarrow (\lambda X. \exists X) \downarrow P]$  **by simp**

**lemma**  $[(\lambda X. \Diamond \exists X) (P::\uparrow\langle\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle\rangle) \rightarrow (\lambda X. \exists X) P]$

**nitpick**[*card 't=1, card i=2*] **oops** — countersatisfiable

**lemma**  $[(\lambda X. \Diamond \exists X) \downarrow (P::\uparrow\langle\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle\rangle) \rightarrow (\lambda X. \exists X) \downarrow P]$  **by simp**

**lemma**  $[(\lambda X. \Diamond \exists X) (P::\uparrow\langle\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle\rangle) \rightarrow (\lambda X. \exists X) P]$

**nitpick**[*card 't=1, card i=2*] **oops** — countersatisfiable

Example 7.15, p. 99:

**lemma**  $[\Box(P (c::\uparrow\mathbf{0})) \rightarrow (\exists x::\uparrow\mathbf{0}. \Box(P x))]$  **by auto**

with other types for  $P$ :

**lemma**  $[\Box(P (c::\mathbf{0})) \rightarrow (\exists x::\mathbf{0}. \Box(P x))]$  **by auto**

**lemma**  $[\Box(P (c::\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle)) \rightarrow (\exists x::\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle. \Box(P x))]$  **by auto**

Example 7.16, p. 100:

**lemma**  $[\Box(P \downarrow (c::\uparrow\mathbf{0})) \rightarrow (\exists x::\mathbf{0}. \Box(P x))]$

**nitpick**[*card 't=2, card i=2*] **oops** — counterexample with two worlds found

Example 7.17, p. 101:

**lemma**  $[\forall Z::\uparrow\mathbf{0}. (\lambda x::\mathbf{0}. \Box((\lambda y::\mathbf{0}. x \approx y) \downarrow Z)) \downarrow Z]$

**nitpick**[*card 't=2, card i=2*] **oops** — countersatisfiable

**lemma**  $[\forall z::\mathbf{0}. (\lambda x::\mathbf{0}. \Box((\lambda y::\mathbf{0}. x \approx y) z)) z]$  **by simp**

**lemma**  $[\forall Z::\uparrow\mathbf{0}. (\lambda X::\uparrow\mathbf{0}. \Box((\lambda Y::\uparrow\mathbf{0}. X \approx Y) Z)) Z]$  **by simp**

### 3.1.2 Exercises (p. 101)

For Exercises 7.1 and 7.2 see variations on Examples 7.13 and 7.14 above.

Exercise 7.3:

**lemma**  $[\Diamond \exists (P::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle) \rightarrow (\exists X::\uparrow\mathbf{0}. \Diamond(P \downarrow X))]$  **by auto**

**lemma**  $[\Diamond \exists (P::\uparrow\langle\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle\rangle) \rightarrow (\exists X::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle. \Diamond(P \downarrow X))]$

**nitpick**[*card 't=1, card i=2*] **oops** — countersatisfiable

Exercise 7.4:

**lemma**  $[\Diamond(\exists x::\mathbf{0}. (\lambda Y. Y x) \downarrow (P::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle)) \rightarrow (\exists x. (\lambda Y. \Diamond(Y x)) \downarrow P)]$

**nitpick**[*card 't=1, card i=2*] **oops** — countersatisfiable

For Exercise 7.5 see Example 7.17 above.

## 3.2 Miscellaneous Matters (Chapter 9)

### 3.2.1 Equality Axioms (Subsection 1.1)

Example 9.1:

**lemma**  $\llbracket ((\lambda X. \Box(X \downarrow (p::\uparrow\mathbf{0}))) \downarrow (\lambda x. \Diamond(\lambda z. z \approx x) \downarrow p)) \rrbracket$   
**by** *auto* — using normal equality  
**lemma**  $\llbracket ((\lambda X. \Box(X \downarrow (p::\uparrow\mathbf{0}))) \downarrow (\lambda x. \Diamond(\lambda z. z \approx^L x) \downarrow p)) \rrbracket$   
**by** *auto* — using Leibniz equality  
**lemma**  $\llbracket ((\lambda X. \Box(X \downarrow (p::\uparrow\mathbf{0}))) \downarrow (\lambda x. \Diamond(\lambda z. z \approx^C x) \downarrow p)) \rrbracket$   
**by** *simp* — using equality as defined for individual concepts

### 3.2.2 Extensionality (Subsection 1.2)

In the book, extensionality is assumed (globally) for extensional terms. Extensionality is however already implicit in Isabelle/HOL as we can see:

**lemma** *EXT*:  $\forall \alpha::\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle. \forall \beta::\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle. (\forall \gamma::\mathbf{0}. (\alpha \gamma \longleftrightarrow \beta \gamma)) \longrightarrow (\alpha = \beta)$  **by** *auto*  
**lemma** *EXT-set*:  $\forall \alpha::\langle\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle\rangle. \forall \beta::\langle\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle\rangle. (\forall \gamma::\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle. (\alpha \gamma \longleftrightarrow \beta \gamma)) \longrightarrow (\alpha = \beta)$   
**by** *auto*

Extensionality for intensional terms is also already implicit in the HOL embedding:

**lemma** *EXT-int*:  $\llbracket (\lambda x. ((\lambda y. x \approx y) \downarrow (\alpha::\uparrow\mathbf{0}))) \downarrow (\beta::\uparrow\mathbf{0}) \rrbracket \longrightarrow \alpha = \beta$  **by** *auto*  
**lemma** *EXT-int-pred*:  $\llbracket (\lambda x. ((\lambda y. x \approx y) \downarrow (\alpha::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle))) \downarrow (\beta::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle) \rrbracket \longrightarrow \alpha = \beta$   
**using** *ext* **by** *metis*

### 3.2.3 De Re and De Dicto (Subsection 2)

*De re* is equivalent to *de dicto* for non-relativized (extensional or intensional) terms:

**lemma**  $\llbracket \forall \alpha. ((\lambda \beta. \Box(\alpha \beta)) (\tau::\mathbf{0})) \leftrightarrow \Box((\lambda \beta. (\alpha \beta)) \tau) \rrbracket$  **by** *simp*  
**lemma**  $\llbracket \forall \alpha. ((\lambda \beta. \Box(\alpha \beta)) (\tau::\uparrow\mathbf{0})) \leftrightarrow \Box((\lambda \beta. (\alpha \beta)) \tau) \rrbracket$  **by** *simp*  
**lemma**  $\llbracket \forall \alpha. ((\lambda \beta. \Box(\alpha \beta)) (\tau::\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle)) \leftrightarrow \Box((\lambda \beta. (\alpha \beta)) \tau) \rrbracket$  **by** *simp*  
**lemma**  $\llbracket \forall \alpha. ((\lambda \beta. \Box(\alpha \beta)) (\tau::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle)) \leftrightarrow \Box((\lambda \beta. (\alpha \beta)) \tau) \rrbracket$  **by** *simp*

*De re* is not equivalent to *de dicto* for relativized (intensional) terms:

**lemma**  $\llbracket \forall \alpha. ((\lambda \beta. \Box(\alpha \beta)) \downarrow (\tau::\uparrow\mathbf{0})) \leftrightarrow \Box((\lambda \beta. (\alpha \beta)) \downarrow \tau) \rrbracket$   
**nitpick** $[card \ 't=2, card \ i=2]$  **oops** — countersatisfiable  
**lemma**  $\llbracket \forall \alpha. ((\lambda \beta. \Box(\alpha \beta)) \downarrow (\tau::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle)) \leftrightarrow \Box((\lambda \beta. (\alpha \beta)) \downarrow \tau) \rrbracket$   
**nitpick** $[card \ 't=1, card \ i=2]$  **oops** — countersatisfiable

Proposition 9.6 - Equivalences between *de dicto* and *de re*:

**abbreviation** *deDictoEquDeRe*:: $\uparrow\langle\uparrow\mathbf{0}\rangle$   
**where** *deDictoEquDeRe*  $\tau \equiv \forall \alpha. ((\lambda \beta. \Box(\alpha \beta)) \downarrow \tau) \leftrightarrow \Box((\lambda \beta. (\alpha \beta)) \downarrow \tau)$   
**abbreviation** *deDictoImplDeRe*:: $\uparrow\langle\uparrow\mathbf{0}\rangle$   
**where** *deDictoImplDeRe*  $\tau \equiv \forall \alpha. \Box((\lambda \beta. (\alpha \beta)) \downarrow \tau) \rightarrow ((\lambda \beta. \Box(\alpha \beta)) \downarrow \tau)$   
**abbreviation** *deReImplDeDicto*:: $\uparrow\langle\uparrow\mathbf{0}\rangle$

**where**  $deReImplDeDicto \tau \equiv \forall \alpha. ((\lambda \beta. \Box(\alpha \beta)) \downarrow \tau) \rightarrow \Box((\lambda \beta. (\alpha \beta)) \downarrow \tau)$

**abbreviation**  $deDictoEquDeRe-pred::('t \Rightarrow io) \Rightarrow io$

**where**  $deDictoEquDeRe-pred \tau \equiv \forall \alpha. ((\lambda \beta. \Box(\alpha \beta)) \downarrow \tau) \leftrightarrow \Box((\lambda \beta. (\alpha \beta)) \downarrow \tau)$

**abbreviation**  $deDictoImplDeRe-pred::('t \Rightarrow io) \Rightarrow io$

**where**  $deDictoImplDeRe-pred \tau \equiv \forall \alpha. \Box((\lambda \beta. (\alpha \beta)) \downarrow \tau) \rightarrow ((\lambda \beta. \Box(\alpha \beta)) \downarrow \tau)$

**abbreviation**  $deReImplDeDicto-pred::('t \Rightarrow io) \Rightarrow io$

**where**  $deReImplDeDicto-pred \tau \equiv \forall \alpha. ((\lambda \beta. \Box(\alpha \beta)) \downarrow \tau) \rightarrow \Box((\lambda \beta. (\alpha \beta)) \downarrow \tau)$

### 3.2.4 Rigidity (Subsection 3)

Rigidity for intensional individuals:

**abbreviation**  $rigidIndiv::\uparrow\langle\uparrow\mathbf{0}\rangle$  **where**

$rigidIndiv \tau \equiv (\lambda \beta. \Box((\lambda z. \beta \approx z) \downarrow \tau)) \downarrow \tau$

Rigidity for intensional predicates:

**abbreviation**  $rigidPred::('t \Rightarrow io) \Rightarrow io$  **where**

$rigidPred \tau \equiv (\lambda \beta. \Box((\lambda z. \beta \approx z) \downarrow \tau)) \downarrow \tau$

Proposition 9.8 - We can prove it using local consequence (global consequence follows directly).

**lemma**  $\lfloor rigidIndiv (\tau::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle) \rightarrow deReImplDeDicto \tau \rfloor$  **by** *simp*

**lemma**  $\lfloor deReImplDeDicto (\tau::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle) \rightarrow rigidIndiv \tau \rfloor$  **by** *auto*

**lemma**  $\lfloor rigidPred (\tau::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle) \rightarrow deReImplDeDicto-pred \tau \rfloor$  **by** *simp*

**lemma**  $\lfloor deReImplDeDicto-pred (\tau::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle) \rightarrow rigidPred \tau \rfloor$  **by** *auto*

### 3.2.5 Stability Conditions (Subsection 4)

**axiomatization where**

*S5: equivalence aRel* — We use the Sahlqvist correspondence for improved performance

Definition 9.10 - Stability:

**abbreviation**  $stabilityA::('t \Rightarrow io) \Rightarrow io$  **where**  $stabilityA \tau \equiv \forall \alpha. (\tau \alpha) \rightarrow \Box(\tau \alpha)$

**abbreviation**  $stabilityB::('t \Rightarrow io) \Rightarrow io$  **where**  $stabilityB \tau \equiv \forall \alpha. \Diamond(\tau \alpha) \rightarrow (\tau \alpha)$

Proposition 9.10 - Note it is valid only for global consequence.

**lemma**  $\lfloor stabilityA (\tau::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle) \rfloor \longrightarrow \lfloor stabilityB \tau \rfloor$  **using** *S5* **by** *blast*

**lemma**  $\lfloor stabilityA (\tau::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle) \rightarrow stabilityB \tau \rfloor$

**nitpick** $[card \ 't=1, card \ i=2]$  **oops** — countersatisfiable for local consequence

**lemma**  $\lfloor stabilityB (\tau::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle) \rfloor \longrightarrow \lfloor stabilityA \tau \rfloor$  **using** *S5* **by** *blast*

**lemma**  $\lfloor stabilityB (\tau::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle) \rightarrow stabilityA \tau \rfloor$

**nitpick** $[card \ 't=1, card \ i=2]$  **oops** — countersatisfiable for local consequence

Theorem 9.11 - Note that we can prove even local consequence.

**theorem**  $\lfloor rigidPred (\tau::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle) \leftrightarrow (stabilityA \tau \wedge stabilityB \tau) \rfloor$  **by** *meson*

**theorem**  $[rigidPred (\tau::\uparrow\langle\uparrow\mathbf{0}\rangle) \leftrightarrow (stabilityA \tau \wedge stabilityB \tau)]$  **by** *meson*  
**theorem**  $[rigidPred (\tau::\uparrow\langle\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle\rangle) \leftrightarrow (stabilityA \tau \wedge stabilityB \tau)]$  **by** *meson*

## 4 Gödel's Argument, Formally

"Gödel's particular version of the argument is a direct descendent of that of Leibniz, which in turn derives from one of Descartes. These arguments all have a two-part structure: prove God's existence is necessary, if possible; and prove God's existence is possible." [8] p. 138.

### 4.1 Part I - God's Existence is Possible

We divide Gödel's Argument as presented in this textbook (Chapter 11) in two parts. For the first one, while Leibniz provides some kind of proof for the compatibility of all perfections, Gödel goes on to prove an analogous result: (T1) "Every positive property is possibly instantiated", which together with (T2) "God is a positive property" directly implies the conclusion. In order to prove T1 Gödel assumes A2: "Any property entailed by a positive property is positive".

We are currently contemplating a follow-up analysis of the philosophical implications of these axioms, which may encompass some criticism of the notion of property entailment used by Gödel throughout the argument.

#### 4.1.1 General Definitions

**abbreviation**  $existencePredicate::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle (E!)$   
**where**  $E! x \equiv \lambda w. (\exists^E y. y \approx x) w$  — existence predicate in the object-language

**lemma**  $E! x w \longleftrightarrow existsAt x w$   
**by** *simp* — safety check: correctly matches its meta-logical counterpart

**consts**  $positiveProperty::\uparrow\langle\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle\rangle (\mathcal{P})$  — Positiveness/Perfection

Definitions of God (later shown to be equivalent under axiom *A1b*):

**abbreviation**  $God::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle (G)$  **where**  $G \equiv (\lambda x. \forall Y. \mathcal{P} Y \rightarrow Y x)$   
**abbreviation**  $God-star::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle (G*)$  **where**  $G* \equiv (\lambda x. \forall Y. \mathcal{P} Y \leftrightarrow Y x)$

Definitions needed to formalise *A3*:

**abbreviation**  $appliesToPositiveProps::\uparrow\langle\uparrow\langle\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle\rangle\rangle (pos)$  **where**  
 $pos Z \equiv \forall X. Z X \rightarrow \mathcal{P} X$   
**abbreviation**  $intersectionOf::\uparrow\langle\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle, \uparrow\langle\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle\rangle\rangle (intersec)$  **where**  
 $intersec X Z \equiv \Box(\forall x.(X x \leftrightarrow (\forall Y. (Z Y) \rightarrow (Y x))))$  — quantifier is possibilist

**abbreviation** *Entailment*:: $\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle, \uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle$  (infix  $\Rightarrow 60$ ) **where**  
 $X \Rightarrow Y \equiv \Box(\forall^E z. X z \rightarrow Y z)$

#### 4.1.2 Axioms

**axiomatization where**

*A1a*:  $\lfloor \forall X. \mathcal{P} (\neg X) \rightarrow \neg(\mathcal{P} X) \rfloor$  **and** — Axiom 11.3A  
*A1b*:  $\lfloor \forall X. \neg(\mathcal{P} X) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} (\neg X) \rfloor$  **and** — Axiom 11.3B  
*A2*:  $\lfloor \forall X Y. (\mathcal{P} X \wedge (X \Rightarrow Y)) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} Y \rfloor$  **and** — Axiom 11.5  
*A3*:  $\lfloor \forall Z X. (\text{pos } Z \wedge \text{intersec } X Z) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} X \rfloor$  — Axiom 11.10

**lemma** *True nitpick[satisfy] oops* — Model found: axioms are consistent

**lemma**  $\lfloor D \rfloor$  **using** *A1a A1b A2* **by** *blast* — axioms already imply *D* axiom

**lemma**  $\lfloor D \rfloor$  **using** *A1a A3* **by** *metis*

#### 4.1.3 Theorems

**lemma**  $\lfloor \exists X. \mathcal{P} X \rfloor$  **using** *A1b* **by** *auto*

**lemma**  $\lfloor \exists X. \mathcal{P} X \wedge \Diamond \exists^E X \rfloor$  **using** *A1a A1b A2* **by** *metis*

Being self-identical is a positive property:

**lemma**  $\lfloor (\exists X. \mathcal{P} X \wedge \Diamond \exists^E X) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} (\lambda x w. x = x) \rfloor$  **using** *A2* **by** *fastforce*

Proposition 11.6

**lemma**  $\lfloor (\exists X. \mathcal{P} X) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} (\lambda x w. x = x) \rfloor$  **using** *A2* **by** *fastforce*

**lemma**  $\lfloor \mathcal{P} (\lambda x w. x = x) \rfloor$  **using** *A1b A2* **by** *blast*

**lemma**  $\lfloor \mathcal{P} (\lambda x w. x = x) \rfloor$  **using** *A3* **by** *metis*

Being non-self-identical is a negative property:

**lemma**  $\lfloor (\exists X. \mathcal{P} X \wedge \Diamond \exists^E X) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} (\neg (\lambda x w. \neg x = x)) \rfloor$   
**using** *A2* **by** *fastforce*

**lemma**  $\lfloor (\exists X. \mathcal{P} X) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} (\neg (\lambda x w. \neg x = x)) \rfloor$  **using** *A2* **by** *fastforce*

**lemma**  $\lfloor (\exists X. \mathcal{P} X) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} (\neg (\lambda x w. \neg x = x)) \rfloor$  **using** *A3* **by** *metis*

Proposition 11.7

**lemma**  $\lfloor (\exists X. \mathcal{P} X) \rightarrow \neg \mathcal{P} ((\lambda x w. \neg x = x)) \rfloor$  **using** *A1a A2* **by** *blast*

**lemma**  $\lfloor \neg \mathcal{P} (\lambda x w. \neg x = x) \rfloor$  **using** *A1a A2* **by** *blast*

Proposition 11.8 (Informal Proposition 1) - Positive properties are possibly instantiated:

**theorem** *T1*:  $\lfloor \forall X. \mathcal{P} X \rightarrow \Diamond \exists^E X \rfloor$  **using** *A1a A2* **by** *blast*

Proposition 11.14 - Both defs (*God*/*God\**) are equivalent. For improved performance we may prefer to use one or the other:

**lemma** *GodDefsAreEquivalent*:  $\lfloor \forall x. G x \leftrightarrow G^* x \rfloor$  **using** *A1b* **by** *force*

Proposition 11.15 - Possibilist existence of  $God^*$  directly implies  $A1b$ :

**lemma**  $[\exists G^* \rightarrow (\forall X. \neg(\mathcal{P} X) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} (\neg X))]$  **by** *meson*

Proposition 11.16 -  $A3$  implies  $P(G)$  (local consequence):

**lemma**  $A3implT2\text{-local}$ :  $[(\forall Z X. (pos Z \wedge intersec X Z) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} X) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} G]$

**proof** –

```

{
  fix w
  have 1: pos  $\mathcal{P}$  w by simp
  have 2: intersec  $G \mathcal{P}$  w by simp
  {
    assume  $(\forall Z X. (pos Z \wedge intersec X Z) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} X)$  w
    hence  $(\forall X. ((pos \mathcal{P}) \wedge (intersec X \mathcal{P})) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} X)$  w by (rule allE)
    hence  $((pos \mathcal{P}) \wedge (intersec G \mathcal{P})) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} G$  w by (rule allE)
    hence 3:  $((pos \mathcal{P} \wedge intersec G \mathcal{P}) w) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} G$  w by simp
    hence 4:  $((pos \mathcal{P}) \wedge (intersec G \mathcal{P})) w$  using 1 2 by simp
    from 3 4 have  $\mathcal{P} G$  w by (rule mp)
  }
  hence  $(\forall Z X. (pos Z \wedge intersec X Z) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} X)$  w  $\rightarrow \mathcal{P} G$  w by (rule impI)
}
thus ?thesis by (rule allI)
qed

```

$A3$  implies  $P(G)$  (as global consequence):

**lemma**  $A3implT2\text{-global}$ :  $[(\forall Z X. (pos Z \wedge intersec X Z) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} X) \rightarrow [\mathcal{P} G]]$   
**using**  $A3implT2\text{-local}$  **by** *smt*

God is a positive property. Note that this theorem can be axiomatized directly (as noted by Dana Scott). We will do so for the second part.

**theorem**  $T2$ :  $[\mathcal{P} G]$  **using**  $A3implT2\text{-global}$   $A3$  **by** *simp*

Theorem 11.17 (Informal Proposition 3) - Possibly God exists:

**theorem**  $T3$ :  $[\Diamond \exists^E G]$  **using**  $T1$   $T2$  **by** *simp*

## 4.2 Part II - God's Existence is Necessary if Possible

We show here that God's necessary existence follows from its possible existence by adding some additional (potentially controversial) assumptions including, among others, an essentialist premise and the S5 axioms. A more detailed analysis of these rather philosophical issues is foreseen as follow-up work.

### 4.2.1 General Definitions

**abbreviation**  $existencePredicate::\uparrow\langle 0 \rangle (E!)$  **where**

$E! x \equiv (\lambda w. (\exists^E y. y \approx x) w)$

**consts** *positiveProperty*:: $\uparrow\langle\uparrow\langle 0 \rangle\rangle$  ( $\mathcal{P}$ )

**abbreviation** *God*:: $\uparrow\langle 0 \rangle$  ( $G$ ) **where**  $G \equiv (\lambda x. \forall Y. \mathcal{P} Y \rightarrow Y x)$

**abbreviation** *God-star*:: $\uparrow\langle 0 \rangle$  ( $G^*$ ) **where**

$G^* \equiv (\lambda x. \forall Y. \mathcal{P} Y \leftrightarrow Y x)$

**abbreviation** *Entailment*:: $\uparrow\langle\uparrow\langle 0 \rangle, \uparrow\langle 0 \rangle\rangle$  (**infix**  $\Rightarrow$  60) **where**

$X \Rightarrow Y \equiv \Box(\forall^E z. X z \rightarrow Y z)$

#### 4.2.2 Axioms from Part I

Note that the only use Gödel makes of axiom A3 is to show that being Godlike is a positive property (*T2*). We follow therefore Scott's proposal and take (*T2*) directly as an axiom:

**axiomatization where**

*A1a*:  $\lfloor \forall X. \mathcal{P} (\rightarrow X) \rightarrow \neg(\mathcal{P} X) \rfloor$  **and** — Axiom 11.3A

*A1b*:  $\lfloor \forall X. \neg(\mathcal{P} X) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} (\rightarrow X) \rfloor$  **and** — Axiom 11.3B

*A2*:  $\lfloor \forall X Y. (\mathcal{P} X \wedge (X \Rightarrow Y)) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} Y \rfloor$  **and** — Axiom 11.5

*T2*:  $\lfloor \mathcal{P} G \rfloor$  — Proposition 11.16

**lemma** *True nitpick[satisfy] oops* — Model found: axioms are consistent

#### 4.2.3 Useful Results from Part I

**lemma** *GodDefsAreEquivalent*:  $\lfloor \forall x. G x \leftrightarrow G^* x \rfloor$  **using** *A1b* **by** *fastforce*

**theorem** *T1*:  $\lfloor \forall X. \mathcal{P} X \rightarrow \Diamond \exists^E X \rfloor$

**using** *A1a A2* **by** *blast* — Positive properties are possibly instantiated

**theorem** *T3*:  $\lfloor \Diamond \exists^E G \rfloor$  **using** *T1 T2* **by** *simp* — God exists possibly

#### 4.2.4 Axioms for Part II

$\mathcal{P}$  satisfies the so-called stability conditions in [8], p. 124. This means  $\mathcal{P}$  designates rigidly (an essentialist assumption).

**axiomatization where**

*A4a*:  $\lfloor \forall X. \mathcal{P} X \rightarrow \Box(\mathcal{P} X) \rfloor$  — Axiom 11.11

**lemma** *A4b*:  $\lfloor \forall X. \neg(\mathcal{P} X) \rightarrow \Box\neg(\mathcal{P} X) \rfloor$  **using** *A1a A1b A4a* **by** *blast*

**abbreviation** *rigidPred*:: $(t \Rightarrow io) \Rightarrow io$  **where**

*rigidPred*  $\tau \equiv (\lambda \beta. \Box((\lambda z. \beta \approx z) \downarrow \tau)) \downarrow \tau$

**lemma**  $\lfloor \text{rigidPred } \mathcal{P} \rfloor$

**using** *A4a A4b* **by** *blast* —  $\mathcal{P}$  is therefore rigid

**lemma** *True nitpick[satisfy] oops* — Model found: so far all axioms A1-4 consistent

#### 4.2.5 Theorems

**abbreviation**  $essenceOf::\uparrow\langle\uparrow\langle 0 \rangle, 0 \rangle (\mathcal{E})$  **where**

$\mathcal{E} Y x \equiv (Y x) \wedge (\forall Z. Z x \rightarrow Y \Rightarrow Z)$

**abbreviation**  $beingIdenticalTo::0 \Rightarrow \uparrow\langle 0 \rangle (id)$  **where**

$id x \equiv (\lambda y. y \approx x)$  — note that  $id$  is a rigid predicate

Theorem 11.20 - Informal Proposition 5

**theorem**  $GodIsEssential: [\forall x. G x \rightarrow (\mathcal{E} G x)]$  **using**  $A1b A4a$  **by**  $metis$

Theorem 11.21

**theorem**  $[\forall x. G* x \rightarrow (\mathcal{E} G* x)]$  **using**  $A4a$  **by**  $meson$

Theorem 11.22 - Something can have only one essence:

**theorem**  $[\forall X Y z. (\mathcal{E} X z \wedge \mathcal{E} Y z) \rightarrow (X \Rightarrow Y)]$  **by**  $meson$

Theorem 11.23 - An essence is a complete characterization of an individual:

**theorem**  $EssencesCharacterizeCompletely: [\forall X y. \mathcal{E} X y \rightarrow (X \Rightarrow (id y))]$

**proof** ( $rule ccontr$ )

**assume**  $\neg [\forall X y. \mathcal{E} X y \rightarrow (X \Rightarrow (id y))]$

**hence**  $\exists w. \neg((\forall X y. \mathcal{E} X y \rightarrow X \Rightarrow id y) w)$  **by**  $simp$

**then obtain**  $w$  **where**  $\neg((\forall X y. \mathcal{E} X y \rightarrow X \Rightarrow id y) w)$  **..**

**hence**  $(\exists X y. \mathcal{E} X y \wedge \neg(X \Rightarrow id y)) w$  **by**  $simp$

**hence**  $\exists X y. \mathcal{E} X y w \wedge (\neg(X \Rightarrow id y)) w$  **by**  $simp$

**then obtain**  $P$  **where**  $\exists y. \mathcal{E} P y w \wedge (\neg(P \Rightarrow id y)) w$  **..**

**then obtain**  $a$  **where**  $1: \mathcal{E} P a w \wedge (\neg(P \Rightarrow id a)) w$  **..**

**hence**  $2: \mathcal{E} P a w$  **by** ( $rule conjunct1$ )

**from**  $1$  **have**  $(\neg(P \Rightarrow id a)) w$  **by** ( $rule conjunct2$ )

**hence**  $\exists x. \exists z. w r x \wedge existsAt z x \wedge P z x \wedge \neg(a = z)$  **by**  $blast$

**then obtain**  $w1$  **where**  $\exists z. w r w1 \wedge existsAt z w1 \wedge P z w1 \wedge \neg(a = z)$  **..**

**then obtain**  $b$  **where**  $3: w r w1 \wedge existsAt b w1 \wedge P b w1 \wedge \neg(a = b)$  **..**

**hence**  $w r w1$  **by**  $simp$

**from**  $3$  **have**  $existsAt b w1$  **by**  $simp$

**from**  $3$  **have**  $P b w1$  **by**  $simp$

**from**  $3$  **have**  $4: \neg(a = b)$  **by**  $simp$

**from**  $2$  **have**  $P a w$  **by**  $simp$

**from**  $2$  **have**  $\forall Y. Y a w \longrightarrow ((P \Rightarrow Y) w)$  **by**  $auto$

**hence**  $(\neg(id b)) a w \longrightarrow (P \Rightarrow (\neg(id b))) w$  **by** ( $rule allE$ )

**hence**  $\neg(\neg(id b)) a w \vee ((P \Rightarrow (\neg(id b))) w)$  **by**  $blast$

**then show**  $False$  **proof**

**assume**  $\neg(\neg(id b)) a w$

**hence**  $a = b$  **by**  $simp$

**thus**  $False$  **using**  $4$  **by**  $auto$

**next**

**assume**  $((P \Rightarrow (\neg(id b))) w)$

**hence**  $\forall x. \forall z. (w r x \wedge existsAt z x \wedge P z x) \longrightarrow (\neg(id b)) z x$  **by**  $blast$

**hence**  $\forall z. (w r w1 \wedge existsAt z w1 \wedge P z w1) \longrightarrow (\neg(id b)) z w1$

**by** ( $rule allE$ )

**hence**  $(w r w1 \wedge existsAt b w1 \wedge P b w1) \longrightarrow (\neg(id b)) b w1$  **by** ( $rule allE$ )



hence  $\neg(w \text{ } r \text{ } w1 \wedge \text{existsAt } b \text{ } w1 \wedge P \text{ } b \text{ } w1) \vee (\neg(id \text{ } b)) \text{ } b \text{ } w1$  **by simp**  
 hence  $(\neg(id \text{ } b)) \text{ } b \text{ } w$  **using 3 by simp**  
 hence  $\neg(b=b)$  **by simp**  
 thus *False* **by simp**  
 qed  
 qed

Definition 11.24 - Necessary Existence (Informal Definition 6):

**abbreviation** *necessaryExistencePred*:: $\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle$  (*NE*)  
 where  $NE \text{ } x \equiv (\lambda w. (\forall Y. \mathcal{E} \text{ } Y \text{ } x \rightarrow \Box \exists^E Y) \text{ } w)$

Axiom 11.25 (Informal Axiom 5)

**axiomatization where**  
*A5*:  $[\mathcal{P} \text{ } NE]$

**lemma** *True nitpick[satisfy] oops* — Model found: so far all axioms consistent

Theorem 11.26 (Informal Proposition 7) - Possibilist existence of God implies necessary actualist existence:

**theorem** *GodExistenceImpliesNecExistence*:  $[\exists G \rightarrow \Box \exists^E G]$

**proof** –  
 {  
   fix *w*  
   {  
     assume  $\exists x. G \text{ } x \text{ } w$   
     then obtain *g* where  $1: G \text{ } g \text{ } w$  ..  
     hence *NE g w* **using A5 by auto** — Axiom 11.25  
     hence  $\forall Y. (\mathcal{E} \text{ } Y \text{ } g \text{ } w) \rightarrow (\Box \exists^E Y) \text{ } w$  **by simp**  
     hence  $2: (\mathcal{E} \text{ } G \text{ } g \text{ } w) \rightarrow (\Box \exists^E G) \text{ } w$  **by (rule allE)**  
     have  $(\forall x. G \text{ } x \rightarrow (\mathcal{E} \text{ } G \text{ } x)) \text{ } w$  **using GodIsEssential**  
       **by (rule allE)** — GodIsEssential follows from Axioms 11.11 and 11.3B  
     hence  $(G \text{ } g \rightarrow (\mathcal{E} \text{ } G \text{ } g)) \text{ } w$  **by (rule allE)**  
     hence  $G \text{ } g \text{ } w \rightarrow \mathcal{E} \text{ } G \text{ } g \text{ } w$  **by simp**  
     from *this 1* have  $3: \mathcal{E} \text{ } G \text{ } g \text{ } w$  **by (rule mp)**  
     from  $2 \text{ } 3$  have  $(\Box \exists^E G) \text{ } w$  **by (rule mp)**  
   }  
   hence  $(\exists x. G \text{ } x \text{ } w) \rightarrow (\Box \exists^E G) \text{ } w$  **by (rule impI)**  
   hence  $(\exists x. G \text{ } x) \rightarrow \Box \exists^E G \text{ } w$  **by simp**  
 }  
 thus *?thesis* **by (rule allI)**  
 qed

Modal Collapse is countersatisfiable until we introduce S5 axioms:

**lemma**  $[\forall \Phi. (\Phi \rightarrow (\Box \Phi))]$  **nitpick oops**

Axiomatizing semantic frame conditions for different modal logics (via *Sahlqvist correspondence*). All axioms together imply an *S5* logic.

**axiomatization where**

*refl*: reflexive aRel **and**  
*tran*: transitive aRel **and**  
*symm*: symmetric aRel

**lemma** *True nitpick[satisfy] oops* — Model found: axioms still consistent

Using an *S5* logic modal collapse ( $\lfloor \forall \Phi. (\Phi \rightarrow (\Box \Phi)) \rfloor$ ) is actually valid (see proof below)

Some useful rules:

**lemma** *modal-distr*:  $\lfloor \Box(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rfloor \implies \lfloor (\Diamond \varphi \rightarrow \Diamond \psi) \rfloor$  **by** *blast*

**lemma** *modal-trans*:  $(\lfloor \varphi \rightarrow \psi \rfloor \wedge \lfloor \psi \rightarrow \chi \rfloor) \implies \lfloor \varphi \rightarrow \chi \rfloor$  **by** *simp*

Theorem 11.27 - Informal Proposition 8

**theorem** *possExistenceImpliesNecEx*:  $\lfloor \Diamond \exists G \rightarrow \Box \exists^E G \rfloor$  — local consequence

**proof** —

**have**  $\lfloor \exists G \rightarrow \Box \exists^E G \rfloor$  **using** *GodExistenceImpliesNecExistence*

**by** *simp* — follows from Axioms 11.11, 11.25 and 11.3B

**hence**  $\lfloor \Box(\exists G \rightarrow \Box \exists^E G) \rfloor$  **using** *NEC* **by** *simp*

**hence** 1:  $\lfloor \Diamond \exists G \rightarrow \Diamond \Box \exists^E G \rfloor$  **by** (*rule modal-distr*)

**have** 2:  $\lfloor \Diamond \Box \exists^E G \rightarrow \Box \exists^E G \rfloor$  **using** *symm tran* **by** *metis*

**from** 1 2 **have**  $\lfloor \Diamond \exists G \rightarrow \Diamond \Box \exists^E G \rfloor \wedge \lfloor \Diamond \Box \exists^E G \rightarrow \Box \exists^E G \rfloor$  **by** *simp*

**thus** *?thesis* **by** (*rule modal-trans*)

**qed**

**lemma** *T4*:  $\lfloor \Diamond \exists G \rfloor \longrightarrow \lfloor \Box \exists^E G \rfloor$  **using** *possExistenceImpliesNecEx*

**by** *simp* — global consequence

Corollary 11.28 - Necessary (actualist) existence of God (for both definitions):

**lemma** *GodNecExists*:  $\lfloor \Box \exists^E G \rfloor$  **using** *T3 T4* **by** *metis*

**lemma** *God-starNecExists*:  $\lfloor \Box \exists^E G^* \rfloor$

**using** *GodNecExists GodDefsAreEquivalent* **by** *simp*

#### 4.2.6 Monotheism

Monotheism for non-normal models (with Leibniz equality) follows directly from God having all and only positive properties:

**theorem** *Monotheism-LeibnizEq*:  $\lfloor \forall x. G x \rightarrow (\forall y. G y \rightarrow (x \approx^L y)) \rfloor$

**using** *GodDefsAreEquivalent* **by** *simp*

Monotheism for normal models is trickier. We need to consider some previous results (p. 162):

**lemma** *GodExistenceIsValid*:  $\lfloor \exists^E G \rfloor$  **using** *GodNecExists refl*

**by** *auto* — Note that we hadn't needed frame reflexivity until now

Proposition 11.29

**theorem** *Monotheism-normalModel*:  $[\exists x. \forall y. G y \leftrightarrow x \approx y]$   
**proof** –  
{  
  **fix**  $w$   
  **have**  $[\exists^E G]$  **using** *GodExistenceIsValid* **by** *simp* — follows from corollary 11.28  
  
  **hence**  $(\exists^E G) w$  **by** (*rule allE*)  
  **then obtain**  $g$  **where**  $1: \text{existsAt } g \ w \wedge G \ g \ w \ ..$   
  **hence**  $2: \mathcal{E} \ G \ g \ w$  **using** *GodIsEssential* **by** *blast* — follows from ax. 11.11/11.3B  
  
  {  
    **fix**  $y$   
    **have**  $G \ y \ w \longleftrightarrow (g \approx y) \ w$  **proof**  
    **assume**  $G \ y \ w$   
    **hence**  $3: \mathcal{E} \ G \ y \ w$  **using** *GodIsEssential* **by** *blast*  
    **have**  $(\mathcal{E} \ G \ y \rightarrow (G \Rightarrow \text{id } y)) \ w$  **using** *EssencesCharacterizeCompletely*  
    **by** *simp* — follows from theorem 11.23  
    **hence**  $\mathcal{E} \ G \ y \ w \rightarrow ((G \Rightarrow \text{id } y) \ w)$  **by** *simp*  
    **from this 3 have**  $(G \Rightarrow \text{id } y) \ w$  **by** (*rule mp*)  
    **hence**  $(\Box(\forall^E z. G \ z \rightarrow z \approx y)) \ w$  **by** *simp*  
    **hence**  $\forall x. w \ r \ x \rightarrow ((\forall z. (\text{existsAt } z \ x \wedge G \ z \ x) \rightarrow z = y))$  **by** *auto*  
    **hence**  $w \ r \ w \rightarrow ((\forall z. (\text{existsAt } z \ w \wedge G \ z \ w) \rightarrow z = y))$  **by** (*rule allE*)  
    **hence**  $\forall z. (w \ r \ w \wedge \text{existsAt } z \ w \wedge G \ z \ w) \rightarrow z = y$  **by** *auto*  
    **hence**  $4: (w \ r \ w \wedge \text{existsAt } g \ w \wedge G \ g \ w) \rightarrow g = y$  **by** (*rule allE*)  
    **have**  $w \ r \ w$  **using** *refl*  
    **by** *simp* — note that we rely explicitly on frame reflexivity (Axiom M)  
    **hence**  $w \ r \ w \wedge (\text{existsAt } g \ w \wedge G \ g \ w)$  **using**  $1$  **by** (*rule conjI*)  
    **from 4 this have**  $g = y$  **by** (*rule mp*)  
    **thus**  $(g \approx y) \ w$  **by** *simp*  
  **next**  
  **assume**  $(g \approx y) \ w$   
  **from this 2 have**  $\mathcal{E} \ G \ y \ w$  **by** *simp*  
  **thus**  $G \ y \ w$  **by** (*rule conjunct1*)  
  **qed**  
  }  
  **hence**  $\forall y. G \ y \ w \longleftrightarrow (g \approx y) \ w$  **by** (*rule allI*)  
  **hence**  $\exists x. (\forall y. G \ y \ w \longleftrightarrow (x \approx y) \ w)$  **by** (*rule exI*)  
  **hence**  $(\exists x. (\forall y. G \ y \leftrightarrow (x \approx y))) \ w$  **by** *simp*  
  }  
**thus** *?thesis* **by** (*rule allI*)  
**qed**

Corollary 11.30

**lemma** *GodImpliesExistence*:  $[\forall x. G \ x \rightarrow E! \ x]$   
**using** *GodExistenceIsValid Monotheism-normalModel* **by** *metis*

#### 4.2.7 Positive Properties are Necessarily Instantiated

**lemma** *PosPropertiesNecExist*:  $[\forall Y. \mathcal{P} \ Y \rightarrow \Box \exists^E \ Y]$  **using** *GodNecExists A4a*

by *meson* — Proposition 11.31: follows from corollary 11.28 and axiom A4a

#### 4.2.8 Objections and Criticism

**lemma** *useful*:  $(\forall x. \varphi x \longrightarrow \psi) \implies ((\exists x. \varphi x) \longrightarrow \psi)$  **by** *simp*

After introducing the S5 axioms Modal Collapse becomes valid (pp. 163-4):

**lemma** *ModalCollapse*:  $[\forall \Phi. (\Phi \rightarrow (\Box \Phi))]$

**proof** –

```

{
  fix w
  {
    fix Q
    have  $(\forall x. G x \rightarrow (\mathcal{E} G x)) w$  using GodIsEssential
      by (rule allE) — follows from Axioms 11.11 and 11.3B
    hence  $\forall x. G x w \longrightarrow \mathcal{E} G x w$  by simp
    hence  $\forall x. G x w \longrightarrow (\forall Z. Z x \rightarrow \Box(\forall^E z. G z \rightarrow Z z)) w$  by force
    hence  $\forall x. G x w \longrightarrow ((\lambda y. Q) x \rightarrow \Box(\forall^E z. G z \rightarrow (\lambda y. Q) z)) w$  by force
    hence  $\forall x. G x w \longrightarrow (Q \rightarrow \Box(\forall^E z. G z \rightarrow Q)) w$  by simp
    hence 1:  $(\exists x. G x w) \longrightarrow ((Q \rightarrow \Box(\forall^E z. G z \rightarrow Q)) w)$  by (rule useful)
    have  $\exists x. G x w$  using GodExistenceIsValid by auto
    from 1 this have  $(Q \rightarrow \Box(\forall^E z. G z \rightarrow Q)) w$  by (rule mp)
    hence  $(Q \rightarrow \Box((\exists^E z. G z) \rightarrow Q)) w$  using useful by blast
    hence  $(Q \rightarrow (\Box(\exists^E z. G z) \rightarrow \Box Q)) w$  by simp
    hence  $(Q \rightarrow \Box Q) w$  using GodNecExists by simp
  }
  hence  $(\forall \Phi. \Phi \rightarrow \Box \Phi) w$  by (rule allI)
}
thus ?thesis by (rule allI)
qed

```

## 5 Fitting's Solution

In this section we consider Fitting's solution to the objections raised in his previous discussion of Gödel's Argument (pp. 164-9), especially the problem of Modal Collapse, which has been metaphysically interpreted as implying a rejection of free will. Since we are generally committed to the existence of free will (in a pre-theoretical sense), such a result is philosophically unappealing and rather seen as a problem in the argument's formalisation.

This part of the book still leaves several details unspecified and the reader is thus compelled to fill in the gaps. As a result, we came across some premises and theorems allowing for different formalisations and therefore leading to disparate implications. Only some of those cases are shown here for illustrative purposes. The options chosen were those better suiting argument's validity.

## 5.1 Implicit Extensionality Assumptions

Since Isabelle/HOL is extensional, extensionality principles are valid directly out of the box:

**lemma** *EXT*:  $\forall \alpha::\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle. \forall \beta::\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle. (\forall \gamma::\mathbf{0}. (\alpha \gamma \longleftrightarrow \beta \gamma)) \longrightarrow (\alpha = \beta)$  **by** *auto*

**lemma** *EXT-set*:  $\forall \alpha::\langle\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle\rangle. \forall \beta::\langle\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle\rangle. (\forall \gamma::\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle. (\alpha \gamma \longleftrightarrow \beta \gamma)) \longrightarrow (\alpha = \beta)$  **by** *auto*

**lemma** *EXT-intensional*:  $\lfloor (\lambda x. ((\lambda y. x \approx y) \downarrow (\alpha::\uparrow\mathbf{0}))) \downarrow (\beta::\uparrow\mathbf{0}) \rfloor \longrightarrow \alpha = \beta$  **by** *auto*

**lemma** *EXT-int-pred*:  $\lfloor (\lambda x. ((\lambda y. x \approx y) \downarrow (\alpha::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle))) \downarrow (\beta::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle) \rfloor \longrightarrow \alpha = \beta$  **using** *ext* **by** *metis*

## 5.2 General Definitions

The following technical definitions are needed only for type correctness. They are used to convert extensional objects into rigid intensional ones.

**abbreviation** *trivialExpansion*::*bool* $\Rightarrow$ *io* ( $\lfloor - \rfloor$ ) **where**  $\lfloor \varphi \rfloor \equiv \lambda w. \varphi$

**abbreviation** *existencePredicate*:: $\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle$  (*E!*) **where**

$E! x \equiv (\lambda w. (\exists^E y. y \approx x) w)$

**consts** *positiveProperty*:: $\uparrow\langle\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle\rangle$  ( $\mathcal{P}$ )

**abbreviation** *God*:: $\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle$  (*G*) **where**  $G \equiv (\lambda x. \forall Y. \mathcal{P} Y \rightarrow \lfloor Y x \rfloor)$

**abbreviation** *God-star*:: $\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle$  (*G\**) **where**  $G* \equiv (\lambda x. \forall Y. \mathcal{P} Y \leftrightarrow \lfloor Y x \rfloor)$

**abbreviation** *Entailment*:: $\uparrow\langle\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle, \langle\mathbf{0}\rangle\rangle$  (*infix*  $\Rightarrow$  60) **where**

$X \Rightarrow Y \equiv \square(\forall^E z. \lfloor X z \rfloor \rightarrow \lfloor Y z \rfloor)$

## 5.3 Part I - God's Existence is Possible

**axiomatization** **where**

*A1a*:  $\lfloor \forall X. \mathcal{P} (\neg X) \rightarrow \neg(\mathcal{P} X) \rfloor$  **and** — Axiom 11.3A

*A1b*:  $\lfloor \forall X. \neg(\mathcal{P} X) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} (\neg X) \rfloor$  **and** — Axiom 11.3B

*A2*:  $\lfloor \forall X Y. (\mathcal{P} X \wedge (X \Rightarrow Y)) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} Y \rfloor$  **and** — Axiom 11.5

*T2*:  $\lfloor \mathcal{P} \downarrow G \rfloor$  — Proposition 11.16 (modified)

**lemma** *True nitpick[satisfy] oops* — Model found: axioms are consistent

**lemma** *GodDefsAreEquivalent*:  $\lfloor \forall x. G x \leftrightarrow G* x \rfloor$  **using** *A1b* **by** *fastforce*

*T1* (Positive properties are possibly instantiated) can be formalised in two different ways:

**theorem** *T1a*:  $\lfloor \forall X::\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle. \mathcal{P} X \rightarrow \Diamond(\exists^E z. \lfloor X z \rfloor) \rfloor$

**using** *A1a A2* **by** *blast* — this is the one used in the book

**theorem** *T1b*:  $\lfloor \forall X::\uparrow\langle\mathbf{0}\rangle. \mathcal{P} \downarrow X \rightarrow \Diamond(\exists^E z. X z) \rfloor$

**nitpick oops** — this one is also possible but not valid so we won't use it

Some interesting (non-) equivalences:

**lemma**  $[\Box \exists^E (Q :: \uparrow \langle 0 \rangle) \leftrightarrow \Box (\exists^E \downarrow Q)]$  **by simp**  
**lemma**  $[\Box \exists^E (Q :: \uparrow \langle 0 \rangle) \leftrightarrow ((\lambda X. \Box \exists^E X) Q)]$  **by simp**  
**lemma**  $[\Box \exists^E (Q :: \uparrow \langle 0 \rangle) \leftrightarrow ((\lambda X. \Box \exists^E \downarrow X) Q)]$  **by simp**  
**lemma**  $[\Box \exists^E (Q :: \uparrow \langle 0 \rangle) \leftrightarrow ((\lambda X. \Box \exists^E X) \downarrow Q)]$  **nitpick oops** — not equivalent!

$T3$  (God exists possibly) can be formalised in two different ways, using a *de re* or a *de dicto* reading.

**theorem**  $T3\text{-}deRe$ :  $[(\lambda X. \Diamond \exists^E X) \downarrow G]$  **using**  $T1a$   $T2$  **by simp**

**theorem**  $T3\text{-}deDicto$ :  $[\Diamond \exists^E \downarrow G]$  **nitpick oops** — countersatisfiable

From the last two theorems, we think  $T3\text{-}deRe$  should be the version originally implied in the book, since  $T3\text{-}deDicto$  is not valid (unless  $T1b$  were valid but it isn't)

**lemma assumes**  $T1b$ :  $[\forall X. \mathcal{P} \downarrow X \rightarrow \Diamond (\exists^E z. X z)]$   
**shows**  $T3\text{-}deDicto$ :  $[\Diamond \exists^E \downarrow G]$  **using** *assms*  $T2$  **by simp**

## 5.4 Part II - God's Existence is Necessary if Possible

In this variant  $\mathcal{P}$  also designates rigidly, as shown in the last section.

**axiomatization where**

$A4a$ :  $[\forall X. \mathcal{P} X \rightarrow \Box (\mathcal{P} X)]$  — Axiom 11.11

**lemma**  $A4b$ :  $[\forall X. \neg (\mathcal{P} X) \rightarrow \Box \neg (\mathcal{P} X)]$  **using**  $A1a$   $A1b$   $A4a$  **by blast**

**lemma** *True* **nitpick**[*satisfy*] **oops** — Model found: so far all axioms consistent

**abbreviation**  $essenceOf :: \uparrow \langle \langle 0 \rangle, 0 \rangle (\mathcal{E})$  **where**

$\mathcal{E} Y x \equiv (\downarrow Y x) \wedge (\forall Z :: \langle 0 \rangle. (\downarrow Z x) \rightarrow Y \Rightarrow Z)$

Theorem 11.20 - Informal Proposition 5

**theorem**  $GodIsEssential$ :  $[\forall x. G x \rightarrow ((\mathcal{E} \downarrow_1 G) x)]$  **using**  $A1b$  **by metis**

Theorem 11.21

**theorem**  $God\text{-}starIsEssential$ :  $[\forall x. G^* x \rightarrow ((\mathcal{E} \downarrow_1 G^*) x)]$  **by meson**

**abbreviation**  $necExistencePred :: \uparrow \langle 0 \rangle (NE)$  **where**

$NE x \equiv \lambda w. (\forall Y. \mathcal{E} Y x \rightarrow \Box (\exists^E z. (\downarrow Y z))) w$

Informal Axiom 5

**axiomatization where**

$A5$ :  $[\mathcal{P} \downarrow NE]$

**lemma** *True* **nitpick**[*satisfy*] **oops** — Model found: so far all axioms consistent

Reminder: We use the down-arrow notation because it is more explicit. See (non-) equivalences above.

**lemma**  $[\exists G \leftrightarrow \exists \downarrow G]$  **by simp**

**lemma**  $[\exists^E G \leftrightarrow \exists^E \downarrow G]$  **by simp**

**lemma**  $[\Box \exists^E G \leftrightarrow \Box \exists^E \downarrow G]$  **by** *simp*

Theorem 11.26 (Informal Proposition 7) - (possibilist) existence of God implies necessary (actualist) existence.

There are two different ways of formalising this theorem. Both of them are proven valid:

First version:

**theorem** *GodExImpliesNecEx-v1*:  $[\exists \downarrow G \rightarrow \Box \exists^E \downarrow G]$

**proof** –

```
{
  fix w
  {
    assume  $\exists x. G x w$ 
    then obtain g where 1:  $G g w$  ..
    hence NE g w using A5 by auto
    hence  $\forall Y. (\mathcal{E} Y g w) \rightarrow (\Box(\exists^E z. (\mathcal{I} Y z))) w$  by simp
    hence  $(\mathcal{E} (\lambda x. G x w) g w) \rightarrow (\Box(\exists^E z. (\mathcal{I} (\lambda x. G x w) z))) w$  by (rule allE)
    hence 2:  $((\mathcal{E} \downarrow_1 G) g w) \rightarrow (\Box(\exists^E G)) w$  using A4b by meson
    have  $(\forall x. G x \rightarrow ((\mathcal{E} \downarrow_1 G) x)) w$  using GodIsEssential by (rule allE)
    hence  $(G g \rightarrow ((\mathcal{E} \downarrow_1 G) g)) w$  by (rule allE)
    hence  $G g w \rightarrow (\mathcal{E} \downarrow_1 G) g w$  by simp
    from this 1 have 3:  $(\mathcal{E} \downarrow_1 G) g w$  by (rule mp)
    from 2 3 have  $(\Box \exists^E G) w$  by (rule mp)
  }
  hence  $(\exists x. G x w) \rightarrow (\Box \exists^E G) w$  by (rule impI)
  hence  $(\exists x. G x) \rightarrow \Box \exists^E G$  w by simp
}
thus ?thesis by (rule allI)
qed
```

Second version (which can be proven directly by automated tools using last version):

**theorem** *GodExImpliesNecEx-v2*:  $[\exists \downarrow G \rightarrow ((\lambda X. \Box \exists^E X) \downarrow G)]$   
**using** A4a *GodExImpliesNecEx-v1* **by** *metis*

Compared to Goedel's argument, the following theorems can be proven in  $K$  logic (note that S5 no longer needed):

Theorem 11.27 - Informal Proposition 8

**theorem** *possExImpliesNecEx-v1*:  $[\Diamond \exists \downarrow G \rightarrow \Box \exists^E \downarrow G]$

**using** *GodExImpliesNecEx-v1* T3-deRe **by** *metis*

**theorem** *possExImpliesNecEx-v2*:  $[(\lambda X. \Diamond \exists^E X) \downarrow G \rightarrow ((\lambda X. \Box \exists^E X) \downarrow G)]$

**using** *GodExImpliesNecEx-v2* **by** *blast*

Corollaries:

**lemma** *T4-v1*:  $[\Diamond \exists \downarrow G] \rightarrow [\Box \exists^E \downarrow G]$

**using** *possExImpliesNecEx-v1* **by** *simp*  
**lemma** *T4-v2*:  $[(\lambda X. \Diamond \exists^E X) \downarrow G] \longrightarrow [(\lambda X. \Box \exists^E X) \downarrow G]$   
**using** *possExImpliesNecEx-v2* **by** *simp*

## 5.5 Conclusion (*De re* and *De dicto*)

Version I - Necessary Existence of God (*de dicto* reading):

**lemma** *GodNecExists-v1*:  $[\Box \exists^E \downarrow G]$   
**using** *GodExImpliesNecEx-v1 T3-deRe* **by** *fastforce* — Corollary 11.28  
**lemma** *God-starNecExists-v1*:  $[\Box \exists^E \downarrow G^*]$   
**using** *GodNecExists-v1 GodDefsAreEquivalent* **by** *simp*  
**lemma**  $[\Box(\lambda X. \exists^E X) \downarrow G^*]$   
**using** *God-starNecExists-v1* **by** *simp* — *de dicto* shown here explicitly

Version II - Necessary Existence of God (*de re* reading)

**lemma** *GodNecExists-v2*:  $[(\lambda X. \Box \exists^E X) \downarrow G]$   
**using** *T3-deRe T4-v2* **by** *blast*  
**lemma** *God-starNecExists-v2*:  $[(\lambda X. \Box \exists^E X) \downarrow G^*]$   
**using** *GodNecExists-v2 GodDefsAreEquivalent* **by** *simp*

## 5.6 Modal Collapse

Modal Collapse is countersatisfiable even in *S5*. Note that countermodels with a cardinality of one for the domain of ground-level objects are found by Nitpick (the countermodel shown in the book has cardinality of two).

**lemma**  $[\forall \Phi. (\Phi \rightarrow (\Box \Phi))]$   
**nitpick** $[card \ 't=1, card \ i=2]$  **oops** — countermodel found in *K*

**axiomatization where**

*S5*: *equivalence aRel* — assume *S5* logic

**lemma**  $[\forall \Phi. (\Phi \rightarrow (\Box \Phi))]$   
**nitpick** $[card \ 't=1, card \ i=2]$  **oops** — countermodel also found in *S5*

## 6 Anderson's Alternative

In this last section we consider Anderson's Alternative to the objections previously shown, as exposed in the last part of the textbook (pp. 169-171)

### 6.1 General Definitions

**abbreviation** *existencePredicate*:: $\uparrow \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle (E!)$   
**where**  $E! \ x \equiv \lambda w. (\exists^E y. y \approx x) \ w$

**consts** *positiveProperty*:: $\uparrow \langle \uparrow \langle \mathbf{0} \rangle \rangle (\mathcal{P})$



Godlike, Anderson Version (Definition 11.33)

**abbreviation**  $God::\uparrow\langle 0 \rangle (G^A)$  **where**  $G^A \equiv \lambda x. \forall Y. (\mathcal{P} Y) \leftrightarrow \Box(Y x)$

**abbreviation**  $Entailment::\uparrow\langle \uparrow\langle 0 \rangle, \uparrow\langle 0 \rangle \rangle$  (**infix**  $\Rightarrow 60$ ) **where**  
 $X \Rightarrow Y \equiv \Box(\forall^{Ez}. X z \rightarrow Y z)$

## 6.2 Part I - God's Existence is Possible

**axiomatization where**

$A1a: [\forall X. \mathcal{P} (\rightarrow X) \rightarrow \neg(\mathcal{P} X)]$  **and** — Axiom 11.3A

$A2: [\forall X Y. (\mathcal{P} X \wedge (X \Rightarrow Y)) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} Y]$  **and** — Axiom 11.5

$T2: [\mathcal{P} G^A]$  — Proposition 11.16

**lemma** *True* **nitpick**[*satisfy*] **oops** — Model found: axioms are consistent

**theorem**  $T1: [\forall X. \mathcal{P} X \rightarrow \Diamond \exists^E X]$

**using**  $A1a A2$  **by** *blast* — Positive properties are possibly instantiated

**theorem**  $T3: [\Diamond \exists^E G^A]$  **using**  $T1 T2$  **by** *simp* — God exists possibly

## 6.3 Part II - God's Existence is Necessary if Possible

$\mathcal{P}$  now satisfies only one of the stability conditions (p. 124). But since the argument uses an *S5* logic, the other stability condition is implied. Therefore  $\mathcal{P}$  becomes rigid.

**axiomatization where**

$A4a: [\forall X. \mathcal{P} X \rightarrow \Box(\mathcal{P} X)]$  — Axiom 11.11

Axiomatizing semantic frame conditions for different modal logics (via *Sahlqvist correspondence*). All axioms together imply an *S5* logic.

**axiomatization where**

*refl*: *reflexive aRel* **and**

*tran*: *transitive aRel* **and**

*symm*: *symmetric aRel*

**lemma** *True* **nitpick**[*satisfy*] **oops** — Model found: so far all axioms consistent

**abbreviation**  $rigidPred::('t \Rightarrow io) \Rightarrow io$  **where**

$rigidPred \tau \equiv (\lambda \beta. \Box((\lambda z. \beta \approx z) \downarrow \tau)) \downarrow \tau$

**lemma**  $A4b: [\forall X. \neg(\mathcal{P} X) \rightarrow \Box \neg(\mathcal{P} X)]$

**using**  $A4a$  *symm* **by** *auto* — note only symmetry is needed ( $\lambda w. \forall x. (x \rightarrow \Box \Diamond x)$  *w* axiom)

**lemma**  $[rigidPred \mathcal{P}]$

**using**  $A4a A4b$  **by** *blast* —  $\mathcal{P}$  is therefore rigid in a  $\lambda w. \forall x. (x \rightarrow \Box \Diamond x)$  *w* logic

Essence, Anderson Version (Definition 11.34)

**abbreviation**  $essenceOf::\uparrow\langle \uparrow\langle 0 \rangle, 0 \rangle (\mathcal{E}^A)$  **where**

$$\mathcal{E}^A Y x \equiv (\forall Z. \Box(Z x) \leftrightarrow Y \Rightarrow Z)$$

Necessary Existence, Anderson Version (Definition 11.35)

**abbreviation** *necessaryExistencePred::↑(0)* ( $NE^A$ )  
**where**  $NE^A x \equiv (\lambda w. (\forall Y. \mathcal{E}^A Y x \rightarrow \Box \exists^E Y) w)$

Theorem 11.36 - If g is God-like, then the property of being God-like is the essence of g.

As shown before, this theorem's proof could be completely automatized for Gödel's and Fitting's variants. For Anderson's version however, we had to provide Isabelle with some help based on the corresponding natural-language proof given by Anderson (see [2], Theorem 2\*, p. 296)

**theorem** *GodIsEssential*:  $[\forall x. G^A x \rightarrow (\mathcal{E}^A G^A x)]$

**proof** –

```
{
  fix w
  {
    fix g
    {
      assume  $G^A g w$ 
      hence 1:  $\forall Y. (\mathcal{P} Y w) \longleftrightarrow (\Box(Y g)) w$  by simp
      {
        fix Q
        from 1 have 2:  $(\mathcal{P} Q w) \longleftrightarrow (\Box(Q g)) w$  by (rule allE)
        have  $(\Box(Q g)) w \longleftrightarrow (G^A \Rightarrow Q) w$  — we need to prove  $\rightarrow$  and  $\leftarrow$ 
        proof
          assume  $(\Box(Q g)) w$  — Suppose g is God-like and necessarily has Q
          hence 3:  $(\mathcal{P} Q w)$  using 2 by simp — Then Q is positive

          {
            fix u
            have  $(\mathcal{P} Q u) \longrightarrow (\forall x. G^A x u \longrightarrow (\Box(Q x)) u)$ 
              by auto — using the definition of God-like
            have  $(\mathcal{P} Q u) \longrightarrow (\forall x. G^A x u \longrightarrow ((Q x)) u)$ 
              using refl by auto — and using  $\Box(\varphi x) \longrightarrow \varphi x$ 
          }
            hence  $\forall z. (\mathcal{P} Q z) \longrightarrow (\forall x. G^A x z \longrightarrow Q x z)$  by (rule allI)
            hence  $[\mathcal{P} Q \rightarrow (\forall x. G^A x \rightarrow Q x)]$ 
              by auto — if Q is positive, then whatever is God-like has Q
            hence  $[\Box(\mathcal{P} Q \rightarrow (\forall x. G^A x \rightarrow Q x))]$  by (rule NEC)

            hence  $[(\Box(\mathcal{P} Q)) \rightarrow \Box(\forall x. G^A x \rightarrow Q x)]$  using K by auto
            hence  $[(\Box(\mathcal{P} Q)) \rightarrow G^A \Rightarrow Q]$  by simp
            hence  $(\Box(\mathcal{P} Q)) \rightarrow G^A \Rightarrow Q$  by (rule allE)
            hence 4:  $(\Box(\mathcal{P} Q)) w \longrightarrow (G^A \Rightarrow Q) w$  by simp
            have  $[\forall X. \mathcal{P} X \rightarrow \Box(\mathcal{P} X)]$  by (rule A4a) — using axiom 4
            hence  $(\forall X. \mathcal{P} X \rightarrow (\Box(\mathcal{P} X))) w$  by (rule allE)
            hence  $\mathcal{P} Q w \longrightarrow (\Box(\mathcal{P} Q)) w$  by (rule allE)
          }
        }
      }
    }
  }
```

hence  $\mathcal{P} Q w \longrightarrow (G^A \Rightarrow Q) w$  **using** 4 **by** *simp*  
 thus  $(G^A \Rightarrow Q) w$  **using** 3 **by** (*rule mp*)  $\longrightarrow$  direction  
 next  
 assume 5:  $(G^A \Rightarrow Q) w$  — Suppose Q is entailed by being God-like  
 have  $[\forall X Y. (\mathcal{P} X \wedge (X \Rightarrow Y)) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} Y]$  **by** (*rule A2*)  
 hence  $(\forall X Y. (\mathcal{P} X \wedge (X \Rightarrow Y)) \rightarrow \mathcal{P} Y) w$  **by** (*rule allE*)  
 hence  $\forall X Y. (\mathcal{P} X w \wedge (X \Rightarrow Y) w) \longrightarrow \mathcal{P} Y w$  **by** *simp*  
 hence  $\forall Y. (\mathcal{P} G^A w \wedge (G^A \Rightarrow Y) w) \longrightarrow \mathcal{P} Y w$  **by** (*rule allE*)  
 hence 6:  $(\mathcal{P} G^A w \wedge (G^A \Rightarrow Q) w) \longrightarrow \mathcal{P} Q w$  **by** (*rule allE*)  
 have  $[\mathcal{P} G^A]$  **by** (*rule T2*)  
 hence  $\mathcal{P} G^A w$  **by** (*rule allE*)  
 hence  $\mathcal{P} G^A w \wedge (G^A \Rightarrow Q) w$  **using** 5 **by** (*rule conjI*)  
 from 6 *this* have  $\mathcal{P} Q w$  **by** (*rule mp*) — Q is positive by A2 and T2  
 thus  $(\Box(Q g)) w$  **using** 2 **by** *simp*  
 qed  
 }  
 hence  $\forall Z. (\Box(Z g)) w \longleftrightarrow (G^A \Rightarrow Z) w$  **by** (*rule allI*)  
 hence  $(\forall Z. \Box(Z g) \leftrightarrow G^A \Rightarrow Z) w$  **by** *simp*  
 hence  $\mathcal{E}^A G^A g w$  **by** *simp*  
 }  
 hence  $G^A g w \longrightarrow \mathcal{E}^A G^A g w$  **by** (*rule impI*)  
 }  
 hence  $\forall x. G^A x w \longrightarrow \mathcal{E}^A G^A x w$  **by** (*rule allI*)  
 }  
 thus ?thesis **by** (*rule allI*)  
 qed

Axiom 11.37 (Anderson's Version of 11.25)

**axiomatization where**

A5:  $[\mathcal{P} NE^A]$

**lemma** *True nitpick*[*satisfy*] **oops** — Model found: so far all axioms consistent

Theorem 11.38 - Possibilist existence of God implies necessary actualist existence:

**theorem** *GodExistenceImpliesNecExistence*:  $[\exists G^A \rightarrow \Box \exists^E G^A]$

**proof** —

{  
 fix  $w$   
 {  
 assume  $\exists x. G^A x w$   
 then obtain  $g$  where 1:  $G^A g w$  ..  
 hence  $NE^A g w$  **using** A5 **by** *blast* — Axiom 11.25  
 hence  $\forall Y. (\mathcal{E}^A Y g w \longrightarrow (\Box \exists^E Y) w)$  **by** *simp*  
 hence 2:  $(\mathcal{E}^A G^A g w) \longrightarrow (\Box \exists^E G^A) w$  **by** (*rule allE*)  
 have  $(\forall x. G^A x \rightarrow (\mathcal{E}^A G^A x)) w$  **using** *GodIsEssential*  
 by (*rule allE*) — *GodIsEssential* follows from Axioms 11.11 and 11.3B  
 hence  $(G^A g \rightarrow (\mathcal{E}^A G^A g)) w$  **by** (*rule allE*)  
 hence  $G^A g w \longrightarrow \mathcal{E}^A G^A g w$  **by** *blast*

```

    from this 1 have 3:  $\mathcal{E}^A G^A g w$  by (rule mp)
    from 2 3 have  $(\Box \exists^E G^A) w$  by (rule mp)
  }
  hence  $(\exists x. G^A x w) \longrightarrow (\Box \exists^E G^A) w$  by (rule impI)
  hence  $((\exists x. G^A x) \rightarrow \Box \exists^E G^A) w$  by simp
}
thus ?thesis by (rule allI)
qed

```

Some useful rules:

**lemma** *modal-distr*:  $\lfloor \Box(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rfloor \Longrightarrow \lfloor (\Diamond \varphi \rightarrow \Diamond \psi) \rfloor$  by blast

**lemma** *modal-trans*:  $(\lfloor \varphi \rightarrow \psi \rfloor \wedge \lfloor \psi \rightarrow \chi \rfloor) \Longrightarrow \lfloor \varphi \rightarrow \chi \rfloor$  by simp

Anderson's Version of Theorem 11.27

**theorem** *possExistenceImpliesNecEx*:  $\lfloor \Diamond \exists G^A \rightarrow \Box \exists^E G^A \rfloor$  — local consequence

**proof** —

```

  have  $\lfloor \exists G^A \rightarrow \Box \exists^E G^A \rfloor$  using GodExistenceImpliesNecExistence
    by simp — follows from Axioms 11.11, 11.25 and 11.3B
  hence  $\lfloor \Box(\exists G^A \rightarrow \Box \exists^E G^A) \rfloor$  using NEC by simp
  hence 1:  $\lfloor \Diamond \exists G^A \rightarrow \Diamond \Box \exists^E G^A \rfloor$  by (rule modal-distr)
  have 2:  $\lfloor \Diamond \Box \exists^E G^A \rightarrow \Box \exists^E G^A \rfloor$  using symm tran by metis
  from 1 2 have  $\lfloor \Diamond \exists G^A \rightarrow \Diamond \Box \exists^E G^A \rfloor \wedge \lfloor \Diamond \Box \exists^E G^A \rightarrow \Box \exists^E G^A \rfloor$  by simp
  thus ?thesis by (rule modal-trans)
qed

```

**lemma** *T4*:  $\lfloor \Diamond \exists G^A \rfloor \longrightarrow \lfloor \Box \exists^E G^A \rfloor$  using *possExistenceImpliesNecEx*  
by simp — global consequence

Conclusion - Necessary (actualist) existence of God:

**lemma** *GodNecExists*:  $\lfloor \Box \exists^E G^A \rfloor$  using *T3 T4* by metis

## 6.4 Modal Collapse

Modal Collapse is countersatisfiable

**lemma**  $\lfloor \forall \Phi. (\Phi \rightarrow (\Box \Phi)) \rfloor$  nitpick oops

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