




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FirmGuide: Boosting the Capability of Rehosting Embedded Linux Kernels through Model-Guided Kernel Execution

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
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Motivation



**Dynamic Bug
or Vulnerability
Understanding**



**Dynamic Bug or
Vulnerability
Mining**

- Linux kernel with drivers inside high-end embedded firmware
- Understanding and testing abilities not easily and scalably due to hardware requirement
- **Rehosting the embedded Linux kernel with the best effort**

Challenge and Observation 1

SoC: plxtech,nas782x

CPU	Arm11MPCore
Memory	up to 512M
Interrupt Controller	gic
Time-related	rps, oscillator, sysclk, pll_a, pll_b, stdclk, twdclk
UART	ns16550a
Others	gmacclk, pcie, watchdog, sata, nand, ethernet, ehci, leds

High fidelity to make the Linux kernel functional-correct

Low fidelity for successful boot

- Numerous peripherals: **Type-I** High Fidelity **Type-II** Low Fidelity
- **Classifying peripherals for a minimum best effort**

High-fidelity Virtual Device

Dummy Virtual Device

Challenge and Observation 2

Multiple models for interrupt controllers

ralink-rt2880-intc


qca,ar7240-intc

marvell,orion-intc

marvell,orion-bridge-intc

arm,cortex-a9-gic

...



- ***Diverse models***: Linux subsystems that hide implementation details
- **Extracting state machines from the Linux subsystems (Type-I)**

Challenge and Observation 3

Mask Interrupt

MMIO Read M -> a

a &= flags


MMIO Write a -> M

Load IRQ number

MMIO Read I -> b


switch(b)

...



- **Complex semantics:** Specific driver interface callbacks that embed complex semantics
- **Extracting MMIO R/W sequences**

Core Technique: Model-guided Kernel Execution



- Peripheral model = the model template (a state machine) + the model parameters (MMIO R/W sequences as transition conditions)


Model-guided Kernel Execution: Running Example

```
1 static void irq_mask_callback(u32 irq)
2 {
3     u32 mask = readl(INTC_REG_MASK);
4     mask &= ~(1 << (irq & 0x1f))
5     writel(mask, INTC_REG_MASK);
6 }
```

(a)


```
1 static void handle_irq_callback(...)
2 {
3     u32 pending = readl(INTC_REG_STATUS);
4     while(pending) {
5         u32 irq = __ffs(pending);
6         generic_handle_irq(irq);
7         pending |= ~(1 << irq);
8     }
9 }
```

Linux kernel driver code (b)




- The MMIO Read/Write sequence from Linux kernel can be recognized to drive the state machine of our emulated peripherals

Model-guided Kernel Execution: Methodology



- **We semi-automatically build the state machine of each peripheral: a general model template (manually) plus model parameters (automatically)**

System Design and Implementation



LLVM pass for preprocess
KLEE for MMIO R/W Seq
Python for glues

Python for main logic
Template-render pattern

Evaluation

RQ 1: What peripheral models can we generate?

Type I

Family of SoCs	Interrupt Controller	Timer	First Solution (Second)	Exists CSVF (y/n)	Timer Semantics
ramips/rt305x	ralink-rt2880-intc	not necessary	1	n	-
ath79/generic	qca,ar7240-intc	not necessary	5	n	-
kirkwood/generic	marvell,orion-intc marvell,orion-bridge-intc	marvell,orion-timer	2	y	$y=\sim x$
bcm53xx/generic	arm,cortex-a9-gic	arm,cortex-a9-global-timer arm,cortex-a9-twd-timer	2,207	y	$y=x1<<32+x2$
oxnas/generic	arm,arm11mp-gic	plxtech,nas782x-rps-timer	914	y	$y=x$

Type II: # of initial values/# of Type II peripherals

Family of SoCs	ramips/rt305x	ath79/generic	kirkwood/generic	bcm53xx/generic	oxnas/generic
count	1/10	2/15	3/26	2/4	2/9

Evaluation

RQ 2: What embedded Linux kernels can we rehost?

Subtarget	Unpack	Kernel	User Space	Shell
ramips/rt3050	4784	4784	4743 (99.14%)	4345 (90.80%)
ath79/generic	541	541	444 (82.07%)	444 (82.07%)
bcm53xx/generic	388	388	388 (100.00%)	388 (100.00%)
kirkwood/generic	330	326	324 (99.39%)	244 (74.85%)
oxnas/generic	149	149	48^ (32.21%)	48^ (32.21 %)
Overall	6192	6188	5947 (96.11%)	5469 (88.38%)

Given 6K+ firmware crossing 10 vendors, 3 architectures, and 22 Linux kernel versions, FirmGuide can successfully rehost more than 96% of them.

^The successful rate to support oxnas/generic is low because it cannot recognize our ramfs due to a unset flag.

Evaluation

RQ 3: What about the functionality of the rehosted embedded Linux kernels?

Linux Test Project: Syscall Testing

Models	Pass	Skipped	Failed	Total
Fully Generated	1049	164	46	1259
Ground Truth	1049	164	46	1259

RQ 4: What are application of FirmGuide?

CVE Reproduction and Exploit Development

Fuzzing

CVE ID	CVE Type	Triggering	Exploitation
CVE-2016-5195	Race Condition	N	N
CVE-2016-8655	Race Condition	Yes	Y
CVE-2016-9793	Integer Overflow	Y	N
CVE-2017-7038	Integer Overflow	Y	Y
CVD-2017-1000112	Buffer Overflow	Y	Y
CVE-2018-5333	NULL Pointer Dereference	Y	Y

american fuzzy lop ++2.64d (master) [explore] (2)	
process timing run time : 0 days, 0 hrs, 5 min, 24 sec last new path : 0 days, 0 hrs, 0 min, 25 sec last uniq crash : none seen yet last uniq hang : none seen yet	overall results cycles done : 16 total paths : 15 uniq crashes : 0 uniq hangs : 0
cycle progress now processing : 14.0 (53.3%) paths timed out : 0 (0.00%)	map coverage : 0.02% / 0.02% count coverage : 1.00 bits/tuple
stage progress now trying : havoc stage execs : 8118/16.4k (49.55%) total execs : 159k exec speed : 491.8/sec	findings in depth favored paths : 4 (26.67%) new edges on : 5 (33.33%) total crashes : 0 (0 unique) total tmoats : 0 (0 unique)
fuzzing strategy yields bit flips : 0/32, 0/31, 0/29 byte flips : 0/4, 0/3, 0/1 arithmetic : 0/224, 0/0, 0/0 known ints : 0/26, 0/84, 0/44 dictionary : 0/0, 0/0, 0/2 havoc/read : 1/65.5k, 0/85.2k, 0/0 py/custom : 0/0, 0/0 trim : 78.72k/15, 0.00%	path geometry levels : 5 pending : 1 pend fav : 1 own finds : 1 imported : 0 stability : 100.00%
[cpu002: 15k]	

UnicoreFuzz

american fuzzy lop 2.06b (triforceafl)	
process timing run time : 0 days, 0 hrs, 6 min, 7 sec last new path : 0 days, 0 hrs, 0 min, 30 sec last uniq crash : none seen yet last uniq hang : 0 days, 0 hrs, 1 min, 0 sec	overall results cycles done : 0 total paths : 413 uniq crashes : 0 uniq hangs : 6
cycle progress now processing : 0 (0.00%)	map density : 14.8k (0.70%)
paths timed out : 0 (0.00%)	count coverage : 1.31 bits/tuple
stage progress now trying : havoc stage execs : 7715/32.0k (24.11%) total execs : 12.8k exec speed : 47.71/sec (slow!)	findings in depth favored paths : 298 (72.15%) new edges on : 350 (84.75%) total crashes : 0 (0 unique) total hangs : 10 (6 unique)
fuzzing strategy yields bit flips : 6/32, 3/31, 2/29 byte flips : 0/4, 0/3, 0/1 arithmetic : 10/224, 0/204, 0/68 known ints : 1/8, 0/15, 0/10 dictionary : 0/0, 0/0, 0/0 havoc : 0/0, 0/0 trim : 92.86k/13, 0.00%	path geometry levels : 2 pending : 413 pend fav : 298 own finds : 60 imported : 0 variable : 0 stability : 100.00%
[cpu: 14k]	

TriforceAFL

Summary

Conclusion

A novel technique “Model-Guided Kernel Execution” for peripheral modeling

The first semi-automatic framework for embedded Linux kernel rehosting

Feasible dynamically understanding and mining vulnerability in embedded kernels

Discussion

Limitation and future work

Manual state machine construction for more complex peripherals

High fidelity of Type-II peripherals

Q & A

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