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request_handling.go
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request_handling.go
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package vault
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/armon/go-metrics"
"github.com/hashicorp/go-multierror"
"github.com/hashicorp/vault/audit"
"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/consts"
"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/identity"
"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/jsonutil"
"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/policyutil"
"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/strutil"
"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/wrapping"
"github.com/hashicorp/vault/logical"
)
const (
replTimeout = 10 * time.Second
)
// HandleRequest is used to handle a new incoming request
func (c *Core) HandleRequest(req *logical.Request) (resp *logical.Response, err error) {
c.stateLock.RLock()
defer c.stateLock.RUnlock()
if c.sealed {
return nil, consts.ErrSealed
}
if c.standby {
return nil, consts.ErrStandby
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(c.activeContext)
defer cancel()
// Allowing writing to a path ending in / makes it extremely difficult to
// understand user intent for the filesystem-like backends (kv,
// cubbyhole) -- did they want a key named foo/ or did they want to write
// to a directory foo/ with no (or forgotten) key, or...? It also affects
// lookup, because paths ending in / are considered prefixes by some
// backends. Basically, it's all just terrible, so don't allow it.
if strings.HasSuffix(req.Path, "/") &&
(req.Operation == logical.UpdateOperation ||
req.Operation == logical.CreateOperation) {
return logical.ErrorResponse("cannot write to a path ending in '/'"), nil
}
var auth *logical.Auth
if c.router.LoginPath(req.Path) {
resp, auth, err = c.handleLoginRequest(ctx, req)
} else {
resp, auth, err = c.handleRequest(ctx, req)
}
// Ensure we don't leak internal data
if resp != nil {
if resp.Secret != nil {
resp.Secret.InternalData = nil
}
if resp.Auth != nil {
resp.Auth.InternalData = nil
}
}
// We are wrapping if there is anything to wrap (not a nil response) and a
// TTL was specified for the token. Errors on a call should be returned to
// the caller, so wrapping is turned off if an error is hit and the error
// is logged to the audit log.
wrapping := resp != nil &&
err == nil &&
!resp.IsError() &&
resp.WrapInfo != nil &&
resp.WrapInfo.TTL != 0 &&
resp.WrapInfo.Token == ""
if wrapping {
cubbyResp, cubbyErr := c.wrapInCubbyhole(ctx, req, resp, auth)
// If not successful, returns either an error response from the
// cubbyhole backend or an error; if either is set, set resp and err to
// those and continue so that that's what we audit log. Otherwise
// finish the wrapping and audit log that.
if cubbyResp != nil || cubbyErr != nil {
resp = cubbyResp
err = cubbyErr
} else {
wrappingResp := &logical.Response{
WrapInfo: resp.WrapInfo,
Warnings: resp.Warnings,
}
resp = wrappingResp
}
}
auditResp := resp
// When unwrapping we want to log the actual response that will be written
// out. We still want to return the raw value to avoid automatic updating
// to any of it.
if req.Path == "sys/wrapping/unwrap" &&
resp != nil &&
resp.Data != nil &&
resp.Data[logical.HTTPRawBody] != nil {
// Decode the JSON
httpResp := &logical.HTTPResponse{}
err := jsonutil.DecodeJSON(resp.Data[logical.HTTPRawBody].([]byte), httpResp)
if err != nil {
c.logger.Error("core: failed to unmarshal wrapped HTTP response for audit logging", "error", err)
return nil, ErrInternalError
}
auditResp = logical.HTTPResponseToLogicalResponse(httpResp)
}
var nonHMACReqDataKeys []string
var nonHMACRespDataKeys []string
entry := c.router.MatchingMountEntry(req.Path)
if entry != nil {
// Get and set ignored HMAC'd value. Reset those back to empty afterwards.
if rawVals, ok := entry.synthesizedConfigCache.Load("audit_non_hmac_request_keys"); ok {
nonHMACReqDataKeys = rawVals.([]string)
}
// Get and set ignored HMAC'd value. Reset those back to empty afterwards.
if auditResp != nil {
if rawVals, ok := entry.synthesizedConfigCache.Load("audit_non_hmac_response_keys"); ok {
nonHMACRespDataKeys = rawVals.([]string)
}
}
}
// Create an audit trail of the response
logInput := &audit.LogInput{
Auth: auth,
Request: req,
Response: auditResp,
OuterErr: err,
NonHMACReqDataKeys: nonHMACReqDataKeys,
NonHMACRespDataKeys: nonHMACRespDataKeys,
}
if auditErr := c.auditBroker.LogResponse(ctx, logInput, c.auditedHeaders); auditErr != nil {
c.logger.Error("core: failed to audit response", "request_path", req.Path, "error", auditErr)
return nil, ErrInternalError
}
return
}
func (c *Core) handleRequest(ctx context.Context, req *logical.Request) (retResp *logical.Response, retAuth *logical.Auth, retErr error) {
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"core", "handle_request"}, time.Now())
var nonHMACReqDataKeys []string
entry := c.router.MatchingMountEntry(req.Path)
if entry != nil {
// Get and set ignored HMAC'd value.
if rawVals, ok := entry.synthesizedConfigCache.Load("audit_non_hmac_request_keys"); ok {
nonHMACReqDataKeys = rawVals.([]string)
}
}
// Validate the token
auth, te, ctErr := c.checkToken(ctx, req, false)
// We run this logic first because we want to decrement the use count even in the case of an error
if te != nil {
// Attempt to use the token (decrement NumUses)
var err error
te, err = c.tokenStore.UseToken(ctx, te)
if err != nil {
c.logger.Error("core: failed to use token", "error", err)
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError)
return nil, nil, retErr
}
if te == nil {
// Token has been revoked by this point
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, logical.ErrPermissionDenied)
return nil, nil, retErr
}
if te.NumUses == -1 {
// We defer a revocation until after logic has run, since this is a
// valid request (this is the token's final use). We pass the ID in
// directly just to be safe in case something else modifies te later.
defer func(id string) {
err = c.tokenStore.Revoke(ctx, id)
if err != nil {
c.logger.Error("core: failed to revoke token", "error", err)
retResp = nil
retAuth = nil
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError)
}
if retResp != nil && retResp.Secret != nil &&
// Some backends return a TTL even without a Lease ID
retResp.Secret.LeaseID != "" {
retResp = logical.ErrorResponse("Secret cannot be returned; token had one use left, so leased credentials were immediately revoked.")
return
}
}(te.ID)
}
}
if ctErr != nil {
// If it is an internal error we return that, otherwise we
// return invalid request so that the status codes can be correct
errType := logical.ErrInvalidRequest
switch ctErr {
case ErrInternalError, logical.ErrPermissionDenied:
errType = ctErr
}
logInput := &audit.LogInput{
Auth: auth,
Request: req,
OuterErr: ctErr,
NonHMACReqDataKeys: nonHMACReqDataKeys,
}
if err := c.auditBroker.LogRequest(ctx, logInput, c.auditedHeaders); err != nil {
c.logger.Error("core: failed to audit request", "path", req.Path, "error", err)
}
if errType != nil {
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, errType)
}
if ctErr == ErrInternalError {
return nil, auth, retErr
}
return logical.ErrorResponse(ctErr.Error()), auth, retErr
}
// Attach the display name
req.DisplayName = auth.DisplayName
// Create an audit trail of the request
logInput := &audit.LogInput{
Auth: auth,
Request: req,
NonHMACReqDataKeys: nonHMACReqDataKeys,
}
if err := c.auditBroker.LogRequest(ctx, logInput, c.auditedHeaders); err != nil {
c.logger.Error("core: failed to audit request", "path", req.Path, "error", err)
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError)
return nil, auth, retErr
}
// Route the request
resp, routeErr := c.router.Route(ctx, req)
if resp != nil {
// If wrapping is used, use the shortest between the request and response
var wrapTTL time.Duration
var wrapFormat, creationPath string
var sealWrap bool
// Ensure no wrap info information is set other than, possibly, the TTL
if resp.WrapInfo != nil {
if resp.WrapInfo.TTL > 0 {
wrapTTL = resp.WrapInfo.TTL
}
wrapFormat = resp.WrapInfo.Format
creationPath = resp.WrapInfo.CreationPath
sealWrap = resp.WrapInfo.SealWrap
resp.WrapInfo = nil
}
if req.WrapInfo != nil {
if req.WrapInfo.TTL > 0 {
switch {
case wrapTTL == 0:
wrapTTL = req.WrapInfo.TTL
case req.WrapInfo.TTL < wrapTTL:
wrapTTL = req.WrapInfo.TTL
}
}
// If the wrap format hasn't been set by the response, set it to
// the request format
if req.WrapInfo.Format != "" && wrapFormat == "" {
wrapFormat = req.WrapInfo.Format
}
}
if wrapTTL > 0 {
resp.WrapInfo = &wrapping.ResponseWrapInfo{
TTL: wrapTTL,
Format: wrapFormat,
CreationPath: creationPath,
SealWrap: sealWrap,
}
}
}
// If there is a secret, we must register it with the expiration manager.
// We exclude renewal of a lease, since it does not need to be re-registered
if resp != nil && resp.Secret != nil && !strings.HasPrefix(req.Path, "sys/renew") &&
!strings.HasPrefix(req.Path, "sys/leases/renew") {
// Get the SystemView for the mount
sysView := c.router.MatchingSystemView(req.Path)
if sysView == nil {
c.logger.Error("core: unable to retrieve system view from router")
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError)
return nil, auth, retErr
}
// Apply the default lease if none given
if resp.Secret.TTL == 0 {
resp.Secret.TTL = sysView.DefaultLeaseTTL()
}
// Limit the lease duration
maxTTL := sysView.MaxLeaseTTL()
if resp.Secret.TTL > maxTTL {
resp.Secret.TTL = maxTTL
}
// KV mounts should return the TTL but not register
// for a lease as this provides a massive slowdown
registerLease := true
matchingBackend := c.router.MatchingBackend(req.Path)
if matchingBackend == nil {
c.logger.Error("core: unable to retrieve kv backend from router")
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError)
return nil, auth, retErr
}
if ptbe, ok := matchingBackend.(*PassthroughBackend); ok {
if !ptbe.GeneratesLeases() {
registerLease = false
resp.Secret.Renewable = false
}
}
if registerLease {
leaseID, err := c.expiration.Register(req, resp)
if err != nil {
c.logger.Error("core: failed to register lease", "request_path", req.Path, "error", err)
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError)
return nil, auth, retErr
}
resp.Secret.LeaseID = leaseID
}
}
// If the request was to renew a token, and if there are group aliases set
// in the auth object, then the group memberships should be refreshed
if strings.HasPrefix(req.Path, "auth/token/renew") &&
resp != nil &&
resp.Auth != nil &&
resp.Auth.EntityID != "" &&
resp.Auth.GroupAliases != nil {
err := c.identityStore.refreshExternalGroupMembershipsByEntityID(resp.Auth.EntityID, resp.Auth.GroupAliases)
if err != nil {
c.logger.Error("core: failed to refresh external group memberships", "error", err)
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError)
return nil, auth, retErr
}
}
// Only the token store is allowed to return an auth block, for any
// other request this is an internal error. We exclude renewal of a token,
// since it does not need to be re-registered
if resp != nil && resp.Auth != nil && !strings.HasPrefix(req.Path, "auth/token/renew") {
if !strings.HasPrefix(req.Path, "auth/token/") {
c.logger.Error("core: unexpected Auth response for non-token backend", "request_path", req.Path)
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError)
return nil, auth, retErr
}
// Register with the expiration manager. We use the token's actual path
// here because roles allow suffixes.
te, err := c.tokenStore.Lookup(ctx, resp.Auth.ClientToken)
if err != nil {
c.logger.Error("core: failed to look up token", "error", err)
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError)
return nil, auth, retErr
}
if err := c.expiration.RegisterAuth(te.Path, resp.Auth); err != nil {
c.tokenStore.Revoke(ctx, te.ID)
c.logger.Error("core: failed to register token lease", "request_path", req.Path, "error", err)
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError)
return nil, auth, retErr
}
}
if resp != nil &&
req.Path == "cubbyhole/response" &&
len(te.Policies) == 1 &&
te.Policies[0] == responseWrappingPolicyName {
resp.AddWarning("Reading from 'cubbyhole/response' is deprecated. Please use sys/wrapping/unwrap to unwrap responses, as it provides additional security checks and other benefits.")
}
// Return the response and error
if routeErr != nil {
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, routeErr)
}
return resp, auth, retErr
}
// handleLoginRequest is used to handle a login request, which is an
// unauthenticated request to the backend.
func (c *Core) handleLoginRequest(ctx context.Context, req *logical.Request) (retResp *logical.Response, retAuth *logical.Auth, retErr error) {
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"core", "handle_login_request"}, time.Now())
req.Unauthenticated = true
var auth *logical.Auth
// Create an audit trail of the request, auth is not available on login requests
// Create an audit trail of the request. Attach auth if it was returned,
// e.g. if a token was provided.
logInput := &audit.LogInput{
Auth: auth,
Request: req,
}
if err := c.auditBroker.LogRequest(ctx, logInput, c.auditedHeaders); err != nil {
c.logger.Error("core: failed to audit request", "path", req.Path, "error", err)
return nil, nil, ErrInternalError
}
// The token store uses authentication even when creating a new token,
// so it's handled in handleRequest. It should not be reached here.
if strings.HasPrefix(req.Path, "auth/token/") {
c.logger.Error("core: unexpected login request for token backend", "request_path", req.Path)
return nil, nil, ErrInternalError
}
// Route the request
resp, routeErr := c.router.Route(ctx, req)
if resp != nil {
// If wrapping is used, use the shortest between the request and response
var wrapTTL time.Duration
var wrapFormat, creationPath string
var sealWrap bool
// Ensure no wrap info information is set other than, possibly, the TTL
if resp.WrapInfo != nil {
if resp.WrapInfo.TTL > 0 {
wrapTTL = resp.WrapInfo.TTL
}
wrapFormat = resp.WrapInfo.Format
creationPath = resp.WrapInfo.CreationPath
sealWrap = resp.WrapInfo.SealWrap
resp.WrapInfo = nil
}
if req.WrapInfo != nil {
if req.WrapInfo.TTL > 0 {
switch {
case wrapTTL == 0:
wrapTTL = req.WrapInfo.TTL
case req.WrapInfo.TTL < wrapTTL:
wrapTTL = req.WrapInfo.TTL
}
}
if req.WrapInfo.Format != "" && wrapFormat == "" {
wrapFormat = req.WrapInfo.Format
}
}
if wrapTTL > 0 {
resp.WrapInfo = &wrapping.ResponseWrapInfo{
TTL: wrapTTL,
Format: wrapFormat,
CreationPath: creationPath,
SealWrap: sealWrap,
}
}
}
// A login request should never return a secret!
if resp != nil && resp.Secret != nil {
c.logger.Error("core: unexpected Secret response for login path", "request_path", req.Path)
return nil, nil, ErrInternalError
}
// If the response generated an authentication, then generate the token
if resp != nil && resp.Auth != nil {
var entity *identity.Entity
auth = resp.Auth
if auth.Alias != nil {
// Overwrite the mount type and mount path in the alias
// information
auth.Alias.MountType = req.MountType
auth.Alias.MountAccessor = req.MountAccessor
if auth.Alias.Name == "" {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("missing name in alias")
}
var err error
// Fetch the entity for the alias, or create an entity if one
// doesn't exist.
entity, err = c.identityStore.CreateOrFetchEntity(auth.Alias)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
if entity == nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create an entity for the authenticated alias")
}
auth.EntityID = entity.ID
if auth.GroupAliases != nil {
err = c.identityStore.refreshExternalGroupMembershipsByEntityID(auth.EntityID, auth.GroupAliases)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
}
}
if strutil.StrListSubset(auth.Policies, []string{"root"}) {
return logical.ErrorResponse("auth methods cannot create root tokens"), nil, logical.ErrInvalidRequest
}
// Determine the source of the login
source := c.router.MatchingMount(req.Path)
source = strings.TrimPrefix(source, credentialRoutePrefix)
source = strings.Replace(source, "/", "-", -1)
// Prepend the source to the display name
auth.DisplayName = strings.TrimSuffix(source+auth.DisplayName, "-")
sysView := c.router.MatchingSystemView(req.Path)
if sysView == nil {
c.logger.Error("core: unable to look up sys view for login path", "request_path", req.Path)
return nil, nil, ErrInternalError
}
// Start off with the sys default value, and update according to period/TTL
// from resp.Auth
tokenTTL := sysView.DefaultLeaseTTL()
switch {
case auth.Period > time.Duration(0):
// Cap the period value to the sys max_ttl value. The auth backend should
// have checked for it on its login path, but we check here again for
// sanity.
if auth.Period > sysView.MaxLeaseTTL() {
auth.Period = sysView.MaxLeaseTTL()
}
tokenTTL = auth.Period
case auth.TTL > time.Duration(0):
// Cap the TTL value. The auth backend should have checked for it on its
// login path (e.g. a call to b.SanitizeTTL), but we check here again for
// sanity.
if auth.TTL > sysView.MaxLeaseTTL() {
auth.TTL = sysView.MaxLeaseTTL()
}
tokenTTL = auth.TTL
}
// Generate a token
te := TokenEntry{
Path: req.Path,
Policies: auth.Policies,
Meta: auth.Metadata,
DisplayName: auth.DisplayName,
CreationTime: time.Now().Unix(),
TTL: tokenTTL,
NumUses: auth.NumUses,
EntityID: auth.EntityID,
}
te.Policies = policyutil.SanitizePolicies(te.Policies, true)
// Prevent internal policies from being assigned to tokens
for _, policy := range te.Policies {
if strutil.StrListContains(nonAssignablePolicies, policy) {
return logical.ErrorResponse(fmt.Sprintf("cannot assign policy %q", policy)), nil, logical.ErrInvalidRequest
}
}
if err := c.tokenStore.create(ctx, &te); err != nil {
c.logger.Error("core: failed to create token", "error", err)
return nil, auth, ErrInternalError
}
// Populate the client token, accessor, and TTL
auth.ClientToken = te.ID
auth.Accessor = te.Accessor
auth.Policies = te.Policies
auth.TTL = te.TTL
// Register with the expiration manager
if err := c.expiration.RegisterAuth(te.Path, auth); err != nil {
c.tokenStore.Revoke(ctx, te.ID)
c.logger.Error("core: failed to register token lease", "request_path", req.Path, "error", err)
return nil, auth, ErrInternalError
}
// Attach the display name, might be used by audit backends
req.DisplayName = auth.DisplayName
}
return resp, auth, routeErr
}