
# ZKP and MPC: Day 2


- Recap
- A Concrete Lightweight MPC Scheme
- Reducing Rounds
- Better Communication Efficiency
- MPC from ZK

#### ZKP from MPC



- 1-privacy


- perfect correctness




# ZKP and MPC: Day 2


- Recap
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
Step 1: express f as a circuit







Step 1: express f as a circuit







Step 1: express f as a circuit








Q: what is missing?



#### ZK Simulator for Eve

#### $S_{MPC,E}(\perp,y)$ :


- run Eve honestly
- send y on behalf of Alice and Bob




## ZK Simulator for Bob (/Charlie)

#### $S_{MPC,B}(input_B, y)$ :

- Run Bob honestly
- Send random values on Eve's behalf
- Send random values on Charlie's behalf
- When opening the output, set  $y_C$  s.t.  $y_B + y_C = y$




#### ZKP from MPC



- 1-privacy


- perfect correctness





# ZKP and MPC: Day 2


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### ZKP from MPC











 $\bullet \bullet \bullet$ 

### Can we Squish This?




- Let Dani prove knowledge of their choices first!
- Don't let Dani pick!

# Squishing Rounds



i, i, ..., i random


# Squishing Rounds



i, i, ..., i random

Q: what property dies?

## Squishing Rounds: Fiat-Shamir Heuristic




W


H is a random oracle


### Squishing Rounds: Fiat-Shamir Heuristic

#### Goals:

- completeness
- soundness
- ZK







H is a random oracle

For each i:


Open( ) -> party is view

Check that:

- party i did not cheat, and
- output is 1

# ZKP and MPC: Day 2


- Recap
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Alice only needs to cheat on


behalf of one party!

Dani will get unlucky with probability 2/3




MPC for  $R(x, w_B + w_C)$  with:

- 1-privacy
- perfect correctness




Alice only needs to cheat on behalf of one party!

Dani will get unlucky with probability (n-1)/n



MPC for  $R(x, w_B + w_C)$  with:


- 1-privacy
- perfect correctness



t challenges


Alice only needs to cheat on behalf of one party!

Dani will get unlucky with probability (n-t)/n



MPC for  $R(x, w_B + w_C)$  with:


- t-privacy
- perfect correctness



#### t challenges

Alice needs to cheat on behalf of t+1 parties!

Dani will get unlucky with probability  $\binom{n-(t+1)}{t}/\binom{n}{t}$  = negl



MPC for  $R(x, w_B + w_C)$  with:

- t-privacy Q: Does privacy need to hold if anyone cheats?
- perfect correctness even if up to t parties cheat -

"malicious security"

• Yes! But what's the point?

	Communication Complexity	Tools
Reduce to Sudoku (or something)	poly(k,   R   )	lightweight
Run MPC	O(k  R )	heavyweight
Run MPC in the Head	O(k   R  )	lightweight

Avoiding Repetition in MPC in the Head	O(t   VIEW ) = O(k   R  )	lightweight	
--	---------------------------	-------------	--

• Yes! But what's the point?

	Communication Complexity	Tools
Reduce to Sudoku (or something)	poly(k,  R )	lightweight
Run MPC	O(k  R )	heavyweight
Run MPC in the Head	O(k   R  )	lightweight

• Using a very special MPC, we can do better!

Avoiding Repetition in MPC in the Head	$O( R ) + poly(k, \log( R ))$	lightweight
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## Back to Reality!

- Repetition performs better [ZKBoo, GMO]
- Asymptotically loses to zk-STARKs / zk-SNARKs, but wins for small computations!
- Gives us efficient post-quantum digital signatures!

Up til now...

Zero Knowledge Proofs (ZKP)

Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC)


# Briefly:

Zero Knowledge Proofs (ZKP)

U

Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC)

#### Back to MPC




We have:

- correctness
- privacy

as long as everyone follows instructions.

#### Back to MPC

Strategy for getting malicious security?



We want:

- correctness
- privacy

even if up to t participants cheat!

take a protocol secure against "passive" corruptions, and have each participant zero-knowledge-prove their correct behavior!

### Questions?

Zero Knowledge Proofs (ZKP)

1

Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC)