

# Key Update for OSCORE (KUDOS)

*draft-ietf-core-oscore-key-update-12*

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# Recap of KUDOS (1/2)

## › Key Update for OSCORE (KUDOS)

- Renew the Master Secret and Master Salt; derive new Sender/Recipient keys
- No change to the ID Context or Sender/Recipient ID; can achieve Forward Secrecy
- Agnostic of the key establishment method originally used
- Loosely inspired by Appendix B.2 of OSCORE
- The peers update their current context CTX\_OLD, deriving a new context CTX\_NEW
- Redesigned in v-10 to use a more flexible and simpler approach
  - We now explicitly define a KUDOS state machine

# Recap of KUDOS (2/2)

## › Properties

- Can be initiated by either peer
- It is robust against a peer rebooting and loss of state, avoiding the reuse of AEAD (nonce, key)
- It typically completes in one round trip by exchanging two OSCORE-protected CoAP messages
  - The two peers achieve mutual key confirmation in a following exchange, which is protected with the newly established OSCORE Security Context
- Flexible in terms of message flow; any CoAP message can be a KUDOS message


## › KUDOS message types

- › Divergent message: The sender peer is offering its own nonce in the message and waiting to receive the other peer's nonce.
- Convergent message: The sender peer is offering its own nonce in the message, has received the other peer's nonce, and is going to wait for key confirmation


# Rekeying Procedure

## › Key Update for OSCORE (KUDOS)

- Message exchange to share two nonces N1 and N2
  - Decoupled from request/response and client/server concepts
- Nonces are placed in new fields in OSCORE CoAP option
- *UpdateCtx()* function for deriving new OSCORE Security Context using the two nonces, two 'x' bytes and CTX\_OLD
- Two modes
  - FS mode providing forward secrecy
  - No-FS mode for very constrained devices
- No change of OSCORE identifiers
- Expected to complete in 1 round trip



# KUDOS State Machine




# Changes for v-12

## › Added state machine as ASCII figure

- Now in Appendix B
- Aligned with what was shown in the previous slide
- The state machine is described in Section 4.3.3

## › Editorial improvements



# Changes for v-12

## › Multiple additional message flow examples as appendixes


- › KUDOS Execution Initiated with a Request Message, with Non-capable Server that has Rebooted
  - *The peers have run KUDOS prior to this KUDOS execution and have learned that they must from now on run KUDOS only in no-FS mode*
- › KUDOS Execution Initiated with a Request Message, where the Client Executes KUDOS again after the first Execution
  - *A second KUDOS execution is started by the client immediately after a successful KUDOS key update*
- › KUDOS Execution Initiated with a Request Message, where KUDOS Response #1 is Lost
  - *The server's first response is dropped by the network; thus the client retries and both sides end up deriving the same a CTX\_NEW*
- KUDOS Execution Completed using two Request Messages
  - *Both peers independently initiate KUDOS and exchange two request messages that ultimately result in the same CTX\_NEW*

KUDOS status:  
 - CTX\_OLD: -, -  
 - State: IDLE (0,0)


Client (initiator)

Server (responder)

KUDOS status:  
 - No CTX\_OLD due to reboot  
 - State: IDLE (0,0)





The actual key update process ends here.  
 The two peers can use the new Security Context CTX\_NEW.



Successful KUDOS Execution Initiated with a Request Message, with Non-capable Server that has Rebooted





Successful KUDOS Execution Initiated with a Request Message, with Non-capable Server that has Rebooted

# Summary and next steps

## › KUDOS implementations

- Update the implementation in Java [1] to be aligned with the latest design
- Update the implementation in C for Contiki-NG to be aligned with the latest design

## › Procedural: Move content relevant to SCHC from draft-ietf-schc-8824-update

- Considering the timeline, that content about the extended OSCORE option fits better in this draft

## › Comments and reviews are welcome!

Thank you!

Comments/questions?

<https://github.com/core-wg/oscore-key-update>

# Backup

# KUDOS Message Types

- Two types of KUDOS messages, distinguished by the 7th least significant bit 'z' in the 'x' byte

- Indicates if only one or both nonces have been exchanged

- z = 0: “divergent message”**

- This message is protected with the temporary Security Context CTX\_TEMP (was CTX\_1)
- The sender peer is offering its own nonce in the message and waiting to receive the other peer's nonce.

- z = 1: “convergent message”**

- This message is protected with the final Security Context CTX\_NEW.
- The sender peer is offering its own nonce in the message, has received the other peer's nonce, and is going to wait for key confirmation

```

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 <----- n bytes ----->
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | h | k |   n   | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | d | Partial IV (if any) |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

```

```

<- 1 byte -> <----- s bytes -----> <- 1 byte -> <--- m + 1 bytes --->
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| s (if any) | kid context (if any) | x (if any) | nonce (if any) |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

```

```

/                                     \
/   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7   \
| +---+---+---+---+---+ |
| | 0 | z | b | p |   m   | |
| +---+---+---+---+---+ |

```

Note: The z bit used to have another meaning

# State Machine when in PENDING

- \* Upon receiving a divergent message:
  - In case of successful decryption and verification of the message using a CTX\_TEMP derived from CTX\_OLD:
    1. Delete CTX\_NEW.
    2. Delete the pair (X, nonce) associated with the Security Context CTX\_IN that was used to generate the CTX\_NEW deleted at the previous step.
    3. Abort the ongoing KUDOS execution.
    4. Move to **BUSY** and enter it consistently with the reception of a divergent message.
  - Otherwise, in case of successful decryption and verification of the message using a CTX\_TEMP derived from CTX\_NEW:
    1. Delete the oldest CTX\_TEMP.
    2. Delete the Security Context that was used as CTX\_IN to generate the CTX\_TEMP deleted at the previous step.
    3. CTX\_NEW becomes the oldest Security Context. From this point on, that Security Context is what this KUDOS execution refers to as CTX\_OLD.
    4. Abort the ongoing KUDOS execution.
    5. Move to **BUSY** and enter it consistently with the reception of a divergent message.

# Example Execution

KUDOS status:  
- CTX\_OLD: -, -  
- State: IDLE (0,0)

Client

Generate N1, X1

CTX\_TEMP = updateCtx(  
  X1 | N1,  
  0x,  
  CTX\_OLD )

Protect with CTX\_TEMP

KUDOS status:  
CTX\_OLD: X1, N1  
State: BUSY (1,0)

Request #1

OSCORE {  
  ...  
  Partial IV: 0  
  ...  
  d flag: 1  
  x: X1 = b'00000111'  
  nonce: N1  
  ...  
}  
Encrypted Payload {  
  ...  
}

Server

KUDOS status:  
- CTX\_OLD: -, -  
- State: IDLE (0,0)

/.well-known/kudos

CTX\_TEMP = updateCtx(  
  0x,  
  X1 | N1,  
  CTX\_OLD )


Verify with CTX\_TEMP

KUDOS status:  
CTX\_OLD: -, -  
State: BUSY (0,1)

Generate N2, X2

CTX\_NEW = updateCtx(  
  X2 | N2),  
  X1 | N1)  
  CTX\_OLD )

# Example Execution



```
CTX_NEW = updateCtx(  
  X1 | N1,  
  X2 | N2 |  
  CTX_OLD )
```

Verify with CTX\_NEW

/ key confirmation /

Pre-IDLE steps:  
Delete CTX\_TEMP  
Delete CTX\_OLD, X1, N1

```
KUDOS status:  
CTX_NEW: -, -  
State: IDLE (0,0)
```

The actual key update process ends here.  
The two peers can use the new Security Context CTX\_NEW.

Protect with CTX\_NEW

