misc: fix typos, quoting and spelling

Fix wording of comments, and misquotings where `' is markdown parsed
where it shouldn't be, and remove a misspelled preprocessor comment
which really isn't needed (and removing it makes it match surrounding
code better).

Closes: #13538
Reviewed-by: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>

docs/libcurl/curl_getdate.md

@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ UTC. Supported formats include: -1200, MST, +0100.
 ## day of the week items
 
 Specifies a day of the week. Days of the week may be spelled out in full
-(using English): `Sunday', `Monday', etc or they may be abbreviated to their
+(using English): 'Sunday', 'Monday', etc or they may be abbreviated to their
 first three letters. This is usually not info that adds anything.
 
 ## pure numbers

docs/libcurl/curl_multi_wait.md

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ curl_multi_wait(3) polls all file descriptors used by the curl easy
 handles contained in the given multi handle set. It blocks until activity is
 detected on at least one of the handles or *timeout_ms* has passed.
 Alternatively, if the multi handle has a pending internal timeout that has a
-shorter expiry time than *timeout_ms*, that shorter time is be used
+shorter expiry time than *timeout_ms*, that shorter time is being used
 instead to make sure timeout accuracy is reasonably kept.
 
 The calling application may pass additional *curl_waitfd* structures which

docs/libcurl/libcurl-security.md

@@ -380,10 +380,11 @@ CURLOPT_TIMEOUT(3) and/or CURLOPT_LOW_SPEED_LIMIT(3) options can
 be used to mitigate against this.
 
 A malicious server could cause libcurl to download an infinite amount of data,
-potentially causing all of memory or disk to be filled. Setting the
-CURLOPT_MAXFILESIZE_LARGE(3) option is not sufficient to guard against
-this. Instead, applications should monitor the amount of data received within
-the write or progress callback and abort once the limit is reached.
+potentially causing system resources to be exhausted resulting in a system or
+application crash. Setting the CURLOPT_MAXFILESIZE_LARGE(3) option is not
+sufficient to guard against this. Instead, applications should monitor the
+amount of data received within the write or progress callback and abort once
+the limit is reached.
 
 A malicious HTTP server could cause an infinite redirection loop, causing a
 denial-of-service. This can be mitigated by using the

lib/headers.c

@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ static CURLcode unfold_value(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *value,
   newhs = Curl_saferealloc(hs, sizeof(*hs) + vlen + oalloc + 1);
   if(!newhs)
     return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
-  /* ->name' and ->value point into ->buffer (to keep the header allocation
+  /* ->name and ->value point into ->buffer (to keep the header allocation
      in a single memory block), which now potentially have moved. Adjust
      them. */
   newhs->name = newhs->buffer;

lib/setopt.c

@@ -2324,7 +2324,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param)
         Curl_hsts_cleanup(&data->hsts);
         data->hsts = data->share->hsts;
       }
-#endif   /* CURL_DISABLE_HTTP */
+#endif
 #ifdef USE_SSL
       if(data->share->sslsession) {
         data->set.general_ssl.max_ssl_sessions = data->share->max_ssl_sessions;