

Audit Report **Lazy.Express**

May 2025

Network BSC

Address 0x2bb0b362f2F2E45284756a0cA5672e26A7777777

Audited by © cyberscope



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


Review

Contract Name	LazyExpress
Compiler Version	v0.8.19+commit.7dd6d404
Optimization	200 runs
Explorer	https://bscscan.com/address/0x2bb0b362f2F2E45284756a0 cA5672e26A7777777
Address	0x2bb0b362f2F2E45284756a0cA5672e26A7777777
Network	BSC
Symbol	Lazy
Decimals	18
Total Supply	20,000,000,000

Audit Updates

Initial Audit	08 May 2024
Corrected Phase 2	02 Aug 2024
Corrected Phase 3	16 Feb 2025
Corrected Phase 4	12 May 2025
Corrected Phase 5	22 May 2025
Corrected Phase 6	26 May 2025
Corrected Phase 7	29 May 2025



Source Files

Filename	SHA256
contracts/LotteryToken.sol	d33b142bcdfb11aa848a7952d4752216 592841162fb0b7b6b9ca1237bb919770
contracts/lib/PancakeAdapter.sol	a85fd09d6552f01d1be50f96a9ebe26d4 775e67e65cc8406f052f812b4d54519
contracts/lib/ConstantsAndTypes.sol	55e7218eed94fced7507e45f3c7102b94 dfd9a82a618e8d8f46ec228505e5cb0
contracts/lib/configs/VRFConsumerConfig.sol	7866932b3347d4c775b8a0dc502b89e8 696e3350cd972b3a92607fbba9e08fd1
contracts/lib/configs/ProtocolConfig.sol	2adfd408cbc8ac478e133c23e19b1a2f1 d481d04144d982ba8f6f728e6998ef1
contracts/lib/configs/LotteryEngineConfig.sol	4b3a38c632ffba0117db3c2b0d0a03c3c 8a97caec553e7942a37f74772ecd24f
contracts/lib/configs/Configuration.sol	b92a3ec61683b398508e80ce3d3097ad b2cd70addb66c1b8270f75106e99d97f



Overview

Lazy. Express introduces a reflection token incorporating a lottery mechanism powered by Chainlink VRF. The lottery system comprises three distinct types:

- 1. Smash Time: Triggered when a buy or sell transaction meets or exceeds the significantAmount threshold (currently set to 0.1 USD in settings). For every multiple of this amount, users receive one ticket, up to a maximum of 10 tickets per transaction. The winning ticket is drawn from all participants after the event concludes, with the prize distributed based on Chainlink randomness.
- 2. **Donation**: Participation in the donation lottery requires sending a minimum amount to the designated donation address. The quantity of donation tickets correlates with the total donation amount. Additionally, owners can generate donation tickets. This lottery type is initiated upon any transfer if sufficient eligible addresses are present.
- 3. **Holder**: Triggered by any transfer, the holder lottery awards tickets based on the number of transactions occurring since the last lottery event. Participants receive up to 3 tickets depending on their holding amount.




Findings Breakdown



Sev	verity	Unresolved	Acknowledged	Resolved	Other
•	Critical	0	0	0	0
•	Medium	0	0	0	0
	Minor / Informative	0	16	0	0





Diagnostics

CriticalMediumMinor / Informative

	Description	Status
RSW	Redundant Storage Writes	Acknowledged
• RCS	Redundant Code Segments	Acknowledged
• MEE	Missing Events Emission	Acknowledged
• CCR	Contract Centralization Risk	Acknowledged
• MSC	Missing Sanity Check	Acknowledged
• CO	Code Optimization	Acknowledged
• CR	Code Repetition	Acknowledged
UPV	Unbound Protocol Values	Acknowledged
PIMTC	Potential Incorrect Max Transaction Calculation	Acknowledged
• RSD	Redundant Swap Duplication	Acknowledged
• DPI	Decimals Precision Inconsistency	Acknowledged
PIL	Potential Incorrect Logic	Acknowledged
PVC	Price Volatility Concern	Acknowledged
• L04	Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions	Acknowledged



Express Audit 8

•	L13	Divide before Multiply Operation	Acknowledged
•	L17	Usage of Solidity Assembly	Acknowledged



CO - Code Optimization

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/LotteryToken.sol#L1310,1378
Status	Acknowledged

Description

There are code segments that could be optimized. A segment may be optimized so that it becomes a smaller size, consumes less memory, executes more rapidly, or performs fewer operations.


The function __addDonationsLotteryTickets contains a redundant conditional check towards the end of the function to verify if donations lottery is enabled and if the number of unique donators exceeds the minimum required for participation. However, this check is unnecessary since the function already begins by verifying if the donations lottery is enabled.

Furthermore, the uniqueDonatorsCounter could be checked only after the variable has been incremented.

Finally, the uniqueDonatorsCounter is updated within a for loop, that could be optimized by using a local variable and assigning it to the uniqueDonatorsCounter variable after the end of the for loop.



```
function addDonationsLotteryTickets(address transferrer, address
recipient, uint256 amount) private {
   if (! lotteryConfig.donationsLotteryEnabled) {
        return:
    // if this transfer is a donation, add a ticket for transferrer.
    if ( recipient == lotteryConfig.donationAddress && amount >=
lotteryConfig.minimalDonation) {
       if ( donatorTicketIdxs[ donationRound][ transferrer].length == 0)
            uniqueDonatorsCounter++;
       uint256 length = donators.length;
        donators.push( transferrer);
        donatorTicketIdxs[ donationRound][ transferrer].push(length);
   if ( lotteryConfig.donationsLotteryEnabled && uniqueDonatorsCounter
>= lotteryConfig.minimumDonationEntries) {
       donationsLottery();
function mintDonationTickets(address[] calldata recipients, uint256[]
calldata amounts) external onlyOwner {
   uint256 recipientsLength = recipients.length;
    if (recipientsLength != amounts.length) {
       revert RecipientsLengthNotEqualToAmounts();
   uint256 round = donationRound;
    for (uint256 i = 0; i < recipientsLength;) {</pre>
       address recipient = recipients[i];
       uint256 amount = amounts[i];
       uint256 idx = donatorTicketIdxs[round][recipient].length;
       uint256 newIdx = idx + amount;
        if ( donatorTicketIdxs[round][recipient].length == 0) {
            uniqueDonatorsCounter++;
        for (; idx < newIdx;) {</pre>
            donators.push(recipient);
            donatorTicketIdxs[round][recipient].push(idx);
           unchecked {
               ++idx;
       unchecked {
```



```
++i;
}
}
}
```

The team is advised to take these segments into consideration and rewrite them so the runtime will be more performant. That way it will improve the efficiency and performance of the source code and reduce the cost of executing it.



CR - Code Repetition

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/LotteryToken.sol#L827,856
Status	Acknowledged

Description

During the assessment, we identified redundant logic in the contract related to prize conversion for two different lotteries, namely the SmashTime Lottery and the Donation Lottery. Specifically, the contract contains two private methods named

_convertSmashTimeLotteryPrize and _convertDonationLotteryPrize , both of which essentially perform the same operations with minor differences in variable names.

In both methods, the following steps are executed:

- 1. Determine the amount of tokens held in the respective lottery prize pool.
- 2. Transfer these tokens to the contract.
- 3. Convert the transferred tokens into BNB (Binance Coin) using the swapTokensForBNB function.
- 4. Update the BNB prize balance for the corresponding lottery.

While the functionality is identical, the only discrepancies lie in the variables used to identify the prize pool address and the BNB prize balance storage variable.



```
function convertSmashTimeLotteryPrize() private {
   uint256 conversionAmount =
balanceOf(smashTimeLotteryPrizePoolAddress);
    tokenTransfer(smashTimeLotteryPrizePoolAddress, address(this),
conversionAmount);
    uint256 convertedBNB = swapTokensForBNB(conversionAmount);
    unchecked {
       smashtimeLotteryBNBPrize += convertedBNB;
    * Convert prize for Donation Lottery.
function convertDonationLotteryPrize() private {
   uint256 conversionAmount =
balanceOf (donationLotteryPrizePoolAddress);
    tokenTransfer(donationLotteryPrizePoolAddress, address(this),
conversionAmount);
    uint256 convertedBNB = swapTokensForBNB(conversionAmount);
        donationLotteryBNBPrize += convertedBNB;
```

The team is advised to avoid repeating the same code in multiple places, which can make the contract easier to read and maintain. The authors could try to reuse code wherever possible, as this can help reduce the complexity and size of the contract. For instance, the contract could reuse the common code segments in an internal function in order to avoid repeating the same code in multiple places.



CCR - Contract Centralization Risk

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/LotteryToken.sol#L1365,1470,1487,1507,1522,1526,1530,1534, 1538,1542,1547,1551 contracts/lib/Configuration.sol#L53,59,63,67,73,77,83,89,95,99,103,107,1 11,115,119,123,127,131,135,139,143,147,151,155,159,168,172,176,185
Status	Acknowledged

Description

The contract's functionality and behavior are heavily dependent on external parameters or configurations. While external configuration can offer flexibility, it also poses several centralization risks that warrant attention. Centralization risks arising from the dependence on external configuration include Single Point of Control, Vulnerability to Attacks, Operational Delays, Trust Dependencies, and Decentralization Erosion.

```
function mintDonationTickets(address[] calldata _recipients, uint256[]
calldata _amounts) external onlyOwner
...
function updateHolderList(address[] calldata _holdersToCheck) external
onlyOwner
...
function updateHolderList(address[] calldata _holdersToCheck) external
onlyOwner
...
function includeInReward(address _account) external onlyOwner
...
function setWhitelist(address _account, bool _status) external onlyOwner
...
function setMaxBuyPercent(uint256 _maxBuyPercent) external onlyOwner
...
function setSwapAndLiquifyEnabled(bool _enabled) external onlyOwner
...
function setLiquiditySupplyThreshold(uint256 _amount) external onlyOwner
...
function setFeeSupplyThreshold(uint256 _amount) external onlyOwner
...
function setThreeDaysProtection(bool _enabled) external onlyOwner
...
function withdraw(uint256 _amount) external onlyOwner
...
function withdraw(uint256 _amount) external onlyOwner
...
function withdrawBNB(uint256 _amount) external onlyOwner
...
function withdrawBNB(uint256 _amount) external onlyOwner
```



. . .

Recommendation

To address this finding and mitigate centralization risks, it is recommended to evaluate the feasibility of migrating critical configurations and functionality into the contract's codebase itself. This approach would reduce external dependencies and enhance the contract's self-sufficiency. It is essential to carefully weigh the trade-offs between external configuration flexibility and the risks associated with centralization.



DPI - Decimals Precision Inconsistency

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/LotteryToken.sol#L1353
Status	Acknowledged

Description

However, there is an inconsistency in the way that the decimals field is handled in some ERC20 contracts. The ERC20 specification does not specify how the decimals field should be implemented, and as a result, some contracts use different precision numbers.

This inconsistency can cause problems when interacting with these contracts, as it is not always clear how the decimals field should be interpreted. For example, if a contract expects the decimals field to be 18 digits, but the contract being interacted with uses 8 digits, the result of the interaction may not be what was expected.

```
uint256 usdAmount = _TokenPriceInUSD(_amount) / 1e18;
uint256 hundreds = usdAmount / 100;
```

Recommendation

To avoid these issues, it is important to carefully review the implementation of the decimals field of the underlying tokens. The team is advised to normalize each decimal to one single source of truth. A recommended way is to scale all the decimals to the greatest token's decimal. Hence, the contract will not lose precision in the calculations.



The following example depicts 3 tokens with different decimals precision.

ERC20	Decimals
Token 1	6
Token 2	9
Token 3	18

All the decimals could be normalized to 18 since it represents the ERC20 token with the greatest digits.

Team Update

The team states that the address under review (0xe9e7CEA3DedcA5984780Bafc599bD69ADd087D56) corresponds to BUSD, which uses 18 decimals, as confirmed on BscScan.



MEE - Missing Events Emission

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/LotteryToken.sol#L555,1499,1516,1522,1526,1530,1534,1538,1 542 contracts/lib/configs/Configuration.sol
Status	Acknowledged

Description

The contract performs actions and state mutations from external methods that do not result in the emission of events. Emitting events for significant actions is important as it allows external parties, such as wallets or dApps, to track and monitor the activity on the contract. Without these events, it may be difficult for external parties to accurately determine the current state of the contract.



```
function takeLiquidity(uint256 rLiquidity, uint256 tLiquidity) private
function excludeFromReward(address account) public onlyOwner
function includeInReward(address account) external onlyOwner
function setWhitelist(address account, bool status) external onlyOwner
function setMaxBuyPercent(uint256 maxBuyPercent) external onlyOwner
function setSwapAndLiquifyEnabled(bool enabled) external onlyOwner
function setLiquiditySupplyThreshold(uint256 amount) external onlyOwner
function setFeeSupplyThreshold(uint256 amount) external onlyOwner
function setThreeDaysProtection(bool enabled) external onlyOwner
function setHolderLotteryPrizePoolAddress(
   address newAddress
) external onlyOwner
function setSmashTimeLotteryPrizePoolAddress(
   address newAddress
) external onlyOwner
function setDonationLotteryPrizePoolAddress(
   address newAddress
) external onlyOwner
function setTeamAddress(address newAddress) external onlyOwner
function setTeamAccumulationAddress(address newAddress) external
onlyOwner
function setTreasuryAddress(address newAddress) external onlyOwner
function setTreasuryAccumulationAddress (address newAddress) external
onlyOwner
function setFeeConfig(uint256 feeConfigRaw) external onlyOwner
function switchSmashTimeLotteryFlag(bool flag) external onlyOwner
function switchHoldersLotteryFlag(bool flag) external onlyOwner
function switchDonationsLotteryFlag(bool flag) external onlyOwner
function excludeFromFee (address account) external onlyOwner
```



```
function includeInFee(address account) external onlyOwner
function setHoldersLotteryTxTrigger(uint64 txAmount) external onlyOwner
function setHoldersLotteryMinPercent(uint256 minPercent) external
onlyOwner
function setDonationAddress(address donationAddress) external onlyOwner
function setMinimalDonation(uint256 minimalDonation) external onlyOwner
function setFee(uint256 fee) external onlyOwner
function setMinimumDonationEntries(uint64 minimumEntries) external
onlyOwner
function setSmashTimePrizePercent(uint256 value) external onlyOwner
function setHoldersLottreryPrizePercent(uint256 value) external
onlyOwner
function setDonationLotteryPrizePercent(uint256 value) external
onlyOwner
function setTreasuryPlainTokenPercent(uint256 value) external onlyOwner
function setSignificantAmountForTransfer(uint256 value) external
onlyOwner
```

It is recommended to include events in the code that are triggered each time a significant action is taking place within the contract. These events should include relevant details such as the user's address and the nature of the action taken. By doing so, the contract will be more transparent and easily auditable by external parties. It will also help prevent potential issues or disputes that may arise in the future.



MSC - Missing Sanity Check

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/LotteryToken.sol#L187,1526,1534,1538 contracts/lib/Configuration.sol#L53
Status	Acknowledged

Description

The contract is processing variables that have not been properly sanitized and checked that they form the proper shape. These variables may produce vulnerability issues.

The function arguments are not properly sanitized.

```
constructor (
  address mintSupplyTo,
   address coordinatorAddress,
   address routerAddress,
   address wbnbAddress,
   address tusdAddress,
   uint256 fee,
   ConsumerConfig memory consumerConfig,
   DistributionConfig memory distributionConfig,
   LotteryConfig memory lotteryConfig
   VRFConsumerBaseV2 ( coordinatorAddress)
   PancakeAdapter( routerAddress, wbnbAddress, tusdAddress)
   Configuration( fee, consumerConfig, distributionConfig,
lotteryConfig)
function setMaxBuyPercent(uint256 maxBuyPercent) external onlyOwner
function setLiquiditySupplyThreshold(uint256 amount) external
onlyOwner
function setFeeSupplyThreshold(uint256 amount) external onlyOwner
function setFeeConfig(uint256 feeConfigRaw) external onlyOwner
function setFee(uint256 fee) external onlyOwner
```



The team is advised to properly check the variables according to the required specifications.

Team Update

The team added a check to setMaxBuyPercent function.



PIL - Potential Incorrect Logic

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/LotteryToken.sol#L960
Status	Acknowledged

Description

The contract implements a mechanism to differentiate between regular transfers and other types of transactions, such as those involving liquidity pools. The relevant code segment for this check is as follows:

```
// if pair is not involved => its a regular transfer
bool regularTransfer = (_sender != PANCAKE_PAIR && _recipient !=
PANCAKE_PAIR) ||
    (_isExcludeFromRegularTransfer[_sender] ||
    isExcludeFromRegularTransfer[_recipient]);
```

The logic intends to mark a transaction as a regular transfer if both the sender and recipient are not the liquidity pair address (PANCAKE_PAIR). However, it incorrectly includes a condition that checks if either the sender or recipient is marked as excluded from regular transfers (isExcludeFromRegularTransfer).

The boolean logic within this condition is flawed due to the use of the or (| |) operator, which incorrectly results in the regularTransfer flag being set to true even when either the sender or recipient is excluded from regular transfers. This contradicts the intended behavior implied by the naming of the

```
isExcludeFromRegularTransfer array.
```

```
Specifically, the statement: solidity

(_isExcludeFromRegularTransfer[_sender] ||

_isExcludeFromRegularTransfer[_recipient]) causes regularTransfer

to be true if either __sender or __recipient is excluded from regular transfers,

regardless of their involvement with the liquidity pair. This can lead to misclassifying

transactions involving excluded addresses as regular transfers.
```



To align the logic with the intended functionality, the condition should be revised to correctly reflect the exclusion logic. The corrected logic should ensure that a transaction is marked as a regular transfer only if neither the sender nor the recipient is the pair address and neither is excluded from regular transfers.



PIMTC - Potential Incorrect Max Transaction Calculation

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/LotteryToken.sol#L584,906
Status	Acknowledged

Description

The contract includes a mechanism to enforce a maximum transaction limit, ensuring that no single transfer exceeds a predefined percentage of the total supply. The contract also calculates and imposes fees on token transfers, which are intended to be factored into the max transaction limit check. However, the implementation incorrectly assumes the fee will be applied to the current transaction, potentially leading to inaccurate validation.

In the __antiAbuse function, the contract attempts to prevent large transactions by comparing the transaction amount against a percentage of the total supply. The relevant code snippet is:

Here, the __amount is adjusted by subtracting the calculated fee percentage (__calcFeePercent()). This adjusted amount is then compared against the allowable max transaction limit. However, the fee might not be applicable to the current transaction due to various conditions (e.g., addresses being excluded from fees), leading to a discrepancy between the actual transaction amount and the assumed amount used in the validation.

As a result, transactions that should be permitted might be incorrectly reverted, and transactions that should be restricted might bypass the limitation.



The team is advised to refactor the __antiAbuse function to correctly account for the actual transaction amount after fees are applied, ensuring accurate enforcement of the max transaction limit. This can be achieved by determining the fee applicability before performing the max transaction limit check.

This adjustment ensures that the actual amount being transferred (after fees) is used to check against the max transaction limit, thereby aligning the logic with the intended behavior.



PVC - Price Volatility Concern

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	LotteryToken.sol#L658,1643
Status	Acknowledged

Description

The contract accumulates tokens from the taxes to swap them for ETH. The variable liquiditySupplyThreshold sets a threshold where the contract will trigger the swap functionality. If the variable is set to a big number, then the contract will swap a huge amount of tokens for ETH.

It is important to note that the price of the token representing it, can be highly volatile. This means that the value of a price volatility swap involving Ether could fluctuate significantly at the triggered point, potentially leading to significant price volatility for the parties involved.



The contract could ensure that it will not sell more than a reasonable amount of tokens in a single transaction. A suggested implementation could check that the maximum amount should be less than a fixed percentage of the exchange reserves. Hence, the contract will guarantee that it cannot accumulate a huge amount of tokens in order to sell them.



RCS - Redundant Code Segments

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/LotteryToken.sol#L138,139,145,246,253
Status	Acknowledged

Description

The contract is currently containing code segments, that do not provide any actual functionality. Such redundant code segments can lead to confusion and misinterpretation of the contract's purpose and functionality. Moreover, they contribute to unnecessary bloat in the contract, potentially impacting its efficiency and clarity.

```
// TODO: use real value
```

Recommendation

It is recommended to remove these redundant code segments from the contract. Eliminating these non-functional parts will streamline the contract, making it more efficient and easier to comprehend. This action will also reduce the potential for confusion among users and developers who interact with or audit the contract.



RSW - Redundant Storage Writes

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/LotteryToken.sol#L1522,1530,1542
Status	Acknowledged

Description

The contract modifies the state of the following variables without checking if their current value is the same as the one given as an argument. As a result, the contract performs redundant storage writes, when the provided parameter matches the current state of the variables, leading to unnecessary gas consumption and inefficiencies in contract execution.

```
function setWhitelist(address _account, bool _status) external
onlyOwner {
    whitelist[_account] = _status;
}
...
function setSwapAndLiquifyEnabled(bool _enabled) external onlyOwner
{
    swapAndLiquifyEnabled = _enabled;
}
...
function setThreeDaysProtection(bool _enabled) external onlyOwner {
    threeDaysProtectionEnabled = _enabled;
}
```

Recommendation

The team is advised to implement additional checks within to prevent redundant storage writes when the provided argument matches the current state of the variables. By incorporating statements to compare the new values with the existing values before proceeding with any state modification, the contract can avoid unnecessary storage operations, thereby optimizing gas usage.



RSD - Redundant Swap Duplication

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/LotteryToken.sol#L664,697,698
Status	Acknowledged

Description

The contract contains multiple swap methods that individually perform token swaps and transfer promotional amounts to specific addresses and features. This redundant duplication of code introduces unnecessary complexity and increases dramatically the gas consumption. By consolidating these operations into a single swap method, the contract can achieve better code readability, reduce gas costs, and improve overall efficiency.

```
function _distributeFees() private lockTheSwap {
    _distributeFeeToAddress(teamFeesAccumulationAddress, teamAddress);
    _distributeFeeToAddress(treasuryFeesAccumulationAddress,
    treasuryAddress);
    ...
}
...
function _distributeFeeToAddress(address _feeAccumulationAddress, address _destinationAddress) private {
    ...
    _swapTokensForTUSDT(half, _destinationAddress);
    _swapTokensForBNB(accumulatedBalance - half, _destinationAddress);
    ...
}
```

Recommendation

A more optimized approach could be adopted to perform the token swap operation once for the total amount of tokens and distribute the proportional amounts to the corresponding addresses, eliminating the need for separate swaps.



UPV - Unbound Protocol Values

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/LotteryToken.sol#L1526,1534,1538 contracts/lib/configs/ProtocolConfig.sol#L65,69,73
Status	Acknowledged

Description

The contract contains multiple setter functions that allow the owner to update important parameters. Specifically, the functions setMaxBuyPercent, setLiquiditySupplyThreshold, and setFeeSupplyThreshold do not enforce any upper or lower bounds on the values that can be set.

```
function setMaxBuyPercent(uint256 _maxBuyPercent) external onlyOwner
{
    maxBuyPercent = _maxBuyPercent;
}

function setLiquiditySupplyThreshold(uint256 _amount) external
onlyOwner {
    liquiditySupplyThreshold = _amount;
}

function setFeeSupplyThreshold(uint256 _amount) external onlyOwner {
    feeSupplyThreshold = _amount;
}

...
function _setFeeConfig(uint256 _feeConfigRaw) internal {
    _fees = Fee.wrap(_feeConfigRaw);
}

function _setTreasuryPlainTokenPercent(uint256 _value) internal {
        plainTokenPercent = _value;
}

function _setSignificantAmountForTransfer(uint256 _value) internal {
        significantAmount = _value;
}
```



To mitigate these risks, the team is advised to introduce reasonable upper and lower bounds for each of these parameters. This can be done by adding validation logic within each setter function. By implementing these bounds, the contract can ensure that these critical parameters remain within a safe and reasonable range, thereby reducing the risk of misconfiguration and enhancing the overall security and reliability of the contract.

Team Update

The team added a check to setMaxBuyPercent function, that it cannot be zero.



L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	PancakeAdapter.sol#L8,9,11,13,131 LotteryToken.sol#L129,153,257,270,281,291,308,309,310,334,344,357,53 3,933,934,1205,1303,1427,1454,1455,1508,1518,1527,1564,1582,1606,1 615,1624,1639,1643,1650,1654,1658,1662,1666,1672,1676 lib/PancakeAdapter.sol#L8,9,11,13,131 lib/ConstantsAndTypes.sol#L114,130,150,220,243,250,271,272,277,284, 305,306,312,313,322,323,329,330 ConstantsAndTypes.sol#L114,130,150,220,243,250,271,272,277,284,305 ,306,312,313,322,323,329,330
Status	Acknowledged

Description

The Solidity style guide is a set of guidelines for writing clean and consistent Solidity code. Adhering to a style guide can help improve the readability and maintainability of the Solidity code, making it easier for others to understand and work with.

The followings are a few key points from the Solidity style guide:

- 1. Use camelCase for function and variable names, with the first letter in lowercase (e.g., myVariable, updateCounter).
- 2. Use PascalCase for contract, struct, and enum names, with the first letter in uppercase (e.g., MyContract, UserStruct, ErrorEnum).
- Use uppercase for constant variables and enums (e.g., MAX_VALUE, ERROR_CODE).
- 4. Use indentation to improve readability and structure.
- 5. Use spaces between operators and after commas.
- 6. Use comments to explain the purpose and behavior of the code.
- 7. Keep lines short (around 120 characters) to improve readability.



By following the Solidity naming convention guidelines, the codebase increased the readability, maintainability, and makes it easier to work with.

Find more information on the Solidity documentation

https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/stable/style-guide.html#naming-conventions.



L13 - Divide before Multiply Operation

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	lib/ConstantsAndTypes.sol#L123,124,125,126,140,142,143,144,145,146 ConstantsAndTypes.sol#L123,124,125,126,140,142,143,144,145,146
Status	Acknowledged

Description

It is important to be aware of the order of operations when performing arithmetic calculations. This is especially important when working with large numbers, as the order of operations can affect the final result of the calculation. Performing divisions before multiplications may cause loss of prediction.

```
prize = (accumulated * uint32(val)) / PRECISION
first = (prize * uint32(val >> 32)) / PRECISION

uint256 prize = (accumulated * uint32(val)) / PRECISION
first = (prize * uint32(val >> 32)) / PRECISION
```

Recommendation

To avoid this issue, it is recommended to carefully consider the order of operations when performing arithmetic calculations in Solidity. It's generally a good idea to use parentheses to specify the order of operations. The basic rule is that the multiplications should be prior to the divisions.



L17 - Usage of Solidity Assembly

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	LotteryToken.sol#L921,1191,1205,1302,1303
Status	Acknowledged

Description

Using assembly can be useful for optimizing code, but it can also be error-prone. It's important to carefully test and debug assembly code to ensure that it is correct and does not contain any errors.

Some common types of errors that can occur when using assembly in Solidity include Syntax, Type, Out-of-bounds, Stack, and Revert.

```
assembly {
          __words := add(_array, ONE_WORD)
     }

assembly {
          winnerIdx := mod(mload(_random), 100)
     }

function transfer_unsafe(recipient, amount) {
                pop(call(gas(), recipient, amount, 0, 0, 0, 0))
           }

...
```

Recommendation

It is recommended to use assembly sparingly and only when necessary, as it can be difficult to read and understand compared to Solidity code.



Functions Analysis


Contract	Туре	Bases		
	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
LazyExpress	Implementation	VRFConsum erBaseV2Plu s, PancakeAda pter, Configuratio n		
		Public	✓	VRFConsumerB aseV2Plus PancakeAdapte r Configuration
	name	External		-
	symbol	External		-
	totalSupply	External		-
	balanceOf	Public		-
	transfer	External	✓	-
	allowance	External		-
	approve	External	✓	-
	transferFrom	External	✓	-
	increaseAllowance	External	1	-
	decreaseAllowance	External	1	-
	tokenFromReflection	Public		-
		External	Payable	-
	_reflectFee	Private	✓	
	_getValues	Private		



_getTValues	Private		
_getRValues	Private		
_getRate	Private		
_getCurrentSupply	Public		-
_takeLiquidity	Private	1	
_approve	Private	✓	
_antiAbuse	Private		
_transfer	Private	✓	swapLockOnPai rCall
_distributeFees	Private	1	lockTheSwap
_distributeFeeToAddress	Private	✓	
_checkForHoldersLotteryEligibility	Private	✓	
_holdersEligibilityThreshold	Private		
_checkForHoldersLotteryEligibilities	Private	✓	
_convertSmashTimeLotteryPrize	Private	✓	
_convertDonationLotteryPrize	Private	✓	
_lotteryOnTransfer	Private	✓	
_requestRandomWords	Private	✓	
_toRandomWords	Private		
fulfillRandomWords	Internal	1	
_swapAndLiquify	Private	1	lockTheSwap
_tokenTransfer	Private	1	
_transferStandard	Private	1	
_transferToExcluded	Private	1	



_transferFromExcluded	Private	✓	
_transferBothExcluded	Private	✓	
totalFeePercent	External		-
_finishRound	Private	✓	
_calculateSmashTimeLotteryPrize	Private		
_finishSmashTimeLottery	Private	✓	
_finishHoldersLottery	Private	✓	
_finishDonationLottery	Private	✓	
_smashTimeLottery	Private	✓	
_triggerHoldersLottery	Private	✓	
_addDonationsLotteryTickets	Private	✓	
_donationsLottery	Private	✓	
transferDonationTicket	External	✓	-
mintDonationTickets	External	✓	onlyOwner
holdersLotteryTickets	External		-
donationLotteryTickets	External		-
donationLotteryTicketsAmountPerDonat or	External		-
donate	External	✓	-
availableHoldersLotteryTickets	External		-
claimHoldersLotteryTickets	External	✓	-
updateHolderList	External	✓	onlyOwner
excludeFromReward	Public	✓	onlyOwner
excludeFromRegularTransfer	Public	✓	onlyOwner



	includeInRegularTransfer	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	includeInReward	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setWhitelist	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setMaxBuyPercent	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setSwapAndLiquifyEnabled	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setLiquiditySupplyThreshold	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setFeeSupplyThreshold	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setThreeDaysProtection	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setCanBuy	External	✓	onlyOwner
	withdraw	External	✓	onlyOwner
	withdrawBNB	External	1	onlyOwner
PancakeAdapter	Implementation			
		Public	✓	-
	_createPancakeSwapPair	Internal	✓	
	_addLiquidity	Internal	✓	
	_swapTokensForBNB	Internal	✓	
	_swapTokensForBNBUnsafe	Internal	✓	
	_swapTokensForBNB	Internal	✓	
	_swapTokensForBNBUnsafe	Internal	✓	
	_swapTokensForTUSDT	Internal	✓	
	_TokenPriceInUSD	Internal		
	_isSignificant	Internal		



TypesHelpers	Library			
	getPrizes	Internal		
	getPrizes	Internal		
	compact	Internal		
	burnFeePercent	Internal		
	liquidityFeePercent	Internal		
	distributionFeePercent	Internal		
	treasuryFeePercent	Internal		
	devFeePercent	Internal		
	smashTimeLotteryPrizeFeePercent	Internal		
	holdersLotteryPrizeFeePercent	Internal		
	donationLotteryPrizeFeePercent	Internal		
	allTickets	Internal		
	addFirst	Internal	✓	
	removeFirst	Internal	✓	
	existsFirst	Internal		
	addSecond	Internal	✓	
	removeSecond	Internal	✓	
	existsSecond	Internal		
	addThird	Internal	1	
	existsThird	Internal		
	removeThird	Internal	1	




VRFConsumerC onfig	Implementation			
		Public	1	-
	_setConfig	Internal	✓	
	_setSubscriptionId	Internal	✓	
	_setCallbackGasLimit	Internal	✓	
	_setRequestConfirmations	Internal	✓	
	_setGasPriceKey	Internal	1	
ProtocolConfig	Implementation			
		Public	1	-
	_setHolderLotteryPrizePoolAddress	Internal	✓	
	_setSmashTimeLotteryPrizePoolAddres s	Internal	✓	
	_setDonationLotteryPrizePoolAddress	Internal	✓	
	_setTeamAddress	Internal	✓	
	_setTeamAccumulationAddress	Internal	✓	
	_setTreasuryAccumulationAddress	Internal	✓	
	_setTreasuryAddress	Internal	1	
	_setFeeConfig	Internal	1	
	_setTreasuryPlainTokenPercent	Internal	✓	
	_setSignificantAmountForTransfer	Internal	✓	
LotteryEngineC onfig	Implementation			



		Public	✓	-
	_setSmashTimePrizePercent	Internal	✓	
	_setHoldersLottreryPrizePercent	Internal	✓	
	_setDonationLotteryPrizePercent	Internal	✓	
	_switchSmashTimeLotteryFlag	Internal	✓	
	_switchHoldersLotteryFlag	Internal	✓	
	_setHoldersLotteryTxTrigger	Internal	✓	
	_setHoldersLotteryMinPercent	Internal	✓	
	_setDonationAddress	Internal	✓	
	_switchDonationsLotteryFlag	Internal	✓	
	_setMinimanDonation	Internal	✓	
	_setMinimumDonationEntries	Internal	✓	
Configuration	Implementation	IConfiguratio n, VRFConsum erConfig, ProtocolConf ig, LotteryEngin eConfig, ConfirmedO wner		
		Public	✓	VRFConsumerC onfig ProtocolConfig LotteryEngineC onfig
	_calcFeePercent	Internal		
	setConsumerConfig	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setSubscriptionId	External	✓	onlyOwner
	setCallbackGasLimit	External	✓	onlyOwner



setRequestConfirmations	External	✓	onlyOwner
setGasPriceKey	External	✓	onlyOwner
setHolderLotteryPrizePoolAddress	External	✓	onlyOwner
setSmashTimeLotteryPrizePoolAddress	External	✓	onlyOwner
setDonationLotteryPrizePoolAddress	External	✓	onlyOwner
setTeamAddress	External	✓	onlyOwner
setTeamAccumulationAddress	External	✓	onlyOwner
setTreasuryAddress	External	✓	onlyOwner
setTreasuryAccumulationAddress	External	✓	onlyOwner
setFeeConfig	External	✓	onlyOwner
switchSmashTimeLotteryFlag	External	✓	onlyOwner
switchHoldersLotteryFlag	External	✓	onlyOwner
switchDonationsLotteryFlag	External	✓	onlyOwner
excludeFromFee	External	✓	onlyOwner
includeInFee	External	✓	onlyOwner
setHoldersLotteryTxTrigger	External	✓	onlyOwner
setHoldersLotteryMinPercent	External	✓	onlyOwner
setDonationAddress	External	✓	onlyOwner
setMinimalDonation	External	1	onlyOwner
setFee	External	✓	onlyOwner
setMinimumDonationEntries	External	✓	onlyOwner
setSmashTimePrizePercent	External	1	onlyOwner
setHoldersLottreryPrizePercent	External	1	onlyOwner



setDonationLotteryPrizePercent	External	✓	onlyOwner
setTreasuryPlainTokenPercent	External	✓	onlyOwner
setSignificantAmountForTransfer	External	1	onlyOwner
burnFeePercent	External		-
liquidityFeePercent	External		-
distributionFeePercent	External		-
treasuryFeePercent	External		-
devFeePercent	External		-
smashTimeLotteryPrizeFeePercent	Public		-
holdersLotteryPrizeFeePercent	Public		-
donationLotteryPrizeFeePercent	Public		-
isExcludedFromFee	External		-
isExcludedFromReward	External		-
isExcludedFromRegularTransfer	External		-
smashTimeLotteryEnabled	External		-
holdersLotteryEnabled	External		-
holdersLotteryTxTrigger	External		-
holdersLotteryMinPercent	External		-
donationAddress	External		-
donationsLotteryEnabled	External		-
minimumDonationEntries	External		-
minimalDonation	External		-
subscriptionId	External		-



	callbackGasLimit	External		-
	requestConfirmations	External		-
	gasPriceKey	External		-
IConfiguration	Interface			
	setConsumerConfig	External	1	-
	setSubscriptionId	External	1	-
	setCallbackGasLimit	External	✓	-
	setRequestConfirmations	External	✓	-
	setGasPriceKey	External	1	-
	setTeamAddress	External	1	-
	setTeamAccumulationAddress	External	✓	-
	setTreasuryAddress	External	✓	-
	setTreasuryAccumulationAddress	External	✓	-
	setFeeConfig	External	1	-
	switchSmashTimeLotteryFlag	External	✓	-
	switchHoldersLotteryFlag	External	✓	-
	switchDonationsLotteryFlag	External	✓	-
	excludeFromFee	External	✓	-
	includeInFee	External	✓	-
	setHoldersLotteryTxTrigger	External	✓	-
	setHoldersLotteryMinPercent	External	✓	-
	setDonationAddress	External	1	-




setMinimalDonation	External	✓	-
setFee	External	✓	-
setMinimumDonationEntries	External	✓	-
burnFeePercent	External		-
liquidityFeePercent	External		-
distributionFeePercent	External		-
treasuryFeePercent	External		-
devFeePercent	External		-
smashTimeLotteryPrizeFeePercent	External		-
holdersLotteryPrizeFeePercent	External		-
donationLotteryPrizeFeePercent	External		-
isExcludedFromFee	External		-
isExcludedFromReward	External		-
smashTimeLotteryEnabled	External		-
holdersLotteryEnabled	External		-
holdersLotteryTxTrigger	External		-
holdersLotteryMinPercent	External		-
donationAddress	External		-
donationsLotteryEnabled	External		-
minimumDonationEntries	External		-
minimalDonation	External		-
subscriptionId	External		-
callbackGasLimit	External		-



requestConfirmations	External	-	
gasPriceKey	External	-	



Inheritance Graph





Summary

Lazy. Express is an interesting project that has a friendly and growing community. This audit investigates security issues, business logic concerns and potential improvements. The team has acknowledged the findings.



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The Cyberscope team

https://www.cyberscope.io