

# Audit Report **Bitgold**

December 2023

Network ETH

Address 0x98d7716cb93753fcb30f173dba48da8407063a4f

Audited by © cyberscope



## **Analysis**

CriticalMediumMinor / InformativePass

Severity	Code	Description	Status
•	ST	Stops Transactions	Passed
•	OTUT	Transfers User's Tokens	Passed
•	ELFM	Exceeds Fees Limit	Passed
•	MT	Mints Tokens	Passed
•	ВТ	Burns Tokens	Passed
•	ВС	Blacklists Addresses	Passed



## **Diagnostics**

CriticalMediumMinor / Informative

Severity	Code	Description	Status
•	EPC	Existing Pair Creation	Unresolved
•	L04	Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions	Unresolved
•	L22	Potential Locked Ether	Unresolved



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## **Review**

Explorer	https://etherscan.io/address/0x98d7716cb93753fcb30f173dba4 8da8407063a4f
Symbol	BTG
Decimals	18
Total Supply	21,000,000

### **Audit Updates**

Initial Audit	15 Dec 2023
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#### **Source Files**

Filename	SHA256
Token.sol	d75914ff69e1390f2815c8efbbe33a8d52e50d2396540ff1d453acdba981 34eb
Ownable2Step.sol	3e3bdb084bc14ade54e8259e710287956a7dbf2b2b4ad1e4cd8899d22 93c7241
Ownable.sol	33422e7771fefe5fbfe8934837515097119d82a50eda0e49b38e4d6a64a 1c25d
Initializable.sol	b05c26d897c4178cbdb35ad113527e463e1bdeae5764869318a54f93c8 b98a94
IUniswapV2Router02.sol	a2900701961cb0b6152fc073856b972564f7c798797a4a044e83d2ab8f0 e8d38
IUniswapV2Router01.sol	0439ffe0fd4a5e1f4e22d71ddbda76d63d61679947d158cba4ee0a1da60 cf663



IUniswapV2Pair.sol	29c75e69ce173ff8b498584700fef76bc81498c1d98120e2877a1439f0c3 1b5a
IUniswapV2Factory.sol	51d056199e3f5e41cb1a9f11ce581aa3e190cc982db5771ffeef8d8d1f96 2a0d
IERC20Metadata.sol	b10e2f8bcc3ed53a5d9a82a29b1ad3209225331bb4de4a0459862a762 cf83a1a
IERC20.sol	7ebde70853ccafcf1876900dad458f46eb9444d591d39bfc58e952e2582 f5587
ERC20Burnable.sol	480b22ce348050fdb85a693e38ed6b4767a94e4776fc6806d6808a0ec1 71177e
ERC20.sol	f70c6ae5f2dda91a37e17cfcbec390cc59515ed0d34e316f036f5431b5c0 a3f2
Context.sol	1458c260d010a08e4c20a4a517882259a23a4baa0b5bd9add9fb6d6a1 549814a



## **Findings Breakdown**



Severity		Unresolved	Acknowledged	Resolved	Other
•	Critical	0	0	0	0
•	Medium	0	0	0	0
	Minor / Informative	3	0	0	0



#### **EPC - Existing Pair Creation**

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	Token.sol#L61
Status	Unresolved

#### Description

The contract contains a function that does not handle the scenario where a pair already exists prior to its execution. If a pair for the given tokens has already been established, the <code>createPair</code> function will revert and not proceed with the creation of a new pair. As a result, if a pair has been previously set up before the function is invoked, the contract will encounter an error when trying to call the <code>createPair</code> function. This will prevent the successful execution, essentially leading the function to revert.

```
function _updateRouterV2(address router) private {
    routerV2 = IUniswapV2Router02(router);
    pairV2 =

IUniswapV2Factory(routerV2.factory()).createPair(address(this),
    routerV2.WETH());

_setAMMPair(pairV2, true);

emit RouterV2Updated(router);
}
```

#### Recommendation

To mitigate the risks associated with attempting to create an already existing pair, it is recommended to implement a check to determine whether the pair already exists before proceeding to create a new pair. This can be achieved by utilizing the `getPair` function of the Factory contract to retrieve the address of the pair contract for the specified tokens. If the address returned by the `getPair` function is the zero address, it indicates that the pair does not exist, and the contract can proceed with the `createPair` function. Conversely, if a non-zero address is returned, it indicates that the pair already exists, and the `createPair` function will revert.



#### **L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions**

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	Token.sol#L32,49
Status	Unresolved

#### Description

The Solidity style guide is a set of guidelines for writing clean and consistent Solidity code. Adhering to a style guide can help improve the readability and maintainability of the Solidity code, making it easier for others to understand and work with.

The followings are a few key points from the Solidity style guide:

- 1. Use camelCase for function and variable names, with the first letter in lowercase (e.g., myVariable, updateCounter).
- 2. Use PascalCase for contract, struct, and enum names, with the first letter in uppercase (e.g., MyContract, UserStruct, ErrorEnum).
- 3. Use uppercase for constant variables and enums (e.g., MAX\_VALUE, ERROR\_CODE).
- 4. Use indentation to improve readability and structure.
- 5. Use spaces between operators and after commas.
- 6. Use comments to explain the purpose and behavior of the code.
- 7. Keep lines short (around 120 characters) to improve readability.

```
mapping (address => bool) public AMMPairs;
function initialize(address _router) initializer external {
```

#### Recommendation

By following the Solidity naming convention guidelines, the codebase increased the readability, maintainability, and makes it easier to work with.

Find more information on the Solidity documentation

https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.17/style-guide.html#naming-convention.



#### **L22 - Potential Locked Ether**

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	Token.sol#L53
Status	Unresolved

#### Description

The contract contains Ether that has been placed into a Solidity contract and is unable to be transferred. Thus, it is impossible to access the locked Ether. This may produce a financial loss for the users that have called the payable method.

```
receive() external payable {}
```

#### Recommendation


The team is advised to either remove the payable method or add a withdraw functionality. it is important to carefully consider the risks and potential issues associated with locked Ether.

# **Functions Analysis**

Contract	Туре	Bases		
	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
Bitgold	Implementation	ERC20, ERC20Burna ble, Ownable2St ep, Initializable		
		Public	✓	ERC20
	initialize	External	✓	initializer
		External	Payable	-
	decimals	Public		-
	_updateRouterV2	Private	✓	
	setAMMPair	External	✓	onlyOwner
	_setAMMPair	Private	✓	
	_beforeTokenTransfer	Internal	✓	
	_afterTokenTransfer	Internal	✓	



## **Inheritance Graph**





# Flow Graph





## **Summary**

Bitgold contract implements a token mechanism. This audit investigates security issues, business logic concerns and potential improvements. Bitgold is an interesting project that has a friendly and growing community. The Smart Contract analysis reported no compiler error or critical issues. The contract Owner can access some admin functions that can not be used in a malicious way to disturb the users' transactions.



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Cyberscope is a blockchain cybersecurity company that was founded with the vision to make web3.0 a safer place for investors and developers. Since its launch, it has worked with thousands of projects and is estimated to have secured tens of millions of investors' funds.

Cyberscope is one of the leading smart contract audit firms in the crypto space and has built a high-profile network of clients and partners.



The Cyberscope team

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