

# Indigestion: Assessing the impact of known and future hash function attacks

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# Overview

- Hash functions are used all over cryptographic protocols
- Only a few common functions
  - MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
  - Only MD5 and SHA-1 are commonly used
  - No good theoretical foundation for constructions
- First good attacks on MD5 and SHA-1 published in 2004-2005
- Impact of current attacks on our protocols?
- Impact of plausible future attacks?
- What's being done about it?

## Review of hash function terminology

**Collision** Find  $M, M'$  st  $H(M) = H(M')$

**1st preimage** Given  $X$ , find  $M$  st  $H(M) = X$

**2nd preimage** Given  $M$ , find  $M'$  st  $H(M') = H(M)$

In a perfect hash function of length  $l$ :

- Collisions require  $2^{l/2}$  effort to find
- 1st and 2nd preimages require  $2^l$  effort to find

## How hash functions are used

- Digital signatures
- Key derivation (PRFs, KDFs)
- MACs
- Data fingerprinting (e.g., Tripwire)

# The Current Situation

**MD5** Collisions can be easily found [WY04][Klima06] “Target” collisions can be found with  $2^{52}$  effort [SLW06].

**SHA-1** Collisions in SHA-1 with  $2^{63}$  effort (design goal = 80 bits) [WYY05]

**Certificates** Lenstra et al. demonstrate a pair of certificates with different public keys but the same hash (and hence signature) [LWW05]

**HMAC** Semi-theoretical forgery attacks [KBBH06][CY06]

Important limitations:

- None of these attacks allows you to compute a preimage
- The colliders are not totally controllable

# Basic Collision Attack

- Start with an arbitrary hash state (IV)
- Compute four blocks  $M_0, M_1, M'_0, M'_1$  st.
  - $H(M_0, M_1) = H(M'_0, M'_1)$
- Relationships between colliders are not free
  - Some bits must be the same, some different, some arbitrary, some fixed
- IV must be known
- How practical is this?
  - Very for MD5: Klima shows 17 seconds on a 3.2 GHz P4
  - Not so for SHA-1:  $2^{63}$  operations
    - \* No collision published yet for SHA-1

# Target Collision Attack

- Start with two messages  $M_a, M_b$
- Compute two suffixes  $S_a, S_b$  st.
  - $H(M_a || S_a) = H(M_b || S_b)$
- How practical is this?
  - Suffixes are long ( 4000 bits)
    - \* And random-looking
  - Work factor is about  $2^{52}$  (for now)

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# Essential Elements of a Collision Attack

1. Need a three party situation
  - Alice generates a message
  - Bob (and maybe Alice) signs it
  - Carol acts upon it

# Proposed Uses of Collision Attacks

- Contract signing (classic example)
- Forging certificates
- Compromised software distribution [Kaminsky]
- Fake authorizations [Daum and Lucks]

## Contract Signing and Collisions

- Attacker generates two variants
  - M1 = "I will pay Eric \$10.00/hr" (a bargain)
  - M2 = "I will pay Eric \$10000/hr" (a rip-off)
- Attacker gets victim to sign M1 (E.g., in an S/MIME message)
- Then claims victim signed M2
  - And he has evidence to prove it
- Small problems
  - Real contracts don't have random garbage
  - Victim has both variants
- Big problem
  - This isn't how contracts actually work

# Contracts in the Real World

- You and I negotiate a contract
  - Your lawyer sends me the final copy
  - I sign the last page
  - I fax it over to you
  - You fax it back
- No attempt is made to bind contents to signature
  - At most, I might initial each page
  - But sometimes, just last page is exchanged!
- Signature is unverified
  - How does relying party know, anyway?
  - An "X" can be binding!
- It's the intention that counts

# Essential Elements of a Collision Attack (Revised)

1. Need a three party situation
  - Alice generates a message
  - Bob (and maybe Alice) signs it
  - Carol acts upon it
2. *Signature needs to be mechanically evaluated*
3. *Find somewhere to hide the random junk*

# Software Distribution

- Many software distributions use hashes for integrity checking
- Generate a patch for a Foolix 1.0 in two versions
  - One innocuous
  - One containing a remote exploit
- When Foolix 1.1 is released I swing into action
  - Break into Foolix's distribution server
  - Replace the good version with my version
  - ...
  - Profit
- That sounded a lot better in my head...

# Problems with Software Distribution Attacks

- Hard to predict contents of binaries (prefix)
  - Compiler version, flags, timestamps, ...
  - Especially if other people are checking in stuff
- Somewhat easier on source, but...
  - Other people still might check in
  - Plus CVS/SVN timestamps, Id values, etc.
- Still need to somehow replace the “good” copy of the program
  - Theoretically easier if program is P2P-distributed
  - ... Unless that distribution includes its own checksums
- Why go to all this trouble?
  - Most programs aren't that well reviewed anyway
  - How hard is it to insert vulnerabilities anyway?

## Impact of a Single Collision

- Collisions are easy to generate with MD5
- But expensive with SHA-1 ( $2^{63}$ )
  - ... none have been generated yet
  - Eventually one will be as a demonstration
- What can you do then?
  - Use it as a binary switch
  - Daum and Lucks show a switch-hitting postscript doc

collider1

if(collider1)

display X

else

display Y

collider2

if(collider1)

display X

else

display Y



# Target Collisions and Certificates

- Basic collision attacks seem hard to mount on certificates
  - Cert is packed too tightly to tweak DNs
  - Best attack is to demonstrate two certs with same DN and different public keys
- Targeted collisions are better
  - Can start with different DNs
  - And then “repair” to a collision
    - \* Repair blocks hidden in public keys
- This isn’t currently practical
  - Requires way too many blocks
  - Too many computations
  - And knowledge of prefix values

## Bottom Line: Current Status

- Not affected (much)
  - Key derivation functions (PRFs)
  - Peer authentication without non-repudiation (SSL, IPsec, SSH, etc.)
  - Message authentication (HMAC)
  - Challenge-response protocols (probably)
- Affected
  - Non-repudiation (at least technically)
  - Certificate issuance – but only in some special cases
  - Timestamps (maybe)
- This assumes certificates remain secure

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- **Impact of plausible future attacks?**
- What's being done about it?

# Potential Future Attacks

- Controllable collisions
- 2nd preimage
- Compromise of HMAC
  - Forgery
  - Some kind of reversal

# More Controllable Collisions and Certificates

- What if we could really control collisions?
- Attacker generates two names
  - Good: `www.attacker.com`
  - Bad: `www.a-victim.com`
- Sends a CSR with good name to CA
  - CA signs cert
  - Attacker now has cert with victim's name
- Two problems
  - Can you predict the prefix?
  - What about the random padding?

# The Structure of Certificates

```
TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {  
    version                Integer value=2  
    serialNumber            Integer (chosen by CA)  
    signature               algorithm identifier  
    issuer                  CA's name  
    validity                date range  
    subject                 subject's name  
    subjectPublicKeyInfo    public key  
    extensions              arbitrary stuff  
}
```

- The signature is over  $H(TBSCertificate)$

## Prefix Prediction

- Knowing which values to use depends on the prefix
  - But the prefix isn't totally fixed
  - This is a total design accident!
- All but serial number and validity are fixed
  - Sequential serial numbers are easy to predict
    - \* At least to within a few
    - \* Verisign uses  $H(time\_us)$  which is hard to predict
  - How quantum is the validity?
    - \* Verisign seems to use a fixed "not before" but a "not after" based on the current time
    - \* So predictable to within a few hundred seconds?
- Attacker is likely to need to try the attack a large number of times
- Randomizing serial number is a simple countermeasure

## A Vulnerable Certificate Structure

```
TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {  
    version                Integer value=3  
    signature               algorithm identifier  
    issuer                  CA's name  
    subject                 subject's name  
    subjectPublicKeyInfo    public key  
    serialNumber            Integer (chosen by CA)  
    validity                date range  
    extensions              arbitrary stuff  
}
```



## 2nd Preimages and Certificates

- This is really serious
  - Attacker should be able to forge a cert of his choice
  - Validity of all certs with this digest would be questionable
  - Say goodbye to any cert-based protocol
  - No useful countermeasures
- How likely do we think this is with MD5?
  - If so, really bad
  - Lots of valid certificates use MD5!
- SHA-1 comfort level is higher

## 2nd Preimages and Other Protocols

- Remember: three major uses of hashes
  - MACs
  - Key expansion
  - Signatures
- Only signatures are directly threatened
- But they're commonly used
  - SSH, SSL, IPsec key agreement
    - \* Signatures are over nonces
    - \* Only works if very fast (need to beat timeouts)
  - S/MIME authentication
- And of course all but SSH depend on certificates
- So, this is bad...

# Compromise of HMAC

- HMAC is *the* standard MAC for most protocols
- Proofs of security [Bellare et al.]
  - But these don't apply if the interior hash function is weak [KBBH06][CY06]
- So, what if we had a good attack?
  - Forge new messages without the key
  - Extract the key?
- This turns out to depend on protocol details

## Impact of HMAC Forgery: SSL/TLS

- SSL/TLS uses authenticate then encrypt (AtE)
  - Send  $E(K_e, Message || HMAC(K_m, Message))$
- Hard to get MAC/Message pairs to work with...
- Block ciphers
  - Can't re-insert the MAC
    - \* It gets randomized
  - And wouldn't match the data in any case
- Stream ciphers
  - Can reinsert MAC
  - ... but only if you know the plaintext
  - And need to know *entire* plaintext to get a match

## Impact of HMAC Forgery: IPsec

- IPsec uses encrypt then authenticate (EtA)
  - Send  $E(K_e, Message) || HMAC(K_m, Ciphertext)$
- Easy to get MAC/Message pairs to work with
- Easy to do an existential forgery
  - Modify ciphertext and produce matching MAC
  - Works with block or CTR-mode ciphers
- Harder to do a targeted forgery
  - Unless you know the plaintext
    - \* Or part of it

## Impact of HMAC Key Reversal

- Can you extract master key from HMAC-based KDF?
- Plausible scenarios
  - IPsec (remember, EtA)
    - \* Extract  $K_m$ , work backward to SKEYSEED
  - SSL/TLS (only in NULL encryption mode)
    - \* Extract  $K_m$ , work backward to MS
- Impact of master key size?
  - Remember: if  $|K| > blocksize$ , HMAC uses  $H(K)$
  - DH ZZ will be hashed
  - Elliptic curve ZZ may not be
  - Static RSA PMS (TLS) may not be?
  - What about intermediate master secrets?
- Truncation helps here

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# Transitioning to New Hash Functions

- IETF currently upgrading all protocols
- Currently available
  - SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
- New but “API compatible constructions”
  - Just define new code points and drop in
  - Hopefully these will come out of NIST competition
- Incompatible constructions
  - Randomized hashes
    - \* Where do we put the randomizer?
  - ...



# Transition Strategy Goals

- **Backward compatibility**
  - Switch-hitting can speak to old
  - New can speak to switch-hitting
- **Newest common version**
  - Two switch-hitting implementations should use the new version
- **Downgrade protection**
  - Attacker can't force you to use a weaker algorithm
- Don't have to change protocol structure again for newer algorithms
- Diversity in certificates makes this harder

## S/MIME Transition Issues

- Major problem is first message (if signed)
- Assume sender has two certificates
  - Otherwise there's no choice
- Why not sign twice (once with each certificate)
  - Some implementations don't like partially verifiable messages
  - S/MIME standard wasn't totally clear here
    - \* Clarification in RFC 4853 [Housley]
- Sender has no information about receiver's capabilities
  - Either certificate is potentially wrong
  - Have to guess based on overall upgrade rate
- Subsequent messages can use capabilities attributes

# TLS Transition Issues (I)

- IETF doing TLS 1.2 to fix this
- Certificate Selection
  - Problem: I have certs signed with different algorithms
    - \* Need to somehow select one
    - \* New TLS extension: `cert_hash_types`
- Per-record MAC
  - Already part of TLS negotiation
    - \* New cipher suites being created

## TLS Transition Issues (II): KDF

- HMAC-based PRF construction
  - XOR SHA-1 and MD5 values
  - Belt-and-suspenders
    - \* Oops
- Switching to a negotiated PRF
  - Old PRF construction with stronger hashes
  - Alternate PRF constructions (GOST, NIST 800-56)
- This applies to Finished PRF too

# IPsec Transition Issues

- AH/ESP transition smoothly
- IKE has mostly the same issues as SSL/TLS
  - Which certificates to use if you have more than one?
  - Which hash functions initiator should use in “revised public key mode” (IKEv1)
- Heuristics proposed in [Bell06]
- IETF doesn't plan any changes

# Summary

- Existing systems aren't that threatened by current attacks
  - But enough to cause widespread protocol redesigns
- At least partly by accident
- There's a surprising amount of robustness in our protocols
  - But certificates are a big single point of failure
- But future attacks could be extremely bad
- We're in a race with analytic progress

# Appendix Material

# Distributed Hash Tables

- DHTs typically based on cryptographic hash functions
  - Values typically stored as  $H(\text{lookup\_key})$ 
    - \* This isn't security critical
    - \* Sometimes  $H(\text{Value})$
  - Identities are often  $H(IP)$ 
    - \* This is security critical
  - Hashes used for data integrity
- Collisions aren't that useful here
  - You just contaminate your own data
- Preimages let you contaminate other people's data



## Identity Choice in DHTs

- Node  $X$  is responsible for storing lookup keys near  $X$ 
  - An attacker might want to choose their location
  - To control specific data
- It seems like compromised hashes should help here
  - Choose specific identity info st.  $H(identity) = X$
- But mostly an optimization
  - Easy to brute force for typical DHT sizes
  - Problem is getting control of the identity space