Cyberscope

# Audit Report

# Peanutz

April 2024

| | |
|---|---|
| Network | BSC |
| Address | 0xE625d1dEb48C398Ca85876e5a9F083332474dd82 |
| Audited by | © cyberscope |

# Analysis

🔴 Critical 🟠 Medium ⚪ Minor / Informative ● Pass

| Severity | Code | Description | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| ● | ST | Stops Transactions | Passed |
| ● | OTUT | Transfers User's Tokens | Passed |
| ● | ELFM | Exceeds Fees Limit | Passed |
| ● | MT | Mints Tokens | Passed |
| ● | BT | Burns Tokens | Passed |
| ● | BC | Blacklists Addresses | Passed |

# Diagnostics

🔴 Critical 🟠 Medium ● Minor / Informative

| Severity | Code | Description | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| ● | IDI | Immutable Declaration Improvement | Unresolved |
| ● | MU | Modifiers Usage | Unresolved |
| ● | PLPI | Potential Liquidity Provision Inadequacy | Unresolved |
| ● | PVC | Price Volatility Concern | Unresolved |
| ● | RSW | Redundant Storage Writes | Unresolved |
| ● | L13 | Divide before Multiply Operation | Unresolved |
| ● | L16 | Validate Variable Setters | Unresolved |
| ● | L19 | Stable Compiler Version | Unresolved |
| ● | L20 | Succeeded Transfer Check | Unresolved |

# Table of Contents

# Review

| | |
|---|---|
| **Contract Name** | PNUTZToken |
| **Compiler Version** | v0.8.19+commit.7dd6d404 |
| **Optimization** | 200 runs |
| **Explorer** | https://bscscan.com/address/0xe625d1deb48c398ca85876e5a9f083332474dd82 |
| **Address** | 0xe625d1deb48c398ca85876e5a9f083332474dd82 |
| **Network** | BSC |
| **Symbol** | PNUTZ |
| **Decimals** | 9 |
| **Total Supply** | 500,000,000 |
| **Badge Eligibility** | Yes |

## Audit Updates

| | |
|---|---|
| **Initial Audit** | 03 Apr 2024 |

## Source Files

| **Filename** | SHA256 |
|---|---|
| **PNUTZToken.sol** | 0873660d965dc6ad14bdf3e6f111f7980477d66eedf58b3c2e2c1c5014e8547b |
| **libraries/TaxableToken.sol** | 5efb9bb57cf557d638c790e17c58d03e744d4e2c0bfd568aa8f0821ff5f47df8 |

| | |
|---|---|
| **libraries/TaxDistributor.sol** | 662235c81b331dbf2270aa8e94ab2c416cdcaf7a4d42c836f5a57821149932f4 |
| **libraries/Recoverable.sol** | 10570b0238a33933a903632a7ed989eba9360179edb520c347e1c11a7c1d27e4 |
| **libraries/BEP20Burnable.sol** | 96517b0a60b810d3db2646aa3d6d44b501e323b57e30479106675494c50d12a6 |
| **libraries/BEP20Base.sol** | 2c4f94b4ce861b0b1207040117a7314a5863879b831cc3c5a18b7c1abf1b549f |
| **libraries/BEP20.sol** | 44b0815befb3829ed77173890ded47d08ba9eb586bf86a8add1f3a863cfeb5fb |
| **libraries/AntiWhaleToken.sol** | e072dfb1cc20e261c5c53e45f6134330774cd58c6924e1a1438aaf1ae3dc2750 |
| **interfaces/IBEP20.sol** | f313a08143bc9ce32d8966602ba46fcf1a68668372dd3928aeab8341ff2eeb87 |
| **@uniswap/v2-periphery/contracts/interfaces/IUniswapV2Router02.sol** | a2900701961cb0b6152fc073856b972564f7c798797a4a044e83d2ab8f0e8d38 |
| **@uniswap/v2-periphery/contracts/interfaces/IUniswapV2Router01.sol** | 0439ffe0fd4a5e1f4e22d71ddbda76d63d61679947d158cba4ee0a1da60cf663 |
| **@uniswap/v2-core/contracts/interfaces/IUniswapV2Factory.sol** | 51d056199e3f5e41cb1a9f11ce581aa3e190cc982db5771ffeef8d8d1f962a0d |
| **@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context.sol** | 1458c260d010a08e4c20a4a517882259a23a4baa0b5bd9add9fb6d6a1549814a |
| **@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/structs/EnumerableSet.sol** | d8508ddcfb255875b542cef61ad9bcc9a2d74453bf92c914ee6a546b876ba42b |
| **@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol** | 94f23e4af51a18c2269b355b8c7cf4db8003d075c9c541019eb8dcf4122864d5 |
| **@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol** | bce14c3fd3b1a668529e375f6b70ffdf9cef8c4e410ae99608be5964d98fa701 |

| | |
|---|---|
| **@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol** | af5c8a77965cc82c33b7ff844deb9826166689e55dc037a7f2f790d057811990 |
| **@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol** | 9353af89436556f7ba8abb3f37a6677249aa4df6024fbfaa94f79ab2f44f3231 |

# Findings Breakdown



| Severity | Unresolved | Acknowledged | Resolved | Other |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ● Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ● Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ● Minor / Informative | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

# IDI - Immutable Declaration Improvement

| | |
|---|---|
| **Criticality** | Minor / Informative |
| **Location** | libraries/TaxableToken.sol#L59,60,62 |
| **Status** | Unresolved |

## Description

The contract declares state variables that their value is initialized once in the constructor and are not modified afterwards. The `immutable` is a special declaration for this kind of state variables that saves gas when it is defined.

```
numTokensToSwap
autoProcessFees
liquidityOwner
```

## Recommendation

By declaring a variable as immutable, the Solidity compiler is able to make certain optimizations. This can reduce the amount of storage and computation required by the contract, and make it more gas-efficient.

# MU - Modifiers Usage

| | |
|---|---|
| **Criticality** | Minor / Informative |
| **Location** | libraries/TaxableToken.sol#L47,56 |
| **Status** | Unresolved |

## Description

The contract is using repetitive statements on some methods to validate some preconditions. In Solidity, the form of preconditions is usually represented by the modifiers. Modifiers allow you to define a piece of code that can be reused across multiple functions within a contract. This can be particularly useful when you have several functions that require the same checks to be performed before executing the logic within the function.

```
require(!_collectors.contains(account), "Already fee
collector");
require(_collectors.contains(account), "Not fee collector");
```

## Recommendation

The team is advised to use modifiers since it is a useful tool for reducing code duplication and improving the readability of smart contracts. By using modifiers to perform these checks, it reduces the amount of code that is needed to write, which can make the smart contract more efficient and easier to maintain.

# PLPI - Potential Liquidity Provision Inadequacy

| | |
|---|---|
| **Criticality** | Minor / Informative |
| **Location** | libraries/TaxableToken.sol#L180 |
| **Status** | Unresolved |

## Description

The contract operates under the assumption that liquidity is consistently provided to the pair between the contract's token and the native currency. However, there is a possibility that liquidity is provided to a different pair. This inadequacy in liquidity provision in the main pair could expose the contract to risks. Specifically, during eligible transactions, where the contract attempts to swap tokens with the main pair, a failure may occur if liquidity has been added to a pair other than the primary one. Consequently, transactions triggering the swap functionality will result in a revert.

Before executing the swap operation, the contract currently checks if `liquifyAmount > 0` and `if balanceOf(swapPair) == 0`, opting not to proceed with the swap if the pair has no liquidity. However, this check is insufficient to ensure the swap's success, as it only verifies the existence of any liquidity rather than the adequacy of liquidity to cover the specific swap amount.

```
address[] memory path = new address[](2);
path[0] = address(this);
path[1] = swapRouter.WETH()
_approve(address(this), address(swapRouter), tokenAmount)
// make the swap
swapRouter.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(
    tokenAmount,
    minAmountOut,
    path,
    address(this),
    block.timestamp
);
```

## Recommendation

The team is advised to implement a runtime mechanism to check if the pair has adequate liquidity provisions. This feature allows the contract to omit token swaps if the pair does not have adequate liquidity provisions, significantly minimizing the risk of potential failures.

Furthermore, the team could ensure the contract has the capability to switch its active pair in case liquidity is added to another pair.

Additionally, the contract could be designed to tolerate potential reverts from the swap functionality, especially when it is a part of the main transfer flow. This can be achieved by executing the contract's token swaps in a non-reversible manner, thereby ensuring a more resilient and predictable operation.

To address this gap and further mitigate the risk of transaction reverts due to inadequate liquidity, it is recommended to adjust the condition to `balanceOf(swapPair) < liquifyAmount` . This enhanced check ensures that the swap only proceeds if there is enough liquidity in the pair to cover the amount being swapped, thereby significantly reducing the likelihood of failed transactions due to liquidity issues.

# PVC - Price Volatility Concern

| | |
|---|---|
| **Criticality** | Minor / Informative |
| **Location** | libraries/TaxableToken.sol#L258<br>PNUTZToken.sol#L234 |
| **Status** | Unresolved |

## Description

The contract accumulates tokens from the taxes to swap them for ETH. The variable `numTokensToSwap` sets a threshold where the contract will trigger the swap functionality. If the variable is set to a big number, then the contract will swap a huge amount of tokens for ETH.

It is important to note that the price of the token representing it, can be highly volatile. This means that the value of a price volatility swap involving Ether could fluctuate significantly at the triggered point, potentially leading to significant price volatility for the parties involved.

```
uint256 contractTokenBalance = balanceOf(address(this));
if (contractTokenBalance >= numTokensToSwap) {
    _processFees(numTokensToSwap, 0);
}
...
    function setNumTokensToSwap(uint256 amount) external
override onlyOwner {
        numTokensToSwap = amount;
    }
```

## Recommendation

The contract could ensure that it will not sell more than a reasonable amount of tokens in a single transaction. A suggested implementation could check that the maximum amount should be less than a fixed percentage of the exchange reserves. Hence, the contract will guarantee that it cannot accumulate a huge amount of tokens in order to sell them.

# RSW - Redundant Storage Writes

| | |
|---|---|
| **Criticality** | Minor / Informative |
| **Location** | PNUTZToken.sol#L80 |
| **Status** | Unresolved |

## Description

The contract modifies the state of the following variables without checking if their current value is the same as the one given as an argument. As a result, the contract performs redundant storage writes, when the provided parameter matches the current state of the variables, leading to unnecessary gas consumption and inefficiencies in contract execution.

```
    function setIsExcludedFromAntiWhale(
        address account,
        bool excluded
    ) external onlyOwner {
        _excludedFromAntiWhale[account] = excluded;
        emit ExcludedFromAntiWhale(account, excluded);
    }
```

## Recommendation

The team is advised to implement additional checks within to prevent redundant storage writes when the provided argument matches the current state of the variables. By incorporating statements to compare the new values with the existing values before proceeding with any state modification, the contract can avoid unnecessary storage operations, thereby optimizing gas usage.

## L13 - Divide before Multiply Operation

| | |
|---|---|
| **Criticality** | Minor / Informative |
| **Location** | libraries/TaxableToken.sol#L136,161,265,267 |
| **Status** | Unresolved |

### Description

It is important to be aware of the order of operations when performing arithmetic calculations. This is especially important when working with large numbers, as the order of operations can affect the final result of the calculation. Performing divisions before multiplications may cause loss of prediction.

```
uint256 taxAmount = (amount * taxFee) / FEE_PRECISION
uint256 burnAmount = (taxAmount *
feeConfiguration.burnFeeRatio) / FEE_PRECISION
```

### Recommendation

To avoid this issue, it is recommended to carefully consider the order of operations when performing arithmetic calculations in Solidity. It's generally a good idea to use parentheses to specify the order of operations. The basic rule is that the multiplications should be prior to the divisions.

## L16 - Validate Variable Setters

| | |
|---|---|
| **Criticality** | Minor / Informative |
| **Location** | PNUTZToken.sol#L42,187 |
| **Status** | Unresolved |

### Description

The contract performs operations on variables that have been configured on user-supplied input. These variables are missing of proper check for the case where a value is zero. This can lead to problems when the contract is executed, as certain actions may not be properly handled when the value is zero.

```
payable(feeReceiver_).transfer(msg.value)
liquidityOwner = newOwner
```

### Recommendation

By adding the proper check, the contract will not allow the variables to be configured with zero value. This will ensure that the contract can handle all possible input values and avoid unexpected behavior or errors. Hence, it can help to prevent the contract from being exploited or operating unexpectedly.

## L19 - Stable Compiler Version

| | |
|---|---|
| **Criticality** | Minor / Informative |
| **Location** | PNUTZToken.sol#L3<br>libraries/TaxDistributor.sol#L3<br>libraries/TaxableToken.sol#L3<br>libraries/Recoverable.sol#L3<br>libraries/BEP20.sol#L3<br>libraries/AntiWhaleToken.sol#L3<br>interfaces/IBEP20.sol#L3 |
| **Status** | Unresolved |

### Description

The `^` symbol indicates that any version of Solidity that is compatible with the specified version (i.e., any version that is a higher minor or patch version) can be used to compile the contract. The version lock is a mechanism that allows the author to specify a minimum version of the Solidity compiler that must be used to compile the contract code. This is useful because it ensures that the contract will be compiled using a version of the compiler that is known to be compatible with the code.

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
pragma solidity ^0.8.17;
```

### Recommendation

The team is advised to lock the pragma to ensure the stability of the codebase. The locked pragma version ensures that the contract will not be deployed with an unexpected version. An unexpected version may produce vulnerabilities and undiscovered bugs. The compiler should be configured to the lowest version that provides all the required functionality for the codebase. As a result, the project will be compiled in a well-tested LTS (Long Term Support) environment.

## L20 - Succeeded Transfer Check

| | |
|---|---|
| **Criticality** | Minor / Informative |
| **Location** | libraries/Recoverable.sol#L34 |
| **Status** | Unresolved |

### Description

According to the ERC20 specification, the transfer methods should be checked if the result is successful. Otherwise, the contract may wrongly assume that the transfer has been established.

```
IBEP20(tokenAddress).transfer(to, tokenAmount)
```

### Recommendation

The contract should check if the result of the transfer methods is successful. The team is advised to check the SafeERC20 library from the Openzeppelin library.

# Functions Analysis

| Contract | Type | Bases | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Function Name** | **Visibility** | **Mutability** | **Modifiers** |
| | | | | |
| **PNUTZToken** | Implementation | BEP20Base, AntiWhaleToken, BEP20Burnable, Ownable, Recoverable, TaxableToken | | |
| | | Public | Payable | BEP20Base AntiWhaleToken TaxableToken TaxDistributor |
| | setMaxTokenPerWallet | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | isExcludedFromAntiWhale | Public | | - |
| | setIsExcludedFromAntiWhale | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | burn | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | burnFrom | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | _beforeTokenTransfer | Internal | ✓ | |
| | recoverEth | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | recoverTokens | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | setAutoprocessFees | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | addFeeCollector | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | setIsLpPool | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | setIsExcludedFromFees | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | distributeFees | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | processFees | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | removeFeeCollector | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | setLiquidityOwner | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | setNumTokensToSwap | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | updateFeeCollectorShare | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | setFeeConfiguration | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | setSwapRouter | External | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | _transfer | Internal | ✓ | |
| | | | | |
| **TaxableToken** | Implementation | BEP20Base, TaxDistributor | | |
| | | Public | ✓ | - |
| | | External | Payable | - |
| | isExcludedFromFees | Public | | - |
| | _setIsExcludedFromFees | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _setIsLpPool | Internal | ✓ | |
| | isLpPool | Public | | - |
| | _setSwapRouter | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _setFeeConfiguration | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _processFees | Internal | ✓ | lockTheSwap |
| | _swapTokensForEth | Private | ✓ | |
| | _addLiquidity | Private | ✓ | |
| | _pairFor | Internal | | |
| | _transfer | Internal | ✓ | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | setAutoprocessFees | External | ✓ | - |
| | setIsLpPool | External | ✓ | - |
| | setIsExcludedFromFees | External | ✓ | - |
| | processFees | External | ✓ | - |
| | setLiquidityOwner | External | ✓ | - |
| | setNumTokensToSwap | External | ✓ | - |
| | setFeeConfiguration | External | ✓ | - |
| | setSwapRouter | External | ✓ | - |
| | | | | |
| **TaxDistributor** | Implementation | BEP20Base | | |
| | | Public | ✓ | - |
| | isFeeCollector | Public | | - |
| | feeCollectorShare | Public | | - |
| | _addFeeCollector | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _removeFeeCollector | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _updateFeeCollectorShare | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _distributeFees | Internal | ✓ | |
| | addFeeCollector | External | ✓ | - |
| | removeFeeCollector | External | ✓ | - |
| | updateFeeCollectorShare | External | ✓ | - |
| | distributeFees | External | ✓ | - |
| | | | | |
| **Recoverable** | Implementation | | | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | _recoverEth | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _recoverTokens | Internal | ✓ | |
| | recoverEth | External | ✓ | - |
| | recoverTokens | External | ✓ | - |
| | | | | |
| **BEP20Burnable** | Implementation | Context,<br>BEP20Base | | |
| | burn | External | ✓ | - |
| | _burnFrom | Internal | ✓ | |
| | burnFrom | External | ✓ | - |
| | | | | |
| **BEP20Base** | Implementation | BEP20 | | |
| | | Public | ✓ | BEP20 |
| | decimals | Public | | - |
| | | | | |
| **BEP20** | Implementation | ERC20,<br>IBEP20 | | |
| | | Public | ✓ | ERC20 |
| | _beforeTokenTransfer | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _transfer | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _mint | Internal | ✓ | |
| | | | | |
| **AntiWhaleToken** | Implementation | BEP20Base | | |
| | | Public | ✓ | - |
| | isExcludedFromAntiWhale | Public | | - |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | _setMaxTokenPerWallet | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _beforeTokenTransfer | Internal | ✓ | antiWhale |
| | | | | |
| **IBEP20** | Interface | IERC20 | | |
| | | | | |
| **IUniswapV2Router02** | Interface | IUniswapV2Router01 | | |
| | removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | ✓ | - |
| | removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | ✓ | - |
| | swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | ✓ | - |
| | swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | Payable | - |
| | swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External | ✓ | - |
| | | | | |
| **IUniswapV2Router01** | Interface | | | |
| | factory | External | | - |
| | WETH | External | | - |
| | addLiquidity | External | ✓ | - |
| | addLiquidityETH | External | Payable | - |
| | removeLiquidity | External | ✓ | - |
| | removeLiquidityETH | External | ✓ | - |
| | removeLiquidityWithPermit | External | ✓ | - |
| | removeLiquidityETHWithPermit | External | ✓ | - |
| | swapExactTokensForTokens | External | ✓ | - |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | swapTokensForExactTokens | External | ✓ | - |
| | swapExactETHForTokens | External | Payable | - |
| | swapTokensForExactETH | External | ✓ | - |
| | swapExactTokensForETH | External | ✓ | - |
| | swapETHForExactTokens | External | Payable | - |
| | quote | External | | - |
| | getAmountOut | External | | - |
| | getAmountIn | External | | - |
| | getAmountsOut | External | | - |
| | getAmountsIn | External | | - |
| | | | | |
| **IUniswapV2Factory** | Interface | | | |
| | feeTo | External | | - |
| | feeToSetter | External | | - |
| | getPair | External | | - |
| | allPairs | External | | - |
| | allPairsLength | External | | - |
| | createPair | External | ✓ | - |
| | setFeeTo | External | ✓ | - |
| | setFeeToSetter | External | ✓ | - |
| | | | | |
| **Context** | Implementation | | | |
| | _msgSender | Internal | | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | _msgData | Internal | | |
| | | | | |
| **EnumerableSet** | Library | | | |
| | _add | Private | ✓ | |
| | _remove | Private | ✓ | |
| | _contains | Private | | |
| | _length | Private | | |
| | _at | Private | | |
| | _values | Private | | |
| | add | Internal | ✓ | |
| | remove | Internal | ✓ | |
| | contains | Internal | | |
| | length | Internal | | |
| | at | Internal | | |
| | values | Internal | | |
| | add | Internal | ✓ | |
| | remove | Internal | ✓ | |
| | contains | Internal | | |
| | length | Internal | | |
| | at | Internal | | |
| | values | Internal | | |
| | add | Internal | ✓ | |
| | remove | Internal | ✓ | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | contains | Internal | | |
| | length | Internal | | |
| | at | Internal | | |
| | values | Internal | | |
| | | | | |
| **IERC20** | Interface | | | |
| | totalSupply | External | | - |
| | balanceOf | External | | - |
| | transfer | External | ✓ | - |
| | allowance | External | | - |
| | approve | External | ✓ | - |
| | transferFrom | External | ✓ | - |
| | | | | |
| **ERC20** | Implementation | Context, IERC20, IERC20Metadata | | |
| | | Public | ✓ | - |
| | name | Public | | - |
| | symbol | Public | | - |
| | decimals | Public | | - |
| | totalSupply | Public | | - |
| | balanceOf | Public | | - |
| | transfer | Public | ✓ | - |
| | allowance | Public | | - |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | approve | Public | ✓ | - |
| | transferFrom | Public | ✓ | - |
| | increaseAllowance | Public | ✓ | - |
| | decreaseAllowance | Public | ✓ | - |
| | _transfer | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _mint | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _burn | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _approve | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _spendAllowance | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _beforeTokenTransfer | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _afterTokenTransfer | Internal | ✓ | |
| | | | | |
| **IERC20Metadata** | Interface | IERC20 | | |
| | name | External | | - |
| | symbol | External | | - |
| | decimals | External | | - |
| | | | | |
| **Ownable** | Implementation | Context | | |
| | | Public | ✓ | - |
| | owner | Public | | - |
| | _checkOwner | Internal | | |
| | renounceOwnership | Public | ✓ | onlyOwner |
| | transferOwnership | Public | ✓ | onlyOwner |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | _transferOwnership | Internal | ✓ | |

# Inheritance Graph



# Flow Graph



# Summary

Peanutz contract implements a token mechanism. This audit investigates security issues, business logic concerns and potential improvements. Peanutz is an interesting project that has a friendly and growing community. The Smart Contract analysis reported no compiler error or critical issues. The contract Owner can access some admin functions that can not be used in a malicious way to disturb the users' transactions. There is also a limit of max 20% fees.

The contract's ownership has been renounced. The information regarding the transaction can be accessed through the following link:

https://bscscan.com/tx/0x35ac4a560fdf75de95344ee9e7adbdfd7c026491b53e25338983f3bc5a069fc9

# Disclaimer

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Blockchain technology and cryptographic assets present a high level of ongoing risk Cyberscope's position is that each company and individual are responsible for their own due diligence and continuous security Cyberscope's goal is to help reduce the attack vectors and the high level of variance associated with utilizing new and consistently changing technologies and in no way claims any guarantee of security or functionality of the technology we agree to analyze. The assessment services provided by Cyberscope are subject to dependencies and are under continuing development. You agree that your access and/or use including but not limited to any services reports and materials will be at your sole risk on an as-is where-is and as-available basis Cryptographic tokens are emergent technologies and carry with them high levels of technical risk and uncertainty. The assessment reports could include false positives false negatives and other unpredictable results. The services may access and depend upon multiple layers of third parties.

# About Cyberscope

Cyberscope is a blockchain cybersecurity company that was founded with the vision to make web3.0 a safer place for investors and developers. Since its launch, it has worked with thousands of projects and is estimated to have secured tens of millions of investors' funds.

Cyberscope is one of the leading smart contract audit firms in the crypto space and has built a high-profile network of clients and partners.

**The Cyberscope team**

https://www.cyberscope.io