

# Distributed Security Risks and Opportunities in the W3C Web of Things

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**Abstract**—The W3C Web of Things (WoT) WG has been developing an interoperability standard for IoT devices that includes as its main deliverable a “Thing Description”: a standardized representation the metadata of an IoT device, including in particular its network interface, but also allowing for semantic annotation. Relative to other approaches to IoT, such metadata has at least four major implications. First, it allows for system-wide vulnerability analysis, which can be both a risk and an opportunity. Second, metadata can enable end-to-end security in multistandards networks, avoiding exposing data within bridges otherwise needed for connecting standards pairwise. Third, metadata supports service and device discovery, which raises the question of how to limit discovery to authorized agents. Fourth, metadata can enable distributed security mechanisms for access control and micropayments. To the extent that metadata access can be decentralized, decentralized mechanisms for security can be supported, although several practical issues currently make this difficult to fully support.

## I. INTRODUCTION

The economic impact of the IoT is strongly influenced by how well devices from different manufacturers can interoperate. Very often interoperability is taken for granted when estimating the business benefit of IoT. However, a recent study [?] concluded that 40% to 60% of the benefit of IoT will be unattainable if devices do *not* interoperate, due to use cases that cannot be satisfied by a single manufacturer.

Unfortunately full interoperability is hard to achieve. There are currently many competing IoT standards under development. Most of these standards are prescriptive. In a prescriptive standard, devices are validated against specific requirements and typically all validated devices will interoperate. In addition, it is possible to bridge multiple standards so that devices validated against one prescriptive standard can communicate with devices using another standard by translating communication protocols and payloads.

However, the prescriptive approach has some weaknesses. In particular, there are always going to be devices that follow older standards. There are decades-old devices in particular domains, such as building and factory automation, that are now being connected to the IoT. These devices represent major investments and cannot be economically replaced with newer, standards-conforming devices. This is the “brownfield” problem. In addition, today devices are also being deployed that have not been validated against any particular standard, even if they use common technologies such as JSON and HTTP.

As an alternative, the W3C Web of Things WG has been developing a *descriptive* approach to IoT interoperability. In this approach, metadata is provided that describes how to communicate with each particular device. The metadata itself is standardized but flexible enough to describe a wide variety of IoT network interfaces. With this approach, devices can but do not have to be prevalidated against a particular standard before being deployed. They can be described after the fact, solving the brownfield problem and allowing older devices to and devices satisfying different standards to be integrated into a unified system.

This approach has both risks and opportunities from a security point of view.

Most obviously, devices may vary widely in their support for security, so the system needs to manage different levels of trust for different devices. Devices from different manufacturers may also take different approaches to security and this make cause integration challenges, even if the necessary information is provided in the metadata.

Beyond this basic concern, pervasive metadata raises several other issues from a security perspective. In this paper we discuss four major issues:

- **Vulnerability analysis.** Providing information about what devices can do makes it easier to automatically scan for devices with vulnerabilities. It may also be possible to plan attacks that take advantage of vulnerabilities in multiple devices. However, this risk can in fact be an opportunity as scanning for devices with vulnerabilities is necessary to identify devices whose vulnerabilities need to be mitigated.

- **End-to-end security.** Metadata enables end-to-end security in multistandards networks. If metadata is used to push payload adaptation to endpoints then communication payloads can be encrypted end-to-end. This contrasts with systems that use local bridging between multiple IoT standards which requires opening (and usually deencrypting) data in potentially-vulnerable gateways.
- **Secure discovery.** Information about how to use a service, and ideally even its existence, should not be disclosed to agents without the authorization to use it. The WoT approach allows powerful semantic searches to be used for discovery. How can this capability be made available while still securing the metadata?
- **Security Mechanism Enabling.** Metadata may be provided to enable specific security mechanisms, as well as features with security implications such as payment or scripting. What mechanisms are needed and what data needs to be provided?

The next few sections first introduce the W3C Web of Things draft standard, focusing on the Thing Description metadata format. Then the security model for the WoT will be introduced. This includes a model of stakeholders, assets, attackers, and threats. Once this context has been established, we will discuss in detail these four issues.

## II. WEB OF THINGS

### A. Architecture

Web of Things architecture [4], Thing Description [3] and scripting API [5].

### B. Threat Model

A basic intro to the WoT threat model [6].

### C. Usage Scenarios

Usage scenarios.

## III. RELATED WORK

Some relevant prior work: State-of-the-Art and Challenges for the Internet of Things Security [2]. The Industrial Internet of Things Security Framework [7]. IoT Security Foundation Best Practices Guidelines [1].

## IV. RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES

### A. Local Links

Practical pitfalls. HTTPS not working locally. Local links vs global links in Thing Directories.

### B. Vulnerability Scanning

Vulnerability scanning using metadata.

### C. Endpoint Adaptation

End-to-end secure adaptation by pushing payload transformation to endpoints.

### D. Secure Discovery

Secure semantic searches. How do we ensure only the data permitted for a user is used in a search? Some possibly relevant papers: [8], [9].

### E. Enabling Distributed Security

Metadata for distributed security and payment mechanisms. Tokens. Interledger addresses. Nested security.

## V. CONCLUSION

Conclusions. What are the main points?

## ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Thank you, thank you, all!

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