## exception-tables.txt

Kernel level exception handling in Linux Commentary by Joerg Pommnitz <joerg@raleigh.ibm.com>

When a process runs in kernel mode, it often has to access user mode memory whose address has been passed by an untrusted program. To protect itself the kernel has to verify this address.

In older versions of Linux this was done with the int verify\_area(int type, const void \* addr, unsigned long size) function (which has since been replaced by access\_ok()).

This function verified that the memory area starting at address 'addr' and of size 'size' was accessible for the operation specified in type (read or write). To do this, verify\_read had to look up the virtual memory area (vma) that contained the address addr. In the normal case (correctly working program), this test was successful. It only failed for a few buggy programs. In some kernel profiling tests, this normally unneeded verification used up a considerable amount of time.

To overcome this situation, Linus decided to let the virtual memory hardware present in every Linux-capable CPU handle this test.

How does this work?

Whenever the kernel tries to access an address that is currently not accessible, the CPU generates a page fault exception and calls the page fault handler

void do page fault(struct pt regs \*regs, unsigned long error code)

in arch/x86/mm/fault.c. The parameters on the stack are set up by the low level assembly glue in arch/x86/kernel/entry\_32.S. The parameter regs is a pointer to the saved registers on the stack, error\_code contains a reason code for the exception.

do\_page\_fault first obtains the unaccessible address from the CPU control register CR2. If the address is within the virtual address space of the process, the fault probably occurred, because the page was not swapped in, write protected or something similar. However, we are interested in the other case: the address is not valid, there is no vma that contains this address. In this case, the kernel jumps to the bad area label.

There it uses the address of the instruction that caused the exception (i.e. regs->eip) to find an address where the execution can continue (fixup). If this search is successful, the fault handler modifies the return address (again regs->eip) and returns. The execution will continue at the address in fixup.

Where does fixup point to?

Since we jump to the contents of fixup, fixup obviously points to executable code. This code is hidden inside the user access macros. I have picked the get\_user macro defined in arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h as an example. The definition is somewhat hard to follow, so let's peek at

exception-tables.txt the code generated by the preprocessor and the compiler. I selected the get user call in drivers/char/sysrq.c for a detailed examination. The original code in sysrq.c line 587: get user(c, buf); The preprocessor output (edited to become somewhat readable): ( long \_\_gu\_err = - 14 , \_\_gu\_val = 0;
const \_\_typeof\_\_(\*( ( buf) ) ) \*\_\_gu\_addr = ((buf)); if  $(((((0 + current_set[0]) - )tss.segment) == 0x18))$  $(((sizeof(*(buf))) \le 0xC0000000UL) \&\&$  $((unsigned long) (gu addr) \leq 0xC0000000UL - (sizeof(*(buf))))))$ do { gu err = 0;switch ((sizeof(\*(buf)))) { case 1: ". section . fixup, \"ax\"\n" mov1 %3,%0\n" xor" "b" " %" "b" "1,%" "b" "1\n" jmp 2b\n" . section  $\underline{\phantom{a}}$ ex\_table, \"a\"\n" .align 4\n′ .long 1b,3b\n" : "=r"(\_\_gu\_err), "=q" (\_\_gu\_val): "m"((\*(struct ". text" large struct \*) gu addr )) ), "i"(- 14 ), "0"( gu err )) break; case 2: "1: mov" "w" " %2, %"
"2:\n"
". section . fixup, \"ax\"\n" mov1 %3,%0\n" xor" "w" " %" "w" "1,%" "w" "1\n" jmp 2b\n"  $[.section \__ex\_table, \"a\" \"$ .align 4\n" .long 1b, 3b\n" : "=r"(\_\_gu\_err), "=r" ( gu val) : "m"((\*(struct ". text" large struct \*) ( \_\_gu\_addr )) ), "i"(- 14 ), "0"( gu err )); break: case 4: "2:\n" ".section .fixup, \"ax\"\n"

 $mov1 \%3, \%0 \ n''$ 

第 2 页

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exception-tables.txt
                      xor" "1" " %" "" "1, %" "" "1\n"
                      jmp 2b\n"
              .section __ex_table, \"a\"\n"
                      ". text"
 large struct *)
                               gu addr )) ), "i"(- 14 ), "0"( gu err));
              break;
          default:
            ( gu val) = get user bad();
      \} while (0);
    ((c)) = (typeof_(*((buf))))_gu_val;
     _gu_err;
);
WOW! Black GCC/assembly magic. This is impossible to follow, so let's
see what code gcc generates:
          xorl %edx, %edx
          mov1 current_set, %eax
          cmp1 $24, 788 (%eax)
           je .L1424
          cmp1 $-1073741825, 64 (%esp)
           ja . L1423
   .L1424:
          mov1 %edx, %eax
          mov1 64 (%esp), %ebx
 > #APP
 > 1:
          movb (%ebx), %dl
                                         /* this is the actual user access */
 > 2:
  .section .fixup, "ax"
          mov1 $-14, %eax
          xorb %d1, %d1
          jmp 2b
  .section __ex_table, "a"
          .align 4
           . long 1b, 3b
  .text
  #NO APP
  .L1423:
          movzbl %dl, %esi
The optimizer does a good job and gives us something we can actually
understand. Can we? The actual user access is quite obvious. Thanks
to the unified address space we can just access the address in user
memory. But what does the .section stuff do?????
To understand this we have to look at the final kernel:
 > objdump --section-headers vmlinux
               file format elf32-i386
  vmlinux:
```

> Sections:

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exception-tables.txt
 Idx Name
                               VMA
                                         LMA
                    Size
                                                    File off
                                                              Algn
c0100000
    0 .text
                    00098f40
                               c0100000
                                                    00001000
                                                              2**4
                               ALLOC, LOAD, READONLY, CODE
                    CONTENTS,
                               c0198f40
                    000016bc
                                         c0198f40
                                                    00099f40
                                                              2**0
    1.fixup
                    CONTENTS,
                               ALLOC, LOAD, READONLY, CODE
    2 .rodata
                    0000f127
                               c019a5fc c019a5fc
                                                    0009b5fc
                                                              2**2
                               ALLOC, LOAD, READONLY, DATA
                    CONTENTS,
                               c01a9724
                                         c01a9724
                                                    000aa724
    3 ex table
                    000015c0
                                                              2**2
                               ALLOC, LOAD, READONLY, DATA
                    CONTENTS,
    4 .data
                    0000ea58
                               c01abcf0
                                         c01abcf0
                                                    000abcf0
                                                              2**4
                    CONTENTS,
                               ALLOC, LOAD, DATA
    5.bss
                    00018e21
                               c01ba748
                                         c01ba748
                                                    000ba748
                                                              2**2
                    ALLOC
                    00000ec4
                               00000000
                                         00000000
    6 .comment
                                                    000ba748
                                                              2**0
                    CONTENTS.
                               READONLY
                    00001068
                               00000ec4
                                         00000ec4
                                                              2**0
    7 . note
                                                    000bb60c
                    CONTENTS,
                               READONLY
```

There are obviously 2 non standard ELF sections in the generated object file. But first we want to find out what happened to our code in the final kernel executable:

```
> objdump --disassemble --section=.text vmlinux
 c017e785 (do con write+c1) xor1
                                     %edx. %edx
                                     0xc01c7bec, %eax
 c017e787 (do con write+c3) mov1
> c017e78c <do con write+c8> cmp1
                                     $0x18, 0x314 (%eax)
> c017e793 <do_con_write+cf> je
                                     c017e79f <do_con_write+db>
                                      0xbffffffff, 0x40 (\%esp, 1)
> c017e795 < do_con_write+d1 > cmp1
> c017e79d <do_con_write+d9> ja
                                     c017e7a7 <do con write+e3>
                                     %edx, %eax
> c017e79f <do con write+db> mov1
                                     0x40 (%esp, 1), %ebx
> c017e7a1 <do con write+dd> mov1
                                      (%ebx), %d1
> c017e7a5 <do_con_write+e1> movb
> c017e7a7 <do con write+e3> movzbl %dl, %esi
```

The whole user memory access is reduced to 10 x86 machine instructions. The instructions bracketed in the .section directives are no longer in the normal execution path. They are located in a different section of the executable file:

```
> objdump --disassemble --section=.fixup vmlinux
> c0199ff5 <.fixup+10b5> movl $0xffffffff2, %eax
> c0199ffa <.fixup+10ba> xorb %dl, %dl
> c0199ffc <.fixup+10bc> jmp c017e7a7 <do_con_write+e3>

And finally:
> objdump --full-contents --section=__ex_table vmlinux
> c01aa7c4 93c017c0 e09f19c0 97c017c0 99c017c0
> c01aa7d4 f6c217c0 e99f19c0 a5e717c0 f59f19c0
> c01aa7e4 080a18c0 01a019c0 0a0a18c0 04a019c0
or in human readable byte order:
> c01aa7c4 c017c093 c0199fe0 c017c097 c017c099
第 4 页
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exception-tables.txt
   c01aa7d4 c017c2f6 c0199fe9 c017e7a5 c0199ff5
                                                    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
                                this is the interesting part!
    c01aa7e4 c0180a08 c019a001 c0180a0a c019a004 .....
What happened? The assembly directives
.section .fixup, "ax"
.section __ex_table, "a"
told the assembler to move the following code to the specified
sections in the ELF object file. So the instructions
        mov1 $-14, %eax
        xorb %d1, %d1
        jmp 2b
ended up in the .fixup section of the object file and the addresses
        . long 1b, 3b
ended up in the __ex_table section of the object file. 1b and 3b
are local labels. The local label 1b (1b stands for next label 1
backward) is the address of the instruction that might fault, i.e.
in our case the address of the label 1 is c017e7a5:
the original assembly code: > 1: movb (%ebx), %dl
and linked in vmlinux
                         : > c017e7a5 <do_con_write+e1> movb
                                                                   (%ebx), %d1
The local label 3 (backwards again) is the address of the code to handle
the fault, in our case the actual value is c0199ff5:
the original assembly code: > 3: movl $-14,%eax and linked in vmlinux : > c0199ff5 < fixup+10b5> movl
                                                              $0xffffffff2, %eax
The assembly code
 > .section __ex_table, "a"
           .align 4
           . long 1b, 3b
becomes the value pair
 > c01aa7d4 c017c2f6 c0199fe9 c017e7a5 c0199ff5
                                 this is this is
c017e7a5, c0199ff5 in the exception table of the kernel.
So, what actually happens if a fault from kernel mode with no suitable
vma occurs?
1.) access to invalid address:
> c017e7a5 <do con write+e1> movb
                                       (%ebx), %d1
2.) MMU generates exception
3.) CPU calls do page fault
4.) do page fault calls search exception table (regs->eip == c017e7a5);
5.) search_exception_table looks up the address c017e7a5 in the
    exception table (i.e. the contents of the ELF section __ex_table)
    and returns the address of the associated fault handle code c0199ff5.
6.) do_page_fault modifies its own return address to point to the fault
    handle code and returns.
7.) execution continues in the fault handling code.
8.) 8a) EAX becomes -EFAULT (== -14)
    8b) DL becomes zero (the value we "read" from user space)
第 5 页
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## exception-tables.txt

8c) execution continues at local label 2 (address of the instruction immediately after the faulting user access).

The steps 8a to 8c in a certain way emulate the faulting instruction.

That's it, mostly. If you look at our example, you might ask why we set EAX to -EFAULT in the exception handler code. Well, the get\_user macro actually returns a value: 0, if the user access was successful, -EFAULT on failure. Our original code did not test this return value, however the inline assembly code in get\_user tries to return -EFAULT. GCC selected EAX to return this value.

## NOTE:

Due to the way that the exception table is built and needs to be ordered, only use exceptions for code in the .text section. Any other section will cause the exception table to not be sorted correctly, and the exceptions will fail.