Patches for glibc to compile with GCC7

Signed-off-by: Alexey Neyman <stilor@att.net>

patches/glibc/2.12.1/920-fix-rpc_parse-format.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+commit 5874510faaf3cbd0bb112aaacab9f225002beed1
+Author: Joseph Myers <joseph@codesourcery.com>
+Date:   Tue Nov 8 23:44:51 2016 +0000
+
+    Fix rpcgen buffer overrun (bug 20790).
+
+    Building with GCC 7 produces an error building rpcgen:
+
+    rpc_parse.c: In function 'get_prog_declaration':
+    rpc_parse.c:543:25: error: may write a terminating nul past the end of the destination [-Werror=format-length=]
+         sprintf (name, "%s%d", ARGNAME, num); /* default name of argument */
+                         ~~~~^
+    rpc_parse.c:543:5: note: format output between 5 and 14 bytes into a destination of size 10
+         sprintf (name, "%s%d", ARGNAME, num); /* default name of argument */
+         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+    That buffer overrun is for the case where the .x file declares a
+    program with a million arguments.  The strcpy two lines above can
+    generate a buffer overrun much more simply for a long argument name.
+
+    The limit on length of line read by rpcgen (MAXLINESIZE == 1024)
+    provides a bound on the buffer size needed, so this patch just changes
+    the buffer size to MAXLINESIZE to avoid both possible buffer
+    overruns.  A testcase is added that rpcgen does not crash with a
+    500-character argument name, where it previously crashed.
+
+    It would not at all surprise me if there are many other ways of
+    crashing rpcgen with either valid or invalid input; fuzz testing would
+    likely find various such bugs, though I don't think they are that
+    important to fix (rpcgen is not that likely to be used with untrusted
+    .x files as input).  (As well as fuzz-findable bugs there are probably
+    also issues when various int variables get overflowed on very large
+    input.)  The test infrastructure for rpcgen-not-crashing tests would
+    need extending if tests are to be added for cases where rpcgen should
+    produce an error, as opposed to cases where it should succeed.
+
+    Tested for x86_64 and x86.
+
+            [BZ #20790]
+            * sunrpc/rpc_parse.c (get_prog_declaration): Increase buffer size
+            to MAXLINESIZE.
+            * sunrpc/bug20790.x: New file.
+            * sunrpc/Makefile [$(run-built-tests) = yes] (rpcgen-tests): New
+            variable.
+            [$(run-built-tests) = yes] (tests-special): Add $(rpcgen-tests).
+            [$(run-built-tests) = yes] ($(rpcgen-tests)): New rule.
+
+diff --git a/sunrpc/rpc_parse.c b/sunrpc/rpc_parse.c
+index 1a1df6d8c2..505a6554cf 100644
+--- a/sunrpc/rpc_parse.c
++++ b/sunrpc/rpc_parse.c
+@@ -521,7 +521,7 @@ static void
+ get_prog_declaration (declaration * dec, defkind dkind, int num /* arg number */ )
+ {
+   token tok;
+-  char name[10];		/* argument name */
++  char name[MAXLINESIZE];		/* argument name */
+
+   if (dkind == DEF_PROGRAM)
+     {

patches/glibc/2.12.1/940-nis-bogus-conditional.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+commit f88759ea9bd3c8d8fef28f123ba9767cb0e421a3
+Author: Joseph Myers <joseph@codesourcery.com>
+Date:   Wed Dec 21 23:44:01 2016 +0000
+
+    Fix nss_nisplus build with mainline GCC (bug 20978).
+
+    glibc build with current mainline GCC fails because
+    nis/nss_nisplus/nisplus-alias.c contains code
+
+      if (name != NULL)
+        {
+          *errnop = EINVAL;
+          return NSS_STATUS_UNAVAIL;
+        }
+
+      char buf[strlen (name) + 9 + tablename_len];
+
+    producing an error about strlen being called on a pointer that is
+    always NULL (and a subsequent use of that pointer with a %s format in
+    snprintf).
+
+    As Andreas noted, the bogus conditional comes from a 1997 change:
+
+    -  if (name == NULL || strlen(name) > 8)
+    -    return NSS_STATUS_NOTFOUND;
+    -  else
+    +  if (name != NULL || strlen(name) <= 8)
+
+    So the intention is clearly to return an error for NULL name.
+
+    This patch duly inverts the sense of the conditional.  It fixes the
+    build with GCC mainline, and passes usual glibc testsuite testing for
+    x86_64.  However, I have not tried any actual substantive nisplus
+    testing, do not have an environment for such testing, and do not know
+    whether it is possible that strlen (name) or tablename_len might be
+    large so that the VLA for buf is actually a security issue.  However,
+    if it is a security issue, there are plenty of other similar instances
+    in the nisplus code (that haven't been hidden by a bogus comparison
+    with NULL) - and nis_table.c:__create_ib_request uses strdupa on the
+    string passed to nis_list, so a local fix in the caller wouldn't
+    suffice anyway (see bug 20987).  (Calls to strdupa and other such
+    macros that use alloca must be considered equally questionable
+    regarding stack overflow issues as direct calls to alloca and VLA
+    declarations.)
+
+            [BZ #20978]
+            * nis/nss_nisplus/nisplus-alias.c (_nss_nisplus_getaliasbyname_r):
+            Compare name == NULL, not name != NULL.
+
+diff --git a/nis/nss_nisplus/nisplus-alias.c b/nis/nss_nisplus/nisplus-alias.c
+index 7f698b4e6d..cb5acce01d 100644
+--- a/nis/nss_nisplus/nisplus-alias.c
++++ b/nis/nss_nisplus/nisplus-alias.c
+@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ _nss_nisplus_getaliasbyname_r (const char *name, struct aliasent *alias,
+ 	return status;
+     }
+
+-  if (name != NULL)
++  if (name == NULL)
+     {
+       *errnop = EINVAL;
+       return NSS_STATUS_UNAVAIL;

patches/glibc/2.12.2/920-fix-rpc_parse-format.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+commit 5874510faaf3cbd0bb112aaacab9f225002beed1
+Author: Joseph Myers <joseph@codesourcery.com>
+Date:   Tue Nov 8 23:44:51 2016 +0000
+
+    Fix rpcgen buffer overrun (bug 20790).
+
+    Building with GCC 7 produces an error building rpcgen:
+
+    rpc_parse.c: In function 'get_prog_declaration':
+    rpc_parse.c:543:25: error: may write a terminating nul past the end of the destination [-Werror=format-length=]
+         sprintf (name, "%s%d", ARGNAME, num); /* default name of argument */
+                         ~~~~^
+    rpc_parse.c:543:5: note: format output between 5 and 14 bytes into a destination of size 10
+         sprintf (name, "%s%d", ARGNAME, num); /* default name of argument */
+         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+    That buffer overrun is for the case where the .x file declares a
+    program with a million arguments.  The strcpy two lines above can
+    generate a buffer overrun much more simply for a long argument name.
+
+    The limit on length of line read by rpcgen (MAXLINESIZE == 1024)
+    provides a bound on the buffer size needed, so this patch just changes
+    the buffer size to MAXLINESIZE to avoid both possible buffer
+    overruns.  A testcase is added that rpcgen does not crash with a
+    500-character argument name, where it previously crashed.
+
+    It would not at all surprise me if there are many other ways of
+    crashing rpcgen with either valid or invalid input; fuzz testing would
+    likely find various such bugs, though I don't think they are that
+    important to fix (rpcgen is not that likely to be used with untrusted
+    .x files as input).  (As well as fuzz-findable bugs there are probably
+    also issues when various int variables get overflowed on very large
+    input.)  The test infrastructure for rpcgen-not-crashing tests would
+    need extending if tests are to be added for cases where rpcgen should
+    produce an error, as opposed to cases where it should succeed.
+
+    Tested for x86_64 and x86.
+
+            [BZ #20790]
+            * sunrpc/rpc_parse.c (get_prog_declaration): Increase buffer size
+            to MAXLINESIZE.
+            * sunrpc/bug20790.x: New file.
+            * sunrpc/Makefile [$(run-built-tests) = yes] (rpcgen-tests): New
+            variable.
+            [$(run-built-tests) = yes] (tests-special): Add $(rpcgen-tests).
+            [$(run-built-tests) = yes] ($(rpcgen-tests)): New rule.
+
+diff --git a/sunrpc/rpc_parse.c b/sunrpc/rpc_parse.c
+index 1a1df6d8c2..505a6554cf 100644
+--- a/sunrpc/rpc_parse.c
++++ b/sunrpc/rpc_parse.c
+@@ -521,7 +521,7 @@ static void
+ get_prog_declaration (declaration * dec, defkind dkind, int num /* arg number */ )
+ {
+   token tok;
+-  char name[10];		/* argument name */
++  char name[MAXLINESIZE];		/* argument name */
+
+   if (dkind == DEF_PROGRAM)
+     {

patches/glibc/2.12.2/940-nis-bogus-conditional.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+commit f88759ea9bd3c8d8fef28f123ba9767cb0e421a3
+Author: Joseph Myers <joseph@codesourcery.com>
+Date:   Wed Dec 21 23:44:01 2016 +0000
+
+    Fix nss_nisplus build with mainline GCC (bug 20978).
+
+    glibc build with current mainline GCC fails because
+    nis/nss_nisplus/nisplus-alias.c contains code
+
+      if (name != NULL)
+        {
+          *errnop = EINVAL;
+          return NSS_STATUS_UNAVAIL;
+        }
+
+      char buf[strlen (name) + 9 + tablename_len];
+
+    producing an error about strlen being called on a pointer that is
+    always NULL (and a subsequent use of that pointer with a %s format in
+    snprintf).
+
+    As Andreas noted, the bogus conditional comes from a 1997 change:
+
+    -  if (name == NULL || strlen(name) > 8)
+    -    return NSS_STATUS_NOTFOUND;
+    -  else
+    +  if (name != NULL || strlen(name) <= 8)
+
+    So the intention is clearly to return an error for NULL name.
+
+    This patch duly inverts the sense of the conditional.  It fixes the
+    build with GCC mainline, and passes usual glibc testsuite testing for
+    x86_64.  However, I have not tried any actual substantive nisplus
+    testing, do not have an environment for such testing, and do not know
+    whether it is possible that strlen (name) or tablename_len might be
+    large so that the VLA for buf is actually a security issue.  However,
+    if it is a security issue, there are plenty of other similar instances
+    in the nisplus code (that haven't been hidden by a bogus comparison
+    with NULL) - and nis_table.c:__create_ib_request uses strdupa on the
+    string passed to nis_list, so a local fix in the caller wouldn't
+    suffice anyway (see bug 20987).  (Calls to strdupa and other such
+    macros that use alloca must be considered equally questionable
+    regarding stack overflow issues as direct calls to alloca and VLA
+    declarations.)
+
+            [BZ #20978]
+            * nis/nss_nisplus/nisplus-alias.c (_nss_nisplus_getaliasbyname_r):
+            Compare name == NULL, not name != NULL.
+
+diff --git a/nis/nss_nisplus/nisplus-alias.c b/nis/nss_nisplus/nisplus-alias.c
+index 7f698b4e6d..cb5acce01d 100644
+--- a/nis/nss_nisplus/nisplus-alias.c
++++ b/nis/nss_nisplus/nisplus-alias.c
+@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ _nss_nisplus_getaliasbyname_r (const char *name, struct aliasent *alias,
+ 	return status;
+     }
+
+-  if (name != NULL)
++  if (name == NULL)
+     {
+       *errnop = EINVAL;
+       return NSS_STATUS_UNAVAIL;

patches/glibc/2.13/920-fix-rpc_parse-format.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+commit 5874510faaf3cbd0bb112aaacab9f225002beed1
+Author: Joseph Myers <joseph@codesourcery.com>
+Date:   Tue Nov 8 23:44:51 2016 +0000
+
+    Fix rpcgen buffer overrun (bug 20790).
+
+    Building with GCC 7 produces an error building rpcgen:
+
+    rpc_parse.c: In function 'get_prog_declaration':
+    rpc_parse.c:543:25: error: may write a terminating nul past the end of the destination [-Werror=format-length=]
+         sprintf (name, "%s%d", ARGNAME, num); /* default name of argument */
+                         ~~~~^
+    rpc_parse.c:543:5: note: format output between 5 and 14 bytes into a destination of size 10
+         sprintf (name, "%s%d", ARGNAME, num); /* default name of argument */
+         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+    That buffer overrun is for the case where the .x file declares a
+    program with a million arguments.  The strcpy two lines above can
+    generate a buffer overrun much more simply for a long argument name.
+
+    The limit on length of line read by rpcgen (MAXLINESIZE == 1024)
+    provides a bound on the buffer size needed, so this patch just changes
+    the buffer size to MAXLINESIZE to avoid both possible buffer
+    overruns.  A testcase is added that rpcgen does not crash with a
+    500-character argument name, where it previously crashed.
+
+    It would not at all surprise me if there are many other ways of
+    crashing rpcgen with either valid or invalid input; fuzz testing would
+    likely find various such bugs, though I don't think they are that
+    important to fix (rpcgen is not that likely to be used with untrusted
+    .x files as input).  (As well as fuzz-findable bugs there are probably
+    also issues when various int variables get overflowed on very large
+    input.)  The test infrastructure for rpcgen-not-crashing tests would
+    need extending if tests are to be added for cases where rpcgen should
+    produce an error, as opposed to cases where it should succeed.
+
+    Tested for x86_64 and x86.
+
+            [BZ #20790]
+            * sunrpc/rpc_parse.c (get_prog_declaration): Increase buffer size
+            to MAXLINESIZE.
+            * sunrpc/bug20790.x: New file.
+            * sunrpc/Makefile [$(run-built-tests) = yes] (rpcgen-tests): New
+            variable.
+            [$(run-built-tests) = yes] (tests-special): Add $(rpcgen-tests).
+            [$(run-built-tests) = yes] ($(rpcgen-tests)): New rule.
+
+diff --git a/sunrpc/rpc_parse.c b/sunrpc/rpc_parse.c
+index 1a1df6d8c2..505a6554cf 100644
+--- a/sunrpc/rpc_parse.c
++++ b/sunrpc/rpc_parse.c
+@@ -521,7 +521,7 @@ static void
+ get_prog_declaration (declaration * dec, defkind dkind, int num /* arg number */ )
+ {
+   token tok;
+-  char name[10];		/* argument name */
++  char name[MAXLINESIZE];		/* argument name */
+
+   if (dkind == DEF_PROGRAM)
+     {

patches/glibc/2.13/940-nis-bogus-conditional.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+commit f88759ea9bd3c8d8fef28f123ba9767cb0e421a3
+Author: Joseph Myers <joseph@codesourcery.com>
+Date:   Wed Dec 21 23:44:01 2016 +0000
+
+    Fix nss_nisplus build with mainline GCC (bug 20978).
+
+    glibc build with current mainline GCC fails because
+    nis/nss_nisplus/nisplus-alias.c contains code
+
+      if (name != NULL)
+        {
+          *errnop = EINVAL;
+          return NSS_STATUS_UNAVAIL;
+        }
+
+      char buf[strlen (name) + 9 + tablename_len];
+
+    producing an error about strlen being called on a pointer that is
+    always NULL (and a subsequent use of that pointer with a %s format in
+    snprintf).
+
+    As Andreas noted, the bogus conditional comes from a 1997 change:
+
+    -  if (name == NULL || strlen(name) > 8)
+    -    return NSS_STATUS_NOTFOUND;
+    -  else
+    +  if (name != NULL || strlen(name) <= 8)
+
+    So the intention is clearly to return an error for NULL name.
+
+    This patch duly inverts the sense of the conditional.  It fixes the
+    build with GCC mainline, and passes usual glibc testsuite testing for
+    x86_64.  However, I have not tried any actual substantive nisplus
+    testing, do not have an environment for such testing, and do not know
+    whether it is possible that strlen (name) or tablename_len might be
+    large so that the VLA for buf is actually a security issue.  However,
+    if it is a security issue, there are plenty of other similar instances
+    in the nisplus code (that haven't been hidden by a bogus comparison
+    with NULL) - and nis_table.c:__create_ib_request uses strdupa on the
+    string passed to nis_list, so a local fix in the caller wouldn't
+    suffice anyway (see bug 20987).  (Calls to strdupa and other such
+    macros that use alloca must be considered equally questionable
+    regarding stack overflow issues as direct calls to alloca and VLA
+    declarations.)
+
+            [BZ #20978]
+            * nis/nss_nisplus/nisplus-alias.c (_nss_nisplus_getaliasbyname_r):
+            Compare name == NULL, not name != NULL.
+
+diff --git a/nis/nss_nisplus/nisplus-alias.c b/nis/nss_nisplus/nisplus-alias.c
+index 7f698b4e6d..cb5acce01d 100644
+--- a/nis/nss_nisplus/nisplus-alias.c
++++ b/nis/nss_nisplus/nisplus-alias.c
+@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ _nss_nisplus_getaliasbyname_r (const char *name, struct aliasent *alias,
+ 	return status;
+     }
+
+-  if (name != NULL)
++  if (name == NULL)
+     {
+       *errnop = EINVAL;
+       return NSS_STATUS_UNAVAIL;