

ABLS - An Attribute Based Logging System for the Cloud

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ABSTRACT

User-based non-repudiation is an increasingly important property of cloud-based applications. It provides irrefutable evidence that ties system behavior to specific users, thus enabling strict enforcement of organizational security policies. System logs are typically used as the basis for this property. Thus, the effectiveness of system audits based on log files reduces to the problem of maintaining the integrity and confidentiality of log files. In this project, we study the problem of building secure log files. We investigate the benefits of ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) to solve a variety of log design issues. In addition, we also present the architecture and a preliminary analysis for a proof-of-concept system that fulfills the confidentiality and integrity requirements for a secure log.

1. INTRODUCTION

User-based non-repudiation is a system security property that provides indisputable evidence that links specific actions to individual users (or entities) that trigger such actions. Cryptographically speaking, non-repudiation requires that the integrity and origin of all data should be provable. In essence, this enables system audits to be conducted that can identify data misuse (and thus, potential security policy violations) by comparing the sources of system events with all entities authorized to invoke these events. Therefore, treating non-repudiation as a required system quality attribute in the architecture is likely to become a common trend in the commercial, government, and even more specifically, the health-care domain.

System audits typically use log files to determine the cause and effect of events that took place during the system's lifetime. In order to provide accurate information for non-repudiation purposes, it is often necessary to place some amount user-sensitive data in these log files that can be used to trace data back to its origin. As such, logs of events generated by a client that is being served must maintain data confidentiality and integrity should the system be compromised. These

goals are commonly achieved using a combination of encryption and signature techniques [2]. However, traditional approaches to encryption and signature generation and verification are becoming less effective in the context of cloud applications. Furthermore, naive approaches to log security that are based on tamper-resistant hardware and maintaining continuous secure communication channels between a log aggregator and end user are no longer useful in the context of cloud-based applications [3].

Symmetric-key and public-key encryption of log entries are very common confidentiality techniques proposed in the literature. However, in cloud-based applications, these schemes are becoming less useful. There is a need for a robust access control mechanism that enables dynamic user addition and revocation with minimal overhead (i.e. re-encrypting a subset of the log database should be avoided). Both symmetric and public-key cryptosystems lack in that access policies must be tied directly to keys used for encryption and decryption. If the access policy for a set of log messages needs to be changed, then both the keys used to encrypt and decrypt such log entries will need to be regenerated and distributed, and the entries must also be re-encrypted. Both of these tasks can be very expensive.

In addition, symmetric-key cryptosystems require keys to be shared among users who need access to the same set of logs, which requires a secure and comprehensive key management and distribution policy. From a storage perspective, public-key cryptosystems (e.g. RSA and ElGamal) suffer from the extra data transfer and storage requirements for large cryptographic keys and certificates. There may be insufficient resources to maintain a public-key infrastructure (PKI) for managing keys and digital certificates for all users.

In terms of log file integrity, aggregate signature schemes that support forward secrecy through the use of symmetric and public-key cryptosystems are also becoming outdated [4]. Symmetric-key schemes may promote high computational efficiency for signature generation, but they do not directly support public verifiability for administrators and auditors. This means that robust key distribution schemes or the introduction of a trusted third party (TTP) are needed to ensure all required parties can access the necessary log information. Such schemes also suffer from high storage requirements and communication overhead. Public-key schemes have similar issues, as the increased key size leads to even larger storage requirements and less computational efficiency.

Collectively, we see that a balance between encryption and signature generation and verification performance is needed to support the unique scalability and resource usage require-

ments for cloud-based applications. Attribute-based encryption (ABE), a new cryptographic scheme that uses user attributes (or roles, in certain circumstances) to maintain the confidentiality of user-sensitive data, has an appealing application to logging systems maintained in the cloud and is capable of satisfying the aforementioned confidentiality requirements. In addition, authenticated hash-chains have been shown to be effective at enforcing log file integrity in numerous logging schemes [3].

ABLS, an attribute-based logging system that supports ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) [1] and authenticated hash-chain constructions for log file confidentiality and integrity, respectively, was recently designed and implemented by the primary author. The preliminary ABLS architecture and design was weak with regards to the scalability of encryption operations under heavy traffic loads, the relational database schema to store log-data and other sensitive information, and the interactions with database servers. To address these issues, we propose a set of extensions that modify ABLS in the following ways:

1. The CP-ABE encryption scheme will be replaced with a hybrid cryptosystem in which the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), the standardized symmetric-key encryption algorithm, is used to encrypt user session data by a key that is protected with CP-ABE encryption. In the event that a user generates log messages with varying sensitivity levels during a single session, multiple symmetric keys will be produced to maintain the confidentiality of information in different security classes.
2. The relational database storage scheme will either be changed to include a masking column in the appropriate log table to hide user identities or replaced entirely with a document- or object-based database. Both of these modern database systems are similar in semantics (if documents are conceptually treated as serialized objects), so a product and literature survey will be conducted prior to selecting an adequate replacement that satisfies the necessary security and performance requirements. Though, based on preferences and architectural experience, a document-based database such as MongoDB will be the likely candidate. Also, since the ABLS architecture is highly structured around a relational schema to store data, this change will require modifications made in the logging, attribute authority, and auditing modules in order to maintain functional correctness.
3. Database security mechanisms, including fine-grained access policies for protected databases and encryption of data-in-transit, will be implemented. This is particularly important for the databases that store cryptographic keys. Also, since preference is given to document-based databases such as MongoDB, third-party services such as zNcrypt (provided by Gazzang) that are specifically tailored to this DBMS will likely be used to enforce access control to sensitive databases.
4. The auditing module will be extended to include automated audits of database operations, including changes to the database structure and both successful and unsuccessful client connections with the database. Currently, the auditing module is only designed (and par-

tially implemented) to support strategy-based audits on database contents. However, in this type of application, database performance and security are just as critical. Thus, with this change, there will be two audit techniques that can roughly be equated to data and policy inspections, both of which will only be accessible to users with the appropriate privileges. This access control will be likely be enforced using username and password credentials.

Altogether, the security features of database authentication, encryption, and auditing will be further expanded upon in the existing ABLS architecture. With these changes, we will then re-evaluate the ABLS at an architectural, security, and performance perspective to determine its usefulness in cloud-based settings.

2. LOG DESIGN

In this section we present our log generation and verification schemes. They are influenced by past work done by Schneier et al [3], Bellare et al. [?], Ma et al. [2], and Yavuz et al. [4].

2.1 Log Construction

Log integrity is achieved through hash chains and message-authentication codes. Each log entry is a five-tuple element that contains the generating source information, the encrypted payload of the entry, a hash digest that provides a link between the current and previous hash chain entries, and an authentication tag for this digest. In the proof-of-concept system implementation, Keccak is used as the standalone hash function H and the $HMAC$ function is built using $SHA-512$. Formally, each log entry L_i is built using the following protocol (as depicted in Figure 1):

$$\begin{aligned} X_i &= H(X_{i-1}, E_{SK}(D_i)) \\ Y_i &= HMAC_{EpK_j}(X_i, Ep_j) \\ L_i &= (U_{ID}, S_{ID}, E_{SK}(D_i), X_i, Y_i) \end{aligned}$$

In this scheme the X_i elements are used to link together consecutive entries in the hash chain. Similarly, the Y_i elements are used to provide authentication for the X_i element using an authentication tag that is computed from X_i and the previous epoch digest Ep_{j-1} .

In this context, an epoch Ep_j simply corresponds to a fixed-size set of log entries that are being processed (i.e. an epoch window). For example, if the epoch size is n entries, then the log generation scheme will cycle after n log entries have been constructed and begin working on a new set of log entries. After a cycle is completed, a context block for the most recent epoch is created and inserted into an epoch chain (similar to the log chain). These log generation cycles create frames (or windows) in the entire log chain in which the scheme generates log entries using a single epoch block and key Ep_j and EpK_j , respectively. More specifically, Y_i is the authentication tag that is built using only the entries within the current epoch window.

Context blocks for epoch windows are stored in the same way as log chains. Each epoch chain entry Ep_j is built as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} Ep_j &= HMAC_{EpK_j}(Ep_{j-1}, L_i) \\ Ep_0 &= HMAC_{EpK_0}(0) \end{aligned}$$




Figure 1: A visual depiction of the hash chain construction scheme. In this case, the epoch window is 5 log entries, as shown by the epoch cycle after 5 consecutive log entries.

In this context, L_i is the last log chain entry for the previous epoch Ep_{j-1} . Thus, each epoch chain entry maintains the integrity of the log chain at each epoch cycle by linking the most recent log chain entry to the previous epoch context block. The key EpK_j that is used to compute the Y_i authentication tag is based on the current epoch Ep_j , and only evolves when the epoch window cycles. This update is done with a pseudorandom function H (which, in our case, is simply the Keccak hash function), and is defined as follows:

$$EpK_{j+1} = H(EpK_j)$$

The initial epoch key EpK_0 is a secret that is initialized when a session is started. Corruption of this key can enable a determined attacker to reconstruct the log chain and epoch chain without detection. Without this information, however, such modifications are always detectable. We refer to Section ?? for a more detailed description of this issue.

Finally, as a third layer of integrity, a single digest for the entire log T_i chain is stored as the log chain is iteratively constructed. Formally, T_i is built as follows:

$$T_i = \text{HMAC}_{T_{K_i}}(L_i, T_{i-1})$$

$$T_0 = \text{HMAC}_{T_{K_0}}(L_i, 1)$$

The secret key T_{K_0} for the entire log chain is another secret that is initialized when the session is started. Similar to the epoch key, it is evolved with a pseudorandom function H as follows:

$$T_{K_{i+1}} = H(T_{K_i})$$

A visual representation of this protocol is shown in Figure 2. It is important to note that a chain of T_i elements is not maintained. Instead, only the most recent element is persisted to the database. This is critical to prevent truncation attacks.

2.2 Log Generation Rationale

The construction of each log entry satisfies the following properties:

1. Each log entry payload is encrypted and only viewable by those with the appropriate attributes.
2. The integrity of the log chain is ensured through the links generated by X_i elements, which are verifiable by the Y_i authentication tags.
3. The integrity of the entire log chain is guaranteed with the T_i element. This protects the log chain against truncation attacks.
4. The epoch-based log generation enables the logger to control the frequency of data sent to the log server, which helps with load balancing and protects against wiretapping attacks.
5. The epoch window is assumed to be a fixed (constant) size, and thus it requires $\mathcal{O}(1)$ time to verify. The log chain can be verified in $\mathcal{O}(n)$ time, where n is the length of the log chain. These results are discussed in Section ??.
6. There are three different modes of verification that can be performed (weak, normal, and strongest). These modes are described in Section ??.




Figure 2: A visual depiction of the protocol used to build the log chain authentication tag.

7. The log is searchable by the user identity and session numbers, which leads to very fine-grained database queries.

3. IMPLEMENTATION

In order to test both the correctness and performance of ABLS, a proof-of-concept system has been developed. In this section we provide the design and rationale for the prototype architecture.

3.1 Deployment

ABLS is designed to be a centralized logging system backed by a set of distributed databases. A context diagram for the ABLS deployment scheme is shown in Figure ??, and a more detailed depiction of the flow of data between application and database servers is shown in Figure ??.

Based on the purpose of each piece of database used in the log, it is best to physically separate databases that store data of different security classes rather than rely on MAC with polyinstantiation. Of course, access control and authentication mechanisms for all database servers is enforced at the operating system level, thus prohibiting immediate access to all unauthorized users other than the `LoggingModule` and `PolicyEngine` processes.

In the current ABLS prototype, all database servers are separated as individual SQLite database files. Once the deployment platform is selected and properly configured, these will be replaced with instances of MySQL databases running on separate servers.

3.2 Key Management

In order to increase the performance of log entry encryption during a given user session, symmetric-key encryption using AES-256 is chosen to encrypt all log entry messages. The symmetric key is then encrypted using the CP-ABE scheme. This design enhancement enables increased improvement without sacrificing the level of confidentiality granularity that is needed for each log entry.

The basic algorithm for encrypting a log entry is shown in Algorithm 1.

3.3 Database Design

As shown in section 3.1, there are four main databases that must be maintained by ABLS: the log, key, user, and policy database. The log database maintains the all information in the log chain for every single user and session

Algorithm 1 Log entry encryption

Require: An unencrypted log entry L_i for session S_j of user U_k

- 1: Let P be the access control policy for the message of L_i , as determined by the `PolicyManager`
 - 2: **if** The symmetric key K for (U_k, S_j) has not been generated for P **then**
 - 3: Generate K and encrypt it (with the CP-ABE encryption module) using P
 - 4: Persist K to the key database
 - 5: Encrypt L_i with AES-256 using K , yielding $E(L_i, K)$
 - 6: Persist (L_i, K) to the log database
-

pair. The key database stores the cryptographic keys that were used to construct such log chains. The user and policy databases store user information and policy rules for ABLS, respectively. In the current prototype of ABLS, the policy database is not used externally. All event rules are hard-coded into the `PolicyEngine`.

In order to link the entries in the log tables to their corresponding verification and encryption keys in the key database, common user and session IDs are used (though not as the primary key for the tables since they do not satisfy the uniqueness property). However, because such the storage of such user and session information in plaintext may lead to violation of user privacy, they are deterministically masked before being stored in the database.

This masking procedure uses information sensitive to the

4. COMPLETED AND FUTURE WORK

Over the course of this project I have completed the following tasks.

1. Symmetric-key encryption for the log entries was implemented and integrated into the relational database model.
2. The application and database bootstrap process was automated.
3. Redesigned the relational database model to account for the different security classes among data that is used by ABLS. This resulted in a physical separation of database servers.




Figure 3: The deployment diagram for ABLS.

4. Expanded the test driver program to include a more robust suite of tests to simulate varying traffic loads. The user interface of this program was also improved so as to aid the developers in interacting with the ABLS prototype.
5. The initial implementation of the database masking procedure was started.

5. FUTURE WORK

- auditing design and implementation (define automated worker tasks that use pre-defined strategies for auditing (search by userID) or whatnot that can be triggered by any web application set in front of ABLS - making it easy for auditors to start their own automated audits) - encrypting and masking user identity attributes in all of the databases

6. REFERENCES

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