

Housing Price and Population Growth across China: The Role of Housing Supply

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Abstract

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In this paper, we employ a spatial equilibrium growth model to examine the role of housing supply for differences in housing price and population growth across the provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities of mainland China for 1999-2013. A distinguishing feature of the model used from other spatial equilibrium models is a time-varying and regionally-varying elasticity of housing supply. Regions in the East are found to have had the most inelastic housing supply, while northern regions had the most elastic housing supply. The differences in exogenous housing supply growth are shown to have significantly affected relative regional population growth over the period, suggesting that housing policies can be used to promote growth.

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1. Introduction

The housing sector in China has undergone significant transformation in first becoming privatized with reforms in 1988 and then becoming market-based with the 1998 reforms (Wang and Murie, 2000; Ye et al., 2010; Xu et al., 2009; Man et al., 2011). The move to a market-based housing sector was accompanied by rapid urbanization and growth of housing supply. Across

provinces and municipalities, housing prices on average more than tripled. However, housing price increases have been uneven across China (Yu, 2011; Wang and Zhang, 2014).

Studies of regional housing markets in China have identified numerous determinants of regional and urban housing price increases (e.g., Yu, 2011; Hanink et al., 2012; Bian, 2013; Huang, 2014; Wang and Zhang, 2014). Variables identified in the studies include the availability of credit, construction costs, housing policies, income, land supply, population, preferences for housing, tax treatment and speculative demand. Empirically identifying all the factors affecting housing prices is extremely difficult. Some factors affect the demand for housing, while others affect the supply.

The housing price determinants identified in the above studies reveal then that housing investment and prices can be affected by regional economic performance, in which housing supply in turn can affect regional economic performance (Chen, 2011). Limited housing supply cause housing prices to rise in the face of rising demand, making cities (regions) less attractive for households for a given wage level (Quigley, 2008). A shortage of habitable land may fundamentally limit future economic development in China (Keng, 2006). To be sure, policies to increase housing or land supply can be used with the expressed purpose of increasing local economic competitiveness (Lin and Yi, 2011; Morrison, 2013; He et al., 2014).

Therefore, in this paper, we use the spatial equilibrium growth model of Glaeser and Tobio (2008) to estimate the effects of differences in land and housing supply across mainland China (i.e., excluding Hong Kong and Macao) over the period of 1999 to 2013. The model separates changes in housing prices arising from innovations to firm and household attractiveness from innovations in land supply. We then examine geographic patterns in the differences in housing supply elasticity for the provinces and municipalities. We also estimate

the proportions of relative housing price changes attributable to housing supply differences across China's regions and then assess the role of housing supply in influencing relative population growth across the nation.

In the next section, we briefly discuss the literature on incorporating housing supply intol regional growth analysis. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework of the model and derives the expression for innovations in regional land supply and the expressions for their effects on regional housing prices and population growth. Section 4 presents and discusses empirical implementation of the model for the provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities under central government control in China. Section 5 discusses the findings of the analysis. Primary findings include the significant geographical differences in housing price growth and the importance of differences in regional housing supply in explaining the differences in housing price growth. Regions in the East had the most inelastic housing supply, while the northern regions had the most elastic housing supply. The differences in the elasticity of housing supply are then demonstrated to greatly affect relative population growth, significantly reducing growth in the East, and to a lesser extent, increasing growth in the northern regions. The conclusion contains a brief summary and concluding statements.

2. Regional Housing Supply in Spatial Equilibrium Analysis

The spatial equilibrium growth model of Glaeser and Tobio (2008) is an extension of the canonical Rosen-Roback spatial equilibrium model (Rosen, 1979, Roback 1982). In the Rosen-Roback model, land is used by both households and firms, and can be transferred between uses without frictions. Perfect mobility of households and firms equalizes utility and profits across space. Therefore, in spatial equilibrium wages and land rents reflect relative location advantages

for firms and households. Land rents increase (decrease) in response to higher (lower) household amenity attractiveness and firm productivity.

The spatial equilibrium model has been used extensively to estimate both the regional quality of life and the regional quality of the business environment in countries including China (Zheng et al., 2014b), Germany (Buettner and Ebertz, 2009), Russia (Berger et al., 2008) and the United States (e.g., Roback, 1982; Blomquist et al., 1988; Beeson and Eberts, 1989; Gabriel and Rosenthal, 2004). Assuming that spatial equilibrium holds continuously, the effects of changing household amenity attractiveness and productivity across regions can be examined (Gabriel et al., 2003; Partridge et al., 2010). However, Rickman (2014) notes the passive role of the housing sector in the traditional spatial equilibrium model, whereby regionally-uniform elasticities of housing supply are assumed and exogenous changes in housing supply are not allowed in growth analyses.

A number of studies then have incorporated differing elasticities of housing supply within a spatial equilibrium model. Glaeser et al. (2006) retain the assumption of spatial equalization of utility but do not impose equalization of profits. They then allow the elasticity of housing to vary spatially and demonstrate empirically that labor demand innovations have larger housing price effects and lower population growth in areas with less elastic housing supply. This can explain why in declining U.S. cities there are larger responses in housing prices and lower population outflows (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005); houses are built more quickly than they depreciate, making housing supply relatively inelastic in declining areas. Krupka and Donaldson (2013) likewise expand the Rosen-Roback model such that household amenity attractiveness and firm productivity do not solely determine wages and rents and impose additional equilibrium conditions for the labor and housing markets.

Glaeser and Tobio (2008) take the spatial equilibrium model one step further by incorporating innovations in residential land supply. Local areas may enact restrictive housing development policies in response to concerns with adverse effects of growth or may be especially aggressive in promoting growth through expansive housing supply policies. Therefore, the model becomes fairly comprehensive in its ability to account for the primary channels of growth.

The first use of the model by Glaeser and Tobio (GT) (2008) was their examination of the sources of growth in the southern region of the United States over the last half of the twentieth century. A notable finding of the study was that rather than increased demand by households for natural amenities, such as a favorable climate, the most important growth factor in the most recent decades was a more favorable housing regulatory environment in southern states that made housing supply more elastic.

Rickman and Rickman (2011) used the model of GT to assess the changing role of natural amenity demand in nonmetropolitan county growth for 1990-2000, while accounting for the elasticity of housing supply and labor demand. They found household amenity demand as underlying stronger population growth in areas with higher levels of natural amenities. However, they found amenities becoming fully capitalized in housing prices in the most amenity attractive areas, which reduced their relative population growth. But they did not find housing supply to be more inelastic in these areas.

Rickman and Wang (2015) found that both differences in natural amenities and urban agglomeration underpinned U.S. regional growth differences post-2000. In contrast to the 1990s, Rickman and Wang found more inelastic housing supply in the highest natural amenity areas, particularly in nonmetropolitan areas. Davidsson and Rickman (2011) used the GT framework to

examine population growth differences in micropolitan areas across the U.S. from 1990-2000.

They found significant Census Division effects, which they assessed as primarily driven by productivity growth differences, followed by amenity demand, with innovations in household housing supply the least important.

3. Deriving Innovations to Regional Housing Supply

The spatial equilibrium model of Glaeser and Tobio (GT) (2008) is used in this study to derive expressions for innovations in regional land (housing) supply, in which we closely follow the presentations of the spatial equilibrium model by GT and Rickman and Rickman (2011). The model contains two optimizing agents: the household and the firm. The household supplies one unit of labor and is assumed completely mobile across regions. Subject to a budget constraint, the household consumes a composite traded good with a normalized price of unity and housing (H) with price P_h to maximize utility. Amenities (A_h) serve as a utility shifter across regions. Utility of the household is assumed to be represented by the Cobb-Douglas constant-returns-to-scale function, with housing expenditure share α , and is equalized across regions in equilibrium because of perfect household mobility. Equalized indirect utility (V_0) can be written as:

$$V_0 = \alpha^{\alpha} (1 - \alpha)^{(1 \alpha)} A_h w P_h^{\alpha} \tag{1}$$

The firm produces a nationally-traded good, with normalized price equal to unity, according to a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas function using labor (N), nationally mobile capital (K), and locally fixed capital (Z), with input expenditure shares equal to β , γ , and $(1-\beta-\gamma)$, respectively. In addition, site-specific characteristics cause productivity (A_f) to vary regionally. Profit maximization yields the following inverse labor demand function:

$$\mathbf{W} = \hat{\beta} \gamma^{(\gamma/(1-\gamma))} \hat{\mathbf{A}}_{\mathbf{f}}^{1/(1-\gamma)} \hat{\mathbf{N}}^{(\beta+\gamma-1)/(1-\gamma)} Z^{(1-\beta-\gamma)/(1-\gamma)}$$
(2)

Equation (2) stands in contrast to the formulation in the canonical Rosen-Roback static spatial equilibrium model. First, land is not used in production of the traded good. So, only households are affected by land prices. Second, profits are not constrained to be equal across regions. As such, spatial differences in productivity do not directly affect land prices, which they do in the traditional spatial equilibrium model.

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The supply of housing is given by the fixed level of land (L) and housing structure (h) on the land. The cost per unit of land is P_l ; the cost of housing structure is $\xi_0 h^\delta$ where ξ_0 is a constant and $\delta > 1$. Housing supply is then directly affected by land supply and the amount of housing structure per unit of land. Free entry and zero economic profits are assumed in the housing sector in equilibrium. Using the first-order profit maximizing level of h, total housing supply is given as: $h\underline{L} = (ph/\xi_0\delta)^{(1/(\delta-1))}$. Equating housing demand with housing supply in equilibrium yields the following equilibrium expression for housing prices:

$$ph = ((N/\underline{L})\alpha w)^{((\delta-1)/\delta)} \delta^{(1/\delta)} \xi_0^{(1/\delta)} . \tag{3}$$

The housing market equilibrium condition is required because of the absence of land as an input into production and the absence of a firm profit constraint.

In natural logarithms, the static equilibrium conditions for population (assuming full employment), wages and housing prices from the above are as follows (Glaeser and Tobio, 2008; Rickman and Rickman, 2011):

$$\ln(N) = K_N + \left[(\delta + \alpha - \alpha \delta) \ln(\mathbf{A}_f) + (1 - \gamma)(\delta \ln(\mathbf{A}_h) + \alpha(\delta - 1) \ln(L)) \right] / \Delta$$

$$\ln(w) = K_W + \left[(\delta - 1)\alpha \ln(\mathbf{A}_f) + (1 - \beta - \gamma)(\delta \ln(\mathbf{A}_h) + \alpha(\delta - 1) \ln(L)) \right] / \Delta$$

$$\ln(P_h) = K_H + \left[(\delta - 1)\ln(\mathbf{A}_f) + \beta \ln(\mathbf{A}_h) - (1 - \beta - \gamma)\ln(L) \right] / \Delta$$
(6)

In the traditional static spatial equilibrium model, with land transferable between residential and firm uses, the assumptions of equalization of utility and profits across space are sufficient to derive equilibrium wages, land rents and population.

where K_N , K_W and K_H are constant terms derived from the solutions and $\Delta = \delta(1 - \beta - \gamma) + \alpha\beta(\delta - 1)$.

Equations (4)-(6) can be used to assess the influence of housing supply elasticity on regional outcomes by estimating regressions for the three variables, and include measures of labor demand and supply innovations that are interacted with proxies for housing supply elasticity (Glaeser et al., 2006). Labor demand and supply innovations will increase housing prices more relative to population in areas with less elastic housing supply. Other sources of growth can come from increased household amenity attractiveness through life cycle factors and increased national income (Graves, 1979; Gyourko et al., 2013).

However, to derive corresponding spatial equilibrium growth equations, unanticipated exogenous innovations to amenity demand (labor supply), firm productivity (labor demand) and land supply are added to equations (4) to (6) (Rickman and Rickman, 2011). From the above, exogenous changes in residential land supply then lead to exogenous changes in housing supply.

Assuming that the static equilibrium conditions hold between periods t and t+1, equations (4) to (6) can be transformed into growth equations:

$$\ln(N_{t+1}/N_t) = E_N + \Delta^{-1} \left((\delta + \alpha - \alpha \delta) \lambda_f + (1 - \gamma) (\delta \lambda_h + \alpha (\delta - 1) \lambda_L) \right) R + \varepsilon_N$$
 (7)
$$\ln(W_{t+1}/W_t) = E_W + \Delta^{-1} \left((\delta - 1) \alpha \lambda_f - (1 - \beta - \gamma) (\delta \lambda_h + \alpha (\delta - 1) \lambda_L) \right) R + \varepsilon_W$$
 (8)
$$\ln(P_{h,t+1}/P_{h,t}) = E_H + \Delta^{-1} \left((\delta - 1) (\lambda_f + \beta \lambda_h - (1 - \beta - \gamma) \lambda_L) \right) R + \varepsilon_H$$
 (9)
where λ_f , λ_h and λ_L are the innovations to firm productivity, household amenity attractiveness and land supply common within regional category R , E_N , E_W and E_H represent innovations common to all regions, while the ε represent innovations idiosyncratic to areas.

Let $B_N B_W$ and B_H represent the expressions multiplied by R in Equations (7) to (9),

respectively. The expressions associated with them can then be solved simultaneously to obtain the innovations in productivity, amenity attractiveness and land supply. It is possible that factors such as the Hukou household registration system prevent Equations (4)-(6) from holding precisely. However, to the extent such factors do not differentially change across regions (R) over time, the interpretations of the expressions multiplied by R hold. We focus on deriving the innovations to land (housing) supply. Various policies are available and have been used to affect regional housing supply in China (Ye et al., 2011; He, 2013; Wu, 2015).

Solving the three expressions for $B_{N_i}B_W$ and B_H for relative growth in land supply (λ_L) yields the following:

$$\mathbf{B_{N}} + \mathbf{B_{W}} - (\delta \mathbf{B_{H}}/(\delta - 1)). \tag{10}$$

Strong population and wage growth relative to housing price growth is evidence of increased elasticity of land (housing) supply. Lower growth in the supply of land (housing) restricts population growth and increases housing prices relative to wages.

To estimate the impacts of the land supply innovations on housing prices we derive the multiplier effect of the innovation in Equation (9). A one unit change of land supply causes the following changes in housing prices and population, respectively:

$$\ln(P_{h,t+1}/P_{h,t}) = -(\delta - 1)(1 - \beta - \gamma) \Delta^{-1}$$
(11a)

$$\ln(N_{t+1}/N_t) = (1-\gamma)\alpha(\delta - 1)\Delta^{-1}$$
(11b)

4. Empirical Implementation

4.1 Data

Rickman and Rickman (2011) find that including measures of potential disequilibrium in the growth equations do not affect their results, despite evidence that Equations (4)-(6) did not hold for the U.S. based on the findings of incomplete interregional migration responses to household utility differentials (Clark, 2003)

^B Derivations of innovations to firm productivity and household amenity attractiveness can be found in Glaeser and Tobio (2008) and Rickman and Rickman (2011).

LAccording to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, China's administrative units are currently based on a three-tier system. The first tier includes provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under central government control; the second tier includes autonomous prefectures, autonomous counties and cities that comprise provinces and autonomous regions; the third tier includes townships, ethnic minority townships, and towns that comprise counties, autonomous counties and cities. In this paper, the analysis focuses on the first tier that includes 23 provinces, 5 autonomous regions and 4 municipalities directly under control of the central government. Table 1 presents the areas of study, including their classification and region of location in mainland China.

The regional data we utilize in this paper are all publicly available. Data are obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China for population, wage and salary income per capita, and the average regional housing price. We calculate the average annual compounded growth rates for the variables over the period of 1999-2013. We begin the analysis with 1999 because of the timing of market-based housing reforms in 1998.

According to China Statistical Yearbooks, population in 1999 and 2013 were estimated on the sample surveys on population changes that cover about one per thousand of the total population of the country. The military personnel were not included in the regional population.

Housing price refers to average selling price per square meter of commercialized residential buildings that are built by real estate companies and traded in the housing market.

Data are obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China.

Regarding wage and salary income per capita, we can only obtain data for urban and rural areas

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China website link is http://english.gov.cn/

This paper focuses only on mainland China. Thus, the two special administrative regions Hong Kong and Macao are excluded.

National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China website link is http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/.

Data are not available for all three variables at a finer geographical level across all of China.

separately. Thus, we use the urbanization ratio, calculated as urban population divided by total population, to weight the urban and rural per capita incomes. For Tibet, because of missing data in 1999 we calculate the average annual growth rate from 2000-2013.

4.2 Growth during the Post-Market Reform Era

4.3 Empirical Model

Annual compounded growth rates for housing prices, per capita income and population by area of study for the post-market reform period of 1999 to 2013 appear in Table 2. As shown in the first column of Table 2, housing prices increased the most in the East. The increases in the East could have been affected by both housing demand and supply influences, which is the subject of the analysis below. The four municipalities under the control of the central government experienced the next fastest growth. Note, for example, that Shanghai is classified as both in the East and as a municipality. The Northeast provinces experienced the slowest growth in housing prices. Strongest growth in per capita income occurred in the Central region, followed closely by those in the East and Northwest regions. Municipalities experienced the slowest growth in per capita income. Yet, municipalities also had the fastest growth in population. Slowest growth in population occurred in the Northeast and Southwest.

Equations (7) to (9) are empirically implemented as percentage changes in population, wages and housing costs between years t and $t+\hat{t}$:

$$\%\Delta(population) = \mathbf{E}_N + \mathbf{B}_N \mathbf{R} + \mathbf{\varepsilon}_N \tag{12}$$

$$\% \Delta(wages) = \pounds_W + \mathbf{B}_W \mathbf{R} + \varepsilon_W \tag{13}$$

$$\%\Delta(housing\ prices) = \pounds_H + \mathbf{B}_H \mathbf{R} + \varepsilon_H \tag{14}$$

The online database for rural and urban population is only available since 2005 and afterwards. Therefore, we calculated the 2013 urbanization ratio using rural and urban population. For 1999, we adopted the ratio from http://www.doczi.com/doc/886469aad0d233d4b04e6916.html.

where \mathcal{E}_N , \mathcal{E}_W and \mathcal{E}_H are constants. \mathcal{B}_N , \mathcal{B}_W and \mathcal{B}_H are the coefficient vectors for the binary indicator variables to be estimated. \mathcal{E}_N , \mathcal{E}_W and \mathcal{E}_H are error terms. \mathbf{R} is the matrix of variables of interest to assess housing supply elasticity across mainland China. Included is a vector of binary indicator variables representing the geographic region of the province/municipality, and binary indicator variables for whether the area is a municipality under direct control of the central government and whether a province is autonomous. Municipalities under the direct control of the central government and autonomous provinces also are classified by geographic region.

For Glaeser and Tobio (2008), in the base regressions **R** represented whether a U.S. metropolitan area was located in one of the eleven former confederate states. In Rickman and Rickman (2011), **R** corresponded to a vector of binary variables for the amenity ranking of U.S. counties produced by Economic Research Service (ERS) of the United States Department of Agriculture. In Rickman and Wang (2015), **R** represented both binary variables for natural amenity attractiveness and binary variables for the area's position along the rural-urban continuum based on the classification by ERS.

5. Results

5.1 Regression Results

Table 3. The reported t-statistics reflect White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. The Central region of China is the omitted category, with its growth reflected in the constant terms.

As shown in the first column of Table 3, the differences in housing price growth across regions of China are statistically significant below the 0.10 based on the F-test. Areas in the East

In addition to representing binary indicator variables as in the other studies, in Davidsson and Rickman (2011) **R** also represented time varying variables. Such variables included industry composition and state and local tax and expenditure variables.

The regressions were estimated in EViews 7.

experienced over two percent greater annual compounded growth in housing prices than those in the Central region. Provinces in the Northeast experienced nearly two percent less annual compounded growth. Autonomous provinces as a group, and municipalities as a group, did not experience significantly different growth in housing prices relative to their respective geographic regions.

Statistically different growth in per capita income relative to the Central region. Yet, provinces in the Northeast and municipalities under central government control experienced nearly two and one-half percent slower per capita income growth. In results not shown, re-estimating the per capita income growth equation after removing all variables other than the indictor variables for the Northeast and municipal areas produced a statistically significant regression (p=0.056), with each coefficient approximately equal to negative two. This confirms the results for these two regions relative to Central provinces shown in the table.

Regression results for population growth are shown in the third column of Table 3.

Population growth has the most statistically significant regional pattern, as evidenced by the highest r-squared and largest F-statistic. Only municipalities though had statistically different population growth than Central provinces and their respective geographic regions, where municipalities on average experienced over two percent greater growth per year.

5.2 Base Decomposition Results

The coefficients from Table 3 are B_{N} , B_{W} and B_{H} in Equation (10), which produces the estimates of λ_{L} . The values for λ_{L} can then be used with Equation (11) to estimate the land (housing) supply effects on housing prices and population growth. Equations (10) and (11) require parameters for the model. For the base case, the following values from Glaeser and Tobio

(2008) are specified for the model parameters: β =0.3, γ =0.6, α =0.3 and δ alternatively is set equal to 1.5 and 3.0 for translating land supply into housing supply. In sensitivity analysis, to demonstrate that the results qualitatively hold up for alternative model parameter values, they are set as follows β =0.6, γ =0.3, α =0.15.

The first two columns of Table 4 show the differences in residential land supply innovations (λ_L) relative to the omitted category, Central China, for $\delta = 1.5$ and $\delta = 3.0$, respectively. A value of 1.5 implies an elasticity of price with respect to density of 0.5, while a value of 3.0 implies an elasticity of 3 (Glaeser and Tobio, 2008). In column (1), the Northeast provinces are estimated to have had the most positive land supply innovations, followed next by the Northwest. The most negative land supply innovations are estimated to have occurred in the East, followed by Municipalities (relative to their respective geographic regions) and the Southwest. As shown in column (2), specifying a larger elasticity of price to density instead predicts the Northwest and the North to have had the most elastic land supply. The most negative land (housing) supply continues to be the East, followed next by the Southwest and then Municipalities. Note, that Shanghai, as a municipality under central government control and in the East region, has the most negative land supply innovation in China. Overall, with the exception of the Northeast region, the results are not much affected by varying the elasticity of housing price to density.

The third and fifth columns reflect the results of using the estimated innovations with

Equation (11) to predict the relative change in housing prices from the differences in land

(housing) supply innovations. Positive (negative) predicted housing price increases in columns (3)

and (5) reflect negative (positive) land (housing) supply innovations in columns (1) and (2),

respectively. The fourth and sixth columns are the ratios of the predicted housing price changes

in columns (3) and (5) to the actual relative changes in housing prices given in column (1) of

Table 3. The multipliers are the same across regions, so the pattern of differences in predicted effects reflect that of the differences in innovations in the first two columns.

From the fourth column, regions with the largest positive innovations in the first column, the Northeast and Northwest, had thirty-seven percent and eighty-two percent of their relative changes in housing prices explained by relative land supply innovations, respectively. The East, the region with the most negative land supply innovations in the first column, had seventy-five percent of its relative increase in housing prices explained by its relative negative land supply innovations. Thus, for the East and Northwest regions most of their relative changes in housing prices are attributable to differential innovations in land supply, not fundamental demand factors related to the attractiveness of the regions to firms and households. For the large municipal regions relative negative innovations in land supply can explain nearly all of the actual relative change in housing prices.

The Southwest, North and Autonomous regions had predicted changes in excess of the actual changes. Thus, fundamental forces worked to dampen or offset the relative effects on housing prices from land (housing) supply innovations. For the North provinces, housing prices would have been lower had it not been for stronger relative fundamental demand forces. For the Autonomous provinces, negative effects from fundamental demand factors on housing prices were in the opposite direction of the increased prices from negative relative land supply innovations. In fact, the negative sign for Autonomous provinces indicate the actual relative prices were negative, despite housing supply predicting there to be relative positive price increases.

The results in the sixth column, reflecting δ =3.0, are qualitatively similar to those in the fourth column. The only switch in signs occurs for the Northeast provinces, in going from a

approximately equals the sum of the change in the sum of income and population growth in Equation (10). This suggests that for this region, the significantly lower growth in housing prices (from column (1) of Table 3) results almost exclusively from relatively lower fundamental demand.

Negative housing supply innovations can feed speculative price bubbles (Rickman and Guettabi, 2015). Thus, the most negative exogenous land (housing) supply effects in the East (particularly Shanghai) is consistent with the evidence reported by Wang and Zhang (2014) that housing prices were higher in several coastal cities than suggested by fundamentals such as income and population. Yu (2011) similarly reports significant housing price bubbles since 2005 in the eastern cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Hangzhou and Ningbo.

The predicted effects of the land (housing) supply innovations on population growth using Equation (11b) are shown in Table 5. From Equation (11b), the multiplier effect of a one unit change in land supply innovation on population growth is approximately 0.31 for δ =1.5 and 0.5 for δ =3.0. Thus, the predicted effects in Table 5 are approximately 0.31 and 0.5 times the innovation values in the first two columns of Table 4, respectively.

The results in Table 5 suggest that annualized population growth in the East region was reduced by as much as two percent by having more inelastic land (housing) supply. The Southwest and municipalities under central government control also grew significantly slower because of inelastic land (housing) supply, while autonomous provinces grew only slightly slower. Recall that for municipalities under central government control and autonomous provinces, the coefficients are interpreted relative to the regions in which they are located. The North and Northwest regions had significantly higher population growth because of more elastic.

housing, in which the Northeast would only be predicted to have grown faster for δ =1.5. The strong result for housing supply affecting population growth in the East region fit the time series findings by Chen (2011) that housing investment Granger causes GDP in the East in the short run and long run, whereas, a much weaker relationship was found for the West.

5.3 Sensitivity Analysis for Decomposition Results

In sensitivity analysis, Table 6 shows alternative decomposition results to those in columns (3)-(6) in Table 4. The results are obtained by specifying different factor production shares and household expenditure share on housing: α =0.15 and β =0.6, γ =0.3. These reflect greater labor intensity (twice the labor factor share) in production in China (Marshall, 2011) and a smaller Chinese expenditure share on housing (i.e., one-half the US share) (Lockett and Henderson, 2014; Stratford and Cowling, 2016). Estimated land supply innovations are not affected by these changes (Equation (10)), so the first two columns of Table 4 (the predicted innovations) do not change and are not reproduced in Table 5.

As shown in Table 6, the pattern of results across the regions holds when assuming the alternative values of the model parameters. The signs do not switch because they are determined by the estimated innovations. Thus, all the magnitudes are affected proportionately because only the multipliers change. The predicted effects on relative housing prices are about 0.65 of the Table 4 predicted effects for δ =1.5 and 0.53 of the predicted effects for δ =3.0. Overall, the estimated roles of relative innovations in land supply are still quantitatively significant for most regions. A notable change though is that only about one-half, rather than the approximately ninety percent in Table 4, of the change in relative housing prices in municipal regions is now estimated to have occurred because of relatively negative innovations in land supply.

Nevertheless, the predicted effects on population growth in Table 7 are only reduced by about

twelve percent from those in Table 5 because of the lower influence on the land supplypopulation growth multiplier of the parameter changes.

6. Conclusion

In this study, we apply a spatial equilibrium growth model (Glaeser and Tobio, 2008) to provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities under central government control in mainland China from 1999-2013 to assess the role of differences in land (housing) supply in regional differences in housing price and population growth. Innumerable factors can underlie differences in economic fundamentals and housing supply across regions, and the general structure of the spatial equilibrium framework can account for them (Ottaviano and Pinelli, 2006; Tabuchi and Thisse, 2006). For example, the relaxing of *Hukou* restrictions would increase household demand for cities with higher amenities, increasing their population growth and housing prices (Zheng et al., 2014a). Promotion of housing supply such as through relaxing housing regulations or public provision of housing (Cao and Keivani, 2014) would increase population growth relative to the change in housing prices.

We first find that there were significant geographical differences in housing price growth across mainland China during the post-market reform era. We find that relative differences in land (housing) supply played major, if not dominant roles, in the differences in housing price growth. This is a result that is robust to alternative parameterizations of the spatial equilibrium model. We then find that the land (housing) supply differences significantly affected regional population growth.

While the factors potentially underlying the land (housing) supply differences are numerous and difficult to fully identify, the results from the spatial equilibrium growth model highlight the important role of land (housing) supply in determining regional housing price and

population growth in mainland China. More research is needed on what specific policies most

increase regional housing supply and promote regional economic competitiveness.

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Table 1. Units of Observation

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Table 2. Annual Compounded Growth: 1999-2013

Region	Housing Prices	Per Capita Income	Population
Classification	%Δ '99-'13	$\%\Delta^{-3}99-13$	$\%\Delta^{,99}-13$
	(annual)	(annual)	(annual)
Central	10.90	16.65	0.71
East	13.29	16.47	1.17
North	10.97	16,16	1.93
Northeast	9.12	14.43	0.25
Northwest	10.16	16.34	0.94
Southwest	11.21	15.57	0.26
Autonomous	10.54	15.53	1.06
Municipality	12.04	14.54	2.76

 Table 3. Regression Results (robust t-statistics in parentheses)

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*significant at or below the 0.01 level, **significant at or below the 0.05 level, **significant at or below the 0.01 level

Table 4. Relative Land Supply Innovations and Effects on Housing Prices: Base Case

Region	Innovation	Innovation	Housing	Predicted/	Housing	Predicted/
	$(\delta=1.5)$	$(\delta=3.0)$	Price	Actual	Price	Actual
	0		$(\delta=1.5)$		$(\delta=3.0)$	
East	-6.68	-3.25	1.71	0.75	1.35	0.59
North	1.34	1.12	-0.34	2.30	-0.47	3.11
Northeast	2.60	-0.11	-0.67	0.37	0.05	-0.03
Northwest	2.28	1.20	-0.58	0.82	-0.50	0.70
Southwest	-2.02	-1.73	0.52	2.65	0.72	3.68
Autonomous	-0.55	-0.70	0.14	-1.38	0.29	-2.87
Municipality	-2.05	-1.19	0.53	0.92	0.50	0.87

Table 5. Predicted Effects on

Population Growth: Base Case

Region	Population	Population
	Growth	Growth
	$(\delta=1.5)$	$(\delta=3.0)$
East	-2.06	-1.63
North	0.41	0.56
Northeast	0.80	-0.06
Northwest	0.70	0.60
Southwest	-0.62	-0.87
Autonomous	-0.17	-0.35
Municipality	-0.63	-0.60

Table 6. Predicted Effects on Housing Prices: Sensitivity Analysis

Region	Housing	Predicted/	Housing	Predicted/
	Price (δ =1.5)	Actual	Price ($\delta = 3.0$)	Actual
East	1.12	0.49	0.72	0.32
North	-0.22	1.50	-0.25	1.66
Northeast	-0.43	0.24	0.02	-0.01
Northwest	-0.38	0.53	-0.27	0.37
Southwest	0.34	1.73	0.38	1.96
Autonomous	0.09	-0.90	0.16	-1.53
Municipality	0.34	0.60	0.27	0.46

Table 7. Predicted Effects on

Population Growth: Sensitivity Analysis

Region	Population	Population
	Growth	Growth
	$(\delta=1.5)$	$(\delta=3.0)$
East	-1.80	-1.42
North	0.36	0.49
Northeast	0.70	-0.05
Northwest	0.61	0.53
Southwest	-0.54	-0.76
Autonomous	-0.15	-0.31
Municipality	-0.55	-0.52

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