
# Domain Generalization using Causal Matching

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## Feature Distribution Matching

- Domain Invariant Representations
  - Bad if labels and domain are correlated (Class Imbalance)
- Class Conditional Version
  - But does the distribution of invariant features need to be the same across domains?
  - Variance in the distribution due to different noise levels across domains

Domain Adversarial Training (Ganin et al.)



#### Perfect Match

#### **Training Domains**











Rotation Angles: 15, 30, 45, 60, 76

#### **Test Domains**






Rotation Angles: 0, 90

- Perfect Match:
  - Same data point rotated by different angle across domains shares the same invariant feature
  - Match feature representations for the "counterfactuals" of each data point across domains

#### Causal View of Domain Generalization

- Object (0) can be interpreted as the base person where the Domain (D) corresponds to different views that lead to creation of an image (X) for that person (O)
- Domains can be interpreted as interventions: For each observed  $x_i^d$ , there area set of counterfactual inputs  $x_i^{d\prime}$  where  $d\neq d\prime$ , but both correspond to the (possibly unobserved) same object (O)



## Invariance Condition from SCM

- Invariance Condition:  $X_C \perp \!\!\! \perp D \mid O$
- Perfect Match:

$$f_{\texttt{perfectmatch}} = \arg\min_{h,\Phi} \sum_{d=1}^{m} L_d(h(\Phi(X)), Y) + \lambda \sum_{\Omega(j,k)=1; d \neq d'} \operatorname{dist}(\Phi(\mathbf{x}_j^{(d)}), \Phi(\mathbf{x}_k^{(d')}))$$

- Prior work incorrectness:
  - Domain-invariant representations:  $X_C \perp \!\!\! \perp D$
  - Class-conditional domain-invariant:  $X_C \perp \!\!\! \perp D \mid Y_{true}$
  - Both incorrect due to backdoor path via Object O

#### Observational Data

- Latent base object not known generally in observational data (PACS, VLCS)
  - Perfect Match still applicable using self augmentations
- Class Conditional Approximation:
  - Data points with the same class label are likely to closer under causal features as compared to point with different class labels
- Inferring latent base objects / match function (  $\Omega: X \times X \rightarrow \{0,1\}$  )
  - Contrastive Loss: Dist(Anchor, Positive Match) Dist(Anchor, Negative Match)
- Iterative Contrastive Learning:
  - Initialize  $\Omega$  with Random Match across domains with same class label
  - Using  $\Omega$  to infer Positive Match given anchor and minimize contrastive loss
  - Update  $\Omega$  based on nearest same-class pairs in the representation space

## MatchDG

$$f_{\texttt{randommatch}} = \arg\min_{h,\Phi} \sum_{d=1}^{m} L_d(h(\Phi(X)), Y) + \lambda \sum_{\Omega_Y(j,k)=1; d \neq d'} \operatorname{dist}(\Phi(\mathbf{x}_j^{(d)}), \Phi(\mathbf{x}_k^{(d')})) \tag{2}$$

$$l(\mathbf{x}_j, \mathbf{x}_k) = -\log \frac{\exp(\sin(\Phi(\mathbf{x}_j), \Phi(\mathbf{x}_k))/\tau)}{\exp(\sin(\Phi(\mathbf{x}_j), \Phi(\mathbf{x}_k))/\tau) + \sum_{i=0, y_i \neq y_j}^{b} \exp(\sin(\Phi(\mathbf{x}_j), \Phi(\mathbf{x}_i))/\tau)}$$
(3)

#### Algorithm 1: MatchDG

Input: Dataset  $(d_i, x_i, y_i)_{i=1}^n$  from m domains,  $\tau$ , t

Output: Function  $f: \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$ 

Create random match pairs  $\Omega_Y$ .

Build a n \* m data matrix  $\mathcal{M}$ .

Phase I. while notconverged do

**Phase 2**. Compute matching based on  $\Phi$ . Minimize the loss (2) to obtain f.

## Chest X Ray Dataset

Details: Link

- Source Domains (NIH, ChexPert)
  - Images with class label 0 are translated vertically downwards
- Target Domains (Kaggle)
  - No spurious correlation

	NIH (Source)	Chex (Source)	RSNA (Target)
ERM	78.9 (0.34)	<b>84.3</b> (3.52)	55.2 (2.27)
IRM	<b>79.1</b> (1.01)	83.4 (2.42)	56.6 (2.04)
CSD	73.2 (3.35)	83.3 (2.03)	60.5 (0.82)
RandMatch	75.3 (1.87)	83.6 (1.84)	57.4 (1.76)
MatchDG	74.7 (0.66)	82.2 (0.68)	58.4 (0.62)
MDGHybrid	74.3 (0.91)	82.4 (1.03)	<b>62.6</b> (0.72)

#### Evaluation Issues with DG

- OOD accuracy evaluated on few test domains (PACS, VLCS)
  - No guarantees regarding performance on a large set of unseen domains
  - Evaluation metrics to capture the extent to which DG algorithm learnt stable features
- Membership Inference (MI) Attacks
  - Utilize overfitting of ML models to predict train vs test dataset samples
  - Stable features → Better Generalization → Good Defense against MI attacks
- Connections between DG and Privacy Attacks
  - Theoretical: Causal models (stable feature learning) leads to better defense on MI attacks
  - <u>Empirical</u>: Use MI attacks to evaluate DG algorithms
  - <u>Software</u>: Toolkit to support DG algorithms and evaluate them on various privacy attacks