## Reading List and Reading Packet Table of Contents

C15-5938

"Liberty and the Economics of Politics: Key Contributions of Public Choice Economics"
Fairfax Marriott at Fair Oaks (Fairfax, Virginia)
November 3-6, 2016

A Co-Sponsored Program of Mercatus Center at George Mason University and Liberty Fund, Inc.

## Full Reader

SESSION I: Economics as Exchange.

Buchanan, James M. The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, Volume 1: The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc., 1999. "What Should Economists Do?" (pages 28–42), "Individual Choice in Voting and the Market" (pages 75–88), "Social Choice, Democracy and Free Markets" (pages 89–102), and "Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy" (pages 191–209). (Book and Reader)

Session II: Public Finance, Public Debt, and Democratic Decision.

Buchanan, James M. The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, Volume 1: The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc., 1999. "Politics Without Romance" (pages 45–59), "The Pure Theory of Government Finance" (pages 119–132), "Public Debt, Cost Theory and the Fiscal Illusion" (pages 150–163), and "Keynesian Follies" (pages 164–178). (Book and Reader)

SESSION III: The Vote Motive and Interest Group Politics.

Tullock, Gordon. The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock, Volume 1: Virginia Political Economy.
 Edited by Charles K. Rowley. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc., 2004. "Public Choice" (pages 16–26), "Problems of Majority Voting" (pages 51–61), "The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft" (pages 169–179), and "The Transitional Gains Trap" (pages 212–221). (Book and Reader)

Session IV: The Problems of Bureaucracy.

Tullock, Gordon. The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock, Volume 6: Bureaucracy. Edited by Charles K. Rowley. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005. Chapter 11, "Subordinates and Inferiors" (pages 131–139), Chapter 13, "Parkinson's Law" (pages 145–147), Chapter 14, "Whispering Down the Lane" (pages 148–152), Chapter 17, "Limitations on Organizational Tasks" (pages 168–175), Chapter 19, "The Problem of Control" (pages 189–196), Chapter 20, "Enforcement" (pages 197–204), and Chapter 25, "What to Do? What to Do?" (pages 235–238). (Book and Reader)

Session V: Constitutional Construction and Social Order.

 Buchanan, James and Gordon Tullock. The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, Volume 3: The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund Inc., 1999. Part II, Chapter 5, "The Organization of Human Activity" (pages 43Reading List, Liberty Fund, Inc.

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62), Chapter 6, "<u>A Generalized Economic Theory of Constitutions</u>" (pages 63–84), Chapter 7, "<u>The Rule of Unanimity</u>" (pages 85–96), and Chapter 8, "<u>The Costs of Decision-Making</u>" (pages 97–116). (Book and Reader)

Session VI: Neither Discrimination nor Dominion.

Buchanan, James M. *The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, Volume 1: The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty.* Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc., 1999. "Natural and Artifactual Man" (pages 246–259), "The Foundations for Normative Individualism" (pages 281–291), "The Ethics of Constitutional Order" (pages 368–373), "Generality as a Constitutional Constraint" (pages 419–428), and "The Constitution of Economic Policy" (pages 455–468). (Book and Reader)