

Key Update for OSCORE (KUDOS)

draft-ietf-core-oscore-key-update-12

Rikard Höglund, RISE
Marco Tiloca, RISE

IETF CoRE WG meeting – IETF 124 – November 7th, 2025

Recap of KUDOS (1/2)

› Key Update for OSCORE (KUDOS)

- Renew the Master Secret and Master Salt; derive new Sender/Recipient keys
- No change to the ID Context or Sender/Recipient ID; can achieve Forward Secrecy
- Agnostic of the key establishment method originally used
- Loosely inspired by Appendix B.2 of OSCORE
- The peers update their current context CTX_OLD, deriving a new context CTX_NEW
- Redesigned in v-10 to use a more flexible and simpler approach
 - We now explicitly define a KUDOS state machine

Recap of KUDOS (2/2)

› Properties

- Can be initiated by either peer
- It is robust against a peer rebooting and loss of state, avoiding the reuse of AEAD (nonce, key)
- It typically completes in one round trip by exchanging two OSCORE-protected CoAP messages
 - The two peers achieve mutual key confirmation in a following exchange, which is protected with the newly established OSCORE Security Context
- Flexible in terms of message flow; any CoAP message can be a KUDOS message


› KUDOS message types

- › Divergent message: The sender peer is offering its own nonce in the message and waiting to receive the other peer's nonce.
- Convergent message: The sender peer is offering its own nonce in the message, has received the other peer's nonce, and is going to wait for key confirmation


Rekeying Procedure

› Key Update for OSCORE (KUDOS)

- Message exchange to share two nonces N1 and N2
 - Decoupled from request/response and client/server concepts
- Nonces are placed in new fields in OSCORE CoAP option
- *UpdateCtx()* function for deriving new OSCORE Security Context using the two nonces, two 'x' bytes and CTX_OLD
- Two modes
 - FS mode providing forward secrecy
 - No-FS mode for very constrained devices
- No change of OSCORE identifiers
- Expected to complete in 1 round trip



KUDOS State Machine




Changes for v-12

- › Added state machine as ASCII figure 



 - Now in Appendix B
 - Aligned with was shown in the previous slide
 - The state machine is described in Section 4.3.3

- › Editorial improvements





Changes for v-12

- › **Multiple additional message flow examples as appendixes**
 - › KUDOS Execution Initiated with a Request Message, with Non-capable Server that has Rebooted
 - *The peers have run KUDOS prior to this KUDOS execution and have learned that they must from now on run KUDOS only in no-FS mode*
 - › KUDOS Execution Initiated with a Request Message, where the Client Executes KUDOS again after the first Execution
 - *A second KUDOS execution is started by the client immediately after a successful KUDOS key update*
 - › KUDOS Execution Initiated with a Request Message, where KUDOS Response #1 is Lost
 - *The server's first response is dropped by the network; thus the client retries and both sides end up deriving the same a CTX_NEW*
 - KUDOS Execution Completed using two Request Messages
 - *Both peers independently initiate KUDOS and exchange two request messages that ultimately result in the same CTX_NEW*



Successful KUDOS Execution Initiated with a Request Message, with Non-capable Server that has Rebooted



Successful KUDOS Execution Initiated with a Request Message, with Non-capable Server that has Rebooted

Summary and next steps

- › **KUDOS implementations**
 - Update the implementation in Java [1] to be aligned with the latest design
 - Update the implementation in C for Contiki-NG to be aligned with the latest design
- › **Procedural: Move content relevant to SCHC from draft-ietf-schc-8824-update**
 - Considering the timeline, that content about the extended OSCORE option fits better in this draft
- › **Comments and reviews are welcome!**

Thank you!


Comments/questions?

<https://github.com/core-wg/oscore-key-update>

Backup

KUDOS Message Types

- › Two types of KUDOS messages, distinguished by the 7th least significant bit 'z' in the 'x' byte
 - Indicates if only one or both nonces have been exchanged
- › z = 0: “divergent message”
 - › This message is protected with the temporary Security Context CTX_TEMP (was CTX_1)
 - › The sender peer is offering its own nonce in the message and waiting to receive the other peer’s nonce.
- › z = 1: “convergent message”
 - › This message is protected with the final Security Context CTX_NEW.
 - › The sender peer is offering its own nonce in the message, has received the other peer’s nonce, and is going to wait for key confirmation



Note: The z bit used to have another meaning

State Machine when in PENDING

* Upon receiving a divergent message:

- In case of successful decryption and verification of the message using a CTX_TEMP derived from CTX_OLD:
 1. Delete CTX_NEW.
 2. Delete the pair (X, nonce) associated with the Security Context CTX_IN that was used to generate the CTX_NEW deleted at the previous step.
 3. Abort the ongoing KUDOS execution.
 4. Move to **BUSY** and enter it consistently with the reception of a divergent message.
- Otherwise, in case of successful decryption and verification of the message using a CTX_TEMP derived from CTX_NEW:
 1. Delete the oldest CTX_TEMP.
 2. Delete the Security Context that was used as CTX_IN to generate the CTX_TEMP deleted at the previous step.
 3. CTX_NEW becomes the oldest Security Context. From this point on, that Security Context is what this KUDOS execution refers to as CTX_OLD.
 4. Abort the ongoing KUDOS execution.
 5. Move to **BUSY** and enter it consistently with the reception of a divergent message.

Example Execution

KUDOS status:
- CTX_OLD: --
- State: IDLE (0,0)

Client

Generate N1, X1

```
CTX_TEMP = updateCtx(  
    X1 | N1,  
    0x,  
    CTX_OLD )
```

Protect with CTX_TEMP

KUDOS status:
CTX_OLD: X1, N1
State: BUSY (1,0)

KUDOS status:
- CTX_OLD: --
- State: IDLE (0,0)

Server

Request #1


./well-known/kudos
OSCORE {
 ...
 Partial IV: 0
 ...
 d flag: 1
 x: X1 = b'00000111'
 nonce: N1
 ...
}
Encrypted Payload {
 ...
}

KUDOS status:
CTX_OLD: --
State: BUSY (0,1)

Generate N2, X2

```
CTX_NEW = updateCtx(  
    X2 | N2),  
    X1 | N1)|  
    CTX_OLD )
```

Example Execution



Response #1

KUDOS status: CTX_OLD: X2, N2
State: PENDING (1,1)

OSCORE {
...
Partial IV: 0
...
d flag: 1
x: X2 = b'01000111'
nonce: N2
...
}
Encrypted Payload {
...
}

Verify with CTX_NEW
/ key confirmation /
Pre-IDLE steps:
Delete CTX_TEMP
Delete CTX_OLD, X1, N1

KUDOS status:
CTX_NEW: -, -
State: IDLE (0,0)

The actual key update process ends here.
The two peers can use the new Security Context CTX_NEW.

Request #2

/temp

Verify with CTX_NEW
/ key confirmation

Pre-IDLE steps:
Delete CTX_TEMP
Delete CTX_OLD, X2,

KUDOS status:
CTX_NEW: -, -
State: IDLE (0,0)