

ANDāNA-v2: Application-Layer Support for Low-Latency Bidirectional Anonymous Traffic in NDN

Design Specification Document

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Abstract

This report documents the motivation, design, and implementation plan for the new version of ANDāNA to support highly efficient bidirectional traffic with low-latency in NDN. Weeks 1-3 of this project were spent setting up the experimental testbed and ramping up with the ANDāNA design and source code; weeks 4-6 were spent designing and running experiments to gather performance data for ANDāNA; weeks 7-8 were spent on the design of ANDāNA-v2 and preliminary attempts at its implementation; weeks 9-10 were spent finalizing the design, completing the implementation, and gathering experimental data that can be used to compare against ANDāNA.

1 Overview

With the possible adoption of NDN or any flavor of information-centric networking as the future Internet architecture in the near future, support for low-latency, bidirectional traffic may prove very useful for a variety of use cases. Consider the scenario in which two parties wish to exchange voice or video content over NDN, such as the case with Skype and related applications. Jacobson et al. [?] have already studied the efficiencies of such content-heavy and QoS-strict applications over CCN. Unfortunately, support for such applications becomes much more difficult when one, or both, of the parties wishes to remain anonymous. Such is the case in settings where voice or video content is being streamed from *some* person in a single organization, but the identity of said person needs to remain secret. A real-world instance where this may be useful is when such traffic needs to be exchanged between military organizations of unfriendly nations. Indeed, the identity of military personell participating in such voice or video conferences should remain secret for safety reasons.

Application-layer support for anonymizing network traffic has already been implemented in the ANDāNA system [?]. However, in that work, the authors focus on a single, unidirectional client-producer scenario in which traffic latency, network jitter, and quality-of-service requirements were not specified nor mandated. In this work, we seek to amend the design of ANDāNA to support low-latency, bidirectional traffic applications with hard QoS and anonymity requirements. Consequently, this new design seeks to attain equivalent anonymity and privacy guarantees of ANDāNA while enjoying significantly higher performance - two factors that are often inversely related in practice.

In the remainder of this document we discuss the motivation and details of our preliminary design for the new anonymizing application, dubbed ANDāNA-v2, as well as our implementation strategy. In order to avoid confusion and repetition throughout the rest of the document, all common terminology used throughout is specified and clarified in Table ?? . Also, for simplicity, we denote the global system security parameter as κ , unless otherwise specified.

Table 1: Notation used in the presentation of this work.

\mathcal{C}	Set of all consumers
\mathcal{P}	Set of all producers
\mathcal{R}	Set of all routers
\mathcal{IF}	Set of all interfaces on all routers
$\text{if}_i^r \in \mathcal{IF}$	Interface i of router r
(pk_i, sk_i)	Public/private key pair for router r
$\overline{\text{int}}_i^j$	Encrypted interest wrapped from router i to router j ($i \leq j$)
\mathcal{A}	Adversary
u	Entity in the network (consumer or producer)
$u \rightarrow_{\text{int}} r$	Entity u sends interest to router r
$\text{int} \rightarrow \text{if}_i^r$	Interest int is sent to interface i of router r
$r \in \mathcal{R}$	An anonymizing router (AR)
$\mathcal{E}_{pk_i}(\cdot)$	Public key encryption using pk_i
$\mathcal{D}_{pk_i}(\cdot)$	Public key decryption using pk_i
$\text{Encrypt}_{k_i}(\cdot)$	Symmetric key encryption using key k_i
$\text{Decrypt}_{k_i}(\cdot)$	Symmetric key decrypt using key k_i
ST	AR session table used to store session ID and digest tuples
PIT	AR pending interest table
H	A collision resistant hash function on the domain $\{0, 1\}^*$ to range $\{0, 1\}^\kappa$
F_k	A keyed pseudorandom function
Pad	An arbitrary padding function that appends <i>random</i> bits to a payload

2 Motivation

The primary motivation for a new design of ANDāNA is to attain the same anonymity and privacy guarantees as ANDāNA with *better* performance. The original design targeted a single use case in which performance, especially in the bidirectional setting, was not a primary concern. Indeed, there was both an asymmetric and symmetric (session-based) variant of ANDāNA, and while the latter enjoyed better speedups over the former it suffered the fatal flaw of not ensuring packet unlinkability. It is generally the case that unlinkability is merely sufficient for anonymity, rather than also being a necessary condition for anonymity. However, in the case of ANDāNA, packet linkability can lead to consumer and producer linkability, which immediately violates anonymity. For example, it is not difficult to hypothesize an adversary that eavesdrops on incoming and outgoing interests for a particular anonymous router, and who by doing so is able to determine that the incoming and outgoing session IDs are linked. In fact, a modified type of this kind of adversary was explicitly studied in the context of Tor by Murdoch and Danezis in [?]. In their work, the goal of the adversary in their “linkability attack” was to determine whether two separate data streams being served by two corrupted servers were initiated by the same consumer, and we suspect that such analysis could be augmented to work for ANDāNA. Specifically, repeating a packet linkability attack at each anonymous router in a circuit may therefore eventually lead to linkability between the producer and consumer. The use of application and environment contextual information has also been formally studied in [?], in which side channel and environment information (e.g., the deterministic behavior of an anonymous router always forwarding a packet upstead after unwrapping an interest received from some downstream router) is used to quantify the *degree of unlinkability*. Furthermore, we remark that regardless of how such linkability information is acquired, it has been shown that it can lead to reduce consumer and producer anonymity beyond what is possible with general traffic analysis [?].

As most of the literature focuses on mix-based anonymizing services like Tor, which inspired the original design of ANDāNA, it is clear that any form of linkability should be avoided in order to maintain consumer and producer anonymity. Therefore, the formal goal for ANDāNA-v2 is to attain the same anonymity and privacy guarantees as the asymmetric variant of ANDāNA, which does not suffer from packet linkability issues, while simultaneously supporting high-throughput and low-latency traffic between two parties in a unidirectional or bidirectional circuit. In addition, we seek to design a more modular architecture that

enables various levels of performance and security guarantees to be achieved based on the type of application traffic that is to be supported.

At the heart of the ANDāNA is the notion of anonymizing routers and connection-oriented circuits, similar in spirit to the inner workings of TOR [?]. Anonymizing routers serve two purposes in ANDāNA: (1) to decapsulate and forward encrypted interests, along with content encryption keys, generated by a consumer until the cleartext interest arrives at the producer, and (2) to encapsulate sensitive content using the previously acquired encryption keys and relay the encrypted content downstream. In this way, the consumer generates an interest wrapped by several layers of encryption and receives a piece of content wrapped in several layers of encryption that it can easily decrypt. It is also important to note that since each anonymizing router operates at the application layer, it effectively serves as the producer for each downstream router in the ANDāNA circuit. Therefore, NDN policy dictates that such content *must be signed*. Verification of content from upstream routers, however, is not mandatory.

We also note that the current ANDāNA design has support for two types of circuits: asymmetric and symmetric session-based. In the asymmetric variant, all encrypted interests are done using a CCA-secure PKI scheme and all content is encrypted using a CCA-secure symmetric key encryption scheme. Conversely, in the session-based variant, all encrypted interests are protected using a CCA-secure symmetric key encryption scheme, where the key is identified using a unique session identifier sent in the cleartext along with the encrypted interests. This worsens anonymity because it provides a way to link packets to a single session (as previously discussed).

Putting together all of the design aspects of the current version of ANDāNA, we see that the following factors weigh in on the overall performance of the application:

1. Content encryption
2. Content signature generation
3. Encrypted interest generation and anonymous router decryption

In ANDāNA-v2 we seek to minimize the degree to which these factors affect interest and content encapsulation and decapsulation by integrating support for anonymous router *state*, which is encapsulated in sessions, into anonymous circuits. The content of this state depends on the type of deployment that will be used by ANDāNA-v2. All possible deployments are described in detail in the following section.

3 Modular Architecture and Configurations

ANDāNA-v2 offers a flexible design that can be tailored for the particular types of applications that require its anonymity services. There are four different dimensions along which ANDāNA-v2 can be deployed, including (1) the type and techniques used for content signature generation and verification, (2) technique for establishing state in an anonymous router circuit, (3) decision whether or not to use regular router caches, and (4) circuit formation decision for bidirectional traffic. We describe each of the configuration parameters in detail below.

1. Content signature generation and verification

- Full reliance on PKI signatures: In this mode, all content flowing downstream will be *signed and verified* using the existing public and private key pairs from the existing PKI-infrastructure.
- Per-hop MAC and PKI-based signatures for NDN: In this mode, the last anonymous router in an anonymous circuit (i.e., the router closest to the producer) will verify the initial piece of content using the public key of the producer, and, upon success, will MAC the newly encrypted content to be sent downstream. This router will also digitally sign the encrypted content and MAC tag using its private key so as to conform to the original NDN specification [?]. All subsequent downstream routers will strip the NDN-layer signature from the upstream router, verify the MAC using a

shared symmetric key, re-MAC their newly encrypted content, and again digitally sign the result before sending the entire collection downstream.¹

- Full reliance on router-to-router MACs: In the event that public-key digital signatures of each content sent downstream are not mandated, this technique will modify the above technique by removing the need for public-key signatures of encrypted content at each anonymous router in the circuit. In doing so, only the last router in the anonymous circuit will verify the initial plaintext content, and each remaining router will only rely on the per-hop MACs to ensure the authenticity of content as it flows downstream. Since the symmetric MAC keys are established by the consumer, such keys can be trusted.

2. Circuit state establishment

- Pre-processing handshake: With the pre-processing handshake parameter configured, a consumer will perform the equivalent of a handshake with each anonymous router specified to partake in the anonymous circuit. This handshake procedure will not be used to acquire any meaningful data (i.e., encrypted interests are not sent in conjunction with interests to configure the anonymous router and state information). Once state is configured, each subsequent “real” interest issued during the lifetime of the circuit will be configured in such a way so that they all have the same length. This is done so that all interests are indistinguishable from the rest in the circuit.
- Piggyback circuit establishment: Without a pre-processing handshake procedure, anonymous circuit state is establishing by piggybacking the *first* encrypted interest with all relevant session content. While this minimizes the overhead of the handshaking phase, it also imposes the requirement that all subsequent interests must again match the size of this first interest to ensure that interests are not distinguishable.

3. NDN cache utilization

- Caching enabled: With caching enabled, all anonymous routers through which anonymous interests traverse will persist the corresponding anonymous content in their caches. Since these routers do not possess any state information associated with the anonymous circuits they serve, any adversary who is able to compromise any subset of incoming and outgoing interfaces on one such router will not be able to use the anonymous interests or content flowing through the router to break producer or consumer anonymity. Therefore, caching in such routers only improves end-to-end latency for popular content (requested across the same circuit).
- Caching disabled: With caching disabled, no routers, including the ANDANA-v2 routers, will store content that is flowing downstream. This will not degrade anonymity or privacy in any way, but it may not benefit end-to-end latency since all encrypted interests will traverse along the entire length of the anonymous circuit.

4. Circuit formation

- Shared circuits for bidirectional communication: In this scheme, two parties participating in bidirectional communication will utilize the same circuit for all interests and content. In doing so, each router will also leverage the interest/content piggybacking technique presented in [?] to *bundle* encrypted interests and decrypted content as they traverse the circuit between two parties. We expect the usage of these packets to benefit performance at the NDN layer by removing the need for FIB lookups and reducing the number of lower-layer invocations for retrieving and moving “packets” to and from router interfaces.
- Independent circuits for bidirectional communication: In this configuration, parties P_1 and P_2 participating in bidirectional communication will independently generate circuits r_1^1, \dots, r_n^1 and r_1^2, \dots, r_m^2 of length n and m , respectively, where n need not equal m . In this mode it may be

¹While the MAC may be perceived as redundant since the encrypted content is already digitally signed, observe that MAC generation and verification is significantly more efficient than a single public key signature verification. Therefore, by only incurring the public key signature verification overhead once at the last router and substituting it with MAC verification along all subsequent router hops, we still gain in efficiency.

the case that there exists some $1 \leq i \leq n$ and $1 \leq j \leq m$ where $r_i^1 = r_j^2$, but since each party is oblivious to the circuit used by the other producer, this shared router does not adversely affect anonymity or privacy.

In the following sections we describe the detailed design issues associated with each of these modes, but do so for the “default” configuration only. For example, we will describe the handshake-based circuit and session establishment procedure using the per-hop MAC and PKI-based signatures for NDN. We aim to present sufficient details so that replacing this content signature generation and verification configuration with, for example, full PKI-based signatures, the only difference is what information is included in the session state. It should be clear from context how the circuit and session handshake procedure would be modified in this instance.

4 Handshake-Based Circuit and Session Establishment

In this section we describe the procedure with which a circuit is established and used with a handshake procedure. Recall that our ultimate goal is to support highly efficient and anonymous bidirectional traffic. As such, the goals of the circuit and session establishment handshake using a list of n anonymous routers r_1, \dots, r_n are as follows:

1. Establish unique session IDs session_i and session IVs SIV_i
2. Establish content encryption keys E_{k_i} and initial counter values EIV_i
3. Establish pairwise MAC keys M_{k_i} used to sign and verify content

The purpose of each of these session entities will become clear from the circuit initialization and usage procedures. After establishment, the circuit from the consumer C to the producer P should be similar to that shown in Figure ?? . We now describe the general protocol for establishing this type of session-based circuit from a consumer C to a producer P given n anonymous routers. Recall that, in order to support bidirectional communication, P would have to establish a similar circuit to C with m routers, where m need not equal n .

Algorithm 1 ServerInterestHandler

Input: Interest int

```

1:  $T := \text{int}[-1]$ 
2:  $\text{session}_i = T[0]$ 
3: if  $\text{session}_i \in \text{ST}$  then                                 $\triangleright$  State initialized already, handle interest as usual
4:   Handle the encrypted interest as needed...
5:    $\text{SIV}_i = \text{SIV}_i + 1 \pmod{2^\kappa}$ 
6:    $\text{SIndex}_i := H(\text{session}_i + \text{SIV}_i)$ 
7:   Update  $(\text{SIndex}_i, \text{session}_i, \text{SIV}_i)$  in ST
8: else                                                     $\triangleright$  Initialize the state
9:    $k := \mathcal{D}_{sk_i}(T[1])$ 
10:   $(\text{session}_i, E_{k_i}, M_{k_i}, M_{k_{i+1}}, \text{EIV}_i, \text{SIV}_i, \text{pad}) := \text{Decrypt}_k(T[2 :])$ 
11:   $\text{SIndex}_i := H(\text{session}_i + \text{SIV}_i)$ 
12:  Persist  $(\text{session}_i, E_{k_i}, M_{k_i}, M_{k_{i+1}}, \text{EIV}_i, \text{SIV}_i)$  to state
13:   $\text{resp} := \text{Pad}(\text{SIndex}_i)$ 
14:   $\text{SIV}_i = \text{SIV}_i + 1 \pmod{2^\kappa}$ 
15:   $\text{SIndex}_i := H(\text{session}_i + \text{SIV}_i)$ 
16:  Update  $(\text{SIndex}_i, \text{session}_i, \text{SIV}_i)$  in ST
17:  return resp

```

Notice that by this procedure, no two routers will share the same session identifier even though they partake in the same circuit since they generate session identifiers independent and uniformly at random from $\{0, 1\}^\kappa$. Also, the `ServerEstablishSession` and `ServerRetrieveMACKey` procedures are asynchronous and only invoked in response to the respective interest.

Algorithm 2 ClientEstablishSession

Input: r_i , LastRouterFlag

```
1:  $\bar{k} \leftarrow \mathcal{E}_{pk_i}(k)$ 
2:  $T = ""$ 
3: if LastRouterFlag = False then
4:    $T := (\text{session}_i, E_{k_i}, M_{k_i}, M_{k_{i+1}} \text{EIV}_i, \text{SIV}_i)$ 
5: else
6:    $T := (\text{session}_i, E_{k_i}, M_{k_i}, \text{Pad}(\epsilon), \text{EIV}_i, \text{SIV}_i)$ 
7:  $T := \text{Pad}(\bar{k} || \text{Encrypt}_k(T))$ 
8:  $\text{int} := \text{namespace}_i / T$ 
9:  $\text{resp} := \text{ccnget}(\text{int})$  // reach out to AR
10: if  $\text{resp}[0] = \text{SIndex}_i$  then // Make sure the AR ACK'd correctly
11:    $\text{SIV}_i = \text{SIV}_i + 1 \pmod{2^\kappa}$ 
12:    $\text{SIndex}_i := H(\text{session}_i + \text{SIV}_i)$ 
13:   Update  $(\text{SIndex}_i, \text{session}_i, \text{SIV}_i)$  in ST
14:   return Pass
15: else
16:   return Fail
```

Algorithm 3 EstablishCircuit

Input: Anonymous routers r_1, r_2, \dots, r_n ($n \geq 2$) with public keys pk_1, pk_2, \dots, pk_n .

```
1: for  $i = 1$  to  $n$  do
2:    $k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ 
3:    $E_{k_i} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$  // Encryption key
4:    $M_{k_i} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$  // MAC key
5:    $\text{EIV}_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$  // counter IV
6:    $x \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ 
7:    $\text{SIV}_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$  // session IV
8:    $\text{session}_i := H(x)$  // session ID
9:    $\text{SIndex}_i := H(\text{session}_i + \text{SIV}_i)$ 
10:  Persist  $(\text{session}_i, E_{k_i}, M_{k_i}, \text{EIV}_i, \text{SIV}_i)$  to state and store  $(\text{SIndex}_i, \text{session}_i, \text{SIV}_i)$  in ST
11: for  $i = 1$  to  $n$  do
12:   if  $i = n$  then
13:     if ClientEstablishSession( $r_n$ , True) = Fail then
14:       return Fail
15:   else
16:     if ClientEstablishSession( $r_n$ , False) = Fail then
17:       return Fail
```

4.1 Circuit Usage

After a circuit and the corresponding sessions have been created between the consumer and each anonymous router, usage of the circuit proceeds as per the original AND \bar{a} NA design. Specifically, there are three main operations that need to be defined: encrypted interest generation, AR interest forwarding, and AR content handling. In what we follows we present the details of each of these procedures as needed for AND \bar{a} NA-v2. We begin with the encrypted interest generation procedure (shown in Algorithm ??) in which a consumer C participating in a particular *application* session with a producer P wraps an interest for the session to be sent into the anonymizing circuit. A wrapped (encrypted) interest from r_i to r_j ($i \leq j$) is denoted as $\overline{\text{int}}_i^j$, meaning that the original plaintext interests int cannot be retrieve unless encrypted by each router r_i, r_{i+1}, \dots, r_j , in that order. Thus, the original wrapped interest is denoted as $\overline{\text{int}}_1^n$.




Figure 1: Sample session-based circuit between a consumer C and producer P with ARs r_1, r_2, r_3, r_4 , where the end routers on the path are run on the same node as C and P .




Figure 2: The first image depicts a sample bidirectional circuit configuration in which two parties communicate using mutually exclusive ARs in both directions. Note that it is not required for each circuit to be the same length, nor is it required that the intersection of the routers for each direction of the circuit to be empty (i.e., routers may *unknowingly* support sessions traversing in both directions). The second image depicts the configuration where both parties knowingly share the same circuit.

Algorithm 4 Encrypted Interest Generation

Input: Interest int , routers r_1, r_2, \dots, r_n ($n \geq 2$) in circuit**Output:** Encrypted interest $\overline{\text{int}}_1^n$

```
1:  $\overline{\text{int}} = \text{int}$ 
2: for  $i = n$  downto 1 do
3:    $\text{SIndex}_i := H(\text{session}_i + \text{SIV}_i)$ 
4:    $\text{SIV}_i = \text{SIV}_i + 1 \pmod{2^\kappa}$ 
5:    $\overline{\text{int}}_i^n = R_i / \text{SIndex}_i / \text{Pad}(\text{Encrypt}_{E_{k_i}}(\overline{\text{int}}, \text{timestamp}))$ 
6: return  $\overline{\text{int}}_1^n$ 
```

Algorithm 5 AR Encrypted Interest Forwarding

Input: $\overline{\text{int}}_i^j$ **Output:** $(\overline{\text{int}}_{i+1}^j, \text{session}_i)$ or discarded packet

```
1: if  $\text{SIndex}_i \in \text{ST}_i$  then
2:   Let  $(\text{session}_i, E_{k_i}, M_{k_i}, \text{EIV}_i, \text{SIV}_i)$  be the session information associated with  $\text{SIndex}_i$ 
3:    $\text{SIV}_i := \text{SIV}_i + 1 \pmod{2^\kappa}$ 
4:    $\text{SIndex}_i := H(\text{session}_i + \text{SIV}_i)$ 
5:   Update  $(\text{SIndex}_i, \text{session}_i, \text{SIV}_i)$  in the session table  $\text{ST}_i$ 
6:    $(\overline{\text{int}}_{i+1}^j, \text{timestamp}) := \text{Decrypt}_{E_{k_i}}(\overline{\text{int}}_i^j)$ 
7:   if decryption fails or timestamp is not current then
8:     Discard  $\overline{\text{int}}_i^j$ 
9:   else
10:    Persist tuple  $T_i = (\overline{\text{int}}_i^j, \overline{\text{int}}_{i+1}^j, \text{session}_i)$  to pending interest table  $\text{PIT}_i$ 
11:    return  $(\overline{\text{int}}_{i+1}^j, \text{session}_i)$ 
12: else
13:   Discard  $\overline{\text{int}}_i^j$  ▷ Some form of interest flooding prevention should be employed here
```

5 Piggybacked Circuit and Session Establishment

In this section we describe the details of the piggybacked circuit establishment technique. For simplicity, we will assume the same session information as in the handshake variant of circuit and session establishment. Details about how to attain uniform packet size is omitted until Section ???. The following algorithms describe the piggybacking session establishment approach. Observe that the only real distinction between this and the handshaking procedure is that the circuit establishment logic is now embedded in each algorithm (i.e., the consumer and routers must differentiate the interest between a new session creation interest and one that simply corresponds to a normal encrypted interest). In particular, the content encapsulation procedure is no different from the handshake-based circuit establishment method.

6 Circuit Formation

One of the possible configuration options for ANDāNA-v2 is the usage of a single, shared circuit or two independent circuits for bidirectional communication. In the latter case, each party can run the circuit establishment and usage procedures as specified in the prior sections. However, in the former case, there are additional requirements for each of these procedures in order to effectively leverage interest and content piggybacking [?]. Specifically, it must be true that (1) each party participating in the bidirectional communication is aware and willing to use the same set of routers to support bidirectional communication, (2) the NDN network layer of the stack supports bundled interest and content packets, and (3) applications know how to form bundled packets to be sent into the network. Under these assumptions, we now define the procedure with which two parties p_1 and p_2 will communicate using a shared, symmetric circuit. For simplicity, assume that p_1 is responsible for initializing the communication.

Algorithm 6 AR Content Handling

Input: Content \overline{data}_{i+1}^j in response to interest \overline{int}_{i+1}^j

Output: Encrypted data packet $data_i^j$

```
1: Recover tuple  $T_i = (\overline{int}_i^j, \overline{int}_{i+1}^j, \text{session}_i)$  based on  $data_{i+1}^j$ 
2: Parse  $data_{i+1}^j$  as a tuple  $(data_{i+1}^j, \sigma_{i+1}, \sigma_p)$ 
3: if  $\sigma_{i+1} = \epsilon$  and  $M_{k_{i+1}} = \epsilon$  then
4:   Let  $pk_p$  be the public key associated with the producer
5:   if  $\sigma_p = \text{Verify}_{pk_p}(data_{i+1}^j)$  then
6:     Pass
7:   else
8:     return Error ▷ Producer signature verification did not pass
9: else if  $\sigma_{i+1} \neq \epsilon$  and  $M_{k_{i+1}} \neq \epsilon$  then
10:   if  $\sigma_{i+1} = \text{Verify}_{M_{k_{i+1}}}(data_{i+1}^j)$  then
11:     Pass
12:   else
13:     return Error ▷ MAC verification did not pass
14: else ▷ There was either a tag or we don't have the upstream MAC key - either way, we error
15:   return Error
16: Remove signature  $\sigma_p$  and name from  $data_{i+1}^j$ 
17: Create new empty data packet  $data_i^j$ 
18: Set name on  $data_i^j$  as the name on  $\overline{int}_i^j$ 
19:  $data_i^j := \text{Encrypt}_{E_{k_i}}(data_i^j)$ 
20:  $\sigma_i := \text{MAC}(data_i^j)$ 
21:  $data_i^j = (data_i^j, \sigma_i)$ 
22: return  $data_i^j$  ▷ Digital signature applied before sending downstream
```

1. p_1 establishes the circuit to p_2 using the technique specified by the ANDāNA-v2 deployment (i.e., using a handshake procedure or piggyback content approach), and then proceeds to send one encrypted, *non-bundled* packet to p_2 .
2. Upon reception, p_2 will generate and return the content corresponding to this interest and then asynchronously establish a circuit to p_1 using the same set of routers, but in reverse order. Again, the latter circuit establishment procedure is done using an encrypted, *non-bundled* packet to p_1 .
3. Upon reception of both the initial content and interest from p_2 , p_1 will generate an encrypted interest for p_2 and bundle it with the content that p_2 requested, and then send the bundled packet into the network. However, this encrypted interest will only consist of the last name component that is usually wrapped by the general encrypted interest generation technique. For example, if the original interest associated with router r_i is $r_i/\text{name}_1/\dots/\text{name}_k/\text{SIndex}_i||\text{tag}$, only $\text{SIndex}_i||\text{tag}$ will be wrapped in layers of encryption for p_2 . This is because each the prefix name components are already associated with the content object to be returned, so including them in the interest is redundant. Therefore, routers will concatenate the decrypted interest session index and tag with the prefix already associated with the content object to form the new interest.
4. Upon receipt of this bundle packet containing the last name component (see above) and the content, p_2 will generate a new encrypted interest using the same procedure as p_1 and content corresponding to the request, bundle both together, and then send the resulting bundle packet into the network.
5. From this point on, both parties will then use bundled packets to issue every subsequent interest and content response.




Figure 3: Visual depiction of the interaction between the consumer and the first hop router. The procedure repeats in the same manner for all further upstream routers after each interest is unrolled and resulting content is encrypted.

Each anonymous router will still perform signature verification, content encryption, session index updating, etc. as per the technique specified in the configuration of **ANDāNA-v2**. The only difference is that the routers reconstruct interests using the decrypted session index and “tag” (see item 2 above) and interest prefix associated with the content object that is being encrypted.

The gain from this piggybacking technique at the application layer is that smaller encrypted interests included in the bundle. This will reduce the amount of overhead involved at each hop in the anonymous circuit. The larger performance gains are seen at the NDN network layer. By sending bundled packets, each NDN router will effectively reduce the amount of low-level API calls and remove FIB entry lookups entirely. Given the performance evaluation in [?], we expect this enhancement to yield improved performance for certain applications and use cases.

7 Subtle Technical Details

In this section we describe some of the more subtle technical details needed to implement **ANDāNA-v2**, including interest padding for uniform interest size and interest flow control. While such details should have been included in the prior discussion of circuit establishment and usage, we felt to omit them for improved

Algorithm 7 Encrypted Interest Generation

Input: Interest int , circuit length n , AR pool \mathcal{R} , global boolean SessionCreated

Output: Encrypted interest $\overline{\text{int}}_1^n$

```
1: if SessionCreated = True then
2:    $\overline{\text{int}} = \text{int}$ 
3:   for  $i = n$  downto 1 do
4:      $\text{SIndex}_i := H(\text{session}_i + \text{SIV}_i)$ 
5:      $\text{SIV}_i = \text{SIV}_i + 1 \pmod{2^\kappa}$ 
6:      $\overline{\text{int}}_i^n = R_i / \text{Pad}(\text{SIndex}_i || \text{Encrypt}_{E_{k_i}}(\overline{\text{int}}, \text{timestamp}))$ 
7:   return  $\overline{\text{int}}_1^n$ 
8: else
9:   for  $i = 1$  to  $n$  do ▷ Initialize state
10:     $k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ 
11:     $E_{k_i} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$  // Encryption key
12:     $M_{k_i} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$  // MAC key
13:     $\text{EIV}_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$  // counter IV
14:     $x \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ 
15:     $\text{SIV}_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$  // session IV
16:     $\text{session}_i := H(x)$  // session ID
17:     $\text{SIndex}_i := H(\text{session}_i + \text{SIV}_i)$ 
18:    Persist  $(\text{session}_i, E_{k_i}, M_{k_i}, \text{EIV}_i, \text{SIV}_i)$  to state and store  $(\text{SIndex}_i, \text{session}_i, \text{SIV}_i)$  in ST
19:     $\overline{\text{int}} = \text{int}$ 
20:    for  $i = n$  downto 1 do ▷ Wrap the state up with the interest
21:       $k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ 
22:       $\bar{k} \leftarrow \mathcal{E}_{pk_i}(k)$ 
23:       $T = ""$ 
24:      if  $i = n$  then
25:         $T := (\text{session}_i, E_{k_i}, M_{k_i}, M_{k_{i+1}} \text{EIV}_i, \text{SIV}_i)$ 
26:      else
27:         $T := (\text{session}_i, E_{k_i}, M_{k_i}, 0^\kappa, \text{EIV}_i, \text{SIV}_i)$ 
28:       $T := \text{Pad}(\bar{k} || \text{Encrypt}_k(T) || \text{Encrypt}_{E_{k_i}}(\overline{\text{int}}, \text{timestamp}))$ 
29:       $\text{SIndex}_i := H(\text{session}_i + \text{SIV}_i)$ 
30:       $\text{SIV}_i = \text{SIV}_i + 1 \pmod{2^\kappa}$ 
31:       $\overline{\text{int}}_i^n = R_i / \text{Pad}(\text{SIndex}_i || \text{Encrypt}_{E_{k_i}}(\overline{\text{int}}, \text{timestamp}))$ 
32:    return  $\overline{\text{int}}_1^n$ 
```

readability.

7.1 Uniform-Length Interest Creation

Since an anonymous circuit may be used to support a variety of applications, as opposed to Tor which only creates an anonymous point-to-point TCP-based circuit between two parties (applications), an adversary must not be able to distinguish between interests corresponding to different applications. As such, all interests supported by a circuit will be generated such that, for each link in the anonymous circuit, all interests will be the same size and consist of seemingly random payloads. It should be clear that all content in an interest that is sent the clear (e.g., the session index SIndex) will be indistinguishable from random bit strings, and by the properties of the CPA-secure encryption schemes, all encrypted portions of the interests will also be indistinguishable from random bit strings. Therefore, it suffices to ensure that all interests, perhaps intended for different applications, have uniform length so that they remain indistinguishable. To accomplish this task, we introduce a padding function Pad that will take as input a bitstring of length l and return a bitstring of length M_i , where M_i is the maximum length of an interest, considered among all possible interests, along a particular hop i in the anonymous circuit. Pad operates as follows: on input

Algorithm 8 AR Encrypted Interest Forwarding

Input: $\overline{\text{int}}_i^j$ **Output:** $(\overline{\text{int}}_{i+1}^j, \text{session}_i)$ or discarded packet

```
1:  $T := \overline{\text{int}}_i^j[-1]$ 
2:  $\text{SIndex}_i = T[0]$ 
3: if  $\text{SIndex}_i \in \text{ST}_i$  then ▷ Normal interest forwarding (with state already initialized)
4:   Let  $(\text{session}_i, E_{k_i}, M_{k_i}, \text{EIV}_i, \text{SIV}_i)$  be the session information associated with  $\text{SIndex}_i$ 
5:    $\text{SIV}_i := \text{SIV}_i + 1 \pmod{2^\kappa}$ 
6:    $\text{SIndex}_i := H(\text{session}_i + \text{SIV}_i)$ 
7:   Update  $(\text{SIndex}_i, \text{session}_i, \text{SIV}_i)$  in the session table  $\text{ST}_i$ 
8:    $(\overline{\text{int}}_{i+1}^j, \text{timestamp}) := \text{Decrypt}_{E_{k_i}}(\overline{\text{int}}_i^j)$ 
9:   if decryption fails or timestamp is not current then
10:     Discard  $\overline{\text{int}}_i^j$ 
11:   else
12:     Persist tuple  $T_i = (\overline{\text{int}}_i^j, \overline{\text{int}}_{i+1}^j, \text{session}_i)$  to pending interest table  $\text{PIT}_i$ 
13:     return  $(\overline{\text{int}}_{i+1}^j, \text{session}_i)$ 
14: else ▷ State initialization and interest forwarding
15:   Parse  $T[1:]$  as  $T' = (\mathcal{E}_{pk_i}(k), \text{Encrypt}_k(T) || \text{Encrypt}_{E_{k_i}}(\overline{\text{int}}_{i+1}^n, \text{timestamp}))$ 
16:    $k := \mathcal{D}_{sk_i}(T'[0])$ 
17:    $(\text{session}_i, E_{k_i}, M_{k_i}, M_{k_{i+1}}, \text{EIV}_i, \text{SIV}_i, \text{pad}) := \text{Decrypt}_k(T'[1])$ 
18:    $\text{SIndex}_i := H(\text{session}_i + \text{SIV}_i)$ 
19:   Persist  $(\text{session}_i, E_{k_i}, M_{k_i}, M_{k_{i+1}}, \text{EIV}_i, \text{SIV}_i)$  to state
20:    $\text{SIV}_i = \text{SIV}_i + 1 \pmod{2^\kappa}$ 
21:    $\text{SIndex}_i := H(\text{session}_i + \text{SIV}_i)$ 
22:   Update  $(\text{SIndex}_i, \text{session}_i, \text{SIV}_i)$  in  $\text{ST}$ 
23:    $(\overline{\text{int}}_{i+1}^j, \text{timestamp}) := \text{Decrypt}_{E_{k_i}}(T'[2])$ 
24:   if decryption fails or timestamp is not current then
25:     Discard  $\overline{\text{int}}_i^j$ 
26:   else
27:     Persist tuple  $T_i = (\overline{\text{int}}_i^j, \overline{\text{int}}_{i+1}^j, \text{session}_i)$  to pending interest table  $\text{PIT}_i$ 
28:     return  $(\overline{\text{int}}_{i+1}^j, \text{session}_i)$ 
```

$x \in \{0, 1\}^l$ (i.e., $|x| = l$), Pad generates $p = M_i - l$ random bits uniformly at random, and then outputs the bit string $x || p$. Note that the bits of the pad p can be generated from some secure PRG so long as an appropriately random and secret seed is chosen. Also, it must be the case that M_i is known before the anonymous circuit is used so that Pad can be implemented correctly. We feel as though this is a reasonable requirement though.

7.2 Interest Flow Control

To further increase the throughput of ANDāNA-v2, the design makes use of a flow control mechanism analogous to the sliding window technique used in standard TCP implementations. In particular, a ANDāNA-v2 instance will declare a global maximum window size w that refers to the maximum number of interests that can be issued asynchronously without being acknowledged. The behavior of the interest sliding window will then proceed as follows:

- All parties, including the consumer and each AR participating in an anonymous circuit, will maintain four pointers, WindowStart, WindowEnd, KeyStart, and KeyEnd, where $\text{WindowEnd} - \text{WindowStart} \leq w$ will always be an invariant. To start, $\text{WindowStart} = \text{WindowEnd} = 0 = \text{KeyStart} = \text{KeyEnd} = 0$.
- When an interest is to be issued or forwarded, the party will check to ensure that $\text{WindowEnd} -$

$\text{WindowStart} < w$, and if so interest is sent/forwarded and WindowEnd is incremented by one. In addition, the keystream at the consumer (for each AR) or AR is pumped by M bits and KeyEnd is incremented by M , where M is the largest piece of content received thus far. Otherwise, the interest is buffered at the consumer or AR.

- When a piece of content arrives that corresponds to some interest issued between WindowStart and WindowEnd , WindowStart is incremented by one and an event is triggered forcing the party to check their interest buffers for new interests to be sent. In addition, KeyStart is incremented by the size of the content, and checks to see if the maximum content size M needs to be updated.

Using this technique, if a router receives an interest for a particular anonymous circuit when $\text{WindowEnd} - \text{WindowStart} = w$, then the interest is dropped. Interest/content flow control and correct functionality of the consumer guarantees that interests will not be issued when the window is full.

Also, while all parties must share the same window size, the consumer w is free to change the window size to adapt to the state of the network. For instance, if there is very little end-to-end latency for content, then the consumer may wish to increase the size of the window. In order to support such dynamic windowing, the consumer must inform all routers in an anonymous circuit of the desired window size. **ANDāNA-v2** supports this by appending the window size to the session index SIndex_i for each r_i in a circuit. In order to ensure that no two interests are distinguishable by this window size w , it is also masked by a random one-time pad p (i.e. $w' = w \oplus p$, where w is interpreted as an integer encoded in binary) that is included in the encrypted interest. In other words, once an interest is decrypted the pad p is recovered, and then the router computes $w = w' \oplus p$. If w is larger than the stored value associated with the circuit, then the new result is simply updated and operation proceeds as normal. Otherwise, the router enters a “backoff” state where it waits for content to be returned and the resulting window size to return to normal before issuing any further interests.




Figure 4: Visual depiction of keystream precomputation during upstream interest traversal and the resulting half of AES-CTR that must be computed for the resulting content flowing downstream. We again emphasize that keystream “pumping” for AES-CTR can be done for interests as well.

8 Correctness and Security Analysis

In order to assess the security of ANDāNA-v2 it is important to first define an adversarial model and corresponding definition of security. To this end, we define an adversarial model for ANDāNA-v2 that has the same capabilities as presented in [?]:

- Deploy compromised routers
- Compromise existing routers
- Control content producers
- Deploy compromised caches
- Observe and replay traffic

Furthermore, any of these actions or capabilities can be carried out adaptively (i.e., in response to status updates from the network or based on the adversary’s observations). We also note that the time required to carry out an attack is non-negligibly larger than the average RTT for an interest-content exchange in order to make this model realistic.

We also make use of the same notions of producer and consumer anonymity and unlinkability to define the security of this scheme. Before reintroducing these definitions, we first establish the relevant notation. An adversary \mathcal{A} is defined as a 4-tuple $(P_{\mathcal{A}}, C_{\mathcal{A}}, R_{\mathcal{A}}, IF_{\mathcal{A}})$, where each individual component denotes the set of producers, consumers, routers, and interfaces compromised by \mathcal{A} , respectively. Following [?], a router r is deemed compromised (i.e., $r \in R_{\mathcal{A}}$) if all of its interfaces belong to $IF_{\mathcal{A}}$. Similarly, if \mathcal{A} controls a producer or consumer then they have complete (and adaptive) control over how they behave in the application session, meaning that \mathcal{A} can control everything from the timing, format, and actual information of each piece of content. We also define the anonymity set with respect to an interface if_i^r (i.e., interface i of router r) to be

$$AS_{if_i^r} = \{d \mid \Pr[d \rightarrow_{\text{int}} r \mid \text{int} \rightarrow if_i^r] > 0\},$$

and the anonymity set with respect to the adversary \mathcal{A} to be

$$AS_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{int}} = \bigcap_{\text{path}^{\text{int}} \cap IF_{\mathcal{A}}} AS_{if_i^r},$$

where path^{int} is the set of interfaces along which the interest int traversed in the circuit from the consumer to the producer.

Finally, we denote the “state” of a network, or configuration, as a snapshot in time of its current activity. Accordingly, each configuration is a relation that maps parties to their actions (e.g., interest or content creation). For circuits of length n , let a configuration C be defined as

$$C : \mathbb{C} \rightarrow \{(r_1, \dots, r_n, p, \overline{\text{int}}_1^n)\},$$

where the $(n+2)$ -element tuple $(r_1, \dots, r_n, p, \text{int}_1^n) \in \mathbb{R}^n \times \mathbb{P} \times \{0, 1\}^*$. This relation can be viewed as a map from a consumer $c \in \mathbb{C}$ to a set of routers defining the circuit from c to all producers $p \in \mathbb{P}$ along which interests $\overline{\text{int}}_1^n$ traverse.

Following in the footsteps of [?], we define the security of our design in the context of indistinguishable network configurations. Specifically, two configurations C and C' are said to be *indistinguishable with respect to \mathcal{A}* , denoted $C \equiv_{\mathcal{A}} C'$, if for all such polynomial-time adversaries \mathcal{A} there exists a negligible function ϵ such that

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(1^n, C) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(1^n, C') = 1]| \leq \epsilon(\kappa),$$

for the global security parameter κ .

We now define security of our design in terms of consumer and producer anonymity and unlinkability. These can be found in [?], but we provide them here for completeness. We also provide new definitions that make sense in the context of the bidirectional session case that ANDāNA-v2 is intended to support.

Definition 1. [?] For $u \in (\mathcal{C} \setminus \mathcal{C}_A)$, u is said to have **consumer anonymity** in configuration C with respect to adversary \mathcal{A} if there exists $C' \equiv_A C$ such that $C'(u') = C(u)$ and $u' \neq u$.

Definition 2. [?] Given $\overline{\text{int}}_1^n$ and $p \in \mathcal{P}$, $u \in \mathcal{C}$ has **producer anonymity** in configuration C with respect to p and adversary \mathcal{A} if there exists a configuration $C' \equiv_A C$ such that $\overline{\text{int}}_1^n$ is sent by a non-compromised consumer to a producer different from p .

Definition 3. Two entities u_1 and u_2 , both serving as producer and consumer of content in an application session, are said to have **session anonymity** in configuration C with respect to adversary \mathcal{A} if both u_1 and u_2 enjoy producer and consumer anonymity in C with respect to \mathcal{A} .

Definition 4. [?] We say that $u \in (\mathcal{C} \setminus \mathcal{C}_A)$ and $p \in \mathcal{P}$ are **unlinkable** in C with respect to an adversary \mathcal{A} if there exists a configuration $C' \equiv_A C$ where u 's interests are sent to a producer $p' \neq p$.

We emphasize that the fundamental differences between the design of ANDāNA and ANDāNA-v2 are that, in ANDāNA-v2, each adjacent router will share a private MAC key used for efficient content signature generation (and, optionally, verification) and sessions are identified by the output of H (rather than encrypting and decrypting interests using expensive asymmetric procedures). Accordingly, the proofs of anonymity and privacy need to be augmented to take this into account. The remainder of the design is syntactically equivalent to that of ANDāNA, and so we may restate the theorems without proof. However, in doing so, we generalize them to circuits of length $n \geq 2$.

Theorem 1. Consumer $u \in (\mathcal{C} \setminus \mathcal{C}_A)$ has consumer anonymity in configuration C with respect to adversary \mathcal{A} if there exists $u \neq u'$ such that any of the following conditions hold:

1. $u, u' \in \text{AS}_A^{C_4(u)}$
2. There exists ARs r_i and r'_i such that $r_i, r'_i \notin \mathcal{R}_A$, both r_i and r'_i are on the circuit traversed by $C_4(u) = \overline{\text{int}}_1^n$.

Proof. See [?]. □

Theorem 2. Consumer u has producer anonymity in configuration C with respect to producer $p \in \mathcal{P}$ and adversary \mathcal{A} if there exists a pair of ARs r_i and r'_i such that r_i and r'_i (for some uncompromised entity $u \notin \mathcal{C}_A$) are on the path traversed by $C_4(u) = \overline{\text{int}}_1^n$, $C_1(u) = C_1(u')$, and $C_3(u) = p \neq C_3(u')$.

Proof. See [?]. □

Corollary 1. Consumer $u \in (\mathcal{C} \setminus \mathcal{C}_A)$ and producer $p \in \mathcal{P}$ are unlinkable in configuration C with respect to adversary \mathcal{A} if p has producer anonymity with respect to u 's interests or u has consumer anonymity and there exists a configuration $C' \equiv_A C$ where $C'(u') = C(u)$ with $u' \neq u$ and u' 's interests have a destination different from p .

In addition to security, we must also be concerned about the correct functioning of each AR supporting a session between two parties. In this context, we (informally) define session correctness as the ability of a consumer to correctly decrypt content that is generated *in response to* its original interest. That is, if a consumer issues an interest, it should be able to correctly decrypt the content that it receives. The following factors impact the correctness of the session:

1. Each AR r_1, \dots, r_n on the consumer-to-producer circuit should correctly recover the session identifier associated with the current session.
2. The session key streams should only be advanced upon the receipt of an interest corresponding to the consumer who initiated the session or content that is generated from the upstream router (potentially the producer) in the circuit.

The first item is necessary in order for each AR to correctly decrypt interests, encrypt content, and perform content signature generation and verification. The second item is necessary so that all content can be correctly decrypted by the consumer. We claim that, given a CCA-secure public key encryption

scheme, the probability that either one of these factors being violated by an adversary \mathcal{A} is negligible. Let **ForgeSession** and **KeyJump** denote the events corresponding to instances where an adversary creates a ciphertext that maps to a valid session identifier for *some* session currently supported by an AR (i.e., the forged session belongs to the routers session table **ST**), and the event that an adversary causes the key stream for *some* AR in a consumer-to-producer circuit to fall out of sync with the consumer. By the design of ANDāNA-v2, it should be clear that **KeyJump** occurs when **ForgeSession** occurs, since the key stream is only advanced upon receipt of an interest, but may also occur when an adversary successfully forges a MAC tag corresponding to the signature of a piece of content from the upstream router (or producer). We denote this latter event as **ContentMacForge**. With the motivation in place, we now formally analyze the probabilities of these events occurring below. For notational convenience, we assume that each event only occurs as a result of some adversarial action, so we omit this relation in what follows.

Lemma 1. *For all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries \mathcal{A} , there exists some negligible function negl such that*

$$\Pr[\text{ForgeSession}] \leq \text{negl}(\kappa).$$

Proof. By the design of ANDāNA-v2, we know that session identifiers are computed as the output of a collision resistant hash function $H : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$, where $m = \text{poly}(\kappa)$ (i.e. polynomial in the global security parameter). Consequently, forging a session identifier *without* the input to H implies that a collision was found, thus violating collision resistance of H . Thus, forging a session is equally hard as finding a collision in H , or more formally, $\Pr[\text{Collision}(H) = 1] = \Pr[\text{ForgeSession}]$. By the properties of collision resistance of H which states that $\Pr[\text{Collision}(H) = 1] \leq \text{negl}(\kappa)$ for some negligible function negl , it follows that $\Pr[\text{ForgeSession}] \leq \text{negl}(\kappa)$. \square

Lemma 2. *For all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries \mathcal{A} , there exists some negligible function negl such that*

$$\Pr[\text{ContentMacForge}] \leq \text{negl}(\kappa).$$

Proof. By the design of ANDāNA-v2, the MAC scheme Π used for content symmetric content signature generation and verification is defined as $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, \text{Mac}, \text{Ver})$, where Gen generates the secret key k used in the scheme, $\text{Mac}_k(m)$ outputs the MAC tag $t := F_k(m)$ for some pseudorandom function F , and $\text{Ver}_k(m, t)$ outputs 1 if $t = \text{Mac}_k(m)$ and 0 otherwise. This is known and proven to be a secure MAC scheme [does this warrant citation?], meaning that for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries \mathcal{A} there exists a negligible function negl such that $\Pr[\text{MacForce}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}(1^\kappa) = 1] \leq \text{negl}(\kappa)$, and since **ContentMacForce** occurs exactly when the even **MacForce** occurs, we have that $\Pr[\text{ContentMacForge}] \leq \text{negl}(\kappa)$. \square

Lemma 3. *For all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries \mathcal{A} , there exists some negligible function negl such that*

$$\Pr[\text{KeyJump}] \leq \text{negl}(\kappa).$$

Proof. By the design of ANDāNA-v2, it follows that $\Pr[\text{KeyJump}] = \Pr[\text{ForgeSession}] + \Pr[\text{ContentMacForce}]$, and since the sum of two negligible functions is also negligible, it follows that there exists some negligible function negl such that $\Pr[\text{KeyJump}] \leq \text{negl}(\kappa)$. \square

Theorem 3. *Session correctness of ANDāNA-v2 is only violated with negligible probability.*

Proof. This follows immediately from Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 and the fact that the sum of two negligible functions is also negligible.² \square

²This sum comes from the fact that the probability of the “failure” events occurring must be taken into account in both directions of the session.

Table 2: Baseline performance metrics gathered from the three scenarios discussed in the text.

Scenario	L_1	σ_1	L_2	σ_2
1	0.00735	0.00798	0.00340	0.00053
2	0.01905	0.13791	0.02248	0.13923
3	0.01321	0.00257	0.01359	0.00567

9 Preliminary Performance Evaluation

In order to justify ANDāNA-v2 as an alternative to existing solutions for low-latency, bidirectional traffic over NDN, we must first establish a baseline of performance metrics against which we can compare our design. Since the original version of ANDāNA targeted circuits of length 2 (i.e., with two ARs), we focus on the same length circuits in these experiments. We note that there is nothing restricting us from lifting this constraint in future experiments. In order to adequately determine a baseline of performance metrics, we instantiated two parties (both acting as a data producer and consumer) interacting by requesting moderately-sized content in short, frequent intervals. In order ensure that such content is never satisfied by the cache of an intervening AR, which is a reasonable assumption for real-time voice and video applications that always want fresh content instead of stale cached content, each piece of content is requested from an anonymized namespace and indexed by a sequence number. For example, if the two parties P_1 and P_2 are communicating and P_1 wants to request the latest content from P_2 , it will issue an (encrypted)interest to `ccnx:/P2/S`, where S is the sequence number that is incremented as soon as the interest is issued. This ensures that such interests are never satisfied by the content in an AR cache throughout the duration of the session.

With this type of traffic generation application, we then tested its performance under the following scenarios:

1. P_1 and P_2 are connected point-to-point (i.e., no hops).
2. P_1 and P_2 are connected through two “insecure” ARs that perform no interest or content encryption (i.e., each AR just serves as an application-level proxy to forward interests and content along through the circuit).
3. P_1 and P_2 are connected through two “secure” ARs that perform interest and content encryption as per the ANDāNA design.

Table ?? shows the performance results from such scenarios 1, 2, and 3, in which performance is characterized as the end-user latency between issuing an interest and receiving the intended content. In this case, we refer to the performance in terms of latency, where L_i denote the average latency and σ_i denote its standard deviation for party i ($i \in \{1, 2\}$). All experiments were collected using the following methodology:

- Each party generates 1000 traffic according to an uniform distribution with $pmf = 1/100$.
- Each party responds to all interests with a random blob of 150 bytes.³

According to the preliminary experimental evaluation, it appears as though low-latency, bidirectional communication is relatively feasible with the current ANDāNA design. However, we would like to do better.

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³This value was chosen to match the average size of a Skype video call packet. Are experiments with different size pieces of content warranted for this proof of concept?

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