



Cyberscope

A **TAC Security** Company

Audit Report **XNAP Token**

October 2025

Contract XNAPToken

SHA256 d10dd9fddf0f36fa0095caf64ded09dffb8924ff5f92675af15dd360bd7acd18

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Analysis

● Critical ● Medium ● Minor / Informative ● Pass

Severity	Code	Description	Status
●	ST	Stops Transactions	Unresolved
●	OTUT	Transfers User's Tokens	Passed
●	ELFM	Exceeds Fees Limit	Passed
●	MT	Mints Tokens	Unresolved
●	BT	Burns Tokens	Unresolved
●	BC	Blacklists Addresses	Passed

Diagnostics

● Critical ● Medium ● Minor / Informative

Severity	Code	Description	Status
●	PAF	Potential Approval Frontrun	Unresolved
●	CCR	Contract Centralization Risk	Unresolved
●	L19	Stable Compiler Version	Unresolved

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Risk Classification

The criticality of findings in Cyberscope's smart contract audits is determined by evaluating multiple variables. The two primary variables are:

1. **Likelihood of Exploitation:** This considers how easily an attack can be executed, including the economic feasibility for an attacker.
2. **Impact of Exploitation:** This assesses the potential consequences of an attack, particularly in terms of the loss of funds or disruption to the contract's functionality.

Based on these variables, findings are categorized into the following severity levels:

1. **Critical:** Indicates a vulnerability that is both highly likely to be exploited and can result in significant fund loss or severe disruption. Immediate action is required to address these issues.
2. **Medium:** Refers to vulnerabilities that are either less likely to be exploited or would have a moderate impact if exploited. These issues should be addressed in due course to ensure overall contract security.
3. **Minor:** Involves vulnerabilities that are unlikely to be exploited and would have a minor impact. These findings should still be considered for resolution to maintain best practices in security.
4. **Informative:** Points out potential improvements or informational notes that do not pose an immediate risk. Addressing these can enhance the overall quality and robustness of the contract.

Severity	Likelihood / Impact of Exploitation
● Critical	Highly Likely / High Impact
● Medium	Less Likely / High Impact or Highly Likely/ Lower Impact
● Minor / Informative	Unlikely / Low to no Impact

Review

Badge Eligibility

Must Fix Criticals

Audit Updates

Initial Audit

07 Oct 2025


Source Files

Filename

SHA256

Xnap_Smart_Contract.pdfd10dd9fddf0f36fa0095caf64ded09dff8924ff5f92675af15dd360
bd7acd18

Findings Breakdown



- Critical 3
- Medium 0
- Minor / Informative 3

Severity	Unresolved	Acknowledged	Resolved	Other
● Critical	3	0	0	0
● Medium	0	0	0	0
● Minor / Informative	3	0	0	0

ST - Stops Transactions

Criticality	Critical
Location	xnaptoken.sol#L59,72,101,109
Status	Unresolved

Description

The contract owner has the authority to stop the sales for all users excluding the owner. The owner may take advantage of it by using the `pause` functionality. As a result, the contract may operate as a honeypot.

Shell

```
modifier notPaused() {
    require(!paused, "Transfers are paused");
}

function pause() external onlyOwner {
    paused = true;
    emit Paused(msg.sender);
}

function transfer(address to, uint256 value) external
notPaused returns (bool)
function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256
value) external notPaused returns (bool)
```

Recommendation

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions.

Temporary Solutions:

These measurements do not decrease the severity of the finding

- Introduce a time-locker mechanism with a reasonable delay.
- Introduce a multi-signature wallet so that many addresses will confirm the action.
- Introduce a governance model where users will vote about the actions.

Permanent Solution:

- Renouncing the ownership, which will eliminate the threats but it is non-reversible.

MT - Mints Tokens

Criticality	Critical
Location	xnaptoken.sol#L80
Status	Unresolved

Description

The contract owner has the authority to mint tokens. The owner may take advantage of it by calling the `mint` function. As a result, the contract tokens will be highly inflated.

```
Shell
function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external
onlyOwner {
require(to != address(0), "Zero address");
_totalSupply += amount;
_balances[to] += amount;
emit Mint(to, amount);
emit Transfer(address(0), to, amount);
}
```

Recommendation

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions.

Temporary Solutions:

These measurements do not decrease the severity of the finding

- Introduce a time-locker mechanism with a reasonable delay.
- Introduce a multi-signature wallet so that many addresses will confirm the action.
- Introduce a governance model where users will vote about the actions.

Permanent Solution:

- Renouncing the ownership, which will eliminate the threats but it is non-reversible.

BT - Burns Tokens

Criticality	Critical
Location	xnaptoken.sol#L87
Status	Unresolved

Description

The contract owner has the authority to burn tokens from a specific address. The owner may take advantage of it by calling the `burn` function. As a result, the targeted address will lose the corresponding tokens.

Shell

```
function burn(address from, uint256 amount) external
onlyOwner {
require(from != address(0), "Zero address");
uint256 bal = _balances[from];
require(bal >= amount, "Insufficient balance");
_balances[from] = bal - amount;
_totalSupply -= amount;
emit Burn(from, amount);
emit Transfer(from, address(0), amount);
}
```

Recommendation

The team should carefully manage the private keys of the owner's account. We strongly recommend a powerful security mechanism that will prevent a single user from accessing the contract admin functions.

Temporary Solutions:

These measurements do not decrease the severity of the finding

- Introduce a time-locker mechanism with a reasonable delay.
- Introduce a multi-signature wallet so that many addresses will confirm the action.
- Introduce a governance model where users will vote about the actions.

Permanent Solution:

- Renouncing the ownership, which will eliminate the threats but it is non-reversible.

PAF - Potential Approval Frontrun

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	xnaptoken.sol#L105
Status	Unresolved

Description

The contract implements only the standard `approve()` function to set allowances and omits the optional `increaseAllowance()` and `decreaseAllowance()` helpers. This exposes users to the ERC20 allowance race condition , where a spender may front-run an allowance change and spend both the old and new allowance amounts.

Shell

```
function approve(address spender, uint256 value) external
notPaused returns (bool) {
    _approve(msg.sender, spender, value);
    return true;
}
```

Recommendation

The team is recommended to implement the `increaseAllowance()` and `decreaseAllowance()` functions to safely adjust allowance values and follow ERC-20 best practices.

CCR - Contract Centralization Risk

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	xnaptoken.sol#L63,68,72,76,80,87
Status	Unresolved

Description

The contract's functionality and behavior are heavily dependent on external parameters or configurations. While external configuration can offer flexibility, it also poses several centralization risks that warrant attention. Centralization risks arising from the dependence on external configuration include Single Point of Control, Vulnerability to Attacks, Operational Delays, Trust Dependencies, and Decentralization Erosion.

Shell

```
function transferOwnership(address newOwner)
external onlyOwner
function renounceOwnership() external onlyOwner

function pause() external onlyOwner
function unpause() external onlyOwner {
function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external
onlyOwner
function burn(address from, uint256 amount)
external onlyOwner
```

Recommendation

To address this finding and mitigate centralization risks, it is recommended to evaluate the feasibility of migrating critical configurations and functionality into the contract's codebase itself. This approach would reduce external dependencies and enhance the contract's self-sufficiency. It is essential to carefully weigh the trade-offs between external configuration flexibility and the risks associated with centralization.

L19 - Stable Compiler Version

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	xnaptoken.sol#L3
Status	Unresolved

Description

The `^` symbol indicates that any version of Solidity that is compatible with the specified version (i.e., any version that is a higher minor or patch version) can be used to compile the contract. The version lock is a mechanism that allows the author to specify a minimum version of the Solidity compiler that must be used to compile the contract code. This is useful because it ensures that the contract will be compiled using a version of the compiler that is known to be compatible with the code.

```
Shell
pragma solidity ^0.8.24;
```

Recommendation

The team is advised to lock the pragma to ensure the stability of the codebase. The locked pragma version ensures that the contract will not be deployed with an unexpected version. An unexpected version may produce vulnerabilities and undiscovered bugs. The compiler should be configured to the lowest version that provides all the required functionality for the codebase. As a result, the project will be compiled in a well-tested LTS (Long Term Support) environment.


Functions Analysis

Contract	Type	Bases		
		Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
XNAPToken	Implementation			
		Public	✓	-
	transferOwnership	External	✓	onlyOwner
	renounceOwnership	External	✓	onlyOwner
	pause	External	✓	onlyOwner
	unpause	External	✓	onlyOwner
	mint	External	✓	onlyOwner
	burn	External	✓	onlyOwner
	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	External		-
	allowance	External		-
	transfer	External	✓	notPaused
	approve	External	✓	notPaused
	transferFrom	External	✓	notPaused
	_transfer	Internal	✓	
	_approve	Internal	✓	

Inheritance Graph



Flow Graph



Summary

XNAP contract implements a token mechanism. This audit investigates security issues, business logic concerns and potential improvements. There are some functions that can be abused by the owner like stop transactions and mint tokens. If the contract owner abuses the mint functionality, then the contract will be highly inflated. A multi-wallet signing pattern will provide security against potential hacks. Temporarily locking the contract or renouncing ownership will eliminate all the contract threats.

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About Cyberscope

Cyberscope is a TAC blockchain cybersecurity company that was founded with the vision to make web3.0 a safer place for investors and developers. Since its launch, it has worked with thousands of projects and is estimated to have secured tens of millions of investors' funds.

Cyberscope is one of the leading smart contract audit firms in the crypto space and has built a high-profile network of clients and partners.



A **TAC Security** Company

The Cyberscope team

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