



THE PROXY WARFARE: UNMASKING RUSSIAN AND CHINESE EXTERNALIZED CYBER CAPABILITIES

WHO I AM?



ALIXIA RUTAYISIRE

- Geopolitical Analyst at  QUOINTELLIGENCE
- Previous role as intelligence analyst at the French MoD
- Assessment of political and security situations
- Providing strategic insights combining geopolitics and CTI

SETTING THE STAGE: Methodology, Scope, Structure



Methodology

- Leaks
- US Indictments
- Intelligence agencies' reports
- Academic research
- CTI companies' reports



Building on the notion of
CAPITAL INTELLIGENCE



Scope

- Participation of non-state actors in cyber operations to the benefit of a State
- Focus on private companies
- Front companies are out of scope




Structure

- Russia's case
- China's case
- Comparative analysis
- Conclusions



Dissolution of the USSR
(1991)


RUSSIA: Cybercrime network historical development



RUSSIA: Intelligence agencies behind warfare apparatus




Presidential
Administration



FSB

Domestic intelligence


- Counterintelligence and law enforcement
- Scope includes Russia's near-abroad



SVR

External civilian intelligence

- Conducts strategic, economic, scientific and technological espionage



GRU


Military intelligence

- Broader scope matching Russia's strategic interests

RUSSIA: The outsourcing ecosystem

Layers of outsourcing:

- intelligence agencies
- private companies
- hacktivist groups
- lone wolves
- eCrime groups



RUSSIA: Proxy services offering



Vulnerability
Identification



Tools & Solutions



Recruiting



Training



Information
Operation


RUSSIA: Outsourcing risk-benefit calculus


RISKS

- Lack of control
- Risky behavior
- Uncertain mobilization

BENEFITS


- Reduced costs
- Flexibility
- Plausible deniability





RUSSIA: The IO network

CHINA: Cyber sphere historical development



CHINA: From patriotic hackers to state contractors



Wu Haibo



Member of the
Green Army



I-Soon



Cai Jingjing



Member of the
Red Hacker
Alliance



Integrity Tech



Tan Dailin



Founder of NCPH
Hacking Group



PLA



Arrested by the
MPS



MSS



Founder of
cybersecurity firms



CCP Politburo



PLA

China military

- Cyber and psychological warfare

State Council



MSS

Civilian intelligence and security service

- Counterintelligence
- Foreign intelligence
- Political security and domestic stability
- Strong provincial organs

CHINA: Institutional architecture of state cyber capabilities

Ministry of Industry and Information Technology



MPS


Law enforcement agency

- Police and homeland security

CHINA: The outsourcing ecosystem

Key Characteristics:

- Comprehensive national strategy
- Public bids
- IT leaders and SMEs
- Subcontracting
- Competitive environment
- Links based *guanxi*
- High degree of autonomy



CHINA: Proxy services offering



Vulnerability
Identification



Hacking-for-hire



Tools & Solutions



Recruiting



Information
Operation

CHINA: Outsourcing risk-benefit calculus

RISKS

- Companies or employees re-selling data
- Corruption and bid rigging
- Risky behavior

BENEFITS

- Reduced costs
- Flexibility
- ~~Plausible deniability~~
- Efficiency




CHINA: Vulnerability identification and exploitation strategy



RUSSIA – CHINA: A comparative analysis

Proxy Characteristics / Countries		
Private companies	YES	YES
Degree of autonomy of private companies	MEDIUM-LOW	HIGH
Full outsourcing to private companies	NO	YES
Hacktivist groups	YES	UNCLEAR
Independent hackers	YES	NO
eCrime groups	LIKELY	NO
Information operations	FOREIGN	DOMESTIC


THE PROXY WARFARE: Conclusions



**IMPLAUSIBLE
DENIABILITY**



**FLOURISHING
INDUSTRY**



**Increasingly complex
environment**



**Challenging
attribution**