

DTLS 1.3

`draft-rescorla-tls-dtls13-01`

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Overview

- DTLS version of TLS 1.3
- Still presented as a delta from TLS 1.3
- Some improvements/cleanup
- Partly informed by early implementation experience

Document Status

- Individual submission
- Currently in call for acceptance
- Here to talk about the draft...

Issue#2: ACKs

- DTLS historically used an implicit ACK
 - Receiving the start of the next flight means the flight was received
- Simple (but also simpleminded)
 - Slightly tricky to implement
 - Gives limited congestion feedback
 - Handles single-packet loss badly
- Interacts badly with some TLS 1.3 features (like NST)
- Solution: introduce an explicit ACK

Where should we ACK?

- Every flight
- Just at the end of things that aren't explicitly acknowledged
 - Client Finished
 - NewSessionTicket
- Proposal: allow ACKs at any time
 - This allows partial retransmit of flights (if we SACK)
 - Also just means one trigger for state machine evolution

Strawman ACK format (not what's in the draft)

```
struct AcknowledgedMessage {  
    uint16 message_seq;  
    uint32 timestamp;  
};
```

```
struct {  
    AcknowledgedMessage messages<2..216-2>;  
} DtlsAck;
```

- This is a compromise between “lots of data” and “convenient”
- We could also include the DTLS records for more path feedback

Connection ID

[TODO: Hannes]

Handshake Message Transcript

- The TLS and DTLS transcripts are different
- Both include the message header
 - But headers are different
 - DTLS includes a (synthetic) DTLHandshake message header
- We could just do the TLS message header
 - Cross-version consistency between cross-protocol consistency

Key Update

- Key Update in TLS 1.3 is unreliable
 - This means new epoch records may appear before KeyUpdate
- Current draft just omits KeyUpdate
 - KeyUpdate from one side triggers another
 - Only one unacknowledged KeyUpdate allowed outstanding
 - Can't unilaterally update
- Potential alternative design
 - Send KeyUpdate (using the ACK for reliability)
 - Still have to process out-of-order records

Shrinking the Packet Header

- DTLS packet header is very large

```
struct {  
    ContentType opaque_type = 23; /* application_data */  
    ProtocolVersion legacy_record_version = {254,253}; // DTLSv1.2  
    uint16 epoch; // DTLS-related field  
    uint48 sequence_number; // DTLS-related field  
    uint16 length;  
    ...  
};
```

- Would be nice to make it smaller
 - Give us room for connection ID...

A shorter header (due to MT)

001eesss ssssssss

Where ee = epoch modulo 4 and ss..ss = sequence number modulo 2048

- Why two bits for the epoch?
- What about long header/short header as in QUIC draft?