



# **Linux Hardening**

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## **Exploit Mitigations**



#### Enable **DEP**:

- → Default since like forever
- → (for old cpus: kernel.exec-shield = 1)
- ★ To disable for a binary: gcc -z noexecstack

#### Enable **ASLR**:

- → Default since like forever
- /proc/sys/kernel/randomize\_va\_space = 2

### Enable Stack protector:

- -fstack-protector (Default)
- -fstack-protector-all (ALL Functions)
- -fstack-protector-strong (Better)

## **Anti-Exploitation - Hardening**



#### More Compiler options:

- → -D\_FORTIFY\_SOURCE=2
  - → FORTIFY\_SOURCE provides (lightweight) buffer overflow checks for the following functions:
    - memcpy, mempcpy, memmove, memset, strcpy, stpcpy, strncpy, strcat, strncat, sprintf, vsprintf, vsnprintf, gets.
  - Compile time warnings
  - **→ Default** in Ubuntu
- Formatstring
  - **→ Default** in Ubuntu
  - -Wformat -Wformat-security
- Full Static Relocation:
  - **→ Default** in Ubuntu
  - → -WI,-z-,relro -WI,-z,now
- Position independent code
  - → NOT Default in Ubuntu (performance penalty)
  - → -pie –fPIE

# Ubuntu Packages Compiled as PIE

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Source package	8.04 LTS	9.04	9.10	10.04 LTS	10.10	11.04	11.10	Ý
openssh (native)	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
apache2		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
bind9		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
openIdap		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
postfix		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
cups		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
postgresql-8.3		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
samba (native)		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
dovecot		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
dhcp3		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
ntp			yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
amavisd-new			yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
squid			yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
cyrus-sasl2			yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
exim4			yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
nagios3			yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
nagios-plugins			yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
xinetd			yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	

## **Ubuntu Packages Compiled as PIE**



Ubuntu 16.10: PIE everywhere ?!

#### **Built as PIE**

All programs built as Position Independent Executables (PIE) with "-fPIE -pie" can take advantage of the exec ASLR. This protects against "return-to-text and generally frustrates memory corruption attacks. This requires centralized changes to the compiler options when building the entire archive. PIE has a large (5-10%) performance penalty on architectures with small numbers of general registers (e.g. x86), so it should only be used for a select number of security-critical packages (some upstreams natively support building with PIE, other require the use of "hardening-wrapper" to force on the correct compand linker flags). PIE on 64-bit architectures do not have the same penalties, and will eventually be made the default (as of 16.10, it is the default on amd64, ppc64el and s390x).



# Ubuntu Packages compiled as PIE - 18.04



COMMAND	DID	RELRO		STACK (	יאאז סע	SECCOMP	NX/P	=V	PIE		FORTIFY
systemd			RELRO	Canary		Seccomp-bpf				enabled	Yes
-	129631			Canary		Seccomp-bpf					Yes
	129672			Canary		Seccomp-bpf					Yes
tmux: client				Canary		Seccomp-bpf					Yes
login			RELRO	Canary		Seccomp-bpf					Yes
rsyslogd				Canary							Yes
						Seccomp-bpf					
systemd-network				Canary		Seccomp-bpf					Yes
systemd-resolve				Canary		Seccomp-bpf					Yes
systemd-journal				Canary		Seccomp-bpf					Yes
systemd			RELRO	Canary		Seccomp-bpf					Yes
(sd-pam)			RELRO	Canary		Seccomp-bpf					Yes
bash			RELRO	Canary		Seccomp-bpf					Yes
accounts-daemon			RELRO	Canary		Seccomp-bpf					Yes
systemd-logind			RELRO	Canary	found	Seccomp-bpf					Yes
cron	153	Full	RELRO	Canary	found	Seccomp-bpf	NX e	nabled	PIE e	enabled	Yes
networkd-dispat	159	Parti	ial RELRO	Canary	found	Seccomp-bpf	NX e	nabled		IE	Yes
dbus-daemon	163	Full	RELRO	Canary	found	Seccomp-bpf	NX e	nabled	PIE e	enabled	Yes
agetty	179	Full	RELRO	Canary	found	Seccomp-bpf	NX e	nabled	PIE e	enabled	Yes
sshd	187	Full	RELRO	Canary	found	Seccomp-bpf	NX e	nabled	PIE e	enabled	Yes
tmux: server	24721	Full	RELRO	Canary	found	Seccomp-bpf	NX e	nabled	PIE e	enabled	Yes
bash	24722	Full	RELRO	Canary	found	Seccomp-bpf	NX e	nabled	PIE e	enabled	Yes
bash	24746	Full	RELRO	Canary	found	Seccomp-bpf	NX e	nabled	PIE e	enabled	Yes
bash	27486	Full	RELRO	Canary	found	Seccomp-bpf	NX e	nabled	PIE e	enabled	Yes
pickup	44165	Full	RELRO	Canary	found	Seccomp-bpf	NX e	nabled	PIE e	enabled	Yes
sshd	44169	Ful1	RELRO	Canary	found	Seccomp-bpf	NX e	nabled	PIE e	enabled	Yes
bash	44209	Full	RELRO	Canary	found	Seccomp-bpf	NX e	nabled	PIE e	enabled	Yes
mc	5437	Ful1	RELRO	Canary	found	Seccomp-bpf	NX e	nabled	PIE e	enabled	Yes
bash	5439	Full	RELRO	Canary	found	Seccomp-bpf	NX e	nabled	PIE e	enabled	Yes
master	583	Full	RELRO	Canary	found	Seccomp-bpf	NX e	nabled	PIE e	enabled	Yes
qmgr	591	Full	RELRO	Canary	found	Seccomp-bpf	NX e	nabled	PIE e		Yes
bash			RELRO	Canary		Seccomp-bpf					Yes
bash			RELRO	Canary			NX e	nabled	PIE e		Yes
root@ubuntu-1804:			_								
			cc Cocurity Ma	strue ele Ce	- AC						Cli da C

## Check: Checksec

Check: Che	ecksec			AAAPASS®
				SECURITY
init	1235 Full RELRO	Canary found	NX enabled	PIE enabled
dbus-launch	1436 Partial RELRO	Canary found	NX enabled	No PIE
dbus-daemon	1453 Partial RELRO	Canary found	NX enabled	No PIE
dbus-daemon	1454 Partial RELRO	Canary found	NX enabled	No PIE
upstart-event-b	1465 Full RELRO	No canary found	NX enabled	PIE enabled
window-stack-br	1471 Partial RELRO	No canary found	NX enabled	No PIE
upstart-dbus-br	1486 Full RELRO	No canary found	NX enabled	PIE enabled
upstart-dbus-br	1488 Full RELRO	No canary found	NX enabled	PIE enabled
upstart-file-br	1497 Full RELRO	Canary found	NX enabled	PIE enabled
ibus-daemon	1503 Partial RELRO	Canary found	NX enabled	No PIE
unity-settings-	1517 Partial RELRO	No canary found	NX enabled	No PIE
bamfdaemon	1519 Partial RELRO	Canary found	NX enabled	No PIE
at-spi-bus-laun	1523 Full RELRO	Canary found	NX enabled	PIE enabled
gnome-session	1524 Partial RELRO	Canary found	NX enabled	No PIE
dbus-daemon	1529 Partial RELRO	Canary found	NX enabled	No PIE
gvfsd	1533 Partial RELRO	No canary found	NX enabled	No PIE
ibus-dconf	1538 Partial RELRO	No canary found	NX enabled	No PIE
ibus-ui-gtk3	1539 Partial RELRO	No canary found	NX enabled	No PIE
ibus-x11	1542 Partial RELRO	Canary found	NX enabled	No PIE
gvfsd-fuse	1545 Partial RELRO	No canary found	NX enabled	No PIE
at-spi2-registr	1555 Full RELRO	Canary found	NX enabled	PIE enabled
pulseaudio	1645 Full RELRO	Canary found	NX enabled	No PIE
ibus-engine-sim	1692 Partial RELRO	No canary found	NX enabled	No PIE
metacity	1775 Partial RELRO	Canary found	NX enabled	No PIE
dconf-service	1781 Partial RELRO	Canary found	NX enabled	No PIE
gnome-panel	1819 Partial RELRO	Canary found	NX enabled	No PIE
indicator-appli	1835 Partial RELRO	No canary found	NX enabled	No PIE
unity-fallback-	1836 Partial RELRO	No canary found	NX enabled	No PIE
indicator-bluet	1837 Partial RELRO	No canary found	NX enabled	No PIE
vmtoolsd	1839 Partial RELRO	Canary found	NX enabled	No PIE
polkit-gnome-au	1841 Partial RELRO	No canary found	NX enabled	No PIE
nautilus	1848 Partial RELRO	Canary found	NX enabled	No PIE
nm-applet	1852 Partial RELRO	Canary found	NX enabled	No PIE
initctl	1853 Full RELRO	No canary found	NX enabled	PIE enabled
indicator-messa	1858 Partial RELRO	No canary found	NX enabled	No PIE de 7
indicator-nower	1863 Partial RFT.RO		NX enabled	No PTF

## **Check: Paxtest**



```
Anonymous mapping randomization test
                                          : 28 quality bits (guessed)
Heap randomization test (ET_EXEC)
                                          : 13 quality bits (guessed)
Heap randomization test (PIE)
                                          : 28 quality bits (guessed)
Main executable randomization (ET_EXEC)
                                          : 28 quality bits (guessed)
Main executable randomization (PIE)
                                          : 28 quality bits (guessed)
Shared library randomization test
                                          : 28 quality bits (guessed)
VDSO randomization test
                                          : 11 quality bits (guessed)
Stack randomization test (SEGMEXEC)
                                          : 28 quality bits (guessed)
Stack randomization test (PAGEEXEC)
                                          : 28 quality bits (guessed)
Arg/env randomization test (SEGMEXEC)
                                          : 20 quality bits (guessed)
Arg/env randomization test (PAGEEXEC)
                                          : 20 quality bits (guessed)
Randomization under memory exhaustion @~0: 28 bits (guessed)
Randomization under memory exhaustion @0 : 28 bits (guessed)
Return to function (strcpy)
                                          : return addr has NULL byte
Return to function (memcpy)
                                          : Vulnerable
Return to function (strcpy, PIE)
                                          : return addr has NULL byte
Return to function (memcpy, PIE)
                                          : Vulnerable
```



What is the fundamental difference between attack and defense?

You know when an attack does not work...





# Advanced Linux hardening

The non-standard stuff

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## **Advanced Hardening - Grsecurity**



# Grsecurity

#### Uses PaX

- ★ Kernel patch
- → Improved DEP and ASLR
- ✦ For userspace
- ★ And kernelspace protection (e.g. SMAP emulation)
- ★ Better randomness, more randomness

### Also provides:

- Chroot hardening
- Hide /proc stuff
- Ptrace restrictions
- Kernel module loading restrictions
- ★ RBAC (Role Based Access Control)





## Container

**Linux Container** 

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### **Linux Container**



#### Relevant?

◆ TEH CLOUD

#### Container: All container share the same kernel

- **→** LXC
- **→** Docker
- ★ FreeBSD Jails (since March 2000)
- → Solaris Zones
- Obsolete: Vserver, openvz

## Virtualization: Each guest has his very own kernel

- → Vmware, virtualbox, kvm, ...
- Not covered here

#### RBAC's

- → SELinux (redhat), Apparmour (Suse), ...
- ♦ Not convered here

#### ! Container



- Chroot is not a container
  - Path restriction only
  - But: Can access other processes, the kernel, IPC, etc.

```
compass@ubuntu:~$ sudo chroot /var/chroot
root@ubuntu:/# cd root/
root@ubuntu:/root# ./w00t -0 --dir /nonexisting
clssic
[+] creating /nonexisting directory
[+] chrooting to /nonexisting
[+] change working directory to real root
[+] chrooting to real root
root@ubuntu:/# ls /
bin cdrom etc initrd.img lib64 media
                        lost+found mnt
boot dev home lib
root@ubuntu:/#
```



# LXC/Docker: Use namespaces for containerization

→ Restrict view/access of certain processes

Linux provides the following namespaces:

Namespace	Constant	Isolates
IPC	CLONE_NEWIPC	System V IPC, POSIX message queues
Network	CLONE_NEWNET	Network devices, stacks, ports, etc.
Mount	CLONE_NEWNS	Mount points
PID	CLONE_NEWPID	Process IDs
User	CLONE_NEWUSER	User and group IDs
UTS	CLONE_NEWUTS	Hostname and NIS domain name



### Lxc container cannot:

- Interact with host processes
- Access root file system
- Access special devices (block, network, ...)
- Mount filesystems
- Execute special ioctl's

## Lxc container can access:

- /proc: certain files
- /sys: certain files
- Do a lot of other stuff

## **Kernel Hardening**



## Seccomp-bpf

- → Seccomp: Since Kernel 2.6.12 (2005)
- → Seccomp-bpf: Since Kernel 3.5 (2012)
- → Whitelist (blacklist) system calls
  - ★ E.g. exit(), read(), write(), ...
- → Who cares?
  - → Chrome-Flash, Chrome-Renderer, vsftpd, OpenSSH, Firefox, Tor,

 $slidelegend.com\_promises- and -pitfalls- of-sandboxes- robert-swiecki\_59c170a41723dd1242166f8f.pdf and the same statement of the s$ 

## **Kernel Hardening**



## FS hardening, only provide:


- → /proc
- → /sys
- → /dev/[zero, null, urandom]
- → Nothing else

## **AppArmour**

 "additional restrictions on mounts, socket, ptrace and file access. Specifically restricting cross-container communication."

### Linux Kernel Attack Surface







Jon Oberheide – SOURCE Boston 2010 – Linux Kernel Exploitation