1 APPENDIX D: OTHER EMPIRICAL MODELS FOR TABLE ??

Table 1 shows probit estimations of the cross sectional models as seen in Equation **??**. Additionally, Table 3 shows the LPM estimates for the same models. The coefficients of the probit estimation are similar in sign and significance to the ones of the logit estimation. Average partial effects for these models are shown in Table 2, also similar in magnitude to those in Table **??**.

Table 1: Probit coefficients for cross-sectional models as seen in Equation **??**

	Model 1	Model 2
Constant	−0.004	−0.037
	(0.371)	(0.284)
Woman	0.025	0.076
	(0.111)	(0.079)
Age	−0.010**	−0.017***
	(0.004)	(0.003)
Years of education	−0.017	−0.029***
	(0.016)	(0.010)
Lives in urban setting	0.088	−0.046
	(0.127)	(0.090)
External political efficacy	−0.014	−0.034
	(0.030)	(0.023)
Internal political efficacy	0.081	0.046*
	(0.053)	(0.026)
Participation in a protest	0.244	0.122
	(0.173)	(0.165)
Interest in politics	−0.143	−0.149*
	(0.126)	(0.080)
Perceptions of corruption	−0.011	0.061
	(0.109)	(0.103)
Exposure to corruption	0.833***	0.396***
	(0.096)	(0.088)
Unemployment	0.517***	0.018
	(0.133)	(0.097)
Approval of Pres. performance	−0.303***	0.009
	(0.061)	(0.042)
Political wing	−0.015	0.030**
	(0.021)	(0.013)
N	1039	1269
AIC	756.30	1434.29
BIC	833.58	1516.10
Year	2014	2016

Note: Probit models for the cross-sectional models for 2014 and 2016 as seen in Equation **??**. Data from the open-access AB databases. Standard errors consider design effects of the AB complex survey design.
*$p < 0.1$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$.

Table 2: Average partial effects for cross-sectional models in Table 1

	Model 1	Model 2
Age	−0.002**	−0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Years of education	−0.003	−0.009***
	(0.003)	(0.003)
External political efficacy	−0.003	−0.011
	(0.006)	(0.007)
Internal political efficacy	0.016	0.015*
	(0.010)	(0.008)
Interest in politics	−0.028	−0.047*
	(0.024)	(0.025)
Perceptions of corruption	−0.002	0.019
	(0.021)	(0.032)
Exposure to corruption	0.161***	0.124***
	(0.019)	(0.027)
Unemployment	0.100***	0.006
	(0.027)	(0.031)
Approval of Pres. performance	−0.059***	0.003
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Political wing	−0.003	0.009**
	(0.004)	(0.004)
N	1039	1269
Year	2014	2016

Note: Average partial effects for probit cross-sectional empirical models in Table 1. Data from the open-access AB databases. Standard errors consider design effects of the AB complex survey design.
*$p < 0.1$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$.

Table 3: LPM coefficients for cross-sectional models as seen in Equation **??**

	Model 1	Model 2
Constant	0.349***	0.432***
	(0.077)	(0.088)
Woman	0.008	0.026
	(0.023)	(0.025)
Age	−0.002**	−0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Years of education	−0.003	−0.009***
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Lives in urban setting	0.015	−0.015
	(0.024)	(0.029)
External political efficacy	−0.003	−0.010
	(0.006)	(0.007)
Internal political efficacy	0.017*	0.015*
	(0.010)	(0.008)
Participation in a protest	0.073	0.041
	(0.053)	(0.054)
Interest in politics	−0.025	−0.045*
	(0.024)	(0.025)
Perceptions of corruption	−0.007	0.019
	(0.021)	(0.032)
Exposure to corruption	0.200***	0.130***
	(0.027)	(0.030)
Unemployment	0.142***	0.008
	(0.042)	(0.031)
Approval of Pres. performance	−0.062***	0.005
	(0.015)	(0.013)
Political wing	−0.002	0.010**
	(0.004)	(0.004)
N	1039	1269
AIC	5949.61	7913.33
BIC	8885.52	13 478.89
Year	2014	2016

Note: LPM models for the cross-sectional models for 2014 and 2016 as seen in Equation **??**. Data from the open-access AB databases. Standard errors consider design effects of the AB complex survey design.
*$p < 0.1$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$.