



# Attackers Vs Defenders: *change your strategy and stop losing*

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# Attack Techniques



# Attacker motivations

**CYBERCRIME**

Financial  
Trojans

Ransomware

**SUBVERSION**

DDoS

Social media  
hacking

**ESPIONAGE**

Nation states

Corporate

**SABOTAGE**

Physical  
damage

Data  
destruction



# The three most common attack vectors

## Spear Phishing

Email with an attachment or link to malicious site  
1 in 247 email has a virus attached



## Drive-by Download Attack


site uses exploit to install malware on computer. Popular Exploit Toolkits

## Supply-chain Hack


Software of a vendor gets compromised and hijacked to infect its clients




# Spear phishing



# Targeted attacks with spear phishing emails



# Drive-by download (Watering hole)





# Watering hole - let's have a look at it



# Supply-chain Hack

- Hidden Lynx (Gov) 2012:
  - During SCADEF campaign, manufacturers and suppliers of military-grade computers were observed installing a Trojanized Intel driver application;
  - Attackers bundled an Intel driver application with variants of Backdoor.Moudoor
- DragonFly (Energy) 2013:
  - Three different ICS equipment providers were targeted and malware was inserted into the software bundles they had made available for download on their websites.



# Nice techniques

*What do they have in common?!?*




- The old days where attackers were hitting servers are gone:
  - They still hit them, but there's a more juicy target
- Attackers are heavily using social engineering techniques:
  - Attacks are accurately planned gathering information my many means
  - E-mails are well built and realistic and relevant to real/realistic projects
  - Users targeted usually have access to sensitive information and have a low security awareness
  - Even badly written e-mails are effective:
    - Crypto/CTBlocker ANYONE?!?

# Talking about social engineering...

## *Operation Francophonie*

- Convinced by phone to open the attachment



# Talking about social engineering...

*Another spear phishing case*



# No you cannot patch them


- Awareness



# What about server vulnerability?

## *Heartbleed OpenSSL Vulnerability*

- Affected > 500M trusted websites (~17% of all TLS servers)
- Heartbleed vulnerability used 4h after reporting
- Other issues: POODLE, FREAK, LogJam ...
- 24 reported zero-day vulnerabilities in 2014




**500  
MILLION**



# But we are good in patching right?

Well... I'd not say good.



Time for vendor to supply a patch.

- No tracking on how long companies take to patch was done.  
**204** days to patch



**Let's see two  
attacks**



# Stages of an attack

## INCURSION



Attacker breaks into the network by delivering targeted malware to vulnerable systems and employees

## DISCOVERY



Attacker then maps organization's defenses from the inside

Create a battle plan

## CAPTURE



Accesses data on unprotected system

Installs malware to secretly acquire data or disrupt operations

## EXFILTRATION



Data sent to attacker for analysis

Information may be used for various purposes including fraud and planning further attacks

ECONNAISSANCE

INCURSION DISCOVERY CAPTURE EXFILTRATION

# Regin at a glance

COMPLEX TOOL-SUITE/PLATFORM FOR SPYING & SURVEILLANCE BY GOVERNMENTS

SIMILAR TO STUXNET IN COMPLEXITY

CUSTOMISED FOR EACH SPECIFIC MISSION

USED AGAINST VARIETY OF ORGS IN MANY COUNTRIES

INVESTIGATED BY SYMANTEC FOR OVER A YEAR

**OPERATING SINCE AT LEAST 2008...**

**SYMANTEC DETECTION NAME  
BACKDOOR.REGIN**



# Regin features

MULTI-STAGED &  
MODULAR

MANY COMPONENTS

CUSTOMIZABLE

DIFFICULT TO ANALYZE

PERSISTANCE &  
STEALTH

BULK OF CODE IS  
HIDDEN

COMPLEX ENCRYPTION

ROBUST C&C

MULTIPLE CHANNELS


HEAVILY ENCRYPTED

P2P

SPECIALIZED

CUSTOMIZED FOR  
EACH JOB

REQUIRES SPECIALIST  
SKILLS



# Regin: What can it do?

COMPUTER INFO

PASSWORDS & LOGIN DETAILS

PROCESS & MEMORY INFO

DELETED FILES  
(FORENSICS)

IIS SERVER INFO & LOGS

GSM BASE STATION ADMIN TRAFFIC

LOW LEVEL PACKET SNIFFING

MULTI-CHANNEL DATA EXFILTRATION  
(TCP, UDP, ICMP, HTTP)

FILE SYSTEM CRAWLING

PARSING MS EXCHANGE DATABASES

UI MANIPULATION

32BIT & 64BIT VERSIONS



**Yep... this was sophisticated and  
ADVANCED**



# Dragonfly: Attacks against the energy sector

Dragonfly attack group has been active since 2011, but shifted focus to the energy sector in early 2013...

## ACTIVITIES

Information theft

Sabotage capable

## TARGETS


Electricity infrastructure

Electricity generation

Industrial equipment

suppliers

Pipeline operators



2011

2012

2013

2014

# Dragonfly: The tools of the trade



## BACKDOOR.OLDREA

Custom made malware

RAT - full back door access

Used in 90% of cases



## TROJAN.KARAGNY

Available in underground markets

Adapted for use by Dragonfly group

Download/upload/execute files

Additional plugins available



# Dragonfly: Attack vectors



## SPAM EMAIL

### TARGETING:

Spam email sent to senior employees and engineers

### HISTORY:


February 2013

### EMAIL SUBJECTS:

- “The account”
- “Settlement of delivery problem”

### EMAIL ATTACHMENT:

Malicious PDF file



## WATERING HOLE

### TARGETING:

Visitors to compromised websites related to energy sector

### HISTORY:

May 2013

### EXPLOITS:

Redirects visitors to other hacked sites hosting Lightsout exploit kit

Malware dropped onto victim's computer



## SUPPLY CHAIN

### TARGETING:

Compromise ICS equipment vendors & suppliers

### HISTORY:

June/July 2013

### POISONED SOFTWARE:

Malware added to software files/updates on vendor's websites

Victims unknowingly download and install “Trojanized” software updates

**Yep... this was less (NOT) so advanced**





# How do we protect?



# Forrest Gump MANTRA

*it happens!!!*



“ **Bumper Sticker Guy:** [running after Forrest] Hey man! Hey listen, I was wondering if you might help me. 'Cause I'm in the bumper sticker business and I've been trying to think of a good slogan, and since you've been such a big inspiration to the people around here I thought you might be able to help me jump into - WOAH! Man, you just ran through a big pile of dog shit!

**Forrest Gump:** It happens.

**Bumper Sticker guy:** What, shit?


**Forrest Gump:** Sometimes.

# Before we start

## *Get the basics right!*

## CESG 10 Steps to Cyber Security


Cyber Security guidance from CESG (Communications-Electronics Security Group), the UK Government's National Technical Authority



# Back to basics...


## *few simple examples*

- Endpoint Protection:
  - Is your technology configured to adopt all available engines?
  - Is the update mechanism scheduled every 2/4h?
- Patch Management:
  - Do you have a Patch Management Process (a real one I mean, not the one you have in your drawer)
- Vulnerability Management:
  - Do you have a Vulnerability Management Process (a real one I mean, not the one you have in your drawer)
- Perimeter Security:
  - Are you sure you should allow binary files (even zipped) attached to e-mail?
- Hardening:
  - I'm kidding... I know it's just a dream.



# **NO: IPS, Firewall and AV are not enough**

***Security... you are doing it wrong***



[SIMIOSGRAVES.COM](http://SIMIOSGRAVES.COM)




# What else should we be doing?

## Evaluating Vendor's Platforms: Ten Key Questions

- What specifically are you monitoring?
- How much data does this generate, what bandwidth and storage does it consume and where is it stored?
- What analytics do you use to detect potential incidents?
- How can the operator tune the algorithms to reduce noise?
- What context do you use to provide actionable intelligence?
- Do you prioritize incidents based on risk? Is this tunable?
- What third-party security intelligence feeds do you integrate?
- What are the capabilities of your own labs?
- Is there a community and ecosystem around the platform?
- What blocking/prevention capabilities does your product have or partners to achieve this?

## Key Inputs Into Next-generation Security Platforms



Gartner


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## Designing an Adaptive Security Architecture for Protection From Advanced Attacks

Published: 12 February 2014

Analyst(s): Neil MacDonald, Peter Firstbrook

Enterprises are overly dependent on blocking and prevention mechanisms that are decreasingly effective against advanced attacks. Comprehensive protection requires an adaptive protection process integrating predictive, preventive, detective and response capabilities.




## Recommendations

Information security architects:


- Shift your security mindset from "incident response" to "continuous response," wherein systems are assumed to be compromised and require continuous monitoring and remediation.
- Adopt an adaptive security architecture for protection from advanced threats using Gartner's 12 critical capabilities as the framework.
- Spend less on prevention; invest in detection, response and predictive capabilities.
- Favor context-aware network, endpoint and application security protection platforms from vendors that provide and integrate prediction, prevention, detection and response capabilities.

# What else should we be investing on?



# Cyber Defense Center

*from monitoring to hunting (from reactive to proactive)*



# Cyber Threat Analysis Cell

*advanced services at the right time*

- In order to benefit from such services:
  - Monitoring related services are required
  - Effective incident response procedures are required
  - A “stable” environment is required





# Thank you!

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