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eip title author discussions-to status type created
<to be assigned>
Update Network Block Rewards to Adhere to "Minimum Viable Issuance" Policy
Kevin Owocki <kevin@gitcoin.co>
Pull Request
Draft
Economic
2020-08-11

Simple Summary

Ethereum's monetary policy is "Minimum Viable Issuance to secure the network". Now that miners are nearly collecting more ETH from fees than blockrewards I believe we should cut block rewards from 2 ETH/block to 1 ETH/block.

This EIP does not change the monetary policy of "Minimum Viable Issuance to secure the network".

Abstract

Cut block rewards from 2 ETH/block to 1 ETH/block.

Motivation

Ethereum's monetary policy is "Minimum Viable Issuance to secure the network". Now that miners are nearly collecting more ETH from fees than blockrewards I believe we should cut block rewards from 2 ETH/block to 1 ETH/block.

This EIP does not change the monetary policy of "Minimum Viable Issuance to secure the network".

Specification

Cut block rewards from 2 ETH/block to 1 ETH/block.

Rationale

Now that

  1. miners are nearly collecting more ETH from fees than blockrewards
  2. ETH is up to $400

we should cut block rewards from 2 ETH/block to 1 ETH/block.

Backwards Compatibility

N/A

Test Cases

N/A

Implementation

TODO

Security Considerations

The revenue from miners is important for securing the Ethereum network. While it is very important that the Ethereum mainnet remain secure from 51% attacks (and other attacks), it is also important that issuance adheres to the specified policy of "Minimum Viable Issuance to secure the network".

Presently, Ethereum is the most profitable ETHHash cryptocurrency to mine, and has become doubly so since fees increased. Because of this, hashrate has been on an upward trend.

If this EIP is accepted, and assuming that (1) the Ethereum price stay on a level or upward trajectory, and (2) gas prices continue to be higher than 30 gWei at low times + 110 gWei at peak times, there are no major security risks introduced to the network.

Note that the outcome of this analysis is likely to hinge on whether EIP 1559 is implemented or not.

If there is rough consensus that this EIP is directionally correct, I believe that a further economic analysis could be performed to prove to what degree the above assumptions (1) and (2) are correct.

Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.