Quantifying superspreading for COVID-19 using Poisson mixture distributions

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Background •0000

Background

 R_0 = average number of secondary cases by an infected individual in a completely susceptible population

* considered constant among population members or specific population groups

Transmission potential = complex combination of host, pathogen, and environmental factors

- → individual variation in disease transmission
 - * affects outbreak probability and subsequent course


Superspreaders: infect substantially more individuals than others


- * relatively small part of cases responsible for most of transmission
- many cases do not transmit disease

Background 00000

Population estimate of R_0 does not account for individual variation

 \rightarrow Overdispersed offspring distribution with mean R_0





Background 00000

Lloyd-Smith et al. (2005): individual reproduction number ν as a random variable that represents the expected number of secondary cases

- * Distribution with population mean R_0
 - encodes all variation in infectiousness
 - \rightarrow SSE are realizations from the right-hand tail of the distribution of ν
- * Stochastic effects in transmission modelled using a Poisson process
 - $_*$ Most studies have assumed the rate $u\sim$ Gamma
 - = negative binomial offspring distribution \rightarrow heterogeneity quantified by dispersion parameter k
 - * k < 1: substantial superspreading
 - * lower k = increased heterogeneity
 - → easy comparison between studies

Individual variation in SARS-CoV-2 transmission

- * (almost) all studies assume a negative binomial distribution
- * k ranging from 0.1 to 0.6

Background 00000

- $p_{80\%}$ = proportion of cases responsible for 80% of transmission; ranging from 9% to 20%
- → indicates important role of SSE in transmission

Other distributions?

Background 0000

- * Brooks-Pollock et al. (2020): model the distribution of cluster sizes for TBC in the UK and NL
 - Poisson-lognormal better fit to UK data
- → importance of comparing different assumptions

What if the assumption of a negative binomial offspring distribution is not the best one?

→ Impact on estimates of heterogeneity?

Poisson mixtures

Number of secondary infections caused by each case is described by an offspring distribution

- * Poisson contact process
- * Rate following a continuous probability distribution
 - $_*$ individual reproduction number u
- \rightarrow Poisson mixture distribution: $Y \sim \text{Poisson}(\nu)$

Distribution for ν	Offspring distribution	Mean R	Variance σ^2
$ u \sim GG(a,d,p) $	$Y \sim PoGG(a,d,p)$	$a \frac{\Gamma(\frac{d+1}{p})}{\Gamma(\frac{d}{p})}$	$a\frac{\Gamma(\frac{d+1}{p})}{\Gamma(\frac{d}{p})} + a^2 \left[\frac{\Gamma(\frac{d+2}{p})}{\Gamma(\frac{d}{p})} - \left(\frac{\Gamma(\frac{d+1}{p})}{\Gamma(\frac{d}{p})} \right)^2 \right]$
$ u \sim Ga(\alpha, \beta)$	$Y \sim NB(\mu, k)$	$\mu = \frac{\alpha}{\beta}$	$\mu(1+rac{\mu}{k})=rac{lpha}{eta}(1+rac{1}{eta})$
$ u \sim LogN(\mu_{log}, \sigma_{log})$	$Y \sim PoLN(\mu_{log}, \sigma_{log})$	$e^{\mu_{log}+rac{\sigma_{log}^2}{2}}$	$e^{\mu_{log}+rac{\sigma_{log}^2}{2}}+\left[(e^{\sigma_{log}^2}-1)e^{2\mu_{log}+\sigma_{log}^2} ight]$
$ u \sim Weibull(p, l)$	$Y \sim PoWB(p, I)$	$I\Gamma(1+\frac{1}{\rho})$	$I\Gamma(1+\frac{1}{p})+I^2\left[\Gamma(1+\frac{2}{p})-\left(\Gamma(1+\frac{1}{p})\right)^2\right]$

Simulation study

Objective: assess bias in estimates of R and its overdispersion

- * generate data from each proposed mixture
 - * varying levels of overdispersion
- * estimate parameters using MLE
- * obtain \hat{R}_i and $\hat{\sigma}_i$
- → Impact of assumed offspring distribution on proportion of cases responsible for certain proportion of transmission?
 - * i.e. importance of superspreading

Expected vs. realized proportions of transmission

Two methods:

- 1. Lloyd-Smith et al. (2005): calculate proportion responsible based on the distribution of $\nu \to \mathbf{expected}$ proportion of transmission based on inherent transmission potential
 - * only depends on level of overdispersion, not R
- 2. Endo et al. (2020): take into account additional variation from Poisson process \rightarrow realized proportion of transmission
 - depends on level of overdispersion as well as R

Same reasoning \rightarrow CDF for disease transmission, $1 - F_{trans}(x)$ gives proportion of transmission due to cases with # secondary > x

- 1. Define proportion p of transmission we are interested in
- 2. x such that $1 F_{trans}(x) = p$
- 3. Proportion responsible are those with # secondary > x

When based on discrete Poisson mixture \rightarrow unlikely that there exists an integer x such that $1 - F_{trans}(x) = p$

- * Endo et al. (2020): continuous approximation of discrete distribution
- * Account for uncertainty around proportions
 - * define x_1, x_2 such that $1 F_{trans}(x_2)$
 - proportion responsible given by a range

Data examples


Fit Poisson mixtures to three COVID-19 datasets using MLE

- Empirical offspring distribution for
 - * 290 cases in Hong Kong Adam et al. (2020)
 - * 84 965 cases in India Laxminarayan et al. (2020)
 - 795 cases in Rwanda
- → Compare distributions in terms of AIC and GOF
 - * Akaike weights to quantify model selection uncertainty
- → Different conclusions regarding superspreading potential, based on $p_{80\%}$?

Simulation study

As overdispersion \nearrow

- bias in variance estimates increases
- * substantial difference between distributions
- \rightarrow Inference of heterogeneity based on the 'wrong' distribution may be biased




Data examples

Dataset	Distribution	R (95%CI)	p _{80%} (95%CI)	AIC	Wi
Hong Kong	NB	0.583 (0.448 - 0.718)	0.288 (0.208 - 0.345)	593.925	0.078
	POLN	0.587 (0.456 - 0.779)	0.332 (0.236 - 0.438)	590.009	0.551
	POWB	0.580 (0.445 - 0.745)	0.294 (0.223 - 0.358)	591.747	0.231
	POGG	0.580 (0.3789 - 0.724)	0.303 (0.279 - 0.325)	592.738	0.141
India	NB	0.484 (0.480 - 0.494)	0.319 (0.314 - 0.324)	163974.5	0.000
	POLN	0.484 (0.477 - 0.491)	0.373 (0.367 - 0.379)	162980.6	1.000
	POWB	0.483 (0.476 - 0.489)	0.322 (0.318 - 0.327)	163530.8	0.000
	POGG	0.484 (0.477 - 0.490)	0.333 (0.332 - 0.335)	163286.5	0.000
Rwanda	NB	0.259 (0.216 - 0.302)	0.323 (0.223 - 0.390)	1015.261	0.157
	POLN	0.260 (0.219 - 0.311)	0.389 (0.318 - 0.459)	1013.073	0.468
	POWB	0.259 (0.217 - 0.311)	0.331 (0.241 - 0.394)	1014.350	0.247
	POGG	0.259 (0.216 - 0.301)	0.344 (0.337 - 0.350)	1015.667	0.128

- Poisson-lognormal best fit based on AIC
- * Considerable differences in expected $p_{80\%}$ when based on distribution of ν , compared to NB
 - ranges mostly overlapping when based on complete offspring distribution

Hong Kong data: NB, POGG, (POWB) don't adequately capture proportion of cases generating one secondary case \rightarrow overestimating superspreading potential



Conclusions

Importance of model comparison

- NB often underestimates proportion of cases with only 1 secondary case
 - \rightarrow overestimates importance of SSEs
- * Studies can also be compared by $p_{80\%}$ instead of k
 - * can be obtained for any distribution
 - * more intuitive interpretation
 - * be aware of the two different approaches!

Importance of correctly quantifying heterogeneity

- * 'Superspreading potential' needs to be taken in account when modeling disease control / planning control strategies
 - * In case of high overdispersion (i.e. low $p_{80\%}$), control measures should focus on limiting potential SSE
 - restricting large events, avoid crowding, . . .
 - * For higher $p_{80\%}$, additional control measures needed focusing on regular contacts

Future work

- Inference from final size data
- Disentangle heterogeneity coming from variation in contact rates vs. variation in viral shedding, to improve control measures
- * Other distributions to describe contact process
 - Poisson process is likely a simplification

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