



Cyberscope

# Audit Report

## **Grok New Year**

December 2023

Network    BSC

Address    0x6bdB939815164d9107aEBa34EEe962BA0EFCC158

Audited by    © cyberscope

# Analysis

● Critical   ● Medium   ● Minor / Informative   ● Pass

| Severity | Code | Description             | Status |
|----------|------|-------------------------|--------|
| ●        | ST   | Stops Transactions      | Passed |
| ●        | OTUT | Transfers User's Tokens | Passed |
| ●        | ELFM | Exceeds Fees Limit      | Passed |
| ●        | MT   | Mints Tokens            | Passed |
| ●        | BT   | Burns Tokens            | Passed |
| ●        | BC   | Blacklists Addresses    | Passed |

# Diagnostics

● Critical ● Medium ● Minor / Informative

| Severity | Code | Description                                | Status     |
|----------|------|--|------------|
| ●        | PVC  | Price Volatility Concern                   | Unresolved |
| ●        | DDP  | Decimal Division Precision                 | Unresolved |
| ●        | MAU  | Misleading Address Usage                   | Unresolved |
| ●        | CR   | Code Repetition                            | Unresolved |
| ●        | RSW  | Redundant Storage Writes                   | Unresolved |
| ●        | PAV  | Pair Address Validation                    | Unresolved |
| ●        | MEE  | Missing Events Emission                    | Unresolved |
| ●        | MVD  | Misleading Variable Definition             | Unresolved |
| ●        | L02  | State Variables could be Declared Constant | Unresolved |
| ●        | L04  | Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions | Unresolved |
| ●        | L13  | Divide before Multiply Operation           | Unresolved |
| ●        | L19  | Stable Compiler Version                    | Unresolved |
| ●        | L20  | Succeeded Transfer Check                   | Unresolved |

# Table of Contents

|  |          |
|--|----------|
| <b>Analysis</b>                                  | <b>1</b> |
| <b>Diagnostics</b>                               | <b>2</b> |
| <b>Table of Contents</b>                         | <b>3</b> |
| <b>Review</b>                                    | <b>5</b> |
| Audit Updates                                    | 5        |
| Source Files                                     | 5        |
| <b>Findings Breakdown</b>                        | <b>7</b> |
| MVD - Misleading Variable Definition             | 8        |
| Description                                      | 8        |
| Recommendation                                   | 8        |
| MEE - Missing Events Emission                    | 9        |
| Description                                      | 9        |
| Recommendation                                   | 9        |
| PAV - Pair Address Validation                    | 10       |
| Description                                      | 10       |
| Recommendation                                   | 10       |
| RSW - Redundant Storage Writes                   | 11       |
| Description                                      | 11       |
| Recommendation                                   | 11       |
| CR - Code Repetition                             | 12       |
| Description                                      | 12       |
| Recommendation                                   | 12       |
| MAU - Misleading Address Usage                   | 13       |
| Description                                      | 13       |
| Recommendation                                   | 13       |
| DDP - Decimal Division Precision                 | 14       |
| Description                                      | 14       |
| Recommendation                                   | 14       |
| PVC - Price Volatility Concern                   | 15       |
| Description                                      | 15       |
| Recommendation                                   | 15       |
| L02 - State Variables could be Declared Constant | 16       |
| Description                                      | 16       |
| Recommendation                                   | 16       |
| L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions | 17       |
| Description                                      | 17       |
| Recommendation                                   | 18       |
| L13 - Divide before Multiply Operation           | 19       |
| Description                                      | 19       |

|                                |           |
|--------------------------------|-----------|
| Recommendation                 | 19        |
| L19 - Stable Compiler Version  | 20        |
| Description                    | 20        |
| Recommendation                 | 20        |
| L20 - Succeeded Transfer Check | 21        |
| Description                    | 21        |
| Recommendation                 | 21        |
| <b>Functions Analysis</b>      | <b>22</b> |
| <b>Inheritance Graph</b>       | <b>25</b> |
| <b>Flow Graph</b>              | <b>26</b> |
| <b>Summary</b>                 | <b>27</b> |
| <b>Disclaimer</b>              | <b>28</b> |
| <b>About Cyberscope</b>        | <b>29</b> |

## Review

|                  |   |
|------------------|---|
| Contract Name    | GrokNY  |
| Compiler Version | v0.8.4+commit.c7e474f2  |
| Optimization     | 99999 runs  |
| Explorer         | <a href="https://bscscan.com/address/0x6bdb939815164d9107aeba34eee962ba0efcc158">https://bscscan.com/address/0x6bdb939815164d9107aeba34eee962ba0efcc158</a> |
| Address          | 0x6bdb939815164d9107aeba34eee962ba0efcc158  |
| Network          | BSC   |
| Symbol           | GrokNY  |
| Decimals         | 18  |
| Total Supply     | 10,000,000,000  |

## Audit Updates


|               |             |
|---------------|-------------|
| Initial Audit | 27 Dec 2023 |
|---------------|-------------|

## Source Files

| Filename                                     | SHA256   |
|--|--|
| contracts/GrokNYDistribution.sol             | 9dd5491ee2929d87459fbe2f1120ccb3aac<br>cac2bd128ebbb4d9926f8a8c94446 |
| contracts/GrokNY.sol                         | dc1200a796f275d6934c4868ab60a21a4bf<br>dfa39eee2aa7f72651f65d1bc2486 |
| contracts/interfaces/IGrokNYDistribution.sol | 3cef3dd78bad33c8f2c7b13785baa081cd<br>bd844901aae606de1a34a2c407c376 |

|   |  |
|---|--|
| @uniswap/v2-periphery/contracts/interfaces/IUniswapV2Router02.sol | a2900701961cb0b6152fc073856b972564f7c798797a4a044e83d2ab8f0e8d38 |
| @uniswap/v2-periphery/contracts/interfaces/IUniswapV2Router01.sol | 0439ffe0fd4a5e1f4e22d71ddbda76d63d61679947d158cba4ee0a1da60cf663 |
| @uniswap/v2-core/contracts/interfaces/IUniswapV2Factory.sol       | 51d056199e3f5e41cb1a9f11ce581aa3e190cc982db5771ffef8d8d1f962a0d  |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Strings.sol                         | cb2df477077a5963ab50a52768cb74ec6f32177177a78611ddb2c07e2d36de   |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context.sol                         | b2cfee351bcafd0f8f27c72d76c054df9b571b62cfac4781ed12c86354e2a56c |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/SignedMath.sol                 | 420a5a5d8d94611a04b39d6cf5f02492552ed4257ea82aba3c765b1ad52f77f6 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol                       | 85a2caf3bd06579fb55236398c1321e15fd524a8fe140dff748c0f73d7a52345 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/introspection/IERC165.sol           | 701e025d13ec6be09ae892eb029cd83b3064325801d73654847a5fb11c58b1e5 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/introspection/ERC165.sol            | 8806a632d7b656cadb8133ff8f2acae4405b3a64d8709d93b0fa6a216a8a6154 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol                    | 7ebde70853ccafcf1876900dad458f46eb9444d591d39bfc58e952e2582f5587 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol | af5c8a77965cc82c33b7ff844deb9826166689e55dc037a7f2f790d057811990 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/access/IAccessControl.sol                 | d03c1257f2094da6c86efa7aa09c1c07ebd33dd31046480c5097bc2542140e45 |

## Findings Breakdown



|                       |    |
|-----------------------|----|
| ● Critical            | 0  |
| ● Medium              | 0  |
| ● Minor / Informative | 13 |

| Severity              | Unresolved | Acknowledged | Resolved | Other |
|-----------------------|------------|--------------|----------|-------|
| ● Critical            | 0          | 0            | 0        | 0     |
| ● Medium              | 0          | 0            | 0        | 0     |
| ● Minor / Informative | 13         | 0            | 0        | 0     |



## MVD - Misleading Variable Definition

|             |                          |
|-------------|--------------------------|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative      |
| Location    | contracts/GrokNY.sol#L22 |
| Status      | Unresolved               |

### Description

The contract initializes the `owner` variable to the zero address ( `address(0)` ), which might create a misleading impression that the contract is renounced from its creation. However, the contract utilizes the `AccessControl` contract from OpenZeppelin, allowing the owner to have administrative rights and perform certain functions. This discrepancy in the initialization of the owner variable could be confusing for users and developers.

```
address public owner = address(0);
```

### Recommendation

The team should consider updating the initialization of the owner variable to match the actual owner address or provide a clear comment explaining the use of the `AccessControl` contract and the role designated as the owner. This will help avoid potential confusion and provide transparency regarding the contract's ownership structure.

## MEE - Missing Events Emission

|                    |                           |
|--------------------|---------------------------|
| <b>Criticality</b> | Minor / Informative       |
| <b>Location</b>    | contracts/GrokNY.sol#L171 |
| <b>Status</b>      | Unresolved                |

### Description

The contract performs actions and state mutations from external methods that do not result in the emission of events. Emitting events for significant actions is important as it allows external parties, such as wallets or dApps, to track and monitor the activity on the contract. Without these events, it may be difficult for external parties to accurately determine the current state of the contract.

```
tradingEnabled = true;
```

### Recommendation

It is recommended to include events in the code that are triggered each time a significant action is taking place within the contract. These events should include relevant details such as the user's address and the nature of the action taken. By doing so, the contract will be more transparent and easily auditable by external parties. It will also help prevent potential issues or disputes that may arise in the future.

## PAV - Pair Address Validation

|             |                           |
|-------------|---------------------------|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative       |
| Location    | contracts/GrokNY.sol#L174 |
| Status      | Unresolved                |

### Description

The `setLpToken` function allows the admin role to set any arbitrary value without validation to the `isLpToken` mapping, which is supposed to hold Uniswap pair addresses. This lack of validation can lead to unintended behavior, including the potential disruption of the contract's intended functionality.

```
function setLpToken(address _lpToken, bool _lp) external
onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
    require(_lpToken != address(0), "ERC20: invalid LP
address");
    require(_lpToken != pair, "ERC20: exclude default pair");

    isLpToken[_lpToken] = _lp;

    emit LpTokenUpdated(_lpToken, _lp);
}
```

### Recommendation

To mitigate the risks associated with the absence of address validation in the pair address argument, it is recommended to implement comprehensive address validation mechanisms. A recommended approach could be to verify pair existence in the decentralized application. Prior to interacting with the pair address contract, perform checks to verify the existence and validity of the contract at the provided address. This can be achieved by querying the provider's contract or utilizing external libraries that provide contract verification services.

## RSW - Redundant Storage Writes

|                    |                                       |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------|
| <b>Criticality</b> | Minor / Informative                   |
| <b>Location</b>    | contracts/GrokNY.sol#L178,184,190,351 |
| <b>Status</b>      | Unresolved                            |

### Description

The contract modifies the state of the following variables without checking if their current value is the same as the one given as an argument. As a result, the contract performs redundant storage writes, when the provided parameter matches the current state of the variables, leading to unnecessary gas consumption and inefficiencies in contract execution.

```
isLpToken[_lpToken] = _lp;  
excludedFromFee[_address] = _isExcludedFromFee;  
excludedFromSwap[_address] = _isExcludedFromSwap;  
enabledSwapForSell = _enabledSwapForSell;
```

### Recommendation

The team is advised to implement additional checks within to prevent redundant storage writes when the provided argument matches the current state of the variables. By incorporating statements to compare the new values with the existing values before proceeding with any state modification, the contract can avoid unnecessary storage operations, thereby optimizing gas usage.

## CR - Code Repetition

|                    |                                       |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------|
| <b>Criticality</b> | Minor / Informative                   |
| <b>Location</b>    | contracts/GrokNY.sol#L198,281,301,327 |
| <b>Status</b>      | Unresolved                            |

### Description

The contract contains repetitive code segments. There are potential issues that can arise when using code segments in Solidity. Some of them can lead to issues like gas efficiency, complexity, readability, security, and maintainability of the source code. It is generally a good idea to try to minimize code repetition where possible.

```
uint256 _totalRate = 0;
for (uint256 _i = 0; _i < _rewardSwapReceiversRate.length;
    _i++) {
    _totalRate += _rewardSwapReceiversRate[_i];
}
require(_totalRate == 10000, "rate");
```

### Recommendation

The team is advised to avoid repeating the same code in multiple places, which can make the contract easier to read and maintain. The authors could try to reuse code wherever possible, as this can help reduce the complexity and size of the contract. For instance, the contract could reuse the common code segments in an internal function in order to avoid repeating the same code in multiple places.

## MAU - Misleading Address Usage

|             |                           |
|-------------|---------------------------|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative       |
| Location    | contracts/GrokNY.sol#L402 |
| Status      | Unresolved                |

### Description

The contract contains an array of addresses called `burnFeeReceivers` to represent a specific type of address, commonly acknowledged in the blockchain for a particular purpose. However, these wallet addresses within this contract are mutable, meaning they can be altered. As a result, the designated addresses may not consistently serve their conventional purpose, potentially leading to unintended behaviors within the contract's operation. This mutable design diverges from the standard practice of utilizing a fixed, immutable address for such purposes, thereby introducing a layer of complexity and potential risk in the contract's functionality.

```
if (burnFeeReceivers.length > 0) {  
    for (uint256 _i = 0; _i < burnFeeReceivers.length; _i++) {  
        _transferAmount(_from, burnFeeReceivers[_i],  
            _calcFee(_burnFeeRes, burnFeeReceiversRate[_i]));  
    }  
}
```

### Recommendation

It's always a good practice for the contract to contain variable names that are specific and descriptive. The team is advised to keep in mind the clarity and comprehensibility of the code to ensure that it accurately reflects the intended functionality. The designated address, which reflects a specific purpose within the contract, should ideally be immutable to maintain consistency in its functionality and to adhere to common practices, thereby reducing the potential for unexpected behaviors or vulnerabilities within the contract's operation.

## DDP - Decimal Division Precision

|                    |                                   |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------|
| <b>Criticality</b> | Minor / Informative               |
| <b>Location</b>    | contracts/GrokNY.sol#L455,476,484 |
| <b>Status</b>      | Unresolved                        |

### Description

Division of decimal (fixed point) numbers can result in rounding errors due to the way that division is implemented in Solidity. Thus, it may produce issues with precise calculations with decimal numbers.

Solidity represents decimal numbers as integers, with the decimal point implied by the number of decimal places specified in the type (e.g. decimal with 18 decimal places). When a division is performed with decimal numbers, the result is also represented as an integer, with the decimal point implied by the number of decimal places in the type. This can lead to rounding errors, as the result may not be able to be accurately represented as an integer with the specified number of decimal places.

Hence, the splitted shares will not have the exact precision and some funds may not be calculated as expected.

```
uint256 _liquidityFeeToken1Amount = _calcFee(_token1Balance,  
_liquidityFeeHalf * 10000 / _amountToSwap);  
uint256 _swapFeeToken1Amount = _calcFee(_token1Balance,  
swapFeeAmount * 10000 / _amountToSwap);  
uint256 _rewardToken1Amount = _calcFee(_token1Balance,  
_rewardsToSwap * 10000 / _amountToSwap);
```

### Recommendation

The team is advised to take into consideration the rounding results that are produced from the solidity calculations. The contract could calculate the subtraction of the divided funds in the last calculation in order to avoid the division rounding issue.

## PVC - Price Volatility Concern

|             |                           |
|-------------|---------------------------|
| Criticality | Minor / Informative       |
| Location    | contracts/GrokNY.sol#L272 |
| Status      | Unresolved                |

### Description

The contract accumulates tokens from the taxes to swap them for ETH. The variable `feeLimit` sets a threshold where the contract will trigger the swap functionality. If the variable is set to a big number, then the contract will swap a huge amount of tokens for ETH. This poses a significant risk, especially if the swap amount exceeds the router's slippage threshold. Such a scenario could result in the failure of the sale transaction.

It is important to note that the price of the token representing it, can be highly volatile. This means that the value of a price volatility swap involving Ether could fluctuate significantly at the triggered point, potentially leading to significant price volatility for the parties involved.

```
function setLimit(uint256 _feeLimit) external
onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
    feeLimit = _feeLimit;

    emit FeeLimitUpdated();
}
```

### Recommendation

The contract could ensure that it will not sell more than a reasonable amount of tokens in a single transaction. A suggested implementation could check that the maximum amount should be less than a fixed percentage of the exchange reserves. Hence, the contract will guarantee that it cannot accumulate a huge amount of tokens in order to sell them.



## L02 - State Variables could be Declared Constant

|                    |                          |
|--------------------|--------------------------|
| <b>Criticality</b> | Minor / Informative      |
| <b>Location</b>    | contracts/GrokNY.sol#L22 |
| <b>Status</b>      | Unresolved               |

### Description

State variables can be declared as constant using the constant keyword. This means that the value of the state variable cannot be changed after it has been set. Additionally, the constant variables decrease gas consumption of the corresponding transaction.

```
address public owner = address(0)
```

### Recommendation

Constant state variables can be useful when the contract wants to ensure that the value of a state variable cannot be changed by any function in the contract. This can be useful for storing values that are important to the contract's behavior, such as the contract's address or the maximum number of times a certain function can be called. The team is advised to add the constant keyword to state variables that never change.

## L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions

|                    |   |
|--------------------|---|
| <b>Criticality</b> | Minor / Informative   |
| <b>Location</b>    | contracts/GrokNYDistribution.sol#L14contracts/GrokNY.sol#L127,131,136,140,145,155,160,174,183,189,195,215,222,236,246,256,272,278,298,324,350 |
| <b>Status</b>      | Unresolved  |

### Description

The Solidity style guide is a set of guidelines for writing clean and consistent Solidity code. Adhering to a style guide can help improve the readability and maintainability of the Solidity code, making it easier for others to understand and work with.

The followings are a few key points from the Solidity style guide:

1. Use camelCase for function and variable names, with the first letter in lowercase (e.g., myVariable, updateCounter).
2. Use PascalCase for contract, struct, and enum names, with the first letter in uppercase (e.g., MyContract, UserStruct, ErrorEnum).
3. Use uppercase for constant variables and enums (e.g., MAX\_VALUE, ERROR\_CODE).
4. Use indentation to improve readability and structure.
5. Use spaces between operators and after commas.
6. Use comments to explain the purpose and behavior of the code.
7. Keep lines short (around 120 characters) to improve readability.

```
address _token
address _to
uint256 _amount
address _account
address _recipient
address _owner
address _spender
address _sender
uint256 _addedValue
uint256 _subtractedValue
address _lpToken
bool _lp
address _address
bool _isExcludedFromFee

...
```

## Recommendation

By following the Solidity naming convention guidelines, the codebase increased the readability, maintainability, and makes it easier to work with.

Find more information on the Solidity documentation

<https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.17/style-guide.html#naming-convention>.

## L13 - Divide before Multiply Operation

|                    |                               |
|--------------------|-------------------------------|
| <b>Criticality</b> | Minor / Informative           |
| <b>Location</b>    | contracts/GrokNY.sol#L426,455 |
| <b>Status</b>      | Unresolved                    |

### Description

It is important to be aware of the order of operations when performing arithmetic calculations. This is especially important when working with large numbers, as the order of operations can affect the final result of the calculation. Performing divisions before multiplications may cause loss of precision.

```
uint256 _liquidityFeeHalf = liquidityFeeAmount / 2
uint256 _liquidityFeeToken1Amount = _calcFee(_token1Balance,
_liquidityFeeHalf * 10000 / _amountToSwap)
```

### Recommendation

To avoid this issue, it is recommended to carefully consider the order of operations when performing arithmetic calculations in Solidity. It's generally a good idea to use parentheses to specify the order of operations. The basic rule is that the multiplications should be prior to the divisions.

## L19 - Stable Compiler Version

|                    |   |
|--------------------|---|
| <b>Criticality</b> | Minor / Informative   |
| <b>Location</b>    | contracts/interfaces/IGrokNYDistribution.sol#L2contracts/GrokNYDistribution.sol#L2contracts/GrokNY.sol#L2 |
| <b>Status</b>      | Unresolved  |

### Description

The `^` symbol indicates that any version of Solidity that is compatible with the specified version (i.e., any version that is a higher minor or patch version) can be used to compile the contract. The version lock is a mechanism that allows the author to specify a minimum version of the Solidity compiler that must be used to compile the contract code. This is useful because it ensures that the contract will be compiled using a version of the compiler that is known to be compatible with the code.

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.2;
```

### Recommendation

The team is advised to lock the pragma to ensure the stability of the codebase. The locked pragma version ensures that the contract will not be deployed with an unexpected version. An unexpected version may produce vulnerabilities and undiscovered bugs. The compiler should be configured to the lowest version that provides all the required functionality for the codebase. As a result, the project will be compiled in a well-tested LTS (Long Term Support) environment.

## L20 - Succeeded Transfer Check

|                    |                                      |
|--------------------|--------------------------------------|
| <b>Criticality</b> | Minor / Informative                  |
| <b>Location</b>    | contracts/GrokNYDistribution.sol#L15 |
| <b>Status</b>      | Unresolved                           |

### Description

According to the ERC20 specification, the transfer methods should be checked if the result is successful. Otherwise, the contract may wrongly assume that the transfer has been established.

```
IERC20(_token).transfer(_to, _amount)
```

### Recommendation

The contract should check if the result of the transfer methods is successful. The team is advised to check the SafeERC20 library from the [Openzeppelin library](#).

## Functions Analysis


| Contract                  | Type                | Bases                              |            |           |
|---------------------------|---------------------|------------------------------------|------------|-----------|
|                           | Function Name       | Visibility                         | Mutability | Modifiers |
|                           |                     |                                    |            |           |
| <b>GrokNYDistribution</b> | Implementation      | IGrokNYDistribution, AccessControl |            |           |
|                           |                     | Public                             | ✓          | -         |
|                           | recoverTokensFor    | External                           | ✓          | onlyRole  |
|                           |                     |                                    |            |           |
| <b>GrokNY</b>             | Implementation      | IERC20Metadata, AccessControl      |            |           |
|                           |                     | Public                             | ✓          | -         |
|                           | balanceOf           | Public                             |            | -         |
|                           | transfer            | External                           | ✓          | -         |
|                           | allowance           | Public                             |            | -         |
|                           | approve             | External                           | ✓          | -         |
|                           | transferFrom        | External                           | ✓          | -         |
|                           | increaseAllowance   | External                           | ✓          | -         |
|                           | decreaseAllowance   | External                           | ✓          | -         |
|                           | enableTrading       | External                           | ✓          | onlyRole  |
|                           | setLpToken          | External                           | ✓          | onlyRole  |
|                           | setExcludedFromFee  | Public                             | ✓          | onlyRole  |
|                           | setExcludedFromSwap | Public                             | ✓          | onlyRole  |

|  |                             |          |   |          |
|--|-----------------------------|----------|---|----------|
|  | setRewardSwapReceivers      | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
|  | setRewardSellRate           | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
|  | setRewardBuyRate            | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
|  | resetRewardsAmount          | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
|  | updateBuyRates              | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
|  | updateSellRates             | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
|  | updateTransferRates         | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
|  | resetCounter                | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
|  | setLimit                    | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
|  | updateBurnFeeReceivers      | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
|  | updateLiquidityFeeReceivers | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
|  | resetLiquidityFee           | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
|  | updateSwapFeeReceivers      | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
|  | resetSwapFee                | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
|  | setEnabledSwapForSell       | External | ✓ | onlyRole |
|  | _transfer                   | Internal | ✓ |          |
|  | _takeFees                   | Internal | ✓ |          |
|  | _transferAmount             | Internal | ✓ |          |
|  | _mint                       | Internal | ✓ |          |
|  | _approve                    | Internal | ✓ |          |
|  | _setRouterAndPair           | Internal | ✓ |          |
|  | _calcFee                    | Internal |   |          |
|  | _isSell                     | Internal |   |          |




|                            |                      |          |   |             |
|----------------------------|----------------------|----------|---|-------------|
|                            | _isBuy               | Internal |   |             |
|                            | _swapTokensForToken1 | Internal | ✓ | lockTheSwap |
|                            | _addLiquidity        | Internal | ✓ | lockTheSwap |
|                            |                      |          |   |             |
| <b>IGrokNYDistribution</b> | Interface            |          |   |             |
|                            | recoverTokensFor     | External | ✓ | -           |

# Inheritance Graph



## Flow Graph



## Summary

Grok New Year contract implements a token mechanism. This audit investigates security issues, business logic concerns and potential improvements. Grok New Year is an interesting project that has a friendly and growing community. The Smart Contract analysis reported no compiler error or critical issues. The contract Owner can access some admin functions that can not be used in a malicious way to disturb the users' transactions. There is also a limit of max 9% fees.

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# About Cyberscope

Cyberscope is a blockchain cybersecurity company that was founded with the vision to make web3.0 a safer place for investors and developers. Since its launch, it has worked with thousands of projects and is estimated to have secured tens of millions of investors' funds.

Cyberscope is one of the leading smart contract audit firms in the crypto space and has built a high-profile network of clients and partners.



**The Cyberscope team**

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