A New Approach to Secure Logging

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Abstract. The need for secure logging is well-understood by the security researchers and practitioners. The ability to efficiently verify all (or some) log entries is important to any application employing secure logging techniques. In this paper, we begin by examining the state-of-the-art in secure logging and identify some problems inherent to systems based on trusted third-party servers. We then propose a different approach based upon recently developed Forward-Secure Sequential Aggregate (FssAgg) authentication techniques. Our approach offers both space-efficiency and provable security. We illustrate two concrete schemes – one private-verifiable and one public-verifiable – that offer practical secure logging without any reliance on on-line trusted third parties or secure hardware. We evaluate proposed schemes and report on our experience with implementing them within a secure logging system.

Keywords: secure logging, forward secure stream integrity, MACs, signatures, truncation attack.

1 Introduction

System logs are an important part of any secure IT system. They record noteworthy events, such as user activity, program execution status, system resource usage and data changes. Logs provide a valuable view of past and current states of almost any type of a complex system. In conjunction with appropriate tools and procedures, audit logs can be used to enforce individual accountability, reconstruct events, detect intrusions and identify problems. Keeping system audit trails and reviewing them in a consistent manner is recommended by NIST as one of the good principles and practices for securing computer systems [1]. Many types of (especially distributed) software include some sort of a logging mechanism.

Because of their forensic value, system logs represent an obvious attack target. An attacker who gains access to a system naturally wishes to remove traces of its presence in order to hide attack details or to frame innocent users. In fact, the first target of an experienced attacker is often the logging system [2,3]. To make the audit log secure, we must prevent the attacker from modifying log data. Secure versions of audit logs should be designed to defend against such tampering. Providing *integrity* checks, the primary security requirement for any secure logging system, is informally stated in the Orange Book [4] as:

Audit data must be protected from modification and unauthorized destruction to permit detection and after-the-fact investigation of security violations.

In addition to the traditional meaning of *data integrity* which stipulates no insertion of fake data and no modification or deletion of existing data, integrity of a log file also requires no re-ordering of log entries. We call this property *log stream integrity*.

In many real-world applications, a log file is generated and stored on an untrusted logging machine which is not sufficently physically secure to guarantee impossibility of compromise [5]. Compromise of a logging machine can happen as long as the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) – the system component responsible for logging – is not totally bug-free, which is unfortunately always the case. In systems using *remote logging* (which send audit data to a remote trusted server), if the server is not available, the log is buffered and stored temporarily at the local machine. Once an attacker obtains the secret key of the compromised logging machine, it can modify *post-compromise* data at will. In this case, one important issue is *forward integrity*: how to ensure that *pre-compromise* data can not be manipulated? That is, even if the attacker obtains the current secret key, she must be unable to modify audit data generated before compromise.

No security measure can protect log entries created after an attacker gains control of a logging machine, unless the logging machine's keys are periodically updated with the help of a remote trusted server or a local trusted hardware component (e.g., using key-insulated and intrusion-resilient authentication schemes [6,7,8]). We focus on the security of log entries pre-dating the compromise of a logging machine. Consequently, we require *forward-secure stream integrity*, i.e., resistance against post-compromise insertion, alteration, deletion and re-ordering of pre-compromise log entries.

Traditional log integrity techniques include using special write-only hard disks or remote logging where copies of log entries are sent to several geographically distributed machines. Recently, a number of cryptographic approaches have been proposed to address security for audit logs which are generated and stored on local logging servers [2, 3, 5, 9]. Bellare and Yee were the first to define the forward-secure stream integrity property required in an audit log system and proposed to use forward-secure MACs and index log entries [2,3]. Schneier and Kelsey proposed a similar system based on forward-secure MACs and one-way hash chain [5]. Holt extended Schneier and Yee's system to the public key setting [9]. Unfortunately, none of these schemes defends against truncation attack - a special kind of deletion attack whereby the attacker deletes a contiguous subset of tail-end log entries. Furthermore, private key-based schemes such as Schneier-Kelsey and Bellare-Yee – also suffer from delayed detection attack 1 since they need a trusted server to aid users in verifying log integrity; modifications can not be detected until the entire log data is uploaded to the trusted server. Moreover, all prior schemes are inefficient in storage and communication which makes them impractical for platforms with meager resources, such as implantable medical devices [10]. We overview prior work in more detail in Section 2.

¹ For a precise definition, see Section 2.

To mitigate aforementioned shortcomings of prior schemes, we propose a new approach which provides *forward-secure stream integrity* for audit logs generated and stored on untrusted machines. Our scheme is based on a new cryptographic technique called *forward-secure sequential aggregate* (FssAgg) authentication recently proposed in [11, 12]. In an FssAgg authentication scheme, forward-secure signatures (or MACs) generated by the same signer are sequentially combined into a single aggregate signature. Successful verification of an aggregate signature is equivalent to that of each component signature. Whereas, as discussed later, failed verification of an aggregate signature implies that at least one component signature is invalid. An FssAgg signature scheme is thus a good match for secure logging applications: it resists truncation attacks due to its all-or-nothing (aggregate and forward-secure) signature verification. In our scheme, users can verify the log without relying on any trusted server; this obviates delayed detection attacks. Our scheme offers storage and bandwidth efficiency inherited from the underlying FssAgg scheme. Also, depending on the specific FssAgg scheme used, our scheme can be either private- or public-verifiable.

In an FssAgg scheme, individual signatures are erased once they are folded into the aggregate signature. Subsequent validity of individual log entries is implied by the validity of the aggregated signature computed over all log entries. This indirect verification process is costly if the verifier is only interested in the validity of one specific log entry. The need to provide finer-grained verification in certain applications motivates us to keep individual log entry signatures in the log file. However since the aggregation function is public, revealing individual signatures enables anyone to truncate log entries and create new aggregate signature based on existing ones. To prevent this truncation attack (even when individual component signatures are revealed), we need the property refferred to as "immutability" of aggregate authentication. Informally, immutability is the computational infeasibility of computing new valid aggregated signatures from existing signatures. To achieve immutability, we extended existing FssAgg MAC/signature schemes. However, due to space limitation, we refer to [13] for details on immutability extensions.

1.1 Contributions

Our contributions are as follows:

- 1. We identify some fundamental security issues and architectural limitations in prior secure logging schemes.
- 2. We propose new secure logging schemes which provide *forward-secure stream integrity* for audit logs generated and stored on untrusted logging machines and avoid the undesirable features of prior schemes. Our schemes inherit the effiency and provable security of the underlying FssAgg schemes.
- We evaluate proposed schemes by comparing them with prior work in terms of security as well as communication and computation efficiency. Our evaluation shows that new schemes offer better security and incur less computation and communication overhead.
- 4. We implement existing FssAgg signature schemes and assess their performance in the context of a real secure logging system.

Organization. We begin with the overview of the state-of-the-art in Section 2, followed by introduction of forward-secure aggregate authentication in Section 3. We then show how to use FssAgg schemes in logging applications: we propose a private-verifiable scheme in Section 4 and a public-verifiable scheme in Section 5. We evaluate our schemes in Section 6 and report on some experience with prototype implementations in Section 7. Section 8 overviews related work and Section 9 concludes the paper.

2 Current Approach Analysis

In this section, we examine the state-of-the-art represented by Schneier-Kelsey scheme [5]. It has been used as a foundation by many subsequently proposed secure logging systems. Readers interested in further details of the Schneier-Kelsey scheme are referred to [5].

2.1 Overview of Schneier-Kelsey Scheme

In the Schneier-Kelsey scheme, a logging machine \mathcal{U} opening a new audit log first establishes a shared secret key A_0 with a trusted remote server \mathcal{T} . After each audit entry is generated, the current secret key A_i is evolved into A_{i+1} through a one-way function. Log entries are linked using a hash chain. Each log entry L_i is composed of three parts:

- 1. Log entry data M_i .²
- 2. Element Y_i in the hash chain, where

$$Y_i = H(M_i||Y_{i-1})$$
 and $Y_0 = H(M_0)$

3. Forward-secure MAC denoted Z_i , computed as: $Z_i = MAC_{A_i}(Y_i)$.

 \mathcal{U} closes the log file by creating a special final-record entry, M_f and erasing A_f as well as other secrets, if any.

There is no constant high-bandwidth channel between $\mathcal U$ and $\mathcal T$. It is assumed that $\mathcal U$ communicates log entries to T infrequently. At times, a moderately-trusted entity, called $\mathcal V$, may need to verify or read the audit log, while it is still on $\mathcal U$. $\mathcal V$ receives from $\mathcal U$ a copy of the audit log, $[L_0, L_1, \cdots, L_f]$, where f is the index value of the last record, from $\mathcal U$. $\mathcal V$ goes through the hash chain in the log entries (the Y_i values), verifying that each entry in the hash chain is correct. $\mathcal V$ then sends Y_f and Z_f to $\mathcal T$. $\mathcal T$ knows A_0 so it can compute A_f ; this allows it to verify that $Z_f = MAC_{A_f}(Y_f)$. $\mathcal T$ informs $\mathcal V$ about the verification result and $\mathcal V$ discovers whether the received copy of the log has any problems.

² [5] provides access control to audit log. Each log entry L_i contains a log entry type W_i and $C_i = E_{K_i}(D_i)$: the actual log data D_i is encrypted with an access control key K_i . Since we focus on log integrity in this paper, to make our discussion clearer, we refer to the combination of W_i and C_i as M_i .

2.2 Analysis

We claim that the Schneier-Kelsey scheme has two security-related drawbacks:

Truncation Attack. A kind of deletion attack whereby the attacker erases a contiguous subset of tail-end log messages. This attack is realistic, since, after breaking in, it is natural for an attacker to want to modify the audit log by deleting the most recent log entries generated right before break-in.

The Schneier-Kelsey scheme uses a hash chain to link log entries such that undetectable log (link) deletion is impossible. This pertains to log entries already off-loaded to \mathcal{T} . However, log entries still residing on \mathcal{U} are vulnerable to the truncation attack since there is no single authentication tag protecting the integrity of the entire log file. A hash chain element Y_i only protects data records generated before time i. Thus, truncating log entries generated after time i is not detected by \mathcal{T} , unless there is synchronization between \mathcal{U} and \mathcal{T} and the latter knows the current value of f. Without a continuous communication channel, synchronization between \mathcal{U} and \mathcal{T} would require \mathcal{U} to generate log entries at a fixed rate. However, most logging systems are event-driven and events are unevenly spaced. Logging events at a fixed rate hinders the logging machine's ability to fully utilize its computation and storage resources.

Delayed Detection. Recall that, \mathcal{V} is unable to verify a log file by itself and needs to ask for help from \mathcal{T} . If this occurs before \mathcal{T} receives a copy of the most up-to-date log from \mathcal{U} , and before \mathcal{U} has closed the log file, an attacker can modify pre-compromise records without being detected. Albeit, such modification will be eventually detected, after \mathcal{T} receives the updated version of a log file.

We illustrate the delayed detection attack in Figure 1. Suppose that, at time $a (\geq 0)$, $\mathcal U$ has transmitted log entries $[L_0,\cdots,L_a]$ to $\mathcal T$. At time b (>a), an attacker breaks into $\mathcal U$ and obtains the current secret key A_b . Even though the attacker can not recover secret keys used in time intervals [a+1,b-1], she can modify the values of M_i and corresponding Y_i in this interval without touching Z_i . At time $f (\geq b)$, $\mathcal V$ receives a copy of log entries L_0,\cdots,L_f . $\mathcal V$ and sends Y_f and Z_f to $\mathcal T$. Since the attacker knows A_b at break-in, she can generate valid MACs from time b. Thus, verification of Y_f with Z_f at $\mathcal T$ will succeed. The modified log file will translate false information to $\mathcal V$ and activities conducted within interval [a+1,f] will elude $\mathcal V$'s detection. In Figure 1, values in the shaded area (M and Y values in time interval [a+1,b-1], all Z values within [b,f]) can be manipulated by an attacker. Since there is no continuous high-bandwidth $\mathcal U \leftrightarrow \mathcal T$ communication channel and $\mathcal U$ only communicates with $\mathcal T$ infrequently, the time interval [a+1,f] can be long.

Since the attacker is unable to fake any values Z_i (for $i \in [a+1,b-1]$), any manipulation in this period can be detected whenever the corresponding log entries are uploaded to \mathcal{T} and \mathcal{T} scan-verifies all individual MACs.³

The two drawbacks of the Schneier-Kelsey scheme seem to be quite fundamental. However, it is rather surprising that they have not been addressed in any later work. In

³ Actually, the authors do not mention any scan-verification (verification of individual MACs) in the paper. They only claim that verification of Z_f equals to verification of all the individual MACs.




Fig. 1. Delayed detection attack. Data in shaded area is controlled by the attacker. a: time when log entries are uploaded to \mathcal{T} ; b: time of break-in; f: index of last log entry as well as time when \mathcal{V} receives a copy of log file from \mathcal{U} .

addition to the security issues discussed above, the Schneier-Kelsey scheme has some architectural limitations:

Online Server. As mentioned earlier, the scheme employs an assisted verification process and a trusted server \mathcal{T} must be present whenever \mathcal{V} wants to pose an integrity query. In other words, the scheme requires a continuous channel (not necessarily high-bandwidth in this case) between \mathcal{V} and \mathcal{T} . As any centralized solution, the scheme has the problem with \mathcal{T} being the single point of failure. Furthermore, the overall security of the scheme scheme relies on the frequency of communication between \mathcal{U} and \mathcal{T} . The need for \mathcal{T} can be avoided by adopting a public key approach, as in [9].

Storage Inefficiency. Each log entry contains a hash Y_i and a MAC Z_i . To provide reasonable long-term security guarantees, a minimum security overhead of 512 bits per log entry is needed to accommodate a 256-bit hash and a 256-bit MAC. This perlog-entry overhead makes the Schneier-Kelsey scheme impractical for resource-poor platforms, such as sensors or implantable medical devices. (The latter, especially, need a light-weight secure logging system [10].)

The same set of vulnerabilities/limitations is equally applicable to the Bellare-Yee private key-based scheme [2, 3]. The Holt scheme [9] involves a public key-based approach. Therefore, it avoids the need for an online server and gains security against delayed detection attacks. However it is still vulnerable to truncation attacks and suffers from storage inefficiency.

3 Forward Secure Sequential Aggregate Authentication

In this section, we briefly introduce FssAgg scheme components. We refer to [11, 12] for a more formal and complete definition of an FssAgg scheme.

An FssAgg scheme includes the following components:

[FssAgg.Kg] – key generation algorithm used to generate public/private key-pairs. It also takes as input T – the maximum number of time periods (key evolvements). [FssAgg.Asig] – sign-and-aggregate algorithm which takes as input: a private key, a message to be signed and a signature-so-far (an aggregated signature computed

up to this point). It computes a new signature on the input message and combines it with the signature-so-far to produce a new aggregate signature. The final step in FssAgg.Asig is a key update procedure FssAgg.Upd which takes as input the signing key for the current period and returns the new signing key for the next period (not exceeding T). The key update is part of the sign-and-aggregate algorithm in order to obtain stronger security guarantees.

[FssAgg.Aver] – verification algorithm, which, on input of: a putative aggregate signature, a set of presumably signed distinct messages and a public key, outputs a binary value indicating whether the signature is valid.

A secure FssAgg scheme must satisfy the following properties:

- 1. *Correctness*. Any aggregated signature produced with *FssAgg.Asig* must be accepted by *FssAgg.Aver*.
- 2. *Forward secure aggregate unforgeability*. No one, even knowing the current signing key, can make a valid FssAgg forgery.

The forward-secure aggregate unforgeability implies two things.

First, a secure FssAgg scheme is append-only - no one can change any message generated before the compromise. Therefore a FssAgg signature can provide integrity protection for the whole message body. An attacker who compromises a signer has two choices: (1) either it includes the intact aggregate-so-far signature in future aggregated signatures, or (2) it ignores the aggregate-so-far signature completely and starts a brand new aggregated signature. What it can not do is selectively delete components of an already-generated aggregate signature. Fscond, it is computationally hard to remove a component signature without knowing it. Thus, a secure FssAgg scheme is resistant to deletion (including truncation) attacks. These two properties are very useful and we exploit them in our design below.

We claim that FssAgg authentication implies forward-secure stream integrity, i.e.:

Forward Security. In an FssAgg scheme, the secret signing key is updated via a one-way function. An attacker is thus unable to recover previous keys from the current (compromised) key and therefore can not forge signatures from prior intervals.⁵

Stream Security. The sequential aggregation process in an FssAgg scheme preserves the message order and provides stream security; thus, re-ordering of messages is impossible.

Integrity. Any insertion of new messages as well as modification and deletion of existing messages renders the final aggregate unverifiable.

Based on the above, we can now construct a secure logging system from any secure FssAgg authentication scheme.

⁴ This append-only property resembles the property of a special write-only disk used in traditional log systems.

⁵ Assuming, of course, that the plain signature scheme – upon which the FssAgg scheme is built – is CPA-secure.

4 Private-Verifiable Scheme

We first describe a private-verifiable scheme that provides *forward-secure stream integrity*. In a private-verifiable scheme, verifiers are drawn from a small "private" group. Our scheme is based, in turn, on the FssAgg MAC scheme proposed in [11]. *Forward-secure stream integrity* is inherited from the FssAgg MAC scheme. To avoid an online server, two FssAgg MACs are computed over the log file with different initial signing keys. A semi-trusted verifier can only verify one of them. The other MAC is used by the trusted server to finally validate the log file. No one – including the semi-trusted verifier – can alter the contents of the log file without being detected.

We next present the trust model and system assumptions, followed by the description of system operation. Then, we show how to add operations to start/open and close a log file such that total deletion and abnormal stop attacks can be detected. We then evaluate the proposed scheme.

4.1 Security and System Model

There are three types of players in our scheme:

- 1. \mathcal{U} is an *untrusted* log generator. By "untrusted", we mean that it is not physically secure, bug-free, or sufficiently tamper-resistant to guarantee that it can not be taken over by an attacker. \mathcal{U} does not behave maliciously, unless controlled by the attacker. It generates log entries and replies to \mathcal{V} 's query. It only interacts with \mathcal{T} to start a log file or after a log file is closed.
- 2. \mathcal{V} is a *semi-trusted* verifier that reads and verifies the log file on \mathcal{U} . Usually, audit logs can only be accessed by a small group of people, such as system administrators, security personnel and auditors. Therefore, \mathcal{V} is drawn from a small group of authorized entities; it can obtain and verify a copy of the audit log from \mathcal{U} . However, \mathcal{V} is not trusted as far as the integrity of the log file.
- 3. \mathcal{T} is a *trusted* machine in a secure location. It has secure storage sufficient to store audit logs from \mathcal{U} . It can authorize a legitimate verifier \mathcal{V} to access the audit log and gives \mathcal{V} the verification key. It also finally validates the log file. \mathcal{T} does not interfere the verification process.

As in [5], we assume that there is no constantly available reliable high-bandwidth channel between \mathcal{U} and trusted storage on \mathcal{T} . Consequently, \mathcal{U} and \mathcal{T} communicate infrequently.

The attacker's goal is to tamper with the log file by deleting, modifying, inserting or re-ordering log entries. Clearly, the attacker who compromises \mathcal{U} obtains the signing key used at the time of compromise. We consider two types of attackers: outsiders and insiders. An outsider is an attacker that knows none of \mathcal{U} 's secrets before compromising \mathcal{U} . A malicious \mathcal{V} is considered to be an insider attacker as it knows some of \mathcal{U} 's secrets. An insider is obviously more powerful as far as its ability to tamper with the integrity of the log file. Our scheme is designed to detect both insider and outsider attacks.

4.2 Scheme Description

We use the following notation from here on:

- L_i : *i*-th message, i.e., the *i*-th log entry. (We assume that log entries are time-stamped and generally have a well-defined format).
- \mathcal{F} : k-bit full-domain hash function with strong collision resistance $\mathcal{F}: \{0,1\}^k \to \{0,1\}^k$.
- \mathcal{H} : one-way hash function with strong collision resistance and arbitrarily long input: $\mathcal{H}: \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^k$.
- mac: secure MAC function $mac : \{0,1\}^k \times \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^t$ that, on input of a k-bit key x and an arbitrary message m, outputs a t-bit $mac_x(m)$.
- UPD: key update frequency (see below).

At any given time, an authenticated log file consists of two parts: (1) log entries: $[L_1, \cdots, L_i]$ and (2) two authentication tags (forward-secure aggregate MACs): $\mu_{\mathcal{T},i}$ and $\mu_{\mathcal{V},i}$ that are defined below.

Log File Initialization. Before the logging system starts, we require \mathcal{T} to be accessible to \mathcal{U} and assume that \mathcal{U} is not compromised (yet). \mathcal{U} generates two random symmetric keys, A_1 and B_1 . Then, it commits these keys to \mathcal{T} along with the other information about the specific log file and the key update interval UPD. We are not concerned with the details of the commitment process. Suffice it to say that, after the commitment process, \mathcal{T} can go off-line and \mathcal{U} can be deployed in an adversarial and unattended environment.

Meanwhile, \mathcal{U} creates the initial "dummy" log entry L_1 which commits to a fixed message (e.g., set to "START") and computes two MACs on L_1 with keys A_1 and B_1 , respectively: $\mu_{T,1} = mac_{A_1}(L_1)$ and $\mu_{V,1} = mac_{B_1}(L_1)$. Next, \mathcal{U} evolves its keys through a one-way function \mathcal{F} : $A_2 = \mathcal{F}(A_1)$, and $B_2 = \mathcal{F}(B_1)$.

Through the initial interaction, \mathcal{T} knows that \mathcal{U} has started a log file at time t with initial secrets A_1 and B_1 . \mathcal{T} stores these values in its database and thereafter knows that a valid log must exist on \mathcal{U} and that that log must contain at least one log entry L_1 . The purpose of this initial commitment step is to prevent a total deletion attack, i.e., an attacker breaking into \mathcal{U} at a later time shold not be able to delete the whole log and simply claim that no such log has been started.

Update Frequency. We make no assumptions about key update frequency, except that it must be fixed at log initialization time by \mathcal{T} or \mathcal{U} (or both). Moreover, it must be encoded in the first message from \mathcal{U} to \mathcal{T} . UPD can be based on time (e.g., every hour), volume of activity (e.g., every 10 log entries) or some combination thereof. However, to simplify our discussion below, we assume that keys are updated for each log entry.

Generating Log Entries. Before the *i*-th entry is generated, the log file contains L_1, \dots, L_{i-1} and two FssAgg MACs $\mu_{T,i-1}, \mu_{V,i-1}$. Current keys of \mathcal{U} are: A_i and B_i .

⁶ We also assume that the initial commitment as well as each subsequent log entry contains a time-stamp.

Now, a new *i*-th event occurs and \mathcal{U} creates a corresponding log entry L_i . \mathcal{U} updates⁷ authentication tags as follows:

1. \mathcal{U} first generates a MAC for \mathcal{V} as: $mac_{A_i}(L_i)$. It then computes $\mu_{V,i}$ as: $\mu_{V,i} = \mathcal{H}(\mu_{V,i-1}||mac_{A_i}(L_i))$. Here, \mathcal{H} acts as the aggregation function. Note that $\mu_{V,i}$ can be represented (un-rolled) as:

$$\mu_{V,i} = \mathcal{H}(\mathcal{H}(\dots \mathcal{H}(\mu_{V,1}||mac_{A_1}(L_1))\dots)||mac_{A_i}(L_i))$$
(1)

- 2. \mathcal{U} updates the second FssAgg MAC (for \mathcal{T}) in the same manner: $\mu_{T,i} = \mathcal{H}(\mu_{T,i-1}||mac_{B_i}(L_i))$
- 3. Finally, \mathcal{U} evolves both keys: $A_{i+1} = \mathcal{F}(A_i)$, and $B_{i+1} = \mathcal{F}(B_i)$. Prior keys A_i and B_i and MACs $mac_{A_i}(L_i)$ and $mac_{B_i}(L_i)$ are immediately and securely erased (e.g., from disk and RAM).

Log File Closure. \mathcal{U} officially closes the log file by creating a special closing message as the final log entry (L_f) , updating the two authentication tags $(\mu_{V,f}$ and $\mu_{T,f})$ and securely erasing the remaining keys $(A_f \text{ and } B_f)$.

This special step is necessary in order to inform users that the log file is closed properly and no longer accepts any new data. Consider that an attacker might prevent the logging system from functioning after gaining control of the logging machine. Without the explicit closing step, we can not determine whether the log file has been closed normally or the logging process has been impeded by an attacker. Once the log file is properly closed, an attacker who breaks into $\mathcal U$ cannot modify anything since no keys are available.

Log File Validation. An authorized verifier $\mathcal V$ starts the validation process by obtaining A_1 – one of the two initial signing keys – from $\mathcal T$. Next, $\mathcal V$ queries $\mathcal U$ and obtains a copy of log entries L_1, \cdots, L_f as well as $\mu_{V,f}$. $\mathcal V$ computes A_2, \cdots, A_f through the key update function, computes $\mu'_{V,f}$ and checks that it matches $\mu_{V,f}$. Verifier's computation costs amount to f invocations of $\mathcal F$, $\mathcal H$ and mac.

When \mathcal{T} receives the complete and already-closed log file, it can independently validate it using B_1 and $\mu_{T,f}$. The validation mimics that performed by \mathcal{V} . Note that, a malicious verifier \mathcal{V} , knowing A_1 , has full control and can modify any log entries by generating its own version of $\mu_{V,f}$. However, it can not forge $\mu_{T,f}$.

4.3 Discussion

The private-verifiable scheme is simple and very computation-efficient, since it only involves fast hashing and symmetric key operations. $\mathcal V$ can verify a log file without consulting $\mathcal T$; thus, no on-line trusted party is needed. Furthermore, it is very storage-efficient: compared with previous schemes which require either f or 2*f units to store authentication-related values, our scheme only needs two storage units for two FssAgg MACs. Considering that log files tend to be very large and can contain millions of log entries, the benefits of storage-efficiency are quite apparent.

⁷ We use the term "updates", since, at all times, there are only two authentication tags in the secure log.

Our scheme provides *forward-secure stream integrity* through the use of a single FssAgg MAC that covers all log entries. An attacker can not forge this MAC without knowing any pre-compromise MAC keys. Deletion and truncation attacks are readily detectable by any verifier. Furthermore, our scheme detects a total deletion attack, since we use an explicit commitment process when starting a log file. Also, by explicitly closing the log file, our scheme can detect certain DoS attacks that aim to incapacitate the logging system.

However, we concede that a malicious verifier \mathcal{V} can tamper with the log without being detected by other verifiers. This tampering can only be detected with the help of \mathcal{T} . It is thus possible for a malicious insider to mount a delayed detection attack. This is a definite drawback which leads us to construct an alternative scheme based on public key techniques.

5 A Public-Verifiable Scheme

We now describe a public-verifiable scheme. It can be based on any FssAgg signature scheme proposed in [11] and [12]. A public-verifiable scheme allows auditors outside the system to make sure no tampering takes place within the system. Therefore, it can be used for systems which require public auditing, such as financial records and voting systems. A public-verifiable scheme also avoids the shortcoming of a private-verifiable schemes which, as pointed out above, suffers from delayed detection attacks.

As in the previous section, we begin with the trust model and system assumptions. Next, we describe and evaluate the new scheme. To avoid unnecessary repetiton, we focus on the difference between private- and public-verifiable schemes.

5.1 Trust Model

In this scheme we no longer require a trusted server \mathcal{T} . Instead, we need a Certification Authority (CA) that can certify/register \mathcal{U} 's public key. The scope of \mathcal{V} moves from a small private group of semi-trusted entities to the public domain, i.e., anyone who has a copy of the log file can verify it. We no longer need to differentiate between inside and outside attackers. An attacker is thus anyone who behaves maliciously and does not know the system's initial secrets.

5.2 Scheme Description

An authenticated log file in the present scheme consists of two parts: log entries $[L_1, \dots, L_f]$ and a single FssAgg signature $\sigma_{1,f}$.

Log File Initialization. To initiate a log file, \mathcal{U} uses FssAgg.Kg to generate the initial secret key sk_1 and the public key pk. Then it registers pk with a public CA. \mathcal{U} 's certificate for log file contains (at least) essential information, such as: the log creator, the log ID, starting time and the public key. For example, CA's signature in \mathcal{U} 's certificate for log file ID_{log} might be as follows:

$$CERT(ID_{log}) = SIGN_{CA}(\mathcal{U}, ID_{log}, t, T, pk, timestamp, \cdots)$$

 \mathcal{U} keeps sk_1 . Next, it creates the initial log entry L_1 which is set to $CERT(ID_{log})$. Then, \mathcal{U} generates a signature $\sigma_{1,1}$ on L_1 with FssAgg.Asig using the initial private key sk_1 . Finally, \mathcal{U} updates its key from sk_1 to sk_2 and securely erases all copies of sk_1 .

Generating Log Entries. Before the i-th entry occurs, the log file contains $[L_1, \cdots, L_{i-1}]$ and the FssAgg signature $\sigma_{1,i-1}$. \mathcal{U} 's current secret key is sk_i . Now, a new event occurs and triggers \mathcal{U} to creates a new log entry L_i . \mathcal{U} updates its FssAgg signature by invoking FssAgg.Asig with input: L_i , $\sigma_{1,i-1}$ and sk_i . Finally, \mathcal{U} evolves its sk_i into sk_{i+1} via FssAgg.Upd and securely erases sk_i . (FssAgg.Upd is invoked immediately after the aggregate signature is generated.)

Since the maximum number of key update periods T is fixed a priori, as the log file grows, the number of updates might eventually to exceed T. To address this issue we can dynamically extend the scheme to support additional key update periods without sacrificing security. One straightforward way is to generate a public key for the next T number of time periods and to use the last (initially certified) secret key sk_T to, in turn, certify a new set of public keys to be used thereafter. In fact, the certification of the next batch of public keys should be treated as a special log entry L_T .

Log File Closure. As in the private-verifiable scheme, \mathcal{U} closes the log file by creating a special closing message as the final log entry L_f , updating the FssAgg signature accordingly, and securely erasing its secret key.

Validating Log File. After receiving a copy of the log file, \mathcal{V} extracts public keys from $CERT(ID_{log})$ contained in the initial log entry L_1 and \mathcal{V} verifies CA's signature on $CERT(ID_{log})$. Then, \mathcal{V} validates the actual log file using FssAgg.Aver.

5.3 Discussion

Compared with its private-verifiable counterpart, the present scheme offers better security because of its resistance to delayed detection attacks. It allows anyone – not just a group of semi-trusted verifiers – to validate a log file. It is thus suitable for applications where scalability is important and, more generally, where public verification is required. Except for the log initialization time, no trusted entity is needed for any system operations.

6 Evaluation

We evaluate the proposed schemes by comparing them with prior schemes. We compare our private verifiable scheme with two existing private-key-based schemes: Schneier-Kelsey [5] and Bellare-Yee [3]. We also compare our public-verifiable scheme with Holt's scheme [9]. Our comparison is based on four factors: 1) resilience to truncation attacks; 2) resilience to delayed detection attacks; 3) on-line server requirements; 4) storage efficiency. Comparison results are summarized in Table 6.

Compared with Schneier-Kelsey and Bellare-Yee, our private scheme is resilient to truncation attacks, more storage-efficient and requires no on-line server. However, it is vulnerable to delayed detection attacks. Compared with Holt's scheme, our public scheme is resilient to truncation attacks and more storage-efficient.

	Private Key Based Schemes			Public Key Based Schemes	
	SK [5]	BY [3]	Ours	Holt [9]	Ours
Resilience to truncation attack?	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Resilience to delayed detection attack?	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
No on-line server?	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Storage efficient?	No	No	Yes	No	Yes

Table 1. Comparisons of Various Schemes

7 Implementation

We investigated the viability of the proposed schemes on an Intel dual-core 1.73GHz Laptop with 1GB RAM running Linux. We used the NTL [14] and the PBC [15] libraries as for necessary cryptographic and number-theoretic primitives.

We prototyped the BLS-FssAgg signature scheme in [11] and the AR-FssAgg and BM-FssAgg signature schemes in [12]. For BM-FssAgg and AR-FssAgg schemes, we selected security parameters k=1024 and l=160. For the BLS-FssAgg scheme, we used a singular curve $Y^2=X^3+X$ defined on a field F_q for |q|=512 and the group order |p|=160, where p is a Solinas prime. Such groups have the fastest pairing operations [15]. We measured signer's computation costs by signature generation and key update on a per-log-entry basis. We measured verifier's computation costs over an aggregate signature $\sigma_{1,t}$ when t=100,1,000 and 10,000 which corresponds to a small, medium, and large log file, respectively. Experimental results shown in Table 2 show that the BM-FssAgg scheme is the most efficient in terms of computation for both signer and verifier. Its signature generation is approximately twice faster than that of AR-FssAgg and 5.5 times faster than that of the BLS-FssAgg. Its signature verification is 4 times faster than that of the AR-FssAgg and 16 times faster than that of the BLS-FssAgg. However, it incurs the most storage overhead.

We also investigated storage overhead incurred by each scheme. Let I_a denote the amount of storage needed to to store the secret key and the aggregate signature - the overhead incurred by authentication. Let |S| denote the size of a signature or a key. Let I denote the number of log entries and |L| denote the average size of a log entry. We

		$\mathbf{BLS} ext{-}FssAgg$	$\mathbf{BM} ext{-}FssAgg$	$\mathbf{AR}\text{-}FssAgg$		
Signer Computation Cost	Asig	30	2.09	4.39		
(per log entry)	Upd	0.002	3.46	7.27		
	total	30.00	5.55	11.66		
	t = 100	2%	162%	3%		
Signer Storage Cost	t = 1000	0.2%	16.2%	0.3%		
	t = 10000	0.02%	1.62%	0.03%		
	t = 100	3.30×10^{3}	211.97	810.88		
Verifier Cost	t = 1000	29.3×10^3	2.13×10^{3}	8.16×10^{3}		
	t = 10000	330.72×10^3	21.35×10^3	80.84×10^3		

Table 2. Comparisons of FssAgg Signature Schemes. (Operation Timing in *msecs*.)

measure storage efficiency by $\frac{I_a*|S|}{I*|L|}$. BLS-FssAgg needs 1 unit of space each for both secret key and signature. BM-FssAgg needs 162 units of storage for secret key and 1 unit for the aggregate signature. BM-FssAgg needs 2 units for secret key and 1 for the aggregate signature. To simply measurements, we assumed log entry size comparable to the size of a signature or a secret key, e.g. $|S| \approx |L|$. The comparison results are also shown in Table 2. BLS-FssAgg is the best in term of storage efficiency, As the number of log entries grows, storage overhead in BLS-FssAgg becomes negligible.

8 Related Work

A number of cryptographic approaches to address secure logging have been proposed to-date. Most prior work focused on three areas: (1) data integrity/authentication, (2) data confidentiality and access control, and (3) searchable encryption. Since we are primarily interested in integrity, only the first area directly relates to this paper.

Bellare and Yee were the first to define the *forward-secure stream integrity* property required in an audit log system and proposed to use forward-secure MACs [2, 3]. They focused on formal definition and construction of forward-secure MAC schemes and applied them to secure audit log applications. In their secure log scheme, multiple log entries are indexed and tagged independently within one time period. At the end of each time period, a special log entry containing the number of log entries in the current time period is created to indicate the end of the current time period. This scheme has the same security as well as the architectural limits as the Schneier and Kelsey scheme analyzed in Section 2.

Schneier and Kelsey proposed a similar system (the SK scheme we analyzed in Section 2) based on forward-secure MAC and one-way hash chains [5,16,17]. Unlike Bellare and Yee's scheme, in the SK scheme, rekeying is performed after each log entry is made. Therefore they no longer use per-stage sequence numbers in tagging logs. Instead, each log entry now contains a link in a hash chain and a forward-secure MAC computed over this link to authenticate the values of all pervious entries. Moreover, they presented a precise protocol design for its implementation in a distributed system, describing how messages are sent to external trusted machines upon log creation and closing.

Chong, et. al. discussed the feasibility of using of tamper-resistent hardware in conjunction with a system like Schneier and Yee's in [18]. Holt extended Schneier and Yee's system to the public key setting [9].

Waters, et. al. designed encrypted and searchable audit log [19]. This showed how identity-based encryption (IBE) can be used to make audit logs efficiently searchable. Keywords which relate to each log entry are used to form public keys in an IBE system. Administrators allow searching and retrieval of entries matching a given set of keywords by issuing clients the corresponding IBE private keys. They recommended the use of the Schneier and Yee's technique as their authentication scheme. The two security attacks, truncation attack and delayed detection attack, which we outlined in Section 2, seem to be very fundamental to all the secure audit log schemes as far as we know. It is surprising that they have not been addressed by any later work so far.

9 Conclusion

In this paper, we identified some issues in current secure logging techniques. We then proposed two concrete schemes to provide *forward-secure stream integrity* for logs generated on untrusted machines. Our approach supports forward security and compact aggregation of authentication tags (MACs or signatures). Both of our proposed schemes offer practical secure logging without reliance on trusted third parties or secure hardware. Our schemes are based on the recent proposed FssAgg authentication schemes where a unique authentication tag is used to protect the integrity of underlying message body. We evaluated the performance of our schemes and reported on our experience with the prototype implementation of a secure logging system. In the full version of this paper [13], we also considered the immutability extensions to our schemes.

Although the security of proposed schemes rests entirely on previously proposed techniques (i.e., [11, 12], we still need to construct separate security proofs for each scheme. Furthermore, we pland to conduct more extensive experiments, and perhaps even trace-driven simulations, to better understand the performance of our schemes.

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