

# CoAP Transport Indication

`ietf-core-transport-indication-09`

*Christian Amsüss, Martine Lenders*

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# Recap: Mission

This slide is getting shorter and shorter per iteration, I think that's good.

- Consistently address resources without per-transport schemes.

## Viewpoint for today


If the scheme/authority is insufficient on its own, what helps a client to find the server?

How can a client find a usable proxy?

# Parallel perspectives

Using web links

Using DNS



## Starting point: URI

“You can find the temperature to monitor at the /t of sensor1.”


```
<coap://sensor1.example.com/t>;rt=core.s
```

- 1 Where is that?
- 2 Which transport can I use?
- 3 Which security mechanism should I use?

# Where is that?

```
<coap://[2001:db8::1]>;rel=has-proxy;  
  anchor="coap://sensor1.example.com"  
<coap://[fda9:7eb0:78db::1]>;rel=has-proxy;  
  anchor="coap://sensor1.example.com"
```

```
sensor1.example.com IN AAAA 2001:db8::1  
sensor1.example.com IN AAAA fda9:7eb0:78db::1
```




# Which transports are available?

TCP version

```
<coap+tcp://[2001:db8::1]>;rel=has-proxy;  
  anchor="coap://sensor1.example.com"
```

```
_coap.sensor1.example.com IN SVCB 1 . ( alpn=COAP )  
  sensor1.example.com IN AAAA 2001:db8::1
```




# Which transports are available?

over a hypothetical CoAP-over-QUIC

```
<coap://636f7175.alpn.2001-db8--1.6.service.arpa>;  
  rel=has-proxy;anchor="coap://sensor1.example.com"
```

```
_coap.sensor1.example.com IN SVCB 1 . ( alpn=coqu )  
sensor1.example.com IN AAAA 2001:db8::1
```





# How do I know whom to talk to?

Only matters unless there is policy, such as “we use WebPKI”



```
<coap://hexhexhex.cred.service.arpa/t>  
<coap+tcp://[2001:db8::1]>;rel=has-proxy;  
    anchor="coap://hexhexhex.cred.service.arpa" a
```

```
_coap.sensor1.example.com IN SVCB 1 . \  
    ( alpn="COAP" cred="hexhexhex" ) b c  
sensor1.example.com IN AAAA 2001:db8::1
```

<sup>a</sup>Questionable name switch, but enables using established sessions.

<sup>b</sup>DNS gets away without a name switch, but needs DNSSEC to make this really count.

<sup>c</sup>What would this look like for an TLSA or SSHFP record? Unsure.



# Additional notes

- Address of the host? 3rd party proxy? Matters not.
- Non-IP transports are easy (e. g. CoAP-over-GATT, slipmux).  
Metadata from BLE or USB characteristics.
- Recent changes:
  - ▶ This now states that it is an SVCB mapping document.
  - ▶ coaptransport dissolved into alpn.
  - ▶ Modelling tweaks.

# Questions

to the WG, unless noted otherwise

- Is the modelling sufficient and suitable?
- What are shared properties, what are properties of a transport?  
In particular, what can we do for the name switch announcing a cryptographic ID?
- Does this fit with the SVCB architecture?  
Will ask Ben Schwartz for review, whose input from DoC shaped recent changes.
- How does DANE fit SVCB?  
Ask ... whom?
- Bikeshedding. (`.service.arpa?`)