

RELOAD Base Update

draft-ietf-p2psip-base-13 IETF 80

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DRR

- Specified in a separate draft
 - Need minimal support in base draft for forward compatibility
- Proposal
 - Exception in § 4.1.2 to allow extensions to adjust state keeping rules:

Whatever algorithm is used, unless a FORWARD_CRITICAL forwarding option or overlay configuration option explicitly indicates this state is not needed, the state **MUST** be maintained for at least the value of the overlay reliability timer (3 seconds) and **MAY** be kept longer. Future extension, such as [I-D.jiang-p2psip-relay], may define mechanisms for determining when this state does not need to be retained.
 - IGNORE-STATE-KEEPING forwarding extension in draft-jiang-p2psip-relay-05 to use via list
 - Agreement from Jennings, Lowekamp, Even, Rescorla

Configuration Refresh

- Previously, just expiration time
- Now: retrieve configuration at a randomly selected time in the future

Configuration Defaults

- Many settings in which there were no defaults now have them
 - Topology plugin (`CHORD_RELOAD`)
 - Port (`6084`)
 - Clients-permitted (`chord-reactive = true`)
 - ...

Resolving Simultaneous Connects

- What happens if two nodes try to simultaneously connect to each other
 - End up with two connections
- Tie-breaker algorithm [Chen]
 - Comparison of Node-Id A , B as unsigned integers
 - Keep $A \rightarrow B$ connection iff $A > B$
 - Larger node-id sends a `Error_In_Progress` error (new)

Replica/Topology Shift Stores and Lifetime

- At time t_0 data is stored at A with lifetime T
- At time t_1 , A stores to B and needs to send lifetime T'
 - Draft didn't define the adjustment algorithm
- § 6.4.1.1 now has an explicit algorithm:
 - $T' = T - (t_1 - t_0)$

Triggered ConfigUpdates

- A tries to store item of kind k to B but B doesn't know about k
 - B sends back `Error_Unknown_Kind`
- This is a signal that B 's config is likely out of date
- New requirement (§ 6.4.1.2) for A to generate a `ConfigUpdate`

Resource-ID Computation Algorithm

- Used to be in the configuration document but now it's defined by the overlay algorithm
 - Proposal: SHA-1 for Chord
- Bug in the current document: § 9.2 specifies truncation to 128 but node-ids vary between 128 and 160 bits (§ 5.3.1.1)
 - This is obviously bad
 - Proposal: SHA-1 truncated to node-id length

Clarify Congestion Control Considerations

- Wasn't totally clear what the requirements were for flow control algorithms. Reworded in § 5.6.3.1

“Because the receiver’s role is limited to providing packet acknowledgements, a wide variety of congestion control algorithms can be implemented on the sender side while using the same basic wire protocol. In general, senders MAY implement any rate control scheme of their choice, provided that it is REQUIRED to be no more aggressive than TFRC[RFC5348].

The following section describes a simple, inefficient, scheme that complies with this requirement. Another alternative would be TFRC-SP [RFC4828] and use the received bitmask to allow the sender to compute packet loss event rates.”

Extensive Uncontroversial Technical and Editorial Changes

Special thanks to Marc Petit-Huguenin for an amazingly thorough reviews.

Open Issue: How to get a certificate with multiple Node-Ids?

- Nothing in the draft here.
- Consensus seems to be POST argument
- Concrete Proposal: nodeids=X URL parameter

Open Issue: Signing With Multiple Node-Ids

- Signatures are currently tied to certificates (`SignerIdentity`)
 - But what about certificates with multiple Node-Ids?
- Proposal: Add a Node-Id indicator to signature

Proposed Multiple Signature Syntax [Petit-Hugenin]

```
enum { reservedSignerIdentity(0),  
        cert_hash(1), cert_hash_node_id(2) (255)} SignerIdentityType;  
  
struct {  
    select (identity_type) {  
        case cert_hash:  
            HashAlgorithm      hash_alg;           // From TLS  
            opaque              certificate_hash<0..2^8-1>;  
  
        case cert_hash_node_id:  
            HashAlgorithm      hash_alg;           // From TLS  
            opaque              certificate_hash<0..2^8-1>;  
            NodeId              node_id;  
  
        /* This structure may be extended with new types if necessary*/  
    };  
} SignerIdentityValue;
```

Attach for Initial Connections

- Ambiguity about whether initial (non-bootstrap) connections require Attach
 - This includes client connections
 - This allows determination of Node-Id
- Now clarified in § 11.

Open Issue: Who Signs Stores?

- § 6.4.1.1 (StoreReq processing) requires verifying the stored value signatures
- § 6.3.x (access control policies) is phrased in terms of the signed request
- Both signatures matter, but this is wrong
- Proposal:
 - Check stored value signatures against access control policies (§ 6.3.1)
 - Check the request signature against either access control policies (original store) or plausible responsible node (replica store)

Open Issue: Refreshing Finger Table

[http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/p2psip/current/
msg05564.html](http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/p2psip/current/msg05564.html)