



Cyberscope

Audit Report

ShadowGold

April 2024

Network MATIC

Address 0x423258dD7d48ba3698C99530D5e2868352BC2D9B

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Review

Explorer	https://polygonscan.com/address/0x423258dD7d48ba3698C99530D5e2868352BC2D9B
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Audit Updates

Initial Audit	03 Apr 2024 https://github.com/cyberscope-io/audits/blob/main/shadowfi/v1/audit.pdf
Corrected Phase 2	15 Apr 2024 https://github.com/cyberscope-io/audits/blob/main/shadowfi/v2/audit.pdf
Corrected Phase 3	28 Apr 2024 https://github.com/cyberscope-io/audits/blob/main/shadowfi/v3/audit.pdf
Corrected Phase 4	20 May 2024

Source Files

Filename	SHA256
ShadowGoldLiquidityLock.sol	2dee5e6587f878d0bb1215f5b5c033ffa3 16dd4605467de8741c64c16b02d7a3

Overview

The `ShadowFiLiquidityLock` contract is strategically engineered to safeguard and optimize the liquidity of the `ShadowGoldToken` within the decentralized finance (DeFi) landscape. It primarily facilitates liquidity locking, migration, and comprehensive management through interactions with decentralized exchange (DEX) routers to swap tokens and manage liquidity pairs effectively.

Liquidity Locking and Management

This essential feature underpins the contract's core objectives, focusing on securing liquidity tokens to bolster market stability and investor confidence in the token's valuation. Initially, the contract sets a predefined lock time during which liquidity tokens are non-transferable. The owner has the privilege to prolong this lock period as needed to align with strategic financial goals. The `endLock` function empowers the owner to reclaim locked liquidity tokens to their wallet after the lock duration expires, marking the liquidity lock's conclusion.

Liquidity Withdrawal

The contract is equipped with mechanisms that allow the owner to withdraw any ERC-20 tokens from the contract's reserves, with the exception of those tokens designated as locked liquidity provider (LP) tokens. This feature is critical for rectifying misdirected tokens or managing assets that are not bound by liquidity lock stipulations, thereby ensuring efficient fund management while adhering to established liquidity constraints.

Liquidity Migration

Incorporated within the contract are features for reallocating liquidity between different pairs or modifying its composition to adapt to evolving market conditions or strategic liquidity adjustments. This is facilitated through functions designed for removing liquidity from one pairing and augmenting another, thus maintaining liquidity balance and market responsiveness.


Token Injection and Burning

The contract also includes proactive supply management and liquidity enhancement capabilities, notably through the `shadowBurst` function for targeted token burning and the `injectMatic` and `injectPaxg` functions for direct liquidity injections. These actions are intended to methodically reduce the overall token supply, potentially increasing its scarcity and perceived value. Simultaneously, injecting liquidity directly into respective pairs aims to deepen market liquidity and enhance stability. These integrated strategies are vital for actively managing the economic framework of the token, ensuring that supply adjustments and liquidity improvements are well-coordinated with market dynamics.

View Functions

To promote transparency and accountability, the contract offers several view functions that provide insights into the current liquidity status, such as the ownership percentage of total liquidity, the volume of liquid tokens available, and the precise lock durations. These tools are invaluable for users and stakeholders to verify the contract's operations and the integrity of the liquidity it governs.

Findings Breakdown



● Critical	0
● Medium	0
● Minor / Informative	18

Severity	Unresolved	Acknowledged	Resolved	Other
● Critical	0	0	0	0
● Medium	0	0	0	0
● Minor / Informative	0	18	0	0

Diagnostics

● Critical ● Medium ● Minor / Informative

Severity	Code	Description	Status
●	CR	Code Repetition	Acknowledged
●	CCR	Contract Centralization Risk	Acknowledged
●	LRV	Liquidity Removal Volatility	Acknowledged
●	LDP	Loss Division Precision	Acknowledged
●	MEN	Misleading Event Naming	Acknowledged
●	MU	Modifiers Usage	Acknowledged
●	PLPI	Potential Liquidity Provision Inadequacy	Acknowledged
●	RED	Redudant Event Declaration	Acknowledged
●	TUU	Time Units Usage	Acknowledged
●	TSI	Tokens Sufficiency Insurance	Acknowledged
●	UVF	Unutilized View Functions	Acknowledged
●	L02	State Variables could be Declared Constant	Acknowledged
●	L04	Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions	Acknowledged
●	L13	Divide before Multiply Operation	Acknowledged

●	L14	Uninitialized Variables in Local Scope	Acknowledged
●	L18	Multiple Pragma Directives	Acknowledged
●	L19	Stable Compiler Version	Acknowledged
●	L20	Succeeded Transfer Check	Acknowledged

CR - Code Repetition

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	ShadowGoldLiquidityLock.sol#L502,562
Status	Acknowledged

Description

The contract contains repetitive code segments. There are potential issues that can arise when using code segments in Solidity. Some of them can lead to issues like gas efficiency, complexity, readability, security, and maintainability of the source code. It is generally a good idea to try to minimize code repetition where possible.

Specifically the functions `migrateSDG` and `migrateLP` use similar code segments.

```
function migrateSDG(uint256 percent, bool wethOrPaxg) public onlyOwner {  
    ...  
}  
  
function migrateLP(uint256 percent, bool wethOrPaxg) public onlyOwner {  
    ...  
}
```

Recommendation

The team is advised to avoid repeating the same code in multiple places, which can make the contract easier to read and maintain. The authors could try to reuse code wherever possible, as this can help reduce the complexity and size of the contract. For instance, the contract could reuse the common code segments in an internal function in order to avoid repeating the same code in multiple places.

Team Update

The team has acknowledged that this is not a security issue and states:

While these functions seem repetitive, they actually perform two different actions. We were unable to merge them into a single function as it caused many stack too deep errors.

CCR - Contract Centralization Risk

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	ShadowGoldLiquidityLock.sol#L405,415,430
Status	Acknowledged

Description

The contract's functionality and behavior are heavily dependent on external parameters or configurations. While external configuration can offer flexibility, it also poses several centralization risks that warrant attention. Centralization risks arising from the dependence on external configuration include Single Point of Control, Vulnerability to Attacks, Operational Delays, Trust Dependencies, and Decentralization Erosion.

Specifically the smart contract presents a centralization risk by granting the owner extensive control over locked tokens and the ability to extend lock periods. This centralized authority allows the owner to claim all tokens after the lock period and adjust the lock duration at will, posing trust and security concerns.

```
function endLock() public onlyOwner {
    require(block.timestamp >= lockTime, "LP tokens are still
locked.");

    maticPair.transfer(owner(), maticPair.balanceOf(address(this)));
    paxgPair.transfer(owner(), paxgPair.balanceOf(address(this)));

    lockEnded = true;
    emit LockEnded();
}

function extendLockTime(uint256 _extraLockTime) public onlyOwner {
    require(!lockEnded, "You already claimed all LP tokens.");
    require(_extraLockTime > 0, "Invalid extra lock time is
provided.");
    require(
        _extraLockTime <= 31536000,
        "You cannot extend more than one year per extend call."
    );

    lockTime += _extraLockTime;
    emit ParameterUpdated();
}

function withdraw() public onlyOwner {
    uint256 balance = address(this).balance;
    payable(msg.sender).transfer(balance);
}
```

Recommendation

To address this finding and mitigate centralization risks, it is recommended to evaluate the feasibility of migrating critical configurations and functionality into the contract's codebase itself. This approach would reduce external dependencies and enhance the contract's self-sufficiency. It is essential to carefully weigh the trade-offs between external configuration flexibility and the risks associated with centralization.

Team Update

The team has acknowledged that this is not a security issue and states:

The contract has some centralized controls to allow for proper managing of multiple liquidity pools.

LRV - Liquidity Removal Volatility

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	ShadowGoldLiquidityLock.sol#L459,486,517,545,582,641
Status	Acknowledged

Description

The contract is designed to facilitate the removal of liquidity from token pairs, such as `ShadowGoldToken` with `WETH` and `PAXG`. This functionality, while providing flexibility in managing liquidity, poses a significant risk if a large portion of the liquidity is withdrawn in a single transaction. Such substantial liquidity removals can lead to increased price volatility of the involved tokens, potentially destabilizing the market and affecting investor confidence. The inherent risk is exacerbated by the lack of safeguards against the withdrawal of large liquidity percentages, which could lead to scenarios where the token's price becomes highly volatile, affecting all market participants.

```
(uint256 amountToken, uint256 amountWmatic) = router
    .removeLiquidity(
        address(shadowGoldToken),
        address(wmatic),
        removeAmount,
        0,
        0,
        address(this),
        block.timestamp + 120
    )
    ...
(uint256 amountToken, uint256 amountPaxg) = router.removeLiquidity(
    address(shadowGoldToken),
    address(paxg),
    removeAmount,
    0,
    0,
    address(this),
    block.timestamp + 120
);
...

```

Recommendation

It is recommended to implement safeguards within the contract to prevent the removal of large amounts of liquidity in a single operation. This could involve setting a maximum threshold for the percentage of liquidity that can be removed at any given time or requiring a multi-step process for large withdrawals, possibly including a time delay or the need for multiple approvals. Additionally, introducing mechanisms for gradual liquidity removal could help mitigate sudden market impacts. Implementing these safeguards will help maintain market stability and protect against the potential for manipulation or adverse market reactions due to significant liquidity changes.

Team Update

The team has acknowledged that this is not a security issue and states:

These functions are necessary to maintain balance between multiple liquidity pools.

LDP - Loss Division Precision

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	ShadowGoldLiquidityLock.sol#L697
Status	Acknowledged

Description

The contract is designed to calculate the percentage of liquid tokens relative to the circulating supply of the `shadowGoldToken`. However, a precision loss issue occurs due to the use of integer arithmetic for multiplication and division operations. Specifically, when calculating `liquidPercent`, the contract multiplies `liquidTokens` by `10000` before dividing by the `shadowGoldToken.getCirculatingSupply`. If the `liquidTokens` value is significantly smaller than the circulating supply, the multiplication by `10000` may not be sufficient to preserve precision, leading to a situation where the expected nonzero result becomes zero. This issue is exacerbated in cases where the multiplier results in a value that, when divided, is less than 1 due to the lack of floating-point arithmetic in Solidity, resulting in a premature rounding down to 0.

```
if(wmaticOrPaxg) {
    uint256 lpOwnershipPercent = (maticPair.balanceOf(address(this)) *
    10000) / maticPair.totalSupply();
    liquidTokens = (shadowGoldToken.balanceOf(address(maticPair)) *
    lpOwnershipPercent) / 10000;

} else {

    uint256 lpOwnershipPercent = (paxgPair.balanceOf(address(this)) * 10000)
    / paxgPair.totalSupply();
    liquidTokens = (shadowGoldToken.balanceOf(address(paxgPair)) *
    lpOwnershipPercent) / 10000;
}
```

Recommendation

It is recommended to increase the precision in calculations by using `1e18` as the multiplication factor instead of `10000`. This change significantly enhances the calculation's accuracy by maintaining more significant digits through the multiplication and

division processes, thus reducing the risk of premature rounding to zero. By adopting a higher precision constant, the contract can better handle small ratios between `liquidTokens` and the circulating supply, ensuring more accurate and reliable results. Additionally, incorporating well-tested mathematical libraries designed for handling high-precision arithmetic in Solidity can further mitigate potential precision loss and improve the robustness of the contract's calculations.

Team Update

The team has acknowledged that this is not a security issue and states:

This is not an issue due to requirements built into the contract to guarantee a proper percentage of liquidTokens can not be removed from either liquidity pool.

MEN - Misleading Event Naming

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	ShadowGoldLiquidityLock.sol#L463,490
Status	Acknowledged

Description

The contract is using the `burntShadowFi` event to log transactions involving the transfer of `amountWeth` to `maticPair` and the burning of `amountToken` of the `shadowGoldToken`. However, the naming of the event suggests that both the `amountWeth` and `amountToken` are being burned, which is not the case. The `amountWeth` is merely transferred to the `maticPair`, not removed from circulation. This discrepancy between the event's implication and the actual operation performed can lead to confusion and misinterpretation of the contract's actions. The use of `burntShadowFi` as an event name is thus misleading, as it inaccurately represents the nature of the transactions being logged, particularly the handling of `amountWeth` and `amountPaxg`, which are not subjected to a burn mechanism but are instead transferred to their respective pairs.

```
assert(IERC20(wmatic).transfer(address(maticPair), amountWmatic))
maticPair.sync();
shadowGoldToken.burn(amountToken);
shadowGoldToken.setIsTxLimitExempt(address(maticPair), false);
shadowGoldToken.setIsTxLimitExempt(address(router), false);
emit burntShadowFi(amountWmatic, amountToken);
...
assert(IERC20(paxg).transfer(address(paxgPair), amountPaxg));
paxgPair.sync();
shadowGoldToken.burn(amountToken);
shadowGoldToken.setIsTxLimitExempt(address(paxgPair), false);
shadowGoldToken.setIsTxLimitExempt(address(router), false);
emit burntShadowFi(amountPaxg, amountToken);
```

Recommendation

It is recommended to revise the event naming and structure to accurately reflect the actions taken by the contract. Specifically, a separate event for token transfers to liquidity pairs and another for token burns should be considered. Otherwise renaming the `burntShadowFi`

event to something more descriptive of its actual functionality, could clarify the operations being performed. Additionally, introducing parameters within the event or creating separate events to distinctly indicate token transfers and burns would enhance transparency and understanding. This approach would prevent confusion and ensure that the contract's intentions and actions are clearly communicated to developers, auditors, and users alike.

Team Update

The team has acknowledged that this is not a security issue and states:

No edit will be made to address this.

MU - Modifiers Usage

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	ShadowGoldLiquidityLock.sol#L448,475,506,534,566,625
Status	Acknowledged

Description

The contract is using repetitive statements on some methods to validate some preconditions. In Solidity, the form of preconditions is usually represented by the modifiers. Modifiers allow you to define a piece of code that can be reused across multiple functions within a contract. This can be particularly useful when you have several functions that require the same checks to be performed before executing the logic within the function.

```
require(  
    percent >= 1 && percent <= 10000,  
    "Invalid parameter is provided"  
);
```

Recommendation

The team is advised to use modifiers since it is a useful tool for reducing code duplication and improving the readability of smart contracts. By using modifiers to perform these checks, it reduces the amount of code that is needed to write, which can make the smart contract more efficient and easier to maintain.

Team Update

The team has acknowledged that this is not a security issue and states:

No edit will be made to address this.

PLPI - Potential Liquidity Provision Inadequacy

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	ShadowGoldLiquidityLock.sol#L586,645
Status	Acknowledged

Description

The contract operates under the assumption that liquidity is consistently provided to the pair between the contract's token and the native currency. However, there is a possibility that liquidity is provided to a different pair. This inadequacy in liquidity provision in the main pair could expose the contract to risks. Specifically, during eligible transactions, where the contract attempts to swap tokens with the main pair, a failure may occur if liquidity has been added to a pair other than the primary one. Consequently, transactions triggering the swap functionality will result in a revert.

```
ISwapRouter.ExactInputParams memory params = ISwapRouter
    .ExactInputParams ({
        path: abi.encodePacked(
            wmatic,
            poolFee,
            usdc,
            poolFee,
            paxg
        ),
        recipient: address(this),
        amountIn: amountWmatic,
        amountOutMinimum: 0
    });
uint256 amountPaxg = swapRouter.exactInput(params);
...

ISwapRouter.ExactInputParams memory params = ISwapRouter
    .ExactInputParams ({
        path: abi.encodePacked(
            paxg,
            poolFee,
            usdc,
            poolFee,
            wmatic
        ),
        recipient: address(this),
        amountIn: amountPaxg,
        amountOutMinimum: 0
    });
```

Recommendation

The team is advised to implement a runtime mechanism to check if the pair has adequate liquidity provisions. This feature allows the contract to omit token swaps if the pair does not have adequate liquidity provisions, significantly minimizing the risk of potential failures.

Furthermore, the team could ensure the contract has the capability to switch its active pair in case liquidity is added to another pair.

Additionally, the contract could be designed to tolerate potential reverts from the swap functionality, especially when it is a part of the main transfer flow. This can be achieved by executing the contract's token swaps in a non-reversible manner, thereby ensuring a more resilient and predictable operation.

Team Update

The team has acknowledged that this is not a security issue and states:

No edit will be made to address this. The community is well aware of the fact that a project without liquidity has many issues.

RED - Redudant Event Declaration

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	ShadowGoldLiquidityLock.sol#L371,378
Status	Acknowledged

Description

The contract uses events that are not emitted within the contract's functions. As a result, these declared events are redundant and serve no purpose within the contract's current implementation.

```
event addedLiquidity(uint256 liquidity);  
event Test(uint256 amount);
```

Recommendation

To optimize contract performance and efficiency, it is advisable to regularly review and refactor the codebase, removing the unused event declarations. This proactive approach not only streamlines the contract, reducing deployment and execution costs but also enhances readability and maintainability.

Team Update

The team has acknowledged that this is not a security issue and states:

No edit will be made to address this.

TUU - Time Units Usage

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	ShadowGoldLiquidityLock.sol#L418
Status	Acknowledged

Description

The contract is using arbitrary numbers to form time-related values. As a result, it decreases the readability of the codebase and prevents the compiler to optimize the source code.

```
require(  
    _extraLockTime <= 31536000,  
    "You cannot extend more than one year per extend call."  
);
```

Recommendation

It is a good practice to use the time units reserved keywords like `seconds`, `minutes`, `hours`, `days` and `weeks` to process time-related calculations.

It's important to note that these time units are simply a shorthand notation for representing time in seconds, and do not have any effect on the actual passage of time or the execution of the contract. The time units are simply a convenience for expressing time in a more human-readable form.

Team Update

The team has acknowledged that this is not a security issue and states:

No edit will be made to address this. Whenever the contract owner needs to add additional lock time, he will need to call the function and insert a number of seconds to pass to the function. By using a readable amount of seconds for this variable, the contract owner will always know what he needs to input into the extend function.

TSI - Tokens Sufficiency Insurance

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/SDGLocker.sol#L363
Status	Acknowledged

Description

The tokens are not held within the contract itself. Instead, the contract is designed to provide the tokens from an external administrator. While external administration can provide flexibility, it introduces a dependency on the administrator's actions, which can lead to various issues and centralization risks.

The contract is designed to function as a locker for tokens, intending to secure them by locking within its structure. However, the tokens intended to be locked are not transferred to the contract at the time of its initialization. Instead, the contract relies on an external administrator to deposit the tokens post-deployment. This approach introduces a significant risk, as the contract's effectiveness and security are contingent upon the actions of the external administrator. The dependency on an external entity not only centralizes control but also exposes the contract to potential delays, or mismanagement of the tokens, thereby undermining the trust and functionality of the contract.

```
address private wmatic = 0x0f4e9Ee7E15A7D135703b7d469E3B18c91D3F1f3;  
address private paxg = 0xA5460F029473D74c8895bA493540E7cd98461316;  
address private usdc = 0xa36A287Bf83769F9A009E8650D9a9FBfFaF06608;
```

Recommendation

It is recommended to consider implementing a more decentralized and automated approach for handling the contract tokens. One possible solution is to hold the presale tokens within the contract itself. If the contract guarantees the process it can enhance its reliability, security, and participant trust, ultimately leading to a more successful and efficient process. It is recommended to modify the contract's initialization process to include the transfer of tokens intended to be locked.

Team Update

The team has acknowledged that this is not a security issue and states:

No edit will be made to address this. Once the contract owner sends the liquidity tokens to the contract, they cannot be withdrawn until the lock time has expired.

UVF - Unutilized View Functions

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/SDGLocker.sol#L695
Status	Acknowledged

Description

The contract is utilizing multiple public view functions to retrieve various pieces of information, such as LP ownership percentage, liquid tokens, liquid percent, and the amount to be removed for operations like shadow bursting. However these functions implement similar functionality, essentially calculating and returning values based on the contract's state and given parameters. This redundancy not only increases the contract's complexity but also its deployment and execution cost due to the duplicated logic. Additionally, it introduces unnecessary points of maintenance and potential inconsistency, as updates to the logic must be meticulously synchronized across all functions.

```
function getLiquidTokens (
    bool wmaticOrPaxg
) public view returns (uint256 liquidTokens) {
    if (wmaticOrPaxg) {
        uint256 lpOwnershipPercent =
            (maticPair.balanceOf(address(this)) *
             10000) / maticPair.totalSupply();
        liquidTokens =
            (shadowGoldToken.balanceOf(address(maticPair)) *
             lpOwnershipPercent) /
            10000;
    } else {
        uint256 lpOwnershipPercent =
            (paxgPair.balanceOf(address(this)) *
             10000) / paxgPair.totalSupply();
        liquidTokens =
            (shadowGoldToken.balanceOf(address(paxgPair)) *
             lpOwnershipPercent) /
            10000;
    }
}
```

Recommendation

It is recommended to consolidate these view functions into a smaller number of versatile functions or internal library calls that can be reused within the contract. This approach would reduce redundancy, simplify the contract's interface, and decrease the potential for inconsistencies in logic updates. Additionally, consider implementing internal helper functions that these public view functions can call, ensuring that the core logic is defined in a single location. This refactoring will not only optimize gas costs for deployments and interactions but also enhance the contract's readability and maintainability.

Team Update

The team has acknowledged that this is not a security issue and states:

These are unutilized view functions within the code of other functions, but the contract owner utilizes these functions to determine if a shadow burst or migration are necessary.

L02 - State Variables could be Declared Constant

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	ShadowGoldLiquidityLock.sol#L355,359,360,361
Status	Acknowledged

Description

State variables can be declared as constant using the constant keyword. This means that the value of the state variable cannot be changed after it has been set. Additionally, the constant variables decrease gas consumption of the corresponding transaction.

```
uint24 poolFee = 3000
address private wmatic = 0x0d500B1d8E8eF31E21C99d1Db9A6444d3ADf1270
address private paxg = 0x553d3D295e0f695B9228246232eDF400ed3560B5
address private usdc = 0x2791Bca1f2de4661ED88A30C99A7a9449Aa84174
```

Recommendation

Constant state variables can be useful when the contract wants to ensure that the value of a state variable cannot be changed by any function in the contract. This can be useful for storing values that are important to the contract's behavior, such as the contract's address or the maximum number of times a certain function can be called. The team is advised to add the constant keyword to state variables that never change.

Team Update

The team has acknowledged that this is not a security issue and states:

No edit will be made to address this.

L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	ShadowGoldLiquidityLock.sol#L366,367,368,369,411,431
Status	Acknowledged

Description

The Solidity style guide is a set of guidelines for writing clean and consistent Solidity code. Adhering to a style guide can help improve the readability and maintainability of the Solidity code, making it easier for others to understand and work with.

The followings are a few key points from the Solidity style guide:

1. Use camelCase for function and variable names, with the first letter in lowercase (e.g., myVariable, updateCounter).
2. Use PascalCase for contract, struct, and enum names, with the first letter in uppercase (e.g., MyContract, UserStruct, ErrorEnum).
3. Use uppercase for constant variables and enums (e.g., MAX_VALUE, ERROR_CODE).
4. Use indentation to improve readability and structure.
5. Use spaces between operators and after commas.
6. Use comments to explain the purpose and behavior of the code.
7. Keep lines short (around 120 characters) to improve readability.

```
event burntShadowFi(uint256 amountWmaticAdded, uint256
amountTokenBurnt);
event addedLiquidity(uint256 liquidity);
event wmaticInjected(uint256 wmaticAmount);
event paxgInjected(uint256 paxgAmount);
uint256 _extraLockTime
address _token
```

Recommendation

By following the Solidity naming convention guidelines, the codebase increased the readability, maintainability, and makes it easier to work with.

Find more information on the Solidity documentation

<https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.17/style-guide.html#naming-convention>.

Team Update

The team has acknowledged that this is not a security issue and states:

No edit will be made to address this.

L13 - Divide before Multiply Operation

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	ShadowGoldLiquidityLock.sol#L446,448,473,475,504,506,532,534,564,566,623,625,694,695,699,700,707,708,709,713,714,715
Status	Acknowledged

Description

It is important to be aware of the order of operations when performing arithmetic calculations. This is especially important when working with large numbers, as the order of operations can affect the final result of the calculation. Performing divisions before multiplications may cause loss of prediction.

```
uint256 liquidTokens = (maticPair.balanceOf(address(this)) *  
    getLPOwnershipPercent(wmaticOrPaxg)) / 10000  
uint256 removeAmount = (liquidTokens * percent) / 10000
```

Recommendation

To avoid this issue, it is recommended to carefully consider the order of operations when performing arithmetic calculations in Solidity. It's generally a good idea to use parentheses to specify the order of operations. The basic rule is that the multiplications should be prior to the divisions.

Team Update

The team has acknowledged that this is not a security issue and states:

No edit will be made to address this.

L14 - Uninitialized Variables in Local Scope

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	ShadowGoldLiquidityLock.sol#L482,541,637
Status	Acknowledged

Description

Using an uninitialized local variable can lead to unpredictable behavior and potentially cause errors in the contract. It's important to always initialize local variables with appropriate values before using them.

```
uint256 amountToken  
uint256 amountPaxg
```

Recommendation

By initializing local variables before using them, the contract ensures that the functions behave as expected and avoid potential issues.

Team Update

The team has acknowledged that this is not a security issue and states:

No edit will be made to address this.

L18 - Multiple Pragma Directives

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	ShadowGoldLiquidityLock.sol#L62,86,148,149,212
Status	Acknowledged

Description

If the contract includes multiple conflicting pragma directives, it may produce unexpected errors. To avoid this, it's important to include the correct pragma directive at the top of the contract and to ensure that it is the only pragma directive included in the contract.

```
pragma solidity >=0.5.0;  
pragma solidity >=0.7.5;  
pragma solidity ^0.8.7;  
pragma abicoder v2;
```

Recommendation

It is important to include only one pragma directive at the top of the contract and to ensure that it accurately reflects the version of Solidity that the contract is written in.

By including all required compiler options and flags in a single pragma directive, the potential conflicts could be avoided and ensure that the contract can be compiled correctly.

Team Update

The team has acknowledged that this is not a security issue and states:

No edit will be made to address this. We utilize the abi encoder for v3 swaps which are necessary for the migrations.

L19 - Stable Compiler Version

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	ShadowGoldLiquidityLock.sol#L148,212
Status	Acknowledged

Description

The `^` symbol indicates that any version of Solidity that is compatible with the specified version (i.e., any version that is a higher minor or patch version) can be used to compile the contract. The version lock is a mechanism that allows the author to specify a minimum version of the Solidity compiler that must be used to compile the contract code. This is useful because it ensures that the contract will be compiled using a version of the compiler that is known to be compatible with the code.

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.7;
```

Recommendation

The team is advised to lock the pragma to ensure the stability of the codebase. The locked pragma version ensures that the contract will not be deployed with an unexpected version. An unexpected version may produce vulnerabilities and undiscovered bugs. The compiler should be configured to the lowest version that provides all the required functionality for the codebase. As a result, the project will be compiled in a well-tested LTS (Long Term Support) environment.

Team Update

The team has acknowledged that this is not a security issue and states:

No edit will be made to address this.

L20 - Succeeded Transfer Check

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	ShadowGoldLiquidityLock.sol#L404,405,437,599,604,609,658,663,668
Status	Acknowledged

Description

According to the ERC20 specification, the transfer methods should be checked if the result is successful. Otherwise, the contract may wrongly assume that the transfer has been established.

```
maticPair.transfer(owner(), maticPair.balanceOf(address(this)))
paxgPair.transfer(owner(), paxgPair.balanceOf(address(this)))
IERC20(_token).transfer(address(msg.sender), amount)
IERC20(paxg).transfer(address(paxgPair), excessPaxg)
IERC20(wmatic).transfer(address(maticPair), excessWmatic)
shadowGoldToken.transfer(address(maticPair), excessSDG)
shadowGoldToken.transfer(address(paxgPair), excessSDG)
```

Recommendation

The contract should check if the result of the transfer methods is successful. The team is advised to check the SafeERC20 library from the [Openzeppelin library](#).

Team Update


The team has acknowledged that this is not a security issue and states:

No edit will be made to address this.


Functions Analysis

Contract	Type	Bases		
	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
ShadowGoldLiquidityLock	Implementation	Ownable, ReentrancyGuard		
		Public	✓	-
	endLock	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	extendLockTime	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	setToken	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	withdraw	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	withdrawTokens	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	shadowBurst	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	migrateSDG	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	migrateLP	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	getLPOwnershipPercent	Public		-
	getLiquidTokens	Public		-
	getLiquidPercent	Public		-
	injectMatic	Public	Payable	onlyOwner
	injectPaxg	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	getLockTime	Public		-
		External	Payable	-
		External	Payable	-

Inheritance Graph



Flow Graph



Summary

ShadowGold contract implements a locker mechanism. The `ShadowFiLiquidityLock` contract manages the liquidity of the `ShadowGoldToken`, providing mechanisms for locking liquidity, managing funds, migrating liquidity, and adjusting the token's supply. Its functionalities are designed to enhance the stability and trustworthiness of the token within the DeFi ecosystem. This audit investigates security issues, business logic concerns, and potential improvements. The team has acknowledged the findings.

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The Cyberscope team

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