



APKID: PEID FOR ANDROID APPS

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WHAT'S REDNAGA MATE?



- Banded together by the love of 0days and hot sauces
- Random out of work collaboration and pursuit of up-leveling the community
- Disclosures / Code / Lessons available on GitHub
- rednaga.io
- github.com/RedNaga



WHO ARE WE



EDU

CALEB



DIFF



- [@enovella](#)

[@timstrazz](#)

[@Caleb Fenton](#)

github.com/rednaga/APKiD

WHO AM I

- Sr. Security Consultant @ **Synopsys** (UK)
 - Mobile: Android Fingerprint (TEE RE), RASP
 - Embedded: RE/fuzzing/expl
- Previously @ Riscure (NL)
 - SW: Android Mobile Payment (HCE) & DRM
 - Smart-cards, -meters, IOT, ...
 - HW: Side channel & Fault injection attacks
- **Likes:**
 - RE & Embedded & Exploiting & Crypto
 - Read/Write Source Code
 - Automate/Hook/Pwn/Outsmart stuff
- **Hobbies:**
 - Chess player, swimming, biking, running, nature, cooking, traveling



WHY ARE WE HERE



- Showcase **APKiD**; *The “PEiD” of Android Apps*
- Identification of mobile security products, piracy, and how APK was built
- **APKiD** used for many purposes:
 - Which apps could potentially contain malware? Tampered?
 - **Which apps are obfuscated/packed? Which protector?**
 - Has the DEX been compiled in unusual ways? Anomalies?
 - Anti-debugging, anti-emulation, ...





HOW APKID WORKS

The Basics


ANDROID APPLICATION PACKAGING (APK)

application/vnd.android.package-archive



Blah.apk

APK = ZIP



ANDROID APPLICATION PACKAGING (APK)

application/vnd.android.package-archive



Blah.apk

Files APKiD cares about
for identification



META-INF/ MANIFEST.MF
CERT_NAME.(RSA | DSA)
CERT_NAME.SF



lib/ armeabi(-v7a)/ lib*.so
arm64-v8a/
x86/
mips/



res/ drawable-*/ *.png
xml/ *.xml
raw/
...

assets/

AndroidManifest.xml

classes.dex

resources.arsc

*

APKiD workflow:


- Unpacks files in ZIP
- Read magic numbers
- Apply Yara rules
- Print results

ANDROID APPLICATION PACKAGING (APK)

application/vnd.android.package-archive



Blah.apk



Dalvik EXecutable (DEX)
Compiled classes for
DVM

Contains executable
Dalvik code

Optimized on install to:
ODEX for DVM runtime
OAT for ART runtime

Reverse with:
smali / apktool
IDA Pro
Radare2
Frida (dynamic)
JEB
Androguard
Enjarify
dex2jar + jad/jd
JADX
010Editor Templates




A close-up photograph of a vibrant red chili pepper hanging from a green stem with several leaves. The pepper is the central focus, with its bright red color contrasting sharply with the green foliage. The background is softly blurred, emphasizing the pepper's texture and shape. A semi-transparent dark red rectangular box is overlaid on the upper portion of the image, serving as a background for the title text.

MALWARE AND PIRACY DETECTION

Initial uses of APKiD
diff-caleb

THE QUESTION

Three main compilers:

1. dx  Java .class files (source code)
2. dexmerge  Not used manually, only by IDEs (source code)
3. smali (**dexlib**)  DEX files (not source code)

Why would a legitimate developer
ever need to use *smali*?
They have the source.

THE HYPOTHESIS


- If app compiled with dexlib, probably tampered
- If tampered, probably was not the developer
- Tampered apps are likely either:
 - pirated / cracked
 - malware



∴ app is tampered -> app is interesting

SAMPLE SET

- 20,000 APKs from each market
 - Top Play Apps, Aptoide, BlapkMarket, etc.
- 10,000 highest scoring “fraudulent” apps
 - Scored by experimental statical model
 - Fraud may just mean modified XML (not DEX)
- Up to 10 APKs per variant of all malware families



APTOIDE



[Further info: Android Compiler Fingerprint @ HITCON 2016](#)



UNDERSTANDING OBFUSCATION SPICINESS

Spiciness levels = Obfuscation layers

ANDROID OBFUSCATORS / PACKERS

Product	Anti-Tampering	Anti-Hooking	Anti-Debugging	Anti-Emulator	Code Obfuscation	White-Box Cryptography	Device Binding	Root Detection	Anti-Keylogger	Anti-Screen Reader	Data Encryption	Secure Communication
Arxan for Android	✓	✓	✓	.	✓	✓	.	✓	.	.	✓	.
DNP HyperTech CrackProof	✓	.	✓	✓	.	.	.	✓
Entersekt Transakt	✓	✓	✓	✓	.	.	✓
Gemalto Mobile Protector	.	✓	✓	.	✓	.	✓	✓	✓	.	✓	✓
GuardSquare DexGuard	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	.	✓	.	.	.	✓
Inside Secure Core for Android	✓	.	✓	.	✓	✓	.	✓
Intertrust WhiteCryption	✓	.	✓	.	✓	✓	✓	✓
PreEmptive DashO	✓	.	✓	✓	✓	.	✓	✓
Promon SHIELD	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
SecNeo AppShield	✓	.	✓	.	✓	✓	.

Table 1: Overview of RASP products and their advertised features.

[Source: “Honey, I shrunk your app security: The state of Android app Hardening”](#)

ANDROID OBFUSCATORS / PACKERS

- **APKiD** has recently been enhanced to detect:
 - If a **DEX** file was altered or tampered (based on compiler fingerprint)
 - A bunch of **DEX/ELF obfuscators** (pattern, fingerprints and opcodes)
 - Tons of **packers** (hidden dex, dexclassloader, assets, ...)



ANDROID OBFUSCATORS / PACKERS

- Arxan
- ADVObfuscator
- Allatori Demo
- AppSuit
- DexGuard
- DexProtector
- MetaFortress
- Firehash
- Obfuscator-LLVM
- AliPay obfuscator
- MD5 obfuscator
- Promon
- Gemalto Mobile Protector
- DxShield
- Amazon Kiwi
- Secenh, SecShell, SecNeo, Bangcle, ...
- AppSealing
- AppSuit
- ApkGuard
- AppGuard
- APKProtect, AppSolid
- ApkToolPlus (Jiagu)
- Promon
- Gaoxor, ChornClickers
- UPX
- Kiro
- NQ Shield
- Medusah
- Qihoo 360, Baidu
- Yidun

ANDROID OBFUSCATION

```
v0_1 = new RootLog();  
}  
  
label_8:  
HashMap v2_1 = new HashMap();  
ffiiii.a("\u000B\t\n\u0010{\u0011\u0013\u0001\u0015\u0017\u0016\u0003\b\u0015\u000B\r", '\u0087', '\u0000');  
ffiiii.a("G7=0F4@5:8", '\u0016', v10);  
ffiiii.a("uqpt^qq]oolWi[Vgb`PS^RR", 'u', '\u0003');  
ffiiii.a("\u0011\u000F\u0010\u0016\u0002\u001A\n\u0018\u001A\u0011\u0018\u0018", '\u000F', v9);  
ffiiii.a("\u0017\f\t\u0007\t\u000B\u0003{\u0012\u007F\f\f\u0001\u0006\u0004", '\u0090', 'K', '\u0001');  
ffiiii.a("MKLR>LJUW", 'Z', v8);  
(Map)v2_1.put(ffiiii.a("\u001C\u001A\u001B!\r\"$ \u0012&(\\"'\u0014\u0019&\u001C\u001E", '8', '\u0000'), v0_1.a());  
(Map)v2_1.put(ffiiii.a("&\u0015\u001B\u000E$ \u0012\u001E\u001E\u0013\u0018\u0016", '!', v10), wwwnww.b());  
(Map)v2_1.put(ffiiii.a("JHIO;PR@TVUBVJGZWWIN[QS", 'e', v9), v0_1.b());  
(Map)v2_1.put(ffiiii.a("VTU[G_o]_V]]", '!', '\u0000'), wwwnww.b());  
(Map)v2_1.put(ffiiii.a("\f\u0003\u0002\u0002\u0006\n\u0004~\u0017\u0007\u0015\u0017\u000E\u0015\u0015", '\u0018',  
(Map)v2_1.put(ffiiii.a("A=<@*62;;", 'e', '\u0001'), v0_1.c());  
(List)v1.add(v2_1);  
return ((List)v1);
```

- String encryption
- Class renaming



ANDROID OBFUSCATION

```
public static Object f() {
    Object object2;
    Object object1;
    Object object0;
    short s = ((short)QC$a.e[0x14]);
    String string0 = QC$a.j(s, ((byte)(s | 0x28)), ((byte)QC$a.e[0x8F]));
    short s1 = ((short)QC$a.e[0x0D]);
    String string1 = QC$a.j(s1, ((byte)(s1 & 0x2A)), ((byte)QC$a.e[0x2F]));
    int i = 2;
    try {
        object0 = Class.forName(QC$a.j(0x4F, ((byte)(-QC$a.e[6])), ((byte)QC$a.e[9]))).getMethod(
            QC$a.j(0x9B, ((byte)QC$a.e[0x44]), ((byte)QC$a.e[0x47])), String.class, String.class)
            .invoke(null, string0, string1);
    }
    catch(Throwable throwable0) {
        throw throwable0.getCause();
    }

    byte[] array_b = new byte[]{-84, -71, 0x60, -63, 3, -24, 6, -120, -17, 2, -38, -32, -30, 0x29,
        -89, 0x29};
    String string2 = QC$a.j(0x61, ((byte)(QC$a.e[0x1E] - 1)), ((byte)QC$a.e[0x31]));
    int i1 = 2;
    try {
        object1 = Class.forName(QC$a.j(((short)QC$a.e[0x3A]), ((byte)(-QC$a.e[6])), ((byte)QC$a.e[0x3A]))).getDeclaredConstructor(byte[].class, String.class).newInstance(array_b,
            string2);
    }
    catch(Throwable throwable0) {
        throw throwable0.getCause();
    }

    byte[] array_b1 = new byte[]{0x5A, 6, -2, -75, 0x63, 0x4B, 0x20, 0x66, 0xC, -125, 0xB, 0x6E,
        -2, 9, 0x64, 0x4B};
    try {
        object2 = Class.forName(QC$a.j(0x73, ((byte)(-QC$a.e[6])), ((byte)(-QC$a.e[0x1D])))).getDeclaredConstructor(
            byte[].class).newInstance(array_b1);
    }
    catch(Throwable throwable0) {
        throw throwable0.getCause();
    }

    i1 = 3;
    try {
        array_object1 = new Object[i1];
        array_object1[2] = object2;
        array_object1[1] = object1;
        array_object1[0] = new Integer(2);
        Class class0 = Class.forName(QC$a.j(0x4F, ((byte)(-QC$a.e[6])), ((byte)QC$a.e[9])));
        string2 = QC$a.j(((short)QC$a.e[0x2F]), ((byte)QC$a.e[0x14]), ((byte)(-QC$a.e[6])));
        Class[] array_class = new Class[3];
        array_class[0] = Integer.TYPE;
        array_class[1] = Class.forName(QC$a.j(0x63, ((byte)(-QC$a.e[6])), ((byte)QC$a.e[0x8F])));
        byte h = ((byte)(-QC$a.e[6]));
    }
}
```



JEB



• Class encryption



NATIVE OBFUSCATION

```
34 char v117; // r2
35 int v118; // r4
36 int (__fastcall *v119)(int, int); // r5
37 int v120; // r0
38 int v122; // [sp+17Ch] [bp+Ch]
39
40 v86 = a1;
41 a26 = -1836023616;
42 BYTE2(a29) = -91;
43 a27 = 1980321002;
44 a28 = 21516214;
45 a24 = 1535148118;
46 a23 = -588862745;
47 a25 = -1643676290;
48 LOWORD(a29) = 2347;
49 while ( (unsigned __int8)a23 != 238 )
50 {
51     *((_BYTE *)&a23 + (unsigned __int8)a23 % 0x1Au + 1) += 3;
52     LOBYTE(a23) = a23 + 1;
53 }
54 a11 = 622181664;
55 a12 = 1390984027;
56 a13 = 355746589;
57 a14 = -2112483426;
58 a15 = 9;
59 while ( (unsigned __int8)a11 != 40 )
60 {
61     *((_BYTE *)&a11 + (a11 & 0xF) + 1) += 3;
62     LOBYTE(a11) = a11 + 1;
63 }
64 a36 = 848482653;
65 a35 = 1986857018;
66 a31 = 777837714;
67 a32 = -1217557589;
68 a37 = 9969;
69 a30 = -1206877002;
70 a33 = -1791457705;
71 a34 = -1080671916;
72 while ( (unsigned __int8)a30 != 183 )
73 {
74     *((_BYTE *)&a36 + (unsigned __int8)a30 % 0x1Du - 227) += 3;
75     LOBYTE(a30) = a30 + 1;
76 }
77 v87 = (unsigned __int8)a32 ^ BYTE2(a35);
```




Hex-Rays
state-of-the-art code analysis

• String encryption



NATIVE OBFUSCATION



IDA Pro



NATIVE OBFUSCATION

Functions window

Function name	Seg
ObfuscatedCall<ObfuscatedAddress<void (*)>>(...)	.text
ObfuscatedAddress<void (*)>::original(void)	.text
ObfuscatedAddress<int (*)>::original(void)	.text
ObfuscatedAddress<void (*)>::original(void)	.text
strlen	.text
pAB7771827B1F51FA3E703EE417D1A4FE(char *,func_info...	.text
pDFB3268AF3FB1EBD7DCB3D5976048615(char *,func_inf...	.text
p88113D1ADA765D25AE4E7A343F98DAA8(char const*,fu...	.text
find_dexhunter_feature(void)	.text
sub_15E84	.text
ObfuscatedAddress<void (*)>::original(void)	.text
ObfuscatedAddress<void (*)>::original(void)	.text
ObfuscatedAddress<void (*)>::original(void)	.text
ObfuscatedAddress<void (*)>::original(void)	.text
JNI_OnLoad	.text
sub_19328	.text
sub_19A08	.text
sub_19AF4	.text
sub_19BDC	.text
sub_19C98	.text
pD1C5995441BDE309801AA2D6599D7D72	.text
p7F782C775179F8B6311393E00D93C5CF	.text
p75BAEF8CD621B5EF6A86CD883CFFE175	.text
pE4179E5B7B934B31C6DA2EFACBE38B40	.text

Line 196 of 1046

Graph overview

IDA View-A

Pseudocode-B

Pseudocode-A


Hex View-1

Structures

Enums

```
2666 }
2667 }
2668 if ( byte_4E088[4] )
2669     goto LABEL_150;
2670 if ( p3A986CD02384F03165D40910A7CD9F37 <= 0 )
2671 {
2672     if ( p87A0F4CD3F3E115EB8DF9B8F839AF245 == 1 )
2673     {
2674         v199 = &loc_1A6A4;
2675         v200 = 288;
2676         v43 = ObfuscatedCall<ObfuscatedAddress<void (*)>>((char *)&loc_1A6A4 + 1, 288);
2677         goto LABEL_74;
2678     }
2679     v219 = &loc_DCF6;
2680     v220 = 449;
2681     v41 = (int (__fastcall *)(void *))ObfuscatedAddress<void (*)>::original(&v219);
2682     v42 = v194;
2683 }
2684 else
2685 {
2686     v217 = sub_41668;
2687     v218 = 527;
2688     v41 = (int (__fastcall *)(void *))ObfuscatedAddress<void (*)>::original();
2689     v42 = needle;
2690 }
2691 v43 = v41(v42);
2692 LABEL_74:
2693     p75BAEF8CD621B5EF6A86CD883CFFE175(v43);
2694     memset(&src, 0, 0x15u);
2695     v667 = -36;
2696     v659 = -47;
2697     v662 = -43;
2698     v668 = -47;
```

000169F2 JNI_OnLoad:2681 (169F2)




NATIVE OBFUSCATION

```
0xc774a [gp]
; CODE XREF from fcn.000c7684 (0xc772c)
; CODE XREF from syscall.0.1 (+0xd2)
0x000c774a 0020      movs r0, 0
0x000c774c 0d90      str r0, [sp + local_34h]
0x000c774e 0d9b      ldr r3, [sp + local_34h]
; 0xc7768
0x000c7750 05a0      adr r0, 0x14
0x000c7752 00ea0301  and.w r1, r0, r3
0x000c7756 4ff00202  mov.w r2, 2
0x000c775a 02fb01f1  mul r1, r2, r1
0x000c775e      .dword 0x0003ea80 ; aav.0x0003ea80
0x000c7762 0844      add r0, r1
0x000c7764 8746      mov pc, r0
```

```
0xc7bbe [gAv]
; CODE XREFS from fcn.000c7684 (0xc7b22, 0xc7bb4)
0x000c7bbe 4e98      ldr r0, [sp + local_138h]
0x000c7bc0 0121      movs r1, 1
0x000c7bc2 5090      str r0, [sp + local_140h]
0x000c7bc4 0128      cmp r0, 1
;-- aav.0x000c7bc6:
; UNKNOWN XREF from aav.0x00542704 (+0x18)
0x000c7bc6      .dword 0x0004f04f ; aav.0x0004f04e
0x000c7bca 08bf      it eq;[gBk]
```

f t

```
0xc7bcc [gBk]
; CODE XREF from fcn.000c7684 (0xc7bca)
0x000c7bcc 0221      movs r1, 2
```




ANDROID UNPACKING

```
[!] Received: [Reflection => forName => javax.crypto.Cipher]
[!] Received: [Reflection => getMethod => getInstance => public static final javax.crypto.Cipher javax.crypto.Cipher.getInstance(java.lang.String,java.lang.String) throws java.security.NoSuchAlgorithmException,java.security.NoSuchProviderException,javax.crypto.NoSuchPaddingException]
[!] Received: [Reflection => forName => javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec]
[!] Received: [Reflection => forName => javax.crypto.spec.IvParameterSpec]
[!] Received: [Reflection => forName => javax.crypto.Cipher]
[!] Received: [Reflection => forName => java.security.Key]
[!] Received: [Reflection => forName => java.security.spec.AlgorithmParameterSpec]
[!] Received: [Reflection => getMethod => init => public final void javax.crypto.Cipher.init(int,java.security.Key,java.security.spec.AlgorithmParameterSpec) throws java.security.InvalidKeyException,java.security.InvalidAlgorithmParameterException]
[!] Received: [Reflection => forName => javax.crypto.Cipher]
[!] Received: [Reflection => getMethod => doFinal => public final byte[] javax.crypto.Cipher.doFinal(byte[],int,int) throws javax.crypto.IllegalBlockSizeException,javax.crypto.BadPaddingException]
[!] Received: [Reflection => forName => java.util.zip.Inflater]
[!] Received: [Reflection => forName => java.util.zip.Inflater]
[!] Received: [Reflection => getMethod => setInput => public void java.util.zip.Inflater.setInput(byte[],int,int)]
[!] Received: [Reflection => forName => java.util.zip.Inflater]
[!] Received: [Reflection => getMethod => inflate => public int java.util.zip.Inflater.inflate(byte[]) throws java.util.zip.DataFormatException]
[!] Received: [Reflection => forName => dalvik.system.DexFile]
[!] Received: [Reflection => getMethod => write => public void java.io.OutputStream.write(byte[],int,int) throws java.io.IOException]
[!] Received: [Reflection => getMethod => getFD => public final java.io.FileDescriptor java.io.FileOutputStream.getFD() throws java.io.IOException]
[!] Received: [Reflection => getMethod => sync => public native void java.io.FileDescriptor.sync() throws java.io.SyncFailedException]
[!] Received: [Reflection => getMethod => close => public void java.io.OutputStream.close() throws java.io.IOException]
[!] Received: [Reflection => getMethod => getAbsolutePath => public java.lang.String java.io.File.getAbsolutePath()]
[!] Received: [Reflection => getMethod => getAbsolutePath => public java.lang.String java.io.File.getAbsolutePath()]
[!] Received: [Reflection => forName => dalvik.system.DexFile]
[!] Received: [Reflection => getMethod => loadDex => public static dalvik.system.DexFile dalvik.system.DexFile.loadDex(java.lang.String,java.lang.String,int) throws java.io.IOException]
[!] Received: [Reflection => forName => dalvik.system.DexFile]
[!] Received: [Reflection => getMethod => loadClass => public java.lang.Class dalvik.system.DexFile.loadClass(java.lang.String,java.lang.ClassLoader)]
[!] Received: [Reflection => forName => dalvik.system.DexFile]
[!] Received: [Reflection => getMethod => close => public void dalvik.system.DexFile.close() throws java.io.IOException]
[!] Received: [Reflection => getMethod => delete => public boolean java.io.File.delete()]
[!] Received: [Reflection => getMethod => delete => public boolean java.io.File.delete()]
[!] Received: [Reflection => forName => javax.crypto.Cipher]
[!] Received: [Reflection => getMethod => getInstance => public static final javax.crypto.Cipher javax.crypto.Cipher.getInstance(java.lang.String,java.lang.String) throws java.security.NoSuchAlgorithmException,java.security.NoSuchProviderException,javax.crypto.NoSuchPaddingException]
[!] Received: [Reflection => forName => javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec]
[!] Received: [Reflection => forName => javax.crypto.spec.IvParameterSpec]
[!] Received: [Reflection => forName => javax.crypto.Cipher]
[!] Received: [Reflection => forName => java.security.Key]
[!] Received: [Reflection => forName => java.security.spec.AlgorithmParameterSpec]
[!] Received: [Reflection => getMethod => init => public final void javax.crypto.Cipher.init(int,java.security.Key,java.security.spec.AlgorithmParameterSpec) throws java.security.InvalidKeyException,java.security.InvalidAlgorithmParameterException]
[!] Received: [Reflection => forName => javax.crypto.Cipher]
[!] Received: [Reflection => getMethod => doFinal => public final byte[] javax.crypto.Cipher.doFinal(byte[],int,int) throws javax.crypto.IllegalBlockSizeException,javax.crypto.BadPaddingException]
[!] Received: [Reflection => forName => java.util.zip.Inflater]
[!] Received: [Reflection => forName => java.util.zip.Inflater]
[!] Received: [Reflection => getMethod => setInput => public void java.util.zip.Inflater.setInput(byte[],int,int)]
```

FRIDA



ANDROID UNPACKING



APKID

- Can detect all you have just seen in previous slides and many others too
- Important:
 - Detect obfuscators, packers, or other oddities on Android
 - APKiD does identification only! **Does NOT RE any Android protector**

```
[15:30 edu@snps 09-advobfuscator] > apkid f9185b2b673e794ddb77f55e3f5088b0450a87ba745047c1fed5037f80dba23c.apk
[+] APKiD 1.2.1 :: from RedNaga :: rednaga.io
[*] f9185b2b673e794ddb77f55e3f5088b0450a87ba745047c1fed5037f80dba23c.apk!classes.dex
|-> compiler : dexlib 2.x
[*] f9185b2b673e794ddb77f55e3f5088b0450a87ba745047c1fed5037f80dba23c.apk!lib/armeabi/libDexHelper.so
|-> obfuscator : ADVobfuscator
[*] f9185b2b673e794ddb77f55e3f5088b0450a87ba745047c1fed5037f80dba23c.apk!lib/x86/libDexHelper.so
|-> obfuscator : ADVobfuscator
[*] f9185b2b673e794ddb77f55e3f5088b0450a87ba745047c1fed5037f80dba23c.apk!lib/armeabi-v7a/libDexHelper.so
|-> obfuscator : ADVobfuscator
[*] f9185b2b673e794ddb77f55e3f5088b0450a87ba745047c1fed5037f80dba23c.apk
|-> packer : SecNeo
```



APKID

```
| -> packer : UPX (unknown, modified)
[*] ./3cd4afa5ff274415565d641e003ae640527c471b48ffdca5a8f90c7c77dab90d.apk
| -> packer : Ijiami
[*] ./57ffea49904872d93c0f20a233616d31d7c8b5e092494adfc83d0f061ea70c68.apk!classes.dex
| -> compiler : dexlib 2.x
[*] ./57ffea49904872d93c0f20a233616d31d7c8b5e092494adfc83d0f061ea70c68.apk
| -> packer : SecNeo
[*] ./42e033c5546573ae9b2c33dda2312d5116a049d424b0d1acd5cb7600a9a41008.apk!classes.dex
| -> compiler : dexlib 2.x
[*] ./42e033c5546573ae9b2c33dda2312d5116a049d424b0d1acd5cb7600a9a41008.apk
| -> packer : SecNeo
[*] ./f51697cbbe85ef802db85997f4c6bd57edbeee2829751e34c06821590a91748c.apk!classes.dex
| -> compiler : dexlib 2.x
[*] ./f51697cbbe85ef802db85997f4c6bd57edbeee2829751e34c06821590a91748c.apk
| -> packer : SecNeo
[*] ./b5b7b58a116a49481630acd9d87b9c888a227c98ea35c73d628826a273ed634e.apk!classes.dex
| -> compiler : dx
[*] ./b5b7b58a116a49481630acd9d87b9c888a227c98ea35c73d628826a273ed634e.apk
| -> packer : Qihoo 360
[*] ./f51e058d8c6ddc66790854f9e371ed770c61e75a91fe4a2efa3a1ad6f8a5ad14.apk!classes.dex
| -> anti_vm : Build.BOARD check, Build.MANUFACTURER check, possible Build.SERIAL check, ro.build.type che
| -> compiler : dx
[*] ./f51e058d8c6ddc66790854f9e371ed770c61e75a91fe4a2efa3a1ad6f8a5ad14.apk!lib/arm64-v8a/libkxqpplatform.s
| -> obfuscator : Obfuscator-LLVM version 3.5
[*] ./f51e058d8c6ddc66790854f9e371ed770c61e75a91fe4a2efa3a1ad6f8a5ad14.apk!lib/armeabi/libkxqpplatform.so
| -> obfuscator : Obfuscator-LLVM version 3.5
[*] ./f51e058d8c6ddc66790854f9e371ed770c61e75a91fe4a2efa3a1ad6f8a5ad14.apk!lib/x86/libkxqpplatform.so
| -> obfuscator : Obfuscator-LLVM version 3.5
[*] ./f51e058d8c6ddc66790854f9e371ed770c61e75a91fe4a2efa3a1ad6f8a5ad14.apk
[*] ./9f85b3e134ee906d0f2e65e8560c8b4d440bb378cad8fc08328636c09a2b86fa.apk!classes.dex
| -> compiler : dexlib 2.x
[*] ./9f85b3e134ee906d0f2e65e8560c8b4d440bb378cad8fc08328636c09a2b86fa.apk
| -> packer : SecNeo
[*] ./c422f79810fef9006b775809079ebb48f25f3d4fbca3ba3f0065f743c65d7af3.apk!classes.dex
| -> compiler : dx
[*] ./c422f79810fef9006b775809079ebb48f25f3d4fbca3ba3f0065f743c65d7af3.apk
| -> packer : Qihoo 360
[*] ./7056c266614d2cb154b7ee851c17f6e0e32f3b270ce16df36072430d6e9a2a3d.apk!classes.dex
| -> anti_vm : Build.FINGERPRINT check, Build.MANUFACTURER check, Build.MODEL check, Build.PRODUCT check,
k, possible Build.SERIAL check, possible vm check, subscriber ID check
| -> compiler : dx
[*] ./7056c266614d2cb154b7ee851c17f6e0e32f3b270ce16df36072430d6e9a2a3d.apk
| -> packer : APKProtect
[*] ./020b6c17c001a0646ad105d112a0b2bd227d25f5a25b1b15f107a210040da1.apk!classes.dex
```



A close-up photograph of a vibrant red chili pepper hanging from a green plant. The pepper is elongated and slightly curved, with a glossy texture. In the background, several green peppers and leaves are visible, slightly out of focus. A semi-transparent, light brown rectangular overlay with rounded corners is positioned in the center of the image, containing the text "APKID DEMOS" in white, bold, sans-serif capital letters.

APKID DEMOS

THANKS!

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Hats off to all the community opting for open source projects!

Join us on **Slack** at
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06.12.2018

BLACKHAT EUROPE

