



Cyberscope

Audit Report

Quickswap

February 2024

Network Matic

Address 0xb5c064f955d8e7f38fe0460c556a72987494ee17

Audited by © cyberscope

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Review

| | |
|------------------|---|
| Contract Name | Quick |
| Compiler Version | v0.5.16+commit.9c3226ce |
| Optimization | 1000000 runs |
| Explorer | https://polygonscan.com/address/0xb5c064f955d8e7f38fe0460c556a72987494ee17 |
| Address | 0xb5c064f955d8e7f38fe0460c556a72987494ee17 |
| Network | MATIC |
| Symbol | QUICK |
| Decimals | 18 |
| Total Supply | 883,439,539.725 |

Audit Updates

| | |
|---------------|-------------|
| Initial Audit | 12 Feb 2024 |
|---------------|-------------|

Source Files

| | |
|-----------|---|
| Filename | SHA256 |
| Quick.sol | f25f546d694ef6ac2e2c5d4bbaf33bd7b9364658c2901e3be48a0f4834fcb4d |

Overview

Quick Contract Overview

This document presents the overview of the smart contract audit conducted for the `Quick` contract of "Quickswap" project on the Polygon blockchain. The purpose of this audit is to identify and address security vulnerabilities, provide recommendations for code improvements, and ensure the robustness of the codebase.

Deposits and Withdrawals

Features token minting and burning, directly impacting the total supply. The `gateway` contract is responsible for the minting process.

Governance and Voting

- Incorporates delegated voting, allowing token holders to delegate their voting rights.
- Utilizes checkpoints to record and manage vote balances over time, ensuring accurate and historical vote power tracking.

Token Transfer and Allowance

- Supports standard `transfer` and `transferFrom` functions for token movements.
- Implements `approve` and `permit` methods for managing allowances.

Event Logging

Incorporates events for tracking delegate changes and vote balance updates, enhancing transparency and auditability of governance actions.

Findings Breakdown



| | |
|---------------------|---|
| Critical | 0 |
| Medium | 0 |
| Minor / Informative | 5 |

| Severity | Unresolved | Acknowledged | Resolved | Other |
|---------------------|------------|--------------|----------|-------|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Minor / Informative | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Diagnostics

● Critical ● Medium ● Minor / Informative

| Severity | Code | Description | Status |
|----------|-------|--|------------|
| ● | CCR | Contract Centralization Risk | Unresolved |
| ● | DVPUI | Delegated Voting Power Update Inadequacy | Unresolved |
| ● | L16 | Validate Variable Setters | Unresolved |
| ● | L17 | Usage of Solidity Assembly | Unresolved |
| ● | L19 | Stable Compiler Version | Unresolved |

CCR - Contract Centralization Risk

| | |
|-------------|---------------------|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
| Location | Quick.sol#L267,278 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The contract's functionality and behavior are heavily dependent on external parameters or configurations. While external configuration can offer flexibility, it also poses several centralization risks that warrant attention. Centralization risks arising from the dependence on external configuration include Single Point of Control, Vulnerability to Attacks, Operational Delays, Trust Dependencies, and Decentralization Erosion.

Specifically, the contract designates a `gateway` address, which is set during contract initialization and is responsible for token minting. This `gateway` is a proxy contract, implying that its underlying logic and address can be altered. While this design provides adaptability and the potential for upgrading contract functionalities, it inherently centralizes control to the address holding the capability to update the `gateway`. Additionally, given that the `gateway` contract has the authority to mint tokens, by calling the `deposit` function, this centralization places significant trust in the gateway's security.

```
constructor(address gateway_) public {
    gateway = gateway_;
}

function deposit(address user, bytes calldata depositData)
    external
{
    require(msg.sender == gateway, "Invalid access");
    uint256 rawAmount = abi.decode(depositData, (uint256));
    uint96 amount = safe96(rawAmount, "Quick::deposit: amount
exceeds 96 bits");

    _mint(user, amount);
}
```

Recommendation

To address this finding and mitigate centralization risks, it is recommended to evaluate the feasibility of migrating critical configurations and functionality into the contract's codebase itself and re-evaluate the dependence on external configurations, particularly the `gateway` contract. This approach would reduce external dependencies and enhance the contract's self-sufficiency. It is essential to carefully weigh the trade-offs between external configuration flexibility and the risks associated with centralization.

DVPUI - Delegated Voting Power Update Inadequacy

| | |
|-------------|---------------------|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
| Location | Quick.sol#L278,293 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The `deposit` function is designed to mint tokens for users upon depositing on the root chain, while the `withdraw` function burns tokens when users wish to withdraw. However, neither function includes logic to update the delegates' voting power based on the change in token balances. This omission could lead to discrepancies between the actual token balances held by users and the voting power delegated on their behalf. As a result, voting power may not accurately reflect the current distribution of tokens among holders.

```
function deposit(address user, bytes calldata depositData)
    external
{
    require(msg.sender == gateway, "Invalid access");
    uint256 rawAmount = abi.decode(depositData, (uint256));
    uint96 amount = safe96(rawAmount, "Quick::deposit: amount
exceeds 96 bits");

    _mint(user, amount);
}

function withdraw(uint256 rawAmount) external {
    uint96 amount = safe96(rawAmount, "Quick::withdraw: amount
exceeds 96 bits");
    _burn(msg.sender, amount);
}
```

Recommendation

It is recommended to revise the logic behind the adjustment of delegated voting power within both the `deposit` and `withdraw` functions. This involves ensuring that any change in token balances, whether through depositing or withdrawing, is accurately mirrored in the voting power attributed to token holders and their delegates.

L16 - Validate Variable Setters

| | |
|--------------------|---------------------|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
| Location | Quick.sol#L267 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The contract performs operations on variables that have been configured on user-supplied input. These variables are missing of proper check for the case where a value is zero. This can lead to problems when the contract is executed, as certain actions may not be properly handled when the value is zero.

```
gateway = gateway_
```

Recommendation

By adding the proper check, the contract will not allow the variables to be configured with zero value. This will ensure that the contract can handle all possible input values and avoid unexpected behavior or errors. Hence, it can help to prevent the contract from being exploited or operating unexpectedly.

L17 - Usage of Solidity Assembly

| | |
|--------------------|---------------------|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
| Location | Quick.sol#L559 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

Using assembly can be useful for optimizing code, but it can also be error-prone. It's important to carefully test and debug assembly code to ensure that it is correct and does not contain any errors.

Some common types of errors that can occur when using assembly in Solidity include Syntax, Type, Out-of-bounds, Stack, and Revert.

```
assembly { chainId := chainid() }
```

Recommendation

It is recommended to use assembly sparingly and only when necessary, as it can be difficult to read and understand compared to Solidity code.

L19 - Stable Compiler Version

| | |
|--------------------|---------------------|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
| Location | Quick.sol#L13 |
| Status | Unresolved |

Description

The `^` symbol indicates that any version of Solidity that is compatible with the specified version (i.e., any version that is a higher minor or patch version) can be used to compile the contract. The version lock is a mechanism that allows the author to specify a minimum version of the Solidity compiler that must be used to compile the contract code. This is useful because it ensures that the contract will be compiled using a version of the compiler that is known to be compatible with the code.

```
pragma solidity ^0.5.16;
```

Recommendation

The team is advised to lock the pragma to ensure the stability of the codebase. The locked pragma version ensures that the contract will not be deployed with an unexpected version. An unexpected version may produce vulnerabilities and undiscovered bugs. The compiler should be configured to the lowest version that provides all the required functionality for the codebase. As a result, the project will be compiled in a well-tested LTS (Long Term Support) environment.

Functions Analysis

| Contract | Type | Bases | | |
|-----------------|----------------|------------|------------|-----------|
| | Function Name | Visibility | Mutability | Modifiers |
| | | | | |
| SafeMath | Library | | | |
| | add | Internal | | |
| | add | Internal | | |
| | sub | Internal | | |
| | sub | Internal | | |
| | mul | Internal | | |
| | mul | Internal | | |
| | div | Internal | | |
| | div | Internal | | |
| | mod | Internal | | |
| | mod | Internal | | |
| | | | | |
| Quick | Implementation | | | |
| | | Public | ✓ | - |
| | deposit | External | ✓ | - |
| | withdraw | External | ✓ | - |
| | allowance | External | | - |
| | approve | External | ✓ | - |
| | permit | External | ✓ | - |

| | | | | |
|--|------------------|----------|---|---|
| | balanceOf | External | | - |
| | transfer | External | ✓ | - |
| | transferFrom | External | ✓ | - |
| | delegate | Public | ✓ | - |
| | delegateBySig | Public | ✓ | - |
| | getCurrentVotes | External | | - |
| | getPriorVotes | Public | | - |
| | _delegate | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _transferTokens | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _moveDelegates | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _writeCheckpoint | Internal | ✓ | |
| | safe32 | Internal | | |
| | safe96 | Internal | | |
| | add96 | Internal | | |
| | sub96 | Internal | | |
| | getChainId | Internal | | |
| | _mint | Internal | ✓ | |
| | _burn | Internal | ✓ | |

Flow Graph



Summary

Quickswap contract implements a governance mechanism. This audit investigates security issues, business logic concerns and potential improvements.

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Cyberscope is a blockchain cybersecurity company that was founded with the vision to make web3.0 a safer place for investors and developers. Since its launch, it has worked with thousands of projects and is estimated to have secured tens of millions of investors' funds.

Cyberscope is one of the leading smart contract audit firms in the crypto space and has built a high-profile network of clients and partners.



The Cyberscope team

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