1 Appendix D: Other empirical models for Table ??

Table 1 shows probit estimations of the cross sectional models as seen in Equation ??. Additionally, Table 3 shows the LPM estimates for the same models. The coefficients of the probit estimation are similar in sign and significance to the logit estimation. Average partial effects for these models are shown in Table 2, also similar in magnitude to those in Table ??.

Table 1: Probit coefficients for cross-sectional models as seen in Equation ??

	(1)	(2)
Constant	-0.004	-0.037
	(0.371)	(0.284)
Woman	0.025	0.076
	(0.111)	(0.079)
Age	-0.010**	-0.017***
	(0.004)	(0.003)
Years of education	-0.017	-0.029***
	(0.016)	(0.010)
Lives in urban setting	0.088	-0.046
_	(0.127)	(0.090)
External political efficacy	-0.014	-0.034
-	(0.030)	(0.023)
Internal political efficacy	0.081	0.046*
-	(0.053)	(0.026)
Participation in a protest	0.244	0.122
	(0.173)	(0.165)
Interest in politics	-0.143	-0.149*
	(0.126)	(0.080)
Perceptions of corruption	-0.011	0.061
	(0.109)	(0.103)
Exposure to corruption	0.833***	0.396***
	(0.096)	(0.088)
Unemployment	0.517***	0.018
	(0.133)	(0.097)
Approval of Pres. performance	-0.303***	0.009
	(0.061)	(0.042)
Political wing	-0.015	0.030**
	(0.021)	(0.013)
N	1039	1269
AIC	756.30	1434.29
BIC	833.58	1516.10
Year	2014	2016

Note: Probit models for the cross-sectional models for 2014 and 2016 as seen in Equation ??. Data from the open-access AB databases. Standard errors consider design effects of the AB complex survey design.

p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p < 0.01.

Table 2: Average partial effects for cross-sectional models in Table 1

$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$			
Years of education (0.001) (0.001) Years of education -0.003 -0.009*** (0.003) (0.003) External political efficacy -0.003 -0.011 (0.006) (0.007) Internal political efficacy 0.016 0.015* (0.010) (0.008) Interest in politics -0.027 -0.046* (0.023) (0.025) Perceptions of corruption -0.002 0.019 (0.021) (0.032) Exposure to corruption 0.192*** 0.131*** (0.026) (0.030) Unemployment 0.121*** 0.006 (0.037) (0.031) Approval of Pres. performance -0.059*** 0.003 (0.013) (0.013) Political wing -0.003 0.009** (0.004) (0.004)		(1)	(2)
Years of education (0.001) (0.001) Years of education -0.003 -0.009*** (0.003) (0.003) External political efficacy -0.003 -0.011 (0.006) (0.007) Internal political efficacy 0.016 0.015* (0.010) (0.008) Interest in politics -0.027 -0.046* (0.023) (0.025) Perceptions of corruption -0.002 0.019 (0.021) (0.032) Exposure to corruption 0.192*** 0.131*** (0.026) (0.030) Unemployment 0.121*** 0.006 (0.037) (0.031) Approval of Pres. performance -0.059*** 0.003 (0.013) (0.013) Political wing -0.003 0.009** (0.004) (0.004)	Age	-0.002**	-0.005***
$\begin{array}{c} \text{External political efficacy} & (0.003) & (0.003) \\ -0.003 & -0.011 \\ (0.006) & (0.007) \\ \text{Internal political efficacy} & 0.016 & 0.015* \\ (0.010) & (0.008) \\ \text{Interest in politics} & -0.027 & -0.046* \\ (0.023) & (0.025) \\ \text{Perceptions of corruption} & -0.002 & 0.019 \\ (0.021) & (0.032) \\ \text{Exposure to corruption} & 0.192*** & 0.131*** \\ (0.026) & (0.030) \\ \text{Unemployment} & 0.121*** & 0.006 \\ (0.037) & (0.031) \\ \text{Approval of Pres. performance} & -0.059*** & 0.003 \\ (0.013) & (0.013) & 0.009** \\ (0.004) & (0.004) \\ \hline N & 1039 & 1269 \\ \hline \end{array}$	_	(0.001)	(0.001)
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Years of education	-0.003	-0.009***
Internal political efficacy (0.006) (0.007) Internal political efficacy (0.016) $(0.015*)$ (0.010) (0.008) Interest in politics -0.027 $-0.046*$ (0.023) (0.025) Perceptions of corruption -0.002 0.019 (0.021) (0.032) Exposure to corruption $0.192***$ $0.131***$ (0.026) (0.030) Unemployment $0.121***$ 0.006 (0.037) (0.031) Approval of Pres. performance $-0.059***$ 0.003 (0.013) (0.013) Political wing -0.003 $0.009**$ (0.004) (0.004)		(0.003)	(0.003)
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	External political efficacy	-0.003	-0.011
Interest in politics (0.010) (0.008) Interest in politics -0.027 $-0.046*$ (0.023) (0.025) Perceptions of corruption -0.002 0.019 (0.021) (0.032) Exposure to corruption $0.192***$ $0.131***$ (0.026) (0.030) Unemployment $0.121***$ 0.006 (0.037) (0.031) Approval of Pres. performance $-0.059***$ 0.003 (0.013) (0.013) Political wing -0.003 $0.009**$ (0.004) (0.004)		(0.006)	(0.007)
Interest in politics -0.027 $-0.046*$ Perceptions of corruption -0.002 (0.025) Perceptions of corruption -0.002 (0.019) (0.021) (0.032) Exposure to corruption $0.192***$ $0.131***$ (0.026) (0.030) Unemployment $0.121***$ 0.006 (0.037) (0.031) Approval of Pres. performance $-0.059***$ 0.003 (0.013) (0.013) Political wing -0.003 $0.009**$ (0.004) (0.004)	Internal political efficacy	0.016	0.015*
Perceptions of corruption (0.023) (0.025) Perceptions of corruption (0.021) (0.032) Exposure to corruption (0.026) (0.030) Unemployment (0.026) (0.030) Unemployment (0.037) (0.031) Approval of Pres. performance (0.037) (0.031) Political wing (0.013) (0.013) Political wing (0.004) (0.004) N (0.004) (0.004)		(0.010)	(0.008)
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Interest in politics	-0.027	-0.046*
Exposure to corruption (0.021) (0.032) Exposure to corruption 0.192^{***} 0.131^{***} (0.026) (0.030) Unemployment 0.121^{***} 0.006 (0.037) (0.031) Approval of Pres. performance -0.059^{***} 0.003 (0.013) (0.013) Political wing -0.003 0.009^{**} (0.004) (0.004)		(0.023)	(0.025)
Exposure to corruption $0.192***$ $0.131***$ Unemployment $0.121***$ 0.006 Unemployment $0.121***$ 0.006 0.037 0.031 Approval of Pres. performance $-0.059***$ 0.003 0.013 0.013 Political wing -0.003 $0.009**$ 0.004 0.004	Perceptions of corruption	-0.002	0.019
Unemployment (0.026) (0.030) Unemployment $0.121***$ 0.006 (0.037) (0.031) Approval of Pres. performance $-0.059***$ 0.003 (0.013) (0.013) Political wing -0.003 $0.009**$ (0.004) (0.004)		(0.021)	(0.032)
Unemployment $0.121***$ 0.006 (0.037) (0.031) Approval of Pres. performance $-0.059***$ 0.003 (0.013) (0.013) Political wing -0.003 $0.009**$ (0.004) (0.004)	Exposure to corruption	0.192***	0.131***
Approval of Pres. performance (0.037) (0.031) Approval of Pres. performance (0.013) (0.013) Political wing (0.003) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004) N 1039 1269		(0.026)	(0.030)
Approval of Pres. performance $-0.059***$ 0.003 (0.013) (0.013) Political wing -0.003 0.009** (0.004) (0.004) N 1039 1269	Unemployment	0.121***	0.006
Political wing		(0.037)	(0.031)
Political wing $-0.003 0.009** \\ (0.004) (0.004)$ N 1039 1269	Approval of Pres. performance	-0.059***	0.003
(0.004) (0.004) N 1039 1269		(0.013)	(0.013)
N 1039 1269	Political wing	-0.003	0.009**
		(0.004)	(0.004)
Year 2014 2016	N	1039	1269
	Year	2014	2016

Note: Average partial effects for probit cross-sectional empirical models in Table 1. Data from the open-access AB databases. Standard errors consider design effects of the AB complex survey design.

^{*}*p* < 0.1, ***p*< 0.05, ****p* < 0.01.

Table 3: LPM coefficients for cross-sectional models as seen in Equation ??

	(1)	(2)
Constant	0.349***	0.432***
	(0.077)	(0.088)
Woman	0.008	0.026
	(0.023)	(0.025)
Age	-0.002**	-0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Years of education	-0.003	-0.009***
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Lives in urban setting	0.015	-0.015
-	(0.024)	(0.029)
External political efficacy	-0.003	-0.010
-	(0.006)	(0.007)
Internal political efficacy	0.017*	0.015*
-	(0.010)	(0.008)
Participation in a protest	0.073	0.041
	(0.053)	(0.054)
Interest in politics	-0.025	-0.045*
	(0.024)	(0.025)
Perceptions of corruption	-0.007	0.019
	(0.021)	(0.032)
Exposure to corruption	0.200***	0.130***
	(0.027)	(0.030)
Unemployment	0.142***	0.008
	(0.042)	(0.031)
Approval of Pres. performance	-0.062***	0.005
	(0.015)	(0.013)
Political wing	-0.002	0.010**
	(0.004)	(0.004)
N	1039	1269
AIC	5949.61	7913.33
BIC	8885.52	13 478.89
Year	2014	2016

Note: LPM models for the cross-sectional models for 2014 and 2016 as seen in Equation ??. Data from the open-access AB databases. Standard errors consider design effects of the AB complex survey design.

p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p < 0.01.