Variational Characterization of Shapley Values

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Recap of Shapley values

Coalitional game¹

- Suppose there is a game played by a team (or "coalition") of players.
- A coalition game is
 - a set N consisting of n "players" and
 - a function $v: 2^N \to \mathbb{R}$, with $v(\emptyset) = 0$, assigning a value to any subset of players.
- Suppose the whole team plays and gets value v(N).
- How should that value be allocated to the individuals on the team?
- Is there a fair way to do it that reflects the contributions of each individual?

¹Based on the Shapley value article in Wikipedia [Wik20] and [MP08].

- Where we're headed here is that we're going to apply this approach of "value allocation" to "coalitions" of feature "working together" to produce the final output.
- Of course, it's not really clear what it means to use a subset of features with a specific prediction function f(x).
- Various approaches to this will give us different feature interpretations.

Solutions to coalition games

- Let $\mathcal{G}(N)$ denote the set of all coalition games on set N.
 - i.e. a game for every possible $v: 2^N \to \mathbb{R}$.
- A solution to the allocation problem on the set $\mathfrak{G}(N)$ is a map $\Phi:\mathfrak{G}(N)\to\mathbb{R}^n$
 - gives the allocation to each of n players for any game $v \in \mathcal{G}(N)$.
- The **Shapley value solution** is $\Phi(v) = (\phi_i(v))_{i=1}^n$ where

$$\phi_i(v) = \sum_{S \subset (N-\{i\})} k_{|S|,n}(v(S \cup \{i\}) - v(S)),$$

where $k_{s,n} = s! (n-s-1)!/n!$.

The Shapley value solution is special

The Shapley value solution is the unique solution with the following properties:

- Efficiency: For any $v \in \mathcal{G}(N)$, $\sum_{i \in N} \phi_i(v) = v(N)$.
- Symmetry: For any $v \in \mathcal{G}(N)$, $\forall i, j \in N$, if $v(S \cup \{i\}) = v(S \cup \{j\})$ for every subset S of players that excludes i and j, then $\varphi_i(v) = \varphi_j(v)$.
- Linearity: For any $v, w \in \mathcal{G}(N)$, we have $\phi_i(v+w) = \phi_i(v) + \phi_i(w)$ for every player i in N. Also, for any $a \in \mathbb{R}$, $\phi_i(av) = a\phi_i(v)$ for every player i in N.
- Null: A player i is null in v if $v(S \cup \{i\}) = v(S)$ for all coalitions $S \subset N$. If player i is null in a game v, then $\phi_i(v) = 0$.
- That's all very nice... but doesn't give much intuition on what the values are.
- Shapley values are the sum of exponentially many terms, with mysterious weights.

Reformulation of Shapley values

Approximating a set function

- Suppose we have an set function v(S)
 - acting on sets $S \subset N = \{1, ..., n\}$.
- We assume it's arbitrary, except that $v(\emptyset) = 0$.
- So there are $2^n 1$ degrees of freedom.
- The set function has all the information we can want about
 - how valuable each player is in the context of other player coalitions.
- But it's too complicated to examine directly.
- What if we approximate v(S) by a simpler set function?

Additive set function

- One simple type of set function is an additive set function.
- On a finite set, an additive set function takes the form

$$w(S) := \sum_{i \in S} w_i,$$

for some $w \in \mathbb{R}^n$. (empty sum is 0).

Notation overload

Note that when we write w(S), we're thinking of w as a function. While a plain w (without parenthesis), we're thinking of $w \in \mathbb{R}^n$. The relation between the two is in the definition of w(S) above. So for any $w \in \mathbb{R}^n$, we get a function $w: S \mapsto \mathbb{R}$.

Coalitional games given by additive set functions

• On a finite set, an additive set function takes the form

$$w(S) := \sum_{i \in S} w_i,$$

for some $w \in \mathbb{R}^n$. (empty sum is 0).

- Each element of the set $N = \{1, ..., n\}$ gets a value,
 - and w(S) is just the sum of the values in the set S.
- A coalitional game represented by w(S) is easy to interpret:
 - A reasonable assessment of the value of player i is w_i .
- If $w(S) \approx v(S)$,
 - perhaps we can apply interpretations of w(S) to v(S).

Fitting a set function

- We want to find an additive w(S) that approximates v(S).
- We can find $w \in \mathbb{R}^n$ solving

$$\underset{w \in \mathbb{R}^n}{\min} \sum_{S \subset N} \left[w(S) - v(S) \right]^2 q(|S|),$$

where $q:\{1,\ldots,n-1\}\to\mathbb{R}$ is an arbitrary weight function.

- This is a weighted least squares fit of w(S) to v(S).
- Note that the weight corresponding to S depends only on the size of S.
 - e.g. maybe we could weight large sets more than small sets
- Amazingly, we can derive a closed form solution to this optimization problem,
 - with the additional constraint that w(N) = v(N)...

We've intentionally left q(0) and q(n) undefined, as they won't matter...

Generalized Shapley values

Theorem ([CGKR88, Thm 3])

The $w \in \mathbb{R}^n$ that minimizes

$$J(w) = \sum_{S \subset N} [w(S) - v(S)]^2 q(|S|),$$

subject to the constraint that w(N) = v(N) is

$$w_i = \frac{v(N)}{n} + \frac{1}{\beta} \left(\sum_{S \subset N: i \in S} v(S) q(|S|) - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{j=1}^n \sum_{S \subset N: j \in S} v(S) q(|S|) \right),$$

where $\beta = \sum_{s=1}^{n-1} q(s) \binom{n-2}{s-1}$, provided $\beta \neq 0$.

• The w_i 's are called **generalized Shapley values**.

• Note that q(0) and q(n) can take any values in the objective function without affecting the results since

 $- w(\emptyset) = v(\emptyset) = 0$ by definition of w and v, and

- w(N) = v(N) by the constraint.

A quadratic optimization for Shapley values

- Suppose we choose $q(s) = c \binom{n-2}{s-1}^{-1}$, for any $c \neq 0$.
 - We'll call this the **Shapley weight function**.
- Then the $w \in \mathbb{R}^n$ that minimizes
 - the quadratic objective $J(w) = \sum_{S \subset N} [w(S) v(S)]^2 q(|S|)$,
 - subject to the constraint w(N) = v(N)
- are exactly the Shapley values! [CGKR88, Thm 4].

Takeaway

Shapley values arise from finding the best possible additive approximation to a given set function, for a very particular definition of "best possible."

• Practical issue: The objective function has 2^n terms.

Theorem ([CGKR88, Thm 4])

If we choose $q(s) = c \binom{n-2}{s-1}^{-1}$ for any $c \neq 0$, then the solution to the constrained optimization problem stated above is

$$w_{i} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{S \subset N: i \in S} {n-1 \choose |S|-1}^{-1} [v(S) - v(S - \{i\})]$$

$$= \sum_{S \subset (N - \{i\})} k_{|S|,n} [v(S \cup \{i\}) - v(S)],$$

where
$$k_{s,n} = \frac{1}{s+1} {n \choose s+1}^{-1} = \frac{1}{n} {n-1 \choose s-1}^{-1} = s! (n-s-1)!/n!$$
. And so w_i are the Shapley values.

- The notation in [CGKR88, Thm 4] is different, but here we've translated it to our notation. There are many equivalent formulations of Shapley values, so we've tried to give a variety here. The last one matches our original definition.
- With a few lines of algebra and taking $c = \frac{1}{n}$, one can show this result is equivalent to [LL17, Thm 2].

Finding the Shapley values

Dropping the constraint

The generalized Shapley value objective is

$$J(w) = \sum_{S \subset N} [w(S) - v(S)]^2 q(|S|).$$

- We have the constraint that $w(N) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i = v(N)$.
- An easy way to enforce the equality constraint is to eliminate a variable.
- Let's eliminate a variable by setting $w_n = v(N) \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} w_i$.
- With this substitution, we no longer need an explicit constraint that w(N) = v(N).
- We can take q(0) = q(n) = 0, without affecting the result.

The weights for the Shapley kernel

• For n = 30, let $q(s) = \binom{n-2}{s-1}^{-1}$ be the Shapley weight function.

/Users/drosen/Dropbox/repos/mltopics/code/interpretation/figures/shapley_weigh

- This is a plot of the weight function q(s) on $\{1, 2, ..., 29\}$. As noted, we can take q(0) = q(30) = 0 in our optimization.
- So clearly the largest and smallest sets have enormously more weight than mid-sized sets.
- But also remember that there are enormously more mid-sized sets than very small and very large sets...

Total weight by subset size

• For n = 30, let $w(s) = \binom{n}{s} q(s)$ be the total weight for subsets of each size.

/Users/drosen/Dropbox/repos/mltopics/code/interpretation/figures/tot_weight_pe

- This is a plot of the total weight for all subsets of each size s, on $\{1, 2, ..., 29\}$.
- That is, we're plotting $w(s) = \binom{n}{s} q(s) = \binom{n}{s} \binom{n-2}{s-1}^{-1}$

$$w(s) = \binom{n}{s} \binom{n-2}{s-1}^{-1} = \frac{n!}{s!(n-s)!} \frac{(s-1)!(n-s-1)!}{(n-2)!}$$
$$= \frac{n(n-1)}{s(n-s)}$$

the range.

 $= \frac{n(n-1)}{s(n-s)}$ • So most of the weight is on the small and large sets, but there is nontrivial weight throughout

Monte Carlo approximation

- The objective function has 2^n terms,
 - which quickly becomes too large to handle exactly.

$$J(w) = \sum_{S \subset N} [w(S) - v(S)]^2 q(|S|).$$

- Since q(|S|) > 0 for the Shapley weight function,
 - \bullet we can normalize it into a distribution on subsets of N.
- Define $p(S) := \frac{1}{k}q(|S|)$. Then

$$J(w) \propto \mathbb{E}_{S \sim p(S)} \left[w(S) - v(S) \right]^2$$
.

- (How can you sample from p(S)? See note...)
- So now we can approximate J(w) using as many subsets as we have patience.

- Rather than sampling from p(S) directly, it's easier to first sample the size of S, and then we just sample uniformly from subsets of the selected size.
- Computing the probability distribution over sizes is straightforward by renormalizing $w(s) = \binom{n}{s} q(s)$ over $s \in \{1, \dots, n-1\}$.

Hybrid approximation

- In the next module we'll discuss Kernel SHAP.
- Kernel SHAP computes Shapley values with a variant of the Monte Carlo approach.
- We can break the computation J(w) into pieces, such as

$$J_2(w) := \sum_{S:|S| \in \{1,2,(n-2),n-1\}} \left[w(S) - v(S) \right]^2 q(|S|).$$

and

$$J_{-2}(w) := \sum_{S:3 \leqslant |S| \leqslant (n-3)} [w(S) - v(S)]^2 q(|S|),$$

where $J(w) = J_2(w) + J_{-2}(w)$.

- We can then compute $J_2(w)$ by direct computation, and estimate $J_{-2}(w)$ by Monte Carlo.
- Of course we can change the the subset sizes we're using in direct computation.

- From the code for Kernel SHAP (December 8, 2021), it seems that they have a budget (can be user-provided) for the number of subsets they're going to sum over. They start with subsets of size 1 and N-1, and see if they can fit **all** of those subsets into their budget. If so, they sum over all those subsets explicitly.
- Next, they check if they can also include all subsets of size 2 and N-2 within the remaining budget. If so, they add those in. They continue until they get to an i for which they cannot fit all the subsets of size i and N-i within the remaining budget. At this point, they switch to random sampling from remaining subsets with the remaining budget.

References

Resources

• The ideas in the reformulation of Shapley values and generalized Shapley values are from [CGKR88]. However, I found Yuchen Pei's blog post to be very helpful in understanding the proofs in the paper by Charnes et al [CGKR88].

References I

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