## Cryptography Exercise Sheet 6

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1. **Problem:** The 802.11b insecure Mac (Exercise 6.1 in BS)

Consider the following MAC (a variant of this was used for WiFi encryption in 802.11b WEP). Let F be a PRF defined over  $(\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{R}, \mathcal{X})$  where  $\mathcal{X} := \{0, 1\}^{32}$ . Let CRC32 be a simple and popular error-detecting code meant to detect random errors; CRC32 is a function that takes as input  $m \in \{0, 1\}^{\leq \ell}$  and outputs a 32-bit string. Define the following MAC system (S, V):

$$S(k,m) := \left\{ \begin{array}{l} r \xleftarrow{\mathrm{R}} \mathcal{R}, \ t \leftarrow F(k,r) \oplus \mathrm{CRC32}(m), \ \mathrm{output(r,t)} \end{array} \right\}$$

$$V(k,m,(r,t)) := \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \mathbf{accept} \ \mathrm{if} \ t = F(k,r) \oplus \mathrm{CRC32}(m) \ \mathrm{and} \ \mathbf{reject} \ \mathrm{otherwise} \end{array} \right\}$$

Show that this MAC system is insecure.

2. **Problem:** MAC combiners (Exercise 6.5 in BS)

We want to build a MAC system  $\mathcal{I}$  using two MAC systems  $\mathcal{I}_1 = (S_1, V_1)$  and  $\mathcal{I}_2 = (S_2, V_2)$ , so that if at some time one of  $\mathcal{I}_1$  or  $\mathcal{I}_2$  is broken (but not both) then  $\mathcal{I}$  is still secure. Put another way, we want to construct  $\mathcal{I}$  from  $\mathcal{I}_1$  and  $\mathcal{I}_2$  such that  $\mathcal{I}$  is secure if either  $\mathcal{I}_2$  or  $\mathcal{I}_2$  is secure.

(a) Define  $\mathcal{I} = (S, V)$ , where

$$S((k_1, k_2), m) := ((S_1(k_1, m), S_2(k_2, m)),$$

and V is defined in the obvious way: on input  $(k, m, (t_1, t_2))$ , V accepts iff both  $V_1(k_1, m, t_1)$  and  $V_2(k_2, m, t_2)$  accept. Show that  $\mathcal{I}$  is secure if either  $\mathcal{I}_1$  or  $\mathcal{I}_2$  is secure.

(b) Suppose that  $\mathcal{I}_1$  and  $\mathcal{I}_2$  are deterministic MAC systems (see the definition on page 214), and that both have tag space  $\{0,1\}^n$ . Define the deterministic MAC system  $\mathcal{I} = (S,V)$ , where

$$S((k_1, k_2), m) := S1(k_1, m) \oplus S_2(k_2, m).$$

Show that  $\mathcal{I}$  is secure if either  $\mathcal{I}_1$  or  $\mathcal{I}_2$  is secure.