[merged] Protect against hostname changes with unshared UTS namespace #108
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This way we can access these from all the functions.
This is normally verified on argument validation, but it may happen if someone managed to send custom priv-sep operations via e.g. ptrace. See containers#107
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LGTM |
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As reported in #107 we're currently vulnerable to ptrace of the unprivileged part of the child setup. This allows the hostname to be set, even for the host in case the UTS namespace is not unshared.
This is a quick fix to disallow this. We also want to look into the DUMPABLE handling a bit more carefully.