

# Audit Report PREME

January 2025

SHA256

73622cc067d0c04a5712af9e994fd320853b4d4434e2efb568c370aa9c928344

Audited by © cyberscope





# **Analysis**

CriticalMediumMinor / InformativePass

| Severity | Code | Description             | Status |
|----------|------|-------------------------|--------|
| •        | ST   | Stops Transactions      | Passed |
| •        | OTUT | Transfers User's Tokens | Passed |
| •        | ELFM | Exceeds Fees Limit      | Passed |
| •        | MT   | Mints Tokens            | Passed |
| •        | ВТ   | Burns Tokens            | Passed |
| •        | ВС   | Blacklists Addresses    | Passed |



# **Diagnostics**

CriticalMediumMinor / Informative

| Severity | Code | Description                      | Status     |
|----------|------|----------------------------------|------------|
| •        | MEA  | Misleading Event Argument        | Unresolved |
| •        | NCE  | Non Compliant ERC20              | Unresolved |
| •        | L11  | Unnecessary Boolean equality     | Unresolved |
| •        | L13  | Divide before Multiply Operation | Unresolved |



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## **Risk Classification**

The criticality of findings in Cyberscope's smart contract audits is determined by evaluating multiple variables. The two primary variables are:

- 1. **Likelihood of Exploitation**: This considers how easily an attack can be executed, including the economic feasibility for an attacker.
- 2. **Impact of Exploitation**: This assesses the potential consequences of an attack, particularly in terms of the loss of funds or disruption to the contract's functionality.

Based on these variables, findings are categorized into the following severity levels:

- Critical: Indicates a vulnerability that is both highly likely to be exploited and can result in significant fund loss or severe disruption. Immediate action is required to address these issues.
- Medium: Refers to vulnerabilities that are either less likely to be exploited or would have a moderate impact if exploited. These issues should be addressed in due course to ensure overall contract security.
- Minor: Involves vulnerabilities that are unlikely to be exploited and would have a
  minor impact. These findings should still be considered for resolution to maintain
  best practices in security.
- 4. **Informative**: Points out potential improvements or informational notes that do not pose an immediate risk. Addressing these can enhance the overall quality and robustness of the contract.

| Severity                     | Likelihood / Impact of Exploitation                      |
|------------------------------|--|
| <ul> <li>Critical</li> </ul> | Highly Likely / High Impact                              |
| <ul><li>Medium</li></ul>     | Less Likely / High Impact or Highly Likely/ Lower Impact |
| Minor / Informative          | Unlikely / Low to no Impact                              |



## **Review**

| Contract Name     | PREME   |
|-------------------|---|
| Compiler Version  | v0.8.20+commit.a1b79de6   |
| Optimization      | 200 runs  |
| Test Deployment   | https://testnet.bscscan.com/address/0x2b94BC2543daEc2D08 50EBfd62d8A14c3e781718 |
| Address           | 0x2b94BC2543daEc2D0850EBfd62d8A14c3e781718                                      |
| Network           | BSC_TESTNET   |
| Symbol            | PREME   |
| Decimals          | 18  |
| Badge Eligibility | Yes   |

## **Audit Updates**

| Initial Audit 11 Jan 2025 |
|---------------------------|
|---------------------------|

## **Source Files**

| Filename  | SHA256   |
|-----------|--|
| PREME.sol | 73622cc067d0c04a5712af9e994fd320853b4d4434e2efb568c370aa9c9<br>28344 |



# **Findings Breakdown**



| Sev | rerity              | Unresolved | Acknowledged | Resolved | Other |
|-----|---------------------|------------|--------------|----------|-------|
| •   | Critical            | 0          | 0            | 0        | 0     |
| •   | Medium              | 0          | 0            | 0        | 0     |
|     | Minor / Informative | 4          | 0            | 0        | 0     |



## **MEA - Misleading Event Argument**

| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
|-------------|---------------------|
| Location    | PREME.sol#L223      |
| Status      | Unresolved          |

#### Description

The FailedToSwap event is designed to log failures during token-to-ETH swaps, expecting the token's address and the amount involved as arguments. However, the contract incorrectly passes the teamWallet (a wallet address) as the first argument when emitting the event. This behavior is misleading and can result in confusion when analyzing emitted events, as the logged token address might incorrectly represent a wallet address instead of the token contract address involved in the failed swap. Additionally, this error could hinder accurate debugging and monitoring of swap failures.

```
event FailedToSwap(address indexed token, uint256 amount);
...
emit FailedToSwap(teamWallet, amount);
```

#### Recommendation

To mitigate this issue, the team could replace the teamWallet with the correct token contract address when emitting the FailedToSwap event. By addressing this issue, the contract will produce accurate event logs, improving traceability, monitoring, and debugging of swap failures.



#### **NCE - Non Compliant ERC20**

| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
|-------------|---------------------|
| Location    | PREME.sol#L144      |
| Status      | Unresolved          |

#### Description

The \_update function overrides OpenZeppelin's implementation and includes custom logic that alters the recipient address to \_address(0) if it matches \_DEAD\_WALLET or \_DEAD\_WALLET\_VB . While this behavior effectively burns tokens, it violates the ERC20 specification, which expects transfers to respect the explicitly provided recipient address. This deviation from the standard can lead to unexpected behavior, compatibility issues with external tools, and confusion for users or applications interacting with the contract.

```
if (to == DEAD_WALLET || to == DEAD_WALLET_VB) to = address(0);
super._update(from, to, value);
```

#### Recommendation

The team is advised to allow transfers to <code>DEAD\_WALLET</code> or <code>DEAD\_WALLET\_VB</code> without modifications, as tokens sent to these addresses are already considered irrecoverable and effectively burned. By addressing this issue, the contract will align with the ERC20 standard while maintaining its intended burn functionality.



## L11 - Unnecessary Boolean equality

| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
|-------------|---------------------|
| Location    | PREME.sol#L246      |
| Status      | Unresolved          |

#### Description

Boolean equality is unnecessary when comparing two boolean values. This is because a boolean value is either true or false, and there is no need to compare two values that are already known to be either true or false.

it's important to be aware of the types of variables and expressions that are being used in the contract's code, as this can affect the contract's behavior and performance. The comparison to boolean constants is redundant. Boolean constants can be used directly and do not need to be compared to true or false.

#### Recommendation

Using the boolean value itself is clearer and more concise, and it is generally considered good practice to avoid unnecessary boolean equalities in Solidity code.



## L13 - Divide before Multiply Operation

| Criticality | Minor / Informative |
|-------------|---------------------|
| Location    | PREME.sol#L154,157  |
| Status      | Unresolved          |

#### Description

It is important to be aware of the order of operations when performing arithmetic calculations. This is especially important when working with large numbers, as the order of operations can affect the final result of the calculation. Performing divisions before multiplications may cause loss of prediction.

```
uint256 maxSwapAmount = balanceOf(swapPair) / 100
handledTokens = maxSwapAmount * totalTax / swapTax
```

#### Recommendation

To avoid this issue, it is recommended to carefully consider the order of operations when performing arithmetic calculations in Solidity. It's generally a good idea to use parentheses to specify the order of operations. The basic rule is that the multiplications should be prior to the divisions.

# **Functions Analysis**


| Contract | Туре                  | Bases                      |            |                  |
|----------|-----------------------|----------------------------|------------|------------------|
|          | Function Name         | Visibility                 | Mutability | Modifiers        |
|          |                       |                            |            |                  |
| IRouter  | Interface             |                            |            |                  |
|          | factory               | External                   |            | -                |
|          | swapExactTokensForETH | External                   | ✓          | -                |
|          | swapExactETHForTokens | External                   | Payable    | -                |
|          |                       |                            |            |                  |
| IFactory | Interface             |                            |            |                  |
|          | getPair               | External                   |            | -                |
|          |                       |                            |            |                  |
| Pair     | Interface             |                            |            |                  |
|          | token0                | External                   |            | -                |
|          | token1                | External                   |            | -                |
|          |                       |                            |            |                  |
| PREME    | Implementation        | ERC20Burna<br>ble, Ownable |            |                  |
|          |                       | Public                     | ✓          | ERC20<br>Ownable |
|          | _update               | Internal                   | ✓          |                  |
|          | handleTax             | Private                    | <b>✓</b>   |                  |
|          | buyAndBurnTokens      | Private                    | ✓          | lockTheSwap      |
|          | swapTokensForETH      | Private                    | ✓          | lockTheSwap      |
|          | setSwapPair           | Private                    | ✓          |                  |



| setPair                  | Public   | 1       | onlyOwner |
|--------------------------|----------|---------|-----------|
| setSwapAtPercentage      | Public   | ✓       | onlyOwner |
| setTax                   | Public   | ✓       | onlyOwner |
| setExcludedFromTaxStatus | Public   | ✓       | onlyOwner |
| setTeamWallet            | Public   | 1       | onlyOwner |
| setNftWallet             | Public   | ✓       | onlyOwner |
| manualSwap               | External | ✓       | onlyOwner |
| manualBuyAndBurn         | External | 1       | onlyOwner |
|                          | External | Payable | -         |



# **Inheritance Graph**





## **Summary**

PREME Token contract implements a token mechanism. This audit investigates security issues, business logic concerns and potential improvements. PREME Token is an interesting project that has a friendly and growing community. The Smart Contract analysis reported no compiler error or critical issues. The contract Owner can access some admin functions that can not be used in a malicious way to disturb the users' transactions. There is also a limit of max 4% buy and sell fees.



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Cyberscope is a blockchain cybersecurity company that was founded with the vision to make web3.0 a safer place for investors and developers. Since its launch, it has worked with thousands of projects and is estimated to have secured tens of millions of investors' funds.

Cyberscope is one of the leading smart contract audit firms in the crypto space and has built a high-profile network of clients and partners.





The Cyberscope team

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