



Cyberscope

# Audit Report

## **Web3Punks**

December 2023

Network    BSC

Address    0x29b43DA747BA6Ce57887727d6FB3FA1a2fb2ff53

Audited by    © cyberscope

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## Review

**Testing Deploy**

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/address/0x29b43da747ba6ce57887727d6fb3fa1a2fb2ff53>

## Audit Updates

**Initial Audit**

12 Dec 2023

## Source Files

Filename	SHA256
<b>contracts/W3PContract.sol</b>	1526f2832ccad0918c46d0bff9e0067054187ce712673e52b0002cf26474f1b2
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Strings.sol</b>	cb2df477077a5963ab50a52768cb74ec6f32177177a78611ddbbe2c07e2d36de
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context.sol</b>	b2cfee351bcafd0f8f27c72d76c054df9b571b62cfac4781ed12c86354e2a56c
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol</b>	8b85a2463eda119c2f42c34fa3d942b61aee65df381f48ed436fe8edb3a7d602
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/SignedMath.sol</b>	420a5a5d8d94611a04b39d6cf5f02492552ed4257ea82aba3c765b1ad52f77f6
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/SafeMath.sol</b>	fc16aa4564878e1bb65740239d0c1422451cd32136306626ac37f5d5e0606a7b
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol</b>	85a2caf3bd06579fb55236398c1321e15fd524a8fe140dff748c0f73d7a52345
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/introspection/IERC165.sol</b>	701e025d13ec6be09ae892eb029cd83b3064325801d73654847a5fb11c58b1e5

<b>@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/introspection/ERC165.sol</b>	8806a632d7b656cadb8133ff8f2acae4405b3a64d8709d93b0fa6a216a8a6154
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/IERC721Receiver.sol</b>	77f0f7340c2da6bb9edbc90ab6e7d3eb8e2ae18194791b827a3e8c0b11a09b43
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/IERC721.sol</b>	c8d867eda0fd764890040a3644f5ccf5db92f852779879f321ab3ad8b799bf97
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol</b>	7af3ff063370acb5e1f1a2aab125ceca457cd1fa60ff8afa37aabc366349d286
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/extensions/IERC721Metadata.sol</b>	f16b861aa1f623ccc5e173f1a82d8cf45b678a7fb81e05478fd17eb2ccb7b37e
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/extensions/ERC721URIStorage.sol</b>	7bf559fad1068a1329517b56b1ecddefa67e79a03bb0801b9e6bf06bf73eb334
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/extensions/ERC721Burnable.sol</b>	e04aa070ad6f111fae49b96a056671f36307a93dd79b27612e72560e4a9749b2
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts/security/Pausable.sol</b>	2072248d2f79e661c149fd6a6593a8a3f038466557c9b75e50e0b001bcb5cf97
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts/interfaces/IERC721.sol</b>	e3bcee0ce85a310031fcef279f963e73c12c676a66c5c562ab3945ccf10aecff
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts/interfaces/IERC4906.sol</b>	6b572852b6d6e1db371287a0eb443a724e9005e025025b9c82ebc8804433c0ff
<b>@openzeppelin/contracts/interfaces/IERC165.sol</b>	410e40cd79f1b82bb6bbab95fa4279252cae6e3962b0bff46ab4855f6de91d35

## Overview

This document provides the overview of the smart contract audit conducted for the "Web3Punks" contract. This contract is designed for minting NFTs with various attributes and dynamic pricing mechanisms. It utilizes ERC721 standards and leverages OpenZeppelin libraries for enhanced security and functionality. The contract owner has the authority to pause/unpause the mint of NFTs, change price models, and change critical parameters, which pose several centralization risks that warrant attention.

## Functionality

### Mint

Users can mint NFTs by providing a token ID, URI, and attributes. Minting is subject to the contract not being paused and adheres to max supply limits.

### Dynamic Pricing

The contract incorporates a dynamic pricing mechanism based on the token ID and attributes. It includes different base prices for various ranges of token IDs and attribute counts.


### Mint Limit Enforcement

Implements a mint limit logic based on the token ID threshold, ensuring controlled minting activity.

### Mint Limit Individually

Implements a mint limit logic for each user individually, where they can either mint 1 or 7 NFTs, based on how many total NFTs have been already minted.

## Findings Breakdown



Critical	0
Medium	1
Minor / Informative	11

Severity	Unresolved	Acknowledged	Resolved	Other
Critical	0	0	0	0
Medium	1	0	0	0
Minor / Informative	11	0	0	0

# Diagnostics

● Critical ● Medium ● Minor / Informative

Severity	Code	Description	Status
●	OLIE	Ownership Limits Inadequate Enforcement	Unresolved
●	CCR	Contract Centralization Risks	Unresolved
●	PRE	Potential Reentrance Exploit	Unresolved
●	VAR	Variable Assignment Redundancy	Unresolved
●	COI	Conditional Operators Inefficiency	Unresolved
●	IVS	Inefficient Variable Scope	Unresolved
●	RSW	Redundant Storage Writes	Unresolved
●	RSML	Redundant SafeMath Library	Unresolved
●	L06	Missing Events Access Control	Unresolved
●	L07	Missing Events Arithmetic	Unresolved
●	L16	Validate Variable Setters	Unresolved
●	L19	Stable Compiler Version	Unresolved



## OLIE - Ownership Limits Inadequate Enforcement

Criticality	Medium
Location	contracts/W3PContract.sol#L116
Status	Unresolved

### Description

The contract contains a limit on the maximum number of NFTs that can be minted. According to the implementation of the limit, the user is prevented from minting new NFTs if the balance is equal to the threshold. A user can bypass the minting limit by receiving additional NFTs through transfers, effectively accumulating more than the intended limit.

```
// Mint limit enforcement
if (balanceOf(to) == limit) {
    revert MintLimitReached({message: "Mint Limit Reached",
    limitValue: limit});
}
```

### Recommendation

The team is advised to check if the user's balance is greater or equal to the threshold. This way users will not be able to mint NFTs even if they have more NFTs than the threshold.

## CCR - Contract Centralization Risks

<b>Criticality</b>	Minor / Informative
<b>Location</b>	contracts/W3PContract.sol#L79,159,178,191,204,211
<b>Status</b>	Unresolved

### Description

The contract owner has the authority to pause/unpause the mint of NFTs, change price models, and change critical parameters like max supply. While this configuration can offer flexibility, it also poses several centralization risks that warrant attention. Centralization risks arising from the dependence on this type of configuration include Single Point of Control, Vulnerability to Attacks, Operational Delays, Trust Dependencies, and Decentralization Erosion.

```
function pause() public onlyOwner {
    _pause();
}
function updateBasePrice1e3(uint256 basePrice1k) external
onlyOwner {
    basePrice1e3 = basePrice1k;
}
function updateMaxSupply(uint256 newMaxSupply) external
onlyOwner {
    maxSupply = newMaxSupply;
}
```

### Recommendation

To mitigate these centralization risks, consider the following strategies:

- Implement a governance mechanism that allows NFT holders to vote on critical decisions.
- Transition control from a single owner to a multi-signature wallet.
- Implement time locks for critical functions.

## PRE - Potential Reentrance Exploit

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/W3PContract.sol#L127
Status	Unresolved

### Description

The `safeMint` function is susceptible to a potential reentrance exploit due to the sequence of operations where external calls are made before updating the contract's state. The function call `_safeMint`, which could interact with an external contract, followed by state changes. During the reentrance phase, an NFT with the same `URI` could be produced. As a result, the entire business logic of the contract might be violated since the uniqueness of the `URI` will be broken.

```
// Minting process
totalNFTsMinted++;
_safeMint(to, tokenId);
_setTokenURI(tokenId, uri);
_mintedURIs[uri] = true;
tokenAttributes[tokenId] = attributes;
emit NFTMinted(to, tokenId, attributes);
payable(mintFeeReceiver).transfer(price);
```

### Recommendation

The team is advised to prevent the potential re-entrance exploit as part of the solidity best practices. Some suggestions are:

- Add lockers/mutexes in the method scope. It is important to note that mutexes do not prevent cross-function reentrancy attacks.
- Proceed with the external call as the last statement of the method, so that the state will have been updated properly during the re-entrance phase.

## VAR - Variable Assignment Redundancy

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/W3PContract.sol#L113
Status	Unresolved

### Description

In the `safeMint` function, there is an observed redundancy in the assignment of the `limit` variable. This variable is assigned twice in immediate succession with the same conditional logic, which is unnecessary and can be erased for better code clarity and efficiency.

```
// Pricing logic
(tokenId < MINT_THRESHOLD)
  ? ((tokenId < MINT_THRESHOLD / 2) ? price = basePrice1e3 :
price = BASE_PRICE_2E3)
  : price = calculatePrice(attributes);
(tokenId < MINT_THRESHOLD) ? limit = 1 : limit = 7;

// Mint limit logic
(tokenId < MINT_THRESHOLD) ? limit = 1 : limit = 7;
```

### Recommendation

To enhance the clarity and maintainability of the `safeMint` function, consider eliminating the second instance of the `limit` variable assignment. Since the assignment is identical to the first, it serves no functional purpose and can be safely removed.

## COI - Conditional Operators Inefficiency

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/W3PContract.sol#L107
Status	Unresolved

### Description

The `safeMint` function uses nested conditional (ternary) operators to set the `price` and `limit` variables. This implementation, although functionally correct, poses challenges in terms of code readability, maintainability and performance, since The use of nested ternary operators makes the code difficult to read and understand at a glance and adds unnecessary complexity. Additionally, nested conditional operators are not efficient regarding performance.

```
(tokenId < MINT_THRESHOLD)
    ? ((tokenId < MINT_THRESHOLD / 2) ? price =
basePricee3 : price = BASE_PRICE_2E3)
    : price = calculatePrice(attributes);
(tokenId < MINT_THRESHOLD) ? limit = 1 : limit = 7;
```

### Recommendation

To improve the readability, maintainability, efficiency and overall clarity of the `safeMint` function, consider refactoring the `pricing` and `limit` logic by replacing the nested conditional operators with `if-else` statements.

## IVS - Inefficient Variable Scope

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/W3PContract.sol#L52,53
Status	Unresolved

### Description

The `limit` and `price` variables are declared at the contract level as private variables but are used exclusively within the scope of the `safeMint` function. This implementation leads to the following inefficiencies:

- As contract-level variables, `limit` and `price` are stored in contract storage, which is more expensive in terms of gas costs compared to memory. Storage variables are written to the blockchain, incurring higher gas fees, especially when their values are frequently modified.
- Every modification to a storage variable is a state change on the blockchain, which is more expensive and permanent. Since `limit` and `price` are only relevant within a single function call, their state does not need to persist beyond the execution of `safeMint`.

```
uint256 private limit;  
uint256 private price;
```

### Recommendation

In order to optimize the contract for gas efficiency and improve code clarity, consider declaring `limit` and `price` as local variables within the `safeMint` function. This change ensures that these variables are stored in memory, not in contract storage, thus reducing gas costs associated with storage operations.

## RSW - Redundant Storage Writes

<b>Criticality</b>	Minor / Informative
<b>Location</b>	contracts/W3PContract.sol#L159,178,190,204,211,225
<b>Status</b>	Unresolved

### Description

The contract modifies the state of the following variables without checking if their current value is the same as the one given as an argument. As a result, the contract performs redundant storage writes, when the provided parameter matches the current state of the variables, leading to unnecessary gas consumption and inefficiencies in contract execution.

```
basePricele3 = basePrice1k;  
basePrice = basePriceAttribute;  
zeroAttributeBasePrice = basePriceZeroAttribute;  
maxSupply = newMaxSupply;  
mintFeeReceiver = mintAmountReceiver;  
owner = newOwner;
```

### Recommendation

The team is advised to implement additional checks within to prevent redundant storage writes when the provided argument matches the current state of the variables. By incorporating statements to compare the new values with the existing values before proceeding with any state modification, the contract can avoid unnecessary storage operations, thereby optimizing gas usage.

## RSML - Redundant SafeMath Library

Criticality	Minor / Informative
Location	contracts/W3PContract.sol
Status	Unresolved

### Description

SafeMath is a popular Solidity library that provides a set of functions for performing common arithmetic operations in a way that is resistant to integer overflows and underflows.

Starting with Solidity versions that are greater than or equal to 0.8.0, the arithmetic operations revert to underflow and overflow. As a result, the native functionality of the Solidity operations replaces the SafeMath library. Hence, the usage of the SafeMath library adds complexity, overhead and increases gas consumption unnecessarily.

```
library SafeMath {...}
```

### Recommendation

The team is advised to remove the SafeMath library. Since the version of the contract is greater than `0.8.0` then the pure Solidity arithmetic operations produce the same result.

If the previous functionality is required, then the contract could exploit the `unchecked { ... }` statement.

Read more about the breaking change on

<https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.16/080-breaking-changes.html#solidity-v0-8-0-breaking-changes>.



## L06 - Missing Events Access Control

<b>Criticality</b>	Minor / Informative
<b>Location</b>	contracts/W3PContract.sol#L213,226
<b>Status</b>	Unresolved

### Description

Events are a way to record and log information about changes or actions that occur within a contract. They are often used to notify external parties or clients about events that have occurred within the contract, such as the transfer of tokens or the completion of a task. There are functions that have no event emitted, so it is difficult to track off-chain changes.

```
mintFeeReceiver = mintAmountReceiver  
owner = newOwner
```

### Recommendation

To avoid this issue, it's important to carefully design and implement the events in a contract, and to ensure that all required events are included. It's also a good idea to test the contract to ensure that all events are being properly triggered and logged.

By including all required events in the contract and thoroughly testing the contract's functionality, the contract ensures that it performs as intended and does not have any missing events that could cause issues.

## L07 - Missing Events Arithmetic

<b>Criticality</b>	Minor / Informative
<b>Location</b>	contracts/W3PContract.sol#L160,179,192,205
<b>Status</b>	Unresolved

### Description

Events are a way to record and log information about changes or actions that occur within a contract. They are often used to notify external parties or clients about events that have occurred within the contract, such as the transfer of tokens or the completion of a task.

It's important to carefully design and implement the events in a contract, and to ensure that all required events are included. It's also a good idea to test the contract to ensure that all events are being properly triggered and logged.

```
basePrice1e3 = basePrice1k
basePrice = basePriceAttribute
zeroAttributeBasePrice = basePriceZeroAttribute
maxSupply = newMaxSupply
```

### Recommendation

By including all required events in the contract and thoroughly testing the contract's functionality, the contract ensures that it performs as intended and does not have any missing events that could cause issues with its arithmetic.

## L16 - Validate Variable Setters

<b>Criticality</b>	Minor / Informative
<b>Location</b>	contracts/W3PContract.sol#L61,226
<b>Status</b>	Unresolved

### Description

The contract performs operations on variables that have been configured on user-supplied input. These variables are missing of proper check for the case where a value is zero. This can lead to problems when the contract is executed, as certain actions may not be properly handled when the value is zero.

```
mintFeeReceiver = _mintFeeReceiver  
owner = newOwner
```

### Recommendation

By adding the proper check, the contract will not allow the variables to be configured with zero value. This will ensure that the contract can handle all possible input values and avoid unexpected behavior or errors. Hence, it can help to prevent the contract from being exploited or operating unexpectedly.

## L19 - Stable Compiler Version

<b>Criticality</b>	Minor / Informative
<b>Location</b>	contracts/W3PContract.sol#L2
<b>Status</b>	Unresolved

### Description

The `^` symbol indicates that any version of Solidity that is compatible with the specified version (i.e., any version that is a higher minor or patch version) can be used to compile the contract. The version lock is a mechanism that allows the author to specify a minimum version of the Solidity compiler that must be used to compile the contract code. This is useful because it ensures that the contract will be compiled using a version of the compiler that is known to be compatible with the code.

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.9;
```

### Recommendation


The team is advised to lock the pragma to ensure the stability of the codebase. The locked pragma version ensures that the contract will not be deployed with an unexpected version. An unexpected version may produce vulnerabilities and undiscovered bugs. The compiler should be configured to the lowest version that provides all the required functionality for the codebase. As a result, the project will be compiled in a well-tested LTS (Long Term Support) environment.

## Functions Analysis


Contract	Type	Bases		
	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
<b>W3PContract</b>	Implementation	ERC721URI Storage, Pausable		
		Public	✓	ERC721
	supportsInterface	Public		-
	pause	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	unpause	Public	✓	onlyOwner
	safeMint	Public	Payable	whenNotPaused
	calculatePrice	Internal		
	updateBasePrice1e3	External	✓	onlyOwner
	getBasePrice1e3	Public		-
	getBasePrice2e3	Public		-
	updateBasePriceAttributes	External	✓	onlyOwner
	getBasePriceAttributes	Public		-
	updateBasePriceZeroAttributes	External	✓	onlyOwner
	getBasePriceZeroAttributes	Public		-
	updateMaxSupply	External	✓	onlyOwner
	updateMintAmountReceiver	External	✓	onlyOwner
	getMintAmountReceiver	Public		-
	updateOwner	External	✓	onlyOwner

		External	Payable	-
		External	Payable	-

# Inheritance Graph



## Flow Graph





## Summary

Web3Punks contract implements a nft mechanism. It allows users to mint NFTs with diverse attributes and dynamic pricing strategies. This audit investigates security issues, business logic concerns and potential improvements.

## Disclaimer

The information provided in this report does not constitute investment, financial or trading advice and you should not treat any of the document's content as such. This report may not be transmitted, disclosed, referred to or relied upon by any person for any purposes nor may copies be delivered to any other person other than the Company without Cyberscope's prior written consent. This report is not nor should be considered an "endorsement" or "disapproval" of any particular project or team. This report is not nor should be regarded as an indication of the economics or value of any "product" or "asset" created by any team or project that contracts Cyberscope to perform a security assessment. This document does not provide any warranty or guarantee regarding the absolute bug-free nature of the technology analyzed, nor do they provide any indication of the technologies proprietors' business, business model or legal compliance. This report should not be used in any way to make decisions around investment or involvement with any particular project. This report represents an extensive assessment process intending to help our customers increase the quality of their code while reducing the high level of risk presented by cryptographic tokens and blockchain technology.

Blockchain technology and cryptographic assets present a high level of ongoing risk. Cyberscope's position is that each company and individual are responsible for their own due diligence and continuous security. Cyberscope's goal is to help reduce the attack vectors and the high level of variance associated with utilizing new and consistently changing technologies and in no way claims any guarantee of security or functionality of the technology we agree to analyze. The assessment services provided by Cyberscope are subject to dependencies and are under continuing development. You agree that your access and/or use including but not limited to any services reports and materials will be at your sole risk on an as-is where-is and as-available basis. Cryptographic tokens are emergent technologies and carry with them high levels of technical risk and uncertainty. The assessment reports could include false positives, false negatives and other unpredictable results. The services may access and depend upon multiple layers of third parties.

# About Cyberscope

Cyberscope is a blockchain cybersecurity company that was founded with the vision to make web3.0 a safer place for investors and developers. Since its launch, it has worked with thousands of projects and is estimated to have secured tens of millions of investors' funds.

Cyberscope is one of the leading smart contract audit firms in the crypto space and has built a high-profile network of clients and partners.



**The Cyberscope team**

<https://www.cyberscope.io>