

HIGHER EDUCATION AND MORTALITY: LEGACIES OF AN AUTHORITARIAN COLLEGE CONTRACTION*

Felipe González **Luis R. Martínez** **Pablo Muñoz** **Mounu Prem**
Queen Mary University University of Chicago University of Chile Einaudi Institute

Abstract

We provide new evidence on the causal effect of higher education on mortality. Our empirical strategy exploits the reduction in college openings introduced by the Pinochet regime after the 1973 coup in Chile, which led to a sharp downward kink in college enrollment among those cohorts reaching college age in the following years. Using administrative data from the vital statistics, we document an upward kink in the age-specific yearly mortality rate of individuals in the affected cohorts. We estimate a negative effect of college on mortality between ages 34-74, which is larger for men, but also sizable for women. Individuals in the affected cohorts experience worse labor market outcomes, are more likely to be enrolled in the public health system, and report lower consumption of health services. This suggests that economic disadvantage and limited access to care play an important mediating role in the link between higher education and mortality.

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1 Introduction

The relationship between education and health ranks among the most widely studied in economics. More educated people live longer lives, but research on the causal effect of education on mortality has provided largely null findings (Galama et al., 2018; Xue et al., 2021). However, previous work has mostly studied compulsory schooling laws affecting primary or secondary education. Little is known about the impact of *higher* education on mortality (Buckles et al., 2016; Taylor, 2017). Insofar as primary, secondary, and tertiary education differentially affect preferences, knowledge, income, or other health inputs (Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2008; Montez et al., 2012), the effect of education on mortality is likely to vary across different levels of educational attainment.

We provide new evidence on the causal effect of higher education on mortality. We exploit variation in college enrollment among cohorts reaching college age in a narrow window around the 1973 military coup that brought Augusto Pinochet to power in Chile. The Pinochet regime quickly assumed control of all universities and steadily reduced public subsidies to higher education, which led to a steady reduction in the number of openings offered to incoming students (Bautista et al., 2023a). As a result, college-age cohorts experienced a sharp downward kink in college enrollment after 1973. This kink was entirely supply-driven: the secondary completion rate remained on trend and college applicants greatly exceeded openings throughout this period. The centralized admissions process based on a standardized exam also remained unchanged.

We document a higher age-specific mortality rate among individuals exposed to fewer college opportunities. Our empirical analysis uses individual-level records from the 1992 population census and vital statistics between 1994-2017 to calculate yearly mortality rates by cohort, gender, and region of residence. To ensure a relevant counterfactual for college enrollment, we exploit information about education in the vital statistics and restrict attention to individuals who completed secondary education and reached college age between 1964 and 1981. Our baseline sample includes close to 1 million individuals, who we observe between ages 34-74.

Before 1973, college enrollment was rising by close to 2 percentage points (pp) per cohort. This trend breaks after the coup and enrollment begins to *decrease* by 2 pp per cohort, equivalent to a 6% drop relative to the sample mean. Accounting for region-by-year and age fixed effects,

we find that yearly deaths per 1,000 increase by 0.11 for each additional female cohort reaching college age after 1973. For men, we find that mortality increases by 0.31 deaths per 1,000 for each post-coup cohort. These effects are equivalent to 2.9% and 4.4% of the respective sample means. They are largely driven by deaths from cancer and diseases of the circulatory or digestive systems. The results are similar if we collapse the data to the country level, if we expand the sample to include people without complete secondary, or if we examine smaller windows of cohorts or ages.

We estimate the effect of college enrollment on mortality using as an excluded instrument the downward kink in enrollment for cohorts reaching college age after 1973, in the spirit of a regression kink design (RKD) (Nielsen et al., 2010; Card et al., 2015, 2016; Dong, 2018). In support of our identification strategy, we show that the affected cohorts exhibit no kink in predetermined characteristics such as secondary completion or mortality before reaching college age. There is also no kink in mortality during our study period among individuals without complete secondary education. Our instrumental variables (IV) estimates suggest that college enrollment reduces yearly age-specific mortality by 0.27 pp for women and by 0.92 pp for men. These estimates correspond to local average treatment effects (LATE) (Imbens and Angrist, 1994) for those individuals that wanted to attend college but failed to gain admission because of the reduction in openings. We show that this supply-side shock predominantly affected applicants from less affluent backgrounds, whose test scores were close to the cut-off determining admission.

Our analysis of mechanisms indicates that reduced access to college leads to worse labor market outcomes and limited access to medical care. Using data from thirteen waves of a large household survey called CASEN between 1990 and 2017, we show that lower college enrollment decreases labor force participation, the quality of occupation, and monthly income. Fewer college opportunities also increase reliance on the more congested public health system and lead to lower consumption of health services, including visits to primary care physicians or specialists, and preventive care procedures (i.e., Pap smear for women). Hospital discharge summaries linked with the mortality files at the individual level further show that hospitalized patients in the affected cohorts exhibit an upward kink in mortality over multiple time horizons, ranging from 6 months to 5 years.

We contribute primarily to the literature studying the effects of education on health (Galama et al., 2018), which is part of a broader research agenda documenting the non-pecuniary con-

sequences of education (Grossman, 2006; Lochner, 2011; Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011). An extensive body of work—dating back to Kitagawa and Hauser (1968)—has documented an educational gradient in health status. However, causal evidence remains limited. Previous research on mortality has mostly exploited changes to compulsory schooling laws affecting lower levels of education and has found largely null results.¹ The findings from these studies have limited external validity to higher education, insofar as the latter could plausibly have a differential effect on health behaviors and mediating socioeconomic outcomes (Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2008, 2010). Moreover, this literature has largely focused on European countries with relatively equitable access to high-quality medical care, which could attenuate the impact of education.

Two previous studies examine the effect of higher education on mortality, both focused on white individuals in the United States. Buckles et al. (2016) exploit avoidance of the military draft during the Vietnam war (Card and Lemieux, 2001) and find that college reduces male mortality, but face the complication that men exposed to the draft were also more likely to fight in the war. Taylor (2017) leverages variation in the distance to the nearest college at age 17 and finds no average effect of college enrollment on male or female mortality. We contribute to the literature by exploiting a unique setting that allows us to credibly estimate the causal effect of college enrollment on mortality for men and women, both in the population at large and among hospitalized patients. Our setting further enables us to directly combine data from multiple sources to gain insights on the mediating role of labor market outcomes and consumption of health services.

2 Institutional Background

2.1 *Regime Change and Higher Education*

President Salvador Allende was overthrown by a military coup on September 11, 1973. At the time, there were eight universities in Chile, with presence throughout the country. Only two universities were public, but the entire system depended almost exclusively on government funding, which represented 77% of total revenue in 1972. Differentiated tuition based on family income was

¹See Lleras-Muney (2005); Mazumder (2008); Albouy and Lequien (2009); Van Kippersluis et al. (2011); Clark and Royer (2013); Black et al. (2015); Meghir et al. (2018). Papers studying other health outcomes are similarly inconclusive (Arendt, 2005; Oreopoulos, 2006; Braakmann, 2011; Kemptner et al., 2011).

charged, but fees were generally low. Starting in 1967, admissions were determined by a deferred acceptance algorithm based on applicants' preferences, their score in a centralized admissions exam and the yearly number of openings that universities made available for each program.²

A military junta presided by Augusto Pinochet took control of the government after the coup and remained in power until 1990. The junta quickly appointed members of the armed forces as rectors to all universities and gave them authority over university administration. Soon afterwards, policy began to be influenced by a group of free-market economists known as the *Chicago Boys* (Valdés, 1995). The Chicago Boys advocated for a reduction in public subsidies to universities, arguing that these were inefficient and failed to promote effort and thrift. Following their advice, the military government steadily cut back on its contributions to universities over the following years. Panel (a) in Figure 1 shows that the share of the government's education budget allocated to universities fell from a high of 47% in 1974 to 29% in 1980 (38% decrease).³

The reduction in funding was not compensated by increases in tuition or revenue from other sources, which forced universities to reduce the number of openings for new students. Panel (b) in Figure 1 shows that college openings peaked at 47,000 in 1973, equivalent to 71% of graduating secondary students on that year, and fell to 34,000 in 1980 (35% of secondary graduates). This led to a dramatic decrease in the gross college enrollment rate, shown in panel (a), which also peaked at 17% in 1973 and fell to 11% in 1980. UNESCO projections for 1975 overestimated college enrollment by 33%, which suggests that the reduction was not expected (Levy, 1986a). Panel (b) also shows that the number of applicants exceeded the number of openings throughout this period. Hence, the supply of openings was always the binding constraint on initial college enrollment.

Several important aspects of the higher education system remained constant during this period, including the centralized admissions process. As a result, the reduction in openings mechanically affected students with lower tests scores who were close to the admissions cut-off. We show below that these students predominantly came from less affluent socioeconomic backgrounds. Bautista et al. (2023a) further show that the distribution of students across fields hardly changed and the

²Military academies graduated less than 1% of college graduates per year and did not experience any major reform in the 20th century. If anything, their admission criteria became stricter after 1973 (Fuentes, 2012).

³These cuts mostly correspond to a reallocation of public spending on education towards lower levels (Bautista et al., 2023a). Figure A.1 shows that government spending on education and health steadily increased after 1975.

vast majority of academic units continued functioning. Even though the first months after the coup were characterized by strong repression, political persecution was highly targeted and “most previously enrolled students remained enrolled” (Levy, 1986a, p. 101).⁴ Figure A.2 shows that over two-thirds of individuals with some college education report at least four years of college in all of our study cohorts, which suggests a graduation rate comparable to other settings (e.g., Zimmerman, 2014). The number of universities and campuses also remained unchanged until a reform in 1981.

The change in political conditions plausibly affected the college experience after 1973, with a greater emphasis on academic achievement being offset by a limited development of critical thinking and restricted extracurricular activities (Levy, 1986b).⁵ Figure A.2 shows that the trends for both the college graduation rate and the college premium in earnings exhibit upward kinks for the cohorts that reached college age after 1973. These patterns are consistent with an improvement in the quality of higher education but could also reflect positive selection in admissions or match effects (Arcidiacono and Lovenheim, 2016). Focusing on inputs, a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that college enrollment declined more than public funding after the coup, such that public spending per student increased 57% in real terms between 1973 and 1981 (Arriagada, 1989). Hence, while we cannot conclusively assert that the quality of higher education improved after the coup, there is little evidence to suggest that it worsened.

2.2 Health System

Chile experienced rapid economic growth since the mid-1980s, with GDP per capita (in constant 2010 USD) rising from \$4,700 in 1985 to \$14,700 in 2015. Sustained economic growth coincided with improved health: life expectancy rose from 62 to 75 years between 1970 and 1990 and infant mortality plummeted from 67 to 16 deaths per 1,000 live births. Overall, Chile is near the OECD average for several health outcomes (OECD, 2019), although it has relatively high rates of smoking (25% of adults), obesity (74%), and chronic disease morbidity (9% of adults with diabetes).⁶

⁴Twenty-four of the 3200 documented state-led killings during the Pinochet regime correspond to university professors and 252 to students from all levels (Comisión Rettig, 1996). There were 145,000 college students in 1973.

⁵Brunner (1984) argues that pedagogic practices remained unchanged but academic curricula became less flexible.

⁶Health spending as a percentage of GDP increased from 5% in the 1990s to 9% in 2017 but remains relatively efficient. Chile ranked 8th out of 55 countries in the Bloomberg healthcare efficiency index (Clínicas de Chile, 2016).

The health insurance system in Chile was created in 1979-81 and includes private and public providers. The public option is financed with public funds and a payroll tax, has no exclusions, and offers different co-payment based on income and number of dependents. Private insurance companies compete in a regulated market by offering contracts at different prices, and receive payroll tax contributions from their members. The share of the population covered by the public option has risen from 66% in the 1990s to almost 80% in more recent years ([MDS, 2018](#)), partly due to the rising cost of private insurance ([Galetovic and Sanhueza, 2013](#)). The public option serves lower-income and higher-risk individuals, while private providers serve a richer, healthier, and younger segment of the population ([Pardo and Schott, 2012](#)). Switching across sectors is uncommon, though the public option often acts as a safety net ([Duarte, 2011](#)). Provision of health services (laboratories, clinics, hospitals) also involves private and public providers. Public providers are more crowded and have longer wait times.⁷ Private insurance companies offer flexibility over providers and reduced copay for preferred providers. In contrast, the public insurance only covers services by public providers and additional payment is required to access private providers.

3 Data

3.1 Data Sources

We rely on four main data sources. First, individual death records from the vital statistics for the period 1994-2017. Second, individual records from the 1992 and 2002 population censuses. Third, the universe of hospital discharge summaries for the period 2002-2018. Lastly, individual responses in all thirteen waves of the CASEN household survey between 1990 and 2017.

The Department of Health Statistics provides rich individual-level data from death certificates since 1994. This includes year of birth, gender, educational attainment, county of residence, and cause of death. We combine the mortality files with the 1992 census provided by the National Institute of Statistics to calculate yearly mortality rates. The census provides information on basic demographic characteristics and educational attainment. We calculate the mortality rate at the

⁷In 2016, 24% of hospitals were private, but employed 55% of doctors ([Clínicas de Chile, 2016](#)). Figure [A.3](#) shows that the number of doctors per 1,000 beneficiaries in 2014 was 5.3 in the private sector and 1.2 in the public sector. Spending per capita in 2014 was close to \$3,000 in the private sector and less than \$1,000 in the public option.

cohort-gender-region level for each year between 1994 and 2017.⁸ We also calculate disaggregate rates by cause of death based on the ICD classification. For these calculations, we iteratively adjust the population at risk based on the previous number of deaths per cell, following [Clark and Royer \(2013\)](#). We measure the initial share with college from the 1992 census and similarly adjust it based on previous deaths. We focus on college enrollment, rather than completion, as this was the margin directly affected by the contraction after 1973. The youngest cohort in the panel has age 32 in 1992, so we can confidently assume that everyone in our sample has completed their education.

We also use administrative data for the universe of hospital discharge summaries between 2002 and 2018. This dataset includes almost five million hospitalizations and reports basic socioeconomic characteristics of the patient, as well as the hospital of admission, diagnostic and type of insurance, among others. Unfortunately, educational attainment is not reported. We combine this dataset with the 2002 census to construct yearly hospitalization rates at the cohort-gender-region level. Importantly, we can merge the discharge summaries with the mortality files based on a unique individual identifier, which enables us to track the mortality of hospitalized patients.

Finally, we use all thirteen waves of the biennial CASEN household survey between 1990 and 2017. This survey records information on education, health, income, and labor market outcomes. We use CASEN to study mediating outcomes such as labor force participation, occupation, income, and type of insurance. We also examine consumption of health services, including visits to primary care physicians, specialists, or the emergency room, and preventive care procedures such as the Pap smear for women. CASEN's latest waves include more than 260,000 individuals from over 80,000 households. However, sample sizes vary because not every question is asked in every wave.

3.2 Sample Inclusion Criteria and Descriptive Statistics

We restrict the sample to individuals born between 1943 and 1960, who reached age 21 between 1964 and 1981. This leaves us with an 18-cohort window centered around 1973. We focus on age 21 because this was the average age of first-year college students in 1970 ([Schiefelbein, 1976](#)). We end the sample with the 1981 cohort to avoid confounding effects from a subsequent reform of the

⁸We rely on region of residence because region of birth is not reported in the vital statistics. We exclude Chileans living abroad and foreign nationals. Chile is administratively divided into 346 counties located in 16 regions.

university system. In our baseline analysis, we observe the study cohorts between ages 34 and 74, but we show below that our results are robust to using alternative windows of ages or cohorts.

To ensure a relevant counterfactual for college enrollment, we further restrict our baseline sample to individuals reporting four or more years of secondary education. Information on secondary completion is mostly unavailable in our sources, but four years corresponds to the statutory length. In the absence of this restriction, the comparison group also includes individuals with incomplete secondary or less. This reduces the average number of years of education in the comparison group without college from 12 to 8 (i.e., a reduction from full secondary to full primary). Since people with lower educational attainment have higher mortality, as shown in Figure A.4, this comparison could conflate the effect of college enrollment with that of completing secondary education.

A possible concern about this restriction is that the college contraction may have reduced the incentive for secondary students to complete their degree as a prerequisite to access higher education. If so, the sample restriction will likely bias our estimates downwards, insofar as the students that drop out of secondary plausibly have lower socioeconomic status and poorer health. However, it seems unlikely that access to higher education is the main driver behind secondary completion if the prospect of college admission is sufficiently uncertain and there are high returns to a secondary degree (Hungerford and Solon, 1987).⁹ In line with this argument, we show below that secondary completion does not change among the cohorts affected by the college contraction. We also show that the effect of college on mortality is larger in the unrestricted sample, which suggests that the sample restriction to individuals with complete secondary is a conservative choice.

Another potential concern is that the sample restriction to individuals with complete secondary relies crucially on the information on education from the mortality files, which could introduce significant measurement error (Currie and Schwandt, 2016). This is not a major issue in our setting, given that the information on education in the death certificates is cross-checked with administrative data using the unique national identification number of the deceased. This process minimizes measurement error and leads to less than 0.1% of missing data. In terms of data quality, Chile's vital statistics rank among the best in the world (Mikkelsen et al., 2015).

⁹Unreported estimates controlling for year, age, gender, any college and a linear trend in years of education show that CASEN respondents in our study cohorts with full secondary have 38% higher income between ages 25-50.

Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our main variables of interest, disaggregated by gender and by exposure to the college contraction (i.e., college age before and after 1973). There are 1,017,162 individuals that meet our sample inclusion criteria in the 1992 census, with ages 32-49. There are 124,745 deaths among these individuals between 1994 and 2017 (ages 34-74), yielding an aggregate mortality rate of 12%. Male mortality is almost twice as high as female mortality (16% vs 9%), similarly to other settings (Beltrán-Sánchez et al., 2015). Cohorts reaching college age after 1973 have higher rates of secondary completion, but lower college enrollment conditional on full secondary. They also have higher labor force participation, but are less likely to have a white-collar high-skill occupation. These differences in averages partly reflect the different ages at which we observe these cohorts. Our empirical strategy, which we introduce next, ensures that we only compare individuals from different cohorts at the same age.

4 Empirical Strategy

4.1 Econometric Specification

If we could connect the 1992 census to the mortality files at the individual level, a natural model to estimate the relationship between college and mortality would be as follows:

$$D_{it} = \tau C_i + \delta X_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (1)$$

where D_{it} is an indicator that takes the value of one if individual i died in period t . The vector X_{it} measures individual-level covariates, and C_i is an indicator that takes the value of one for individuals with some college education. This is a fixed individual characteristic assuming we only observe people with completed education. By restricting the sample to individuals with complete secondary, we can interpret the parameter of interest τ as the average difference in mortality for people with college relative to those that stop their schooling at the level immediately below.

Since we cannot link our data sources at the individual level, we aggregate the data into cohort-gender-region cells, as described above. This unit of observation allows us to account for differ-

ences in mortality across genders and regions.¹⁰ Similarly to [Lleras-Muney \(2005\)](#), we derive the aggregate model by averaging equation (1) over individuals in a given cell:

$$\overline{D}_{krt} = \tau \overline{C}_{krt} + \delta \overline{X}_{krt} + \overline{\varepsilon}_{krt} \quad (2)$$

where \overline{D}_{krt} is the share of people from cohort k and region r who died in year t , while \overline{C}_{krt} is the share of people with college.¹¹ By weighting each observation by the number of people in that cell, we obtain an estimate of τ identical to the one provided by the individual microdata ([Angrist and Pischke, 2009](#)). As mentioned above, we follow [Clark and Royer \(2013\)](#) and iteratively adjust the denominators of \overline{D}_{krt} and \overline{C}_{krt} based on the previous number of deaths per cell.

We can estimate equation (2) using OLS, but concerns about omitted variables prevent us from interpreting τ as the causal effect of college enrollment ([Card, 1999](#)). Examples of omitted variables include unobservable differences in genetic characteristics, parental inputs, or individual preferences (e.g., discount rates) that affect college enrollment and long-run health ([Fuchs, 1982](#)).¹²

4.2 Identification Strategy

To identify the causal impact of college enrollment on mortality, we exploit the kink in enrollment observed for cohorts reaching college age shortly after the 1973 military coup, in the spirit of a regression kink design (RKD) ([Nielsen et al., 2010](#); [Card et al., 2015, 2016](#); [Dong, 2018](#)). In particular, we examine whether the cohort-level trend in mortality exhibits a kink analogous to the one observed for college enrollment. Although a cross-cohort comparison of this nature could raise concerns about confounding non-linear age effects, our setting allows us to observe the study cohorts repeatedly over 23 years. We leverage the longitudinal nature of the data to include age fixed effects in our regressions, thereby restricting the analysis to individuals of the same age. We

¹⁰This aggregation minimizes measurement error caused by internal migration, which could be large in small cells (e.g., counties). Our results are unchanged if we aggregate to the cohort-gender-year level, which eliminates this risk.

¹¹For simplicity, we are omitting the gender subindex in equation (2), but the collapsed cells are gender-specific.

¹²Previous work has shown, for instance, that low birth weight is associated with worse health during childhood and with reduced educational attainment ([Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2004](#); [Black et al., 2007](#)). Household income is also positively correlated both with children's health and educational attainment ([Case et al., 2002](#)).

estimate the following reduced-form specification:

$$\overline{D}_{krt} = \alpha_{j(k,t)} + \alpha_{rt} + \gamma Z_k + \nu_{krt} \quad (3)$$

We set $k = 0$ for the 1951 birth cohort (which turns 21 in 1972), $k = 1$ for the 1952 birth cohort, and so on ($k \in [-8, 9]$). We focus on age 21 because this was the average age of first-year college students in 1970 (Schiefelbein, 1976). The excluded instrument Z_k is defined as $[1(k > 0) \times k]$. That is, $Z_k = 0$ for $k \leq 0$ and $Z_k = k$ for $k > 0$. The parameter γ captures the linear trend break (i.e., kink) of interest. Besides the age fixed effects, $\alpha_{j(k,t)}$, we also include region-by-year fixed effects (α_{rt}) to account for place-based drivers of mortality and time-varying factors that could vary across regions, such as the construction of new healthcare facilities or the occurrence of natural disasters. We allow for spatial correlation in mortality by clustering the error term ν_{krt} at the region-year level. To account for within-cohort correlation in the error term, we also report the p -values from the wild cluster bootstrap procedure (Cameron et al., 2008; Canay et al., 2021).

In line with equation (3), we can similarly estimate the following first-stage specification:

$$\overline{C}_{krt} = \omega_{j(k,t)} + \omega_{rt} + \theta Z_k + \mu_{krt} \quad (4)$$

where θ captures the kink in college enrollment for the affected cohorts. We expect $\widehat{\theta} < 0$ due to the college contraction. The corresponding second-stage regression is:

$$\overline{D}_{krt} = \phi_{j(k,t)} + \phi_{rt} + \beta \overline{C}_{krt} + \eta_{krt} \quad (5)$$

4.3 Identifying Assumptions and Characterization of Compliers

The IV estimate of β in equation (5) is numerically equivalent to the fuzzy RKD estimate given by the ratio γ/θ . Under the four assumptions of (i) *relevance*, (ii) *monotonicity*, (iii) *smoothness*, and (iv) *exclusion restriction*, β identifies the local average treatment effect (LATE) of college enrollment on mortality (Imbens and Angrist, 1994; Card et al., 2015; Dong, 2018). The relevance assumption states that $\theta \neq 0$, which we corroborate below. The monotonicity assumption states that no individual is more likely to enroll in college than they would have been in the absence of

the college contraction. The reduction in college openings that we exploit, which corresponds to a supply-side shock that takes place under an unchanged admissions process (i.e., no targeting), suggests that this assumption is very likely to be satisfied. The smoothness assumption states that the distribution of potential treatment status and potential outcomes is continuously differentiable around the kink point.¹³ This assumption is the RKD equivalent of the *independence* assumption in [Imbens and Angrist \(1994\)](#). The exclusion restriction implies that any change in mortality for the affected cohorts is only a consequence of their lower college enrollment. We provide a battery of evidence in support of the smoothness assumption and the exclusion restriction in the next section.

The LATE identified by β captures the average causal effect of college enrollment on mortality for people that did not attend college because of the contraction after 1973. These *compliers* had test scores close to the admissions threshold and mechanically failed to gain admission when openings fell. Insofar as test scores correlate positively with innate ability and socioeconomic status (SES), we expect the compliers to be a mix of high-ability/low-SES and low-ability/high-SES applicants.¹⁴ Using microdata from EOD, a large yearly employment survey for the Santiago region conducted since 1958, [Table A.1](#) shows that the share of college students coming from the middle and bottom terciles of household income was increasing in the pre-coup cohorts, but decreases after the coup. There is also a reversal in the share of students with parents that either attended college or have a white-collar high-skill occupation, both of which are markers of high SES. These changes in the composition of the college student body indicate that our compliers mostly correspond to low SES students with high ability and test scores near the admissions cutoff.

The ratio of applicants to openings in [Figure 1](#) suggests that the compliers in our setting had high returns and wanted to attend college, but were prevented from doing so by the college contraction. In contrast, the changes in compulsory schooling that are often studied in the literature mostly affect low-SES students with low ability and force them to obtain education beyond what they want, which suggests low returns ([Domnisoru, 2021](#)). These students plausibly exert less effort, which dampens the effect of the extra schooling ([Lleras-Muney, 2022](#)). A change in compulsory schooling is also likely to have a smaller impact on subsequent economic opportunities

¹³[Nielsen et al. \(2010\)](#) show that γ/θ identifies τ in a constant-effects model under a weaker smoothness assumption.

¹⁴High-ability/high-SES applicants presumably have high test scores and are unaffected by the reduction in openings (*always-takers*) and low-ability/low-SES applicants have low scores and are also unaffected (*never-takers*).

than a change in access to higher education. For instance, college enrollment can provide low-SES students with access to high-SES peers, which is usually not the case for additional schooling at lower levels. In this regard, our research design is closer to those leveraging variation in distance to college, with the important difference that we study a supply-side reduction in the probability of admission while keeping the cost of college fixed. Whereas the Chilean college contraction mostly affected low-SES applicants with high ability, changes in the distance to college tend to affect all low-SES applicants, irrespective of ability, due to their high cost sensitivity (Mountjoy, 2022).

5 College Enrollment and Mortality

5.1 The Kink in College Enrollment

Figure 2 plots raw data from the 1992 population census. Panel (a) shows the share of men and women per cohort with four or more years of secondary education. These shares rise smoothly from approximately 28% for the oldest cohort in our sample, which reached age 21 in 1964, to 40% for our youngest cohort, which reached this age in 1981. Women overtake men in secondary completion starting with the 1977 cohort due to a steeper secular trend. Table A.2 provides regression estimates showing that these cohort trends in secondary completion do not change after 1973.¹⁵ Figure A.5 plots the smooth estimated trends. Panel (b) in Figure 2 shows the respective shares that report any college education, among those with full secondary. Cohorts reaching age 21 before 1973 exhibit rising college enrollment, especially under Allende after 1970. In contrast, cohorts reaching this age after the military coup experienced a sharp decline in the enrollment rate, which fell from 38% for the 1972 cohort to 22% for the one reaching age 21 in 1980.

Table 2 presents regression estimates of the kink in college enrollment. Columns 1-4 show results for women and columns 5-8 for men. We report robust standard errors (clustered at the region-year level in columns 3-4 and 7-8) in parentheses and p -values clustered by cohort in square brackets. Since the original variation in college enrollment takes place across cohorts, we begin

¹⁵The slight drop in secondary completion for the cohorts reaching age 21 in 1971 and 1981 (1950 and 1960 birth years) is a consequence of age heaping in the census (Bachi, 1951; Myers, 1954; A'Hearn et al., 2009). We verify below that our results are unaffected if we smooth the population counts based on a linear projection. In contrast, a seemingly downward kink in the share of men with complete secondary in Table A.2 disappears if we drop the cohort reaching age 21 in 1981 or if we use the smoothed population figures that account for age heaping in the census.

the analysis using data from the 1992 census at the cohort-region level. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 5 is the share with any college education, which we express per ten people to facilitate the interpretation of results below. College enrollment was rising before 1973 by 1-2 percentage points (pp) per cohort, but this trend reverses and *drops* by 3-4 pp after 1973. By adding these coefficients, we obtain a net trend of -2 pp per cohort after 1973 (i.e., 6% of the sample mean). Columns 2 and 6 show a similar downward kink and a net downward trend if we examine average years of college instead. Going back to college enrollment, in columns 3 and 7 we use our longitudinal sample to provide estimates of equation (4) with age and region-year fixed effects, which absorb the baseline cohort trend. We also adjust the college enrollment rate based on previous mortality. The results are very similar to the cross-sectional regression. Columns 4 and 8 replicate the analysis without the sample restriction based on secondary completion. As expected, including people ineligible for college in the sample leads to a smaller kink, though the estimates remain statistically and economically significant (relative to the smaller sample mean).

Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 3 illustrate the kink in college enrollment.¹⁶ The markers show average college enrollment per cohort, the solid lines indicate the estimated trends before and after the coup, and the dashed line denotes the counterfactual trend for the post-coup cohorts. The parsimonious linear model accurately describes the evolution of the college enrollment rate across cohorts and captures the sharp negative kink for those reaching college age after 1973.

5.2 Impact on Mortality

Panels (c)-(d) in Figure 3 show the average risk-adjusted yearly mortality rate by cohort between 1994 and 2017 (ages 34-74).¹⁷ The simple linear model again yields an accurate representation of the cohort-level trend and provides clear indication of an upward kink for cohorts reaching college age after 1973. Panel A in Table 3 shows estimates of equation (3) with age fixed effects and quantifies this kink. Columns 1-4 show results for women and columns 5-8 for men.

Column 1 shows that annual deaths per 1,000 increased by 0.11 per cohort among women reaching college age after 1973. We observe a larger increase of 0.31 per cohort for men in column

¹⁶Figure A.6 provides analogous plots for the unrestricted sample including people without complete secondary.

¹⁷Figure A.4 provides descriptive mortality profiles by age, year and educational attainment.

5. These kinks are equivalent to 2.9% and 4.4% of the respective sample means. Columns 2 and 6 show that the results are the same when we include cohort trends by region, which previous research has shown to be an important predictor of mortality ([Mazumder, 2008](#); [Black et al., 2015](#)). Columns 3 and 7 show that the results also look very similar if we collapse the data to the cohort-year level (i.e., ignore variation across regions). This alleviates concerns about endogenous sorting across regions or measurement error due to internal migration. Columns 4 and 8 show that the results also remain comparable when we expand the sample to include individuals with less than full secondary education, although the estimates lose precision when we cluster by cohort. The stability of the coefficients in the modified sample suggests that people without complete secondary education experienced little change in their mortality profiles, as we further verify below.

Panel B presents IV estimates of the effect of college enrollment. The Kleibergen-Paap F -statistics indicate a strong first-stage relationship. Since we express the share with college per ten individuals, we can interpret the estimated effects on deaths per 1,000 as percentage point effects on the probability of dying. Our baseline specification in column 1 shows that college enrollment reduces age-specific mortality by 0.27 pp among women and by 0.91 pp among men.¹⁸ Rescaled to deaths per 1,000, these effects are equivalent to 71% and 130% of the respective sample means. We can reject at the 5% level that the estimates for men and women are equal. The IV estimates remain stable if we add cohort-region trends or if we collapse to the cohort-year level (columns 2-3 and 6-7). Columns 4 and 8 show that we obtain larger effects if we include in the sample individuals without full secondary. Intuitively, this modified sample includes individuals with much lower levels of education in the comparison group for people with college and magnifies the effect.¹⁹ However, these estimates are again imprecise when we cluster by cohort.

Panel C reveals that our IV estimates are only slightly larger than their OLS counterparts, and we generally fail to reject that the two are equal. Larger IV estimates are common in studies on the effects of education on health ([Galama et al., 2018](#)). One explanation is that the returns to college are particularly high for the compliers ([Card, 1999](#)). As shown above, the marginal applicants who

¹⁸Table [A.5](#) shows that one year of college reduces mortality by 0.07 pp for women and by 0.24 pp for men, equivalent to 19% and 34% of the respective sample means. [Buckles et al. \(2016\)](#) finds that one year of college reduces the mortality of white men in the US over 25 years by 19% relative to the sample mean.

¹⁹The fact that the reduced-form coefficients hardly change in the expanded sample, while the first-stage impact on college enrollment is much smaller, suggests that the latter is the main driver behind the change in magnitude.

failed to enroll in college after 1973 came from less affluent backgrounds and plausibly had high health returns. Our cohort-level instrument also captures educational spillovers across individuals without college that the OLS estimation fails to incorporate (Grossman, 2006).

5.3 Validation of the Identifying Assumptions and Robustness Checks

As mentioned in section 4.3, our identification strategy relies on a *smoothness* assumption. One implication of this assumption is that individuals cannot precisely manipulate the running variable (i.e., no sorting). This condition is likely to be satisfied in our setting because the initial size of all our study cohorts was determined by fertility decisions made many years before the 1973 coup. In support of this claim, Table A.3 shows that there is no kink in cohort size in the 1960 census. We can also expect limited sorting because the age of college enrollment cannot be easily manipulated (i.e., younger cohorts cannot bring forward their secondary completion). The absence of a kink in secondary completion shown in Table A.2 lends support to this claim. The smoothness assumption also implies the absence of kinks in predetermined covariates. Using yearly death counts by cohort for the period 1960-1981 from demographic yearbooks, we show in Table A.3 that the affected cohorts do not exhibit a kink in age-specific mortality before reaching college age.

Our identification strategy also requires that the higher mortality in the affected cohorts is only driven by their lower college enrollment (i.e., *exclusion restriction*). While the 1973 coup brought about changes in factors other than access to college, these only compromise the exclusion restriction if they differentially affected younger individuals reaching college age after the coup. Our baseline sample includes 18 contiguous cohorts, who arguably had a comparable exposure to any other changes. Panel (a) in Figure 4 shows that our results are robust to shorter bandwidths of as few as 8 cohorts, further enhancing their comparability. The uniqueness of our setting, in which younger cohorts experience a *reduction* in educational attainment, also means that secular improvements in health conditions (e.g., information, technology) will likely attenuate our results.

Additional evidence in support of the exclusion restriction comes from the fact that other relevant outcomes do not exhibit a linear kink after 1973. Figure A.1 shows that economic conditions deteriorated near the coup, but this crisis was short-lived. In fact, the cohorts most affected by the college contraction and exhibiting larger increases in mortality reached college age at a time of

rapid economic growth and rising government spending. Figure A.1 also shows that infant mortality and adolescent fertility, which plausibly capture changes in the quality of health care or in major life decisions near college age, evolve smoothly during this period. Using data from the EOD survey, we further show in Table A.4 that there is no kink in youth unemployment in the years after the military coup.²⁰ Table A.5 verifies that our results are robust to controlling for macroeconomic conditions on the year of college enrollment or restricting the sample to counties lacking a military base in 1970, which were less exposed to repression under Pinochet (Bautista et al., 2023b).²¹

While we cannot fully rule out changes in the quality of higher education after the coup, the evidence on graduation rates and the college earnings premium in Figure A.2 suggests that quality may have increased, which could bias our estimates downwards (i.e., attenuate). In line with this argument, Table A.6 shows that the upward kink in mortality is driven by people with complete secondary that do not go to college, while mortality among those with college decreases slightly. Importantly, Table A.6 also shows that there is no kink in mortality among people with incomplete secondary education, who were ineligible for college but were exposed to other changes. This null result is in line with the negligible impact of the inclusion of people without full secondary on our reduced-form findings in Table 3. Table A.7 lends further support to the exclusion restriction by showing that regions more exposed to the college contraction, as measured either by high rates of secondary completion in 1970 or by the presence of a main university campus, have a larger kink.

Although the exclusion restriction is essentially untestable, this body of evidence suggests that changes in factors other than access to college after 1973 cannot explain our results. Alternatively, at the bottom of Table 3 we report results from sensitivity tests based on Conley et al. (2012), which suggest that violations of the exclusion restriction would have to be quite large (70% or more of the reduced-form effects) to change our conclusions.

Another channel through which the 1973 coup may have affected mortality is migration. The analysis at the cohort-year level in Table 3 suggests that internal migration is not affecting our results. Table A.8 further shows that our results are unchanged if we restrict the sample to indi-

²⁰Reassuringly, there is a sizable downward kink in the share of EOD respondents with ages 20-30 that report to be currently studying after 1973. We also check that our main results hold for the Santiago region covered by EOD.

²¹Table A.5 also shows that the results are robust to changes in our econometric specification (i.e., allowing for a discontinuity in 1973 or introducing a quadratic trend), or in the measurement of mortality rates (i.e., not adjusting for previous mortality or smoothing the population counts in the census for age heaping).

viduals residing in their region of birth in 1992. Regarding international migration, Figure A.7 documents downward kinks in the share that reports in 1992 to have lived abroad in 1987 and in the share registered to vote outside the country in 2017, as well as an upward kink in the number of people per cohort with full secondary in 1992. These patterns suggest lower emigration among the affected cohorts. Official figures for 2003/4 show that Chilean migrants are positively selected on education (MRE, 2005). Hence, the decrease in emigration was plausibly driven by the reduced access to higher education affecting college-age cohorts after 1973.

To assess the influence of international migration on our results, we carry out a bounding exercise in which we construct a counterfactual dataset with fewer individuals in post-coup cohorts (i.e., more emigration) using pre-1973 trends. Based on an average college enrollment rate of 30% in our sample (Table 1), we construct bounds for our estimates by assuming that 10% or 50% of would-be migrants were college educated (i.e., negative or positive selection). We then iteratively adjust the number of individuals per cell based on the average mortality rates by educational level (Figure A.4). Table A.8 provides bounds for our IV estimates of $[-0.197, -0.179]$ for women and $[-1.503, -0.755]$ for men. This suggests that emigration is not fundamentally driving our results.

5.4 *Heterogeneous Effects by Age and Cause of Death*

Our baseline analysis tracks the study cohorts between ages 34 and 74. Panel (b) in Figure 4 shows that our results are robust to smaller age windows that increase the overlap between pre-coup and post-coup cohorts.²² We observe a slight reduction in effect size for smaller windows, which could indicate that the effect of college on mortality materializes later in the life cycle. To further explore the role of age, we replicate the analysis for the smaller set of cohorts that reached age 21 between 1969-1976, which we observe over a larger common support of ages (46-62). We then estimate separate regressions excluding one additional age at a time. Figure A.9 shows that our IV estimates with age fixed effects become smaller for samples that exclude individuals aged 58 or older or that include people aged 52 and below. This suggests that college has a larger effect on mortality after people reach their mid-fifties, in line with evidence by Kaestner et al. (2020) for the US.

The larger impact of college on mortality for older individuals aligns with additional disaggre-

²²Figure A.8 shows the number of cohorts observed per age, disaggregated by exposure to the college contraction.

gate results by cause of death. Table A.9 shows that deaths from cancer and diseases related to the circulatory or digestive systems account for 84% of the total effect of college on female mortality and for 69% of the total effect for men, similarly to what Buckles et al. (2016) find for the US.²³ Relative to the respective sample means, college has a smaller impact on deaths from cancer than on those from diseases of the circulatory or digestive systems. These results are consistent with the notion that environmental or hereditary factors play a larger role in cancer incidence, while diseases of the respiratory or digestive system are more strongly affected by individual behaviors (e.g., exercise). However, these findings must be interpreted with caution because of competing risks across causes of death (Honoré and Lleras-Muney, 2006).

6 Mechanisms Linking Higher Education and Mortality

The existing literature has identified many channels linking college and reduced mortality (Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2008, 2010). Following Grossman (2006), we can classify these mechanisms as “market” or “non-market” based. Regarding the former, college education leads to better occupations and higher income (Card, 1999), which facilitates access to health insurance, better health care, and different health hazards. Non-market mechanisms include changes in preferences (e.g. risk aversion), beliefs, peer characteristics, and skills that influence health behaviors (Grossman, 1972; Becker and Mulligan, 1997). In this section, we show that cohorts with lower access to college have worse labor market outcomes and are more likely to be enrolled in the more congested public health system. They are less likely to consume outpatient health services but have similar hospitalization rates. However, they also have higher mortality conditional on being hospitalized.

6.1 Labor Market Outcomes

We measure labor market outcomes using individual responses from the CASEN household survey between 1990 and 2017.²⁴ Since CASEN records information on educational attainment, we can

²³Table A.10 shows that the reduction in cancer deaths is concentrated in the digestive organs and lymphoid tissue, but also breasts and genital organs in the case of women, and urinary and respiratory organs in the case of men. Men are also less likely to die from external causes, mostly non-traffic accidents and medical complications (Table A.11).

²⁴Information in CASEN is self-reported but we do not expect differential misreporting across cohorts. It also remains unclear whether misreporting varies with education (Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2010).

restrict the sample to individuals with complete secondary education and provide IV estimates of the effect of college. Our outcomes of interest are indicators for labor force participation, white-collar high-skill occupation, and enrollment in the public health insurance, as well as monthly income. Averaging across survey waves, Figure 5 shows sizable downward kinks in labor force participation, high-status occupation, and income for the cohorts reaching age 21 after 1973. These kinks are matched by an upward kink in enrollment in the public health insurance.

Table 4 quantifies these kinks and provides IV estimates with age fixed effects. We estimate all regressions at the individual level and include county by year fixed effects that account for a host of spatial and temporal factors. We report standard errors clustered two-way by county and region-year in parentheses (Cameron et al., 2011), and p-values from the wild cluster bootstrap at the cohort level in brackets. Columns 1 and 5 show that college enrollment increases labor force participation by 14 percentage points (pp) for women and by 21 pp for men. Columns 2 and 6 show that college increases the probability of a white-collar, high-skill occupation (mostly professional occupations – e.g., doctor, lawyer – unattainable without a college degree) by 50 pp for women and by 35 pp for men. Columns 3 and 7 show that college increases monthly income by \$173,000 (340 USD) for women and by \$234,000 (460 USD) for men.²⁵ These effects correspond to 57% and 36% of the respective sample means. Finally, columns 4 and 8 show that college reduces enrollment in the public health insurance by 20 pp for women and by 41 pp for men. The larger effect for men may reflect that women can more easily access private health insurance through their spouse. This difference may partly explain the larger effect of college on male mortality.

6.2 Consumption of Health Services

We measure consumption of health services based on CASEN responses on visits to primary care physicians, specialists, or the emergency room in the past three months. The expected effect of college on these outcomes is theoretically ambiguous. On the one hand, the cohorts with lower access to college may consume more health services due to their worse health status, as reflected

²⁵Ffrench-Davis (2018) and Bautista et al. (2023a) show that income inequality increased under Pinochet and that the college contraction hindered social mobility. Higher inequality is associated with worse health outcomes and may have contributed to the increase in mortality (Truesdale and Jencks, 2016). Bautista et al. (2023c) further show that children with parents in the affected cohorts are also less likely to attend college, pointing to higher dependency ratios as another related mechanism.

by their higher mortality. On the other hand, economic disadvantage and high reliance on the public health system could limit access to care for these cohorts.

Figure 6 plots the raw data measuring consumption of health services. Women with fewer college opportunities have a lower probability of seeing a specialist (panel b), while men are less likely to see a primary care physician (panel e). There is no clear pattern for emergency room visits (panels c and g), in line with the idea that this service faces fewer barriers to access than outpatient consultations. Table 5 provides the corresponding regression estimates. College increases the probability of having recently seen a primary care physician by 12.8 pp for men, and the probability of having seen a specialist by 10.1 pp for women. These results suggest that more educated individuals make larger investments in health to increase their time available for market and non-market activities (Grossman, 1972). They are also consistent with previous research documenting a positive correlation between education and the use of preventive care services (e.g., Fletcher and Frisvold 2009; Cutler and Lleras-Muney 2010; Lange 2011).

As an additional measure of preventive care, column 4 examines the probability that women have had a Pap smear in the past three years. This is the main procedure to test for cervical cancer and the Chilean Health Ministry recommends it for all women over the age of 25. Panel (d) in Figure 6 shows a clear downward kink for the affected cohorts, which the regression estimates help to quantify: college enrollment increases the probability of having had this procedure done in a timely fashion by 16.8 pp, equivalent to 23% of the sample mean. This plausibly contributes to the negative impact of college on deaths from female genital cancer documented in Table A.10. Importantly, CASEN asks women who have not had a Pap smear the reason why, which we use to construct additional outcomes in Table A.12. We find that negligence or forgetfulness explains 45% of the college effect, while lack of knowledge or lack of interest explain a further 18%. Although these results are imprecise and should be interpreted with caution, they suggest that college also affects health through non-market channels, including changes in knowledge and preferences.

6.3 Hospitalizations

We study hospital visits as a complementary measure of health care consumption, based on the universe of discharge summaries between 2002-2018. We conduct this part of the analysis at the

cohort-gender-region-year level and source the initial population counts from the 2002 census.²⁶ Unfortunately, the discharge summaries do not provide information on educational attainment, so we drop the sample restriction to individuals with complete secondary and the analysis is exclusively reduced form. We then study the mortality of hospitalized patients by combining the discharge summaries with the vital statistics at the individual level.

Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 7 show small upward kinks in the hospitalization rate (per 1,000 individuals) for the cohorts exposed to the college contraction. However, columns 1 and 2 in Table 6 show no evidence of kinks once we account for age effects, irrespective of whether we measure hospitalization events or individual patients.²⁷ This null result suggests that limited access to college leads to worse health while also limiting access to medical care, such that these two effects tend to cancel out. To explore this possibility, columns 3 and 4 provide estimates by type of insurance. We find evidence of an upward kink in the hospitalization rate using public insurance and a comparable downward kink in the hospitalization rate using private insurance. These results are consistent with the notion that increased reliance on the public health system is a contributing factor in the limited access to care faced by the affected cohorts. We interpret these results with caution because their statistical significance is sensitive to the type of clustering technique.

By combining the discharge summaries with the vital statistics, we can establish whether a hospitalized individual dies over different time horizons. Our final estimating sample includes roughly 1.1 million individuals that were admitted to hospital between 2004 and 2012.²⁸ Our reduced-form specification includes county-by-year and age fixed effects. We report in parentheses standard errors clustered two-way by county and region-year (Cameron et al., 2011), and p-values from the wild cluster bootstrap at the cohort level in brackets.

Column 5 in Table 6 presents results using the 1-year mortality rate of patients hospitalized in 2004-2012 as dependent variable. The mean of this variable is 45 (per 1,000 patients) for women and 77 for men. These mortality rates are one order of magnitude larger than the averages from our main sample in Table 3 and indicate that hospitalized patients have much higher mortality than the

²⁶Table A.5 shows that our main results hold for the 2002 census and the sample period 2003-2018.

²⁷First admissions per patient-year represent 67% of total admissions and within-year re-admissions correspond to 25% of the total. The remaining 8% of admissions do not have an individual identifier.

²⁸We study mortality starting in 2004 because important covariates are missing in the discharges for 2002-03. We finish in 2012 because we study mortality up to five years after a discharge and the mortality data ends in 2017.

population at large. The estimates reveal an upward kink of 1.7 deaths for women in the affected cohorts (panel A) and 2.1 deaths for men (panel B). These per-cohort increases in mortality due to reduced access to college correspond to 3.7% and 2.8% of the respective sample means. Panels (c) and (d) in Figure 7 provide visual evidence of this kink.

While we focus on a 1-year horizon to maximize the comparability of these estimates with our main results, Table A.13 shows that the upward kink in mortality becomes larger for longer time horizons of up to five years. Figure A.10 further shows that accounting for a rich set of observable characteristics in the discharge summaries (diagnostic, hospital, type of insurance and admission, indicators for surgery and previous admission in 2002-3) explains as much as 45% of the kink in mortality for patients in the cohorts with reduced access to college.

7 Conclusion

We provide novel evidence on the causal effect of higher education on mortality. We document an upward kink in mortality between ages 34-74 among Chilean cohorts that reached college age shortly after the 1973 military coup. These cohorts experienced reduced access to higher education and exhibit a downward kink in college enrollment. They also have worse labor market outcomes, are more reliant on the public health system, and consume health services at lower rates, including outpatient consultations and preventive care procedures. These additional results suggest that economic disadvantage and limited access to care play an important mediating role in the causal link between higher education and mortality. Unfortunately, data limitations prevent us from further exploring the underlying mechanisms. This is an exciting avenue for future work.

Our results contribute to the literature on the non-pecuniary effects of education and indicate the presence of a sizable health return to college (Grossman, 2006; Lochner, 2011; Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011). These findings stand in contrast to previous work that has largely struggled to find evidence of a causal effect of education on mortality (Galama et al., 2018; Xue et al., 2021). Existing research has mostly exploited changes in compulsory schooling laws that take place at lower levels and cause relatively small increases in educational attainment. In our setting, reduced access to higher education has life-changing socioeconomic consequences. The large impact of

college enrollment on labor market outcomes and income relative to one additional year of primary or secondary may plausibly explain the positive impact of education on health that we uncover.

Another important difference with respect to previous work is that compulsory schooling laws induce students to acquire additional education that they would have otherwise forgone. Hence, the compliers affected by these policies are likely to exert low effort and to have low returns ([Lleras-Muney, 2022](#)). Moreover, responsibility over educational decisions predominantly falls on parents at lower levels, such that the compliers in these settings plausibly correspond to families that place a low value on the human capital accumulation of their children (perhaps due to pressing economic needs) and provide limited complementary parental inputs. Delegation of educational decisions to parents may also distort human capital accumulation in the presence of imperfect information about individual ability. In contrast, the compliers in our setting had greater agency over their educational decisions and wanted to attend college—as reflected by the ratio of applications to openings— but failed to gain admission because of the reduction in college openings. These applicants predominantly came from less affluent families but had high enough ability to be close to the test score cut-off determining admission. Our findings show that not being able to attend college proved very costly for their economic and health outcomes.

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
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
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Figure 1: Higher education around the 1973 coup




Notes: Panel (a) shows higher education's share of the government's education budget (circle markers, left axis) and the gross enrollment rate in higher education (triangle markers, right axis). Panel (b) shows the yearly number (in thousands) of college applicants (circle markers) and openings on offer by the universities (square markers). Sources: [Universidad de Chile \(1972, 2011\)](#); [PIIE \(1984\)](#).

Figure 2: Educational attainment of cohorts reaching college age around the 1973 coup




Notes: Panel (a) shows the share of people per cohort (normalized to age 21) and gender that report four or more years (i.e., statutory length) of secondary education in the 1992 census. Panel (b) shows the respective shares that report having any college education, among those with complete secondary education. Dashed lines show the start (1964) and end (1981) points of the study cohorts included in the analysis.


Figure 3: College enrollment and mortality




(a) Female: College enrollment



(b) Male: College enrollment




(c) Female: Mortality rate




(d) Male: Mortality rate

Notes: Panels (a) and (b) show the share per cohort with any college education, among people with complete secondary education in the 1992 census. Panels (c) and (d) show the average yearly number of deaths (per 1,000) between 1994 and 2017 (ages 34-74), among individuals with complete secondary education. Mortality rate is adjusted for previous deaths before averaging across years. Solid green line corresponds to the line of best fit for cohorts reaching age 21 before 1973, which we extrapolate for later cohorts (dashed line). Grey line corresponds to line of best fit for cohorts reaching age 21 in 1973 or afterwards.

Figure 4: College enrollment and mortality: alternative bandwidths




(a) Cohorts




(b) Ages

Notes: Panels show point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of β in equation (5). In panel (a), we consider alternative windows of cohorts. In panel (b), we vary the set of ages at which we allow cohorts to enter the sample. The baseline sample (rightmost estimates) includes people with complete secondary education that reached age 21 between 1964 and 1981, who had ages 34-74 between 1994 and 2017. Dependent variable is the number of deaths per 1,000 individuals, while the endogenous variable is the share with college per 10 individuals. The excluded instrument is the interaction of “Cohort trend”, a continuous variable indicating the year when the cohort reached 21 years of age (normalized to zero in 1972) with a dummy for cohorts that reached age 21 on or after 1973. All regressions include region-by-year and age fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by region-year.


Figure 5: Labor market outcomes




(a) Female: In labor force




(b) Female: White-collar high-skill




(c) Female: Income




(d) Female: Public health insurance




(e) Male: In labor force



(f) Male: White-collar high-skill




(g) Male: Income



(h) Male: Public health insurance


Notes: Each panel shows cohort averages for the variable in the caption, based on individual responses to the CASEN survey between 1990 and 2017. Panels (a)/(e): labor force participation. Panels (b)/(f): white-collar high-skill occupation. Panels (c)/(g): monthly income, measured in thousands of constant 2015 Chilean pesos. Panels (d)/(h): enrollment in the public health insurance (FONASA). Sample includes all CASEN respondents who reached age 21 between 1964 and 1981 (both inclusive) and report complete secondary education. Solid green line corresponds to the line of best fit for cohorts reaching age 21 before 1973, which we extrapolate for later cohorts (dashed line). Grey line corresponds to line of best fit for cohorts reaching age 21 in 1973 or afterwards.

Figure 6: Consumption of health services



Notes: Each panel shows cohort averages for the variable in the caption, based on individual responses to the CASEN survey between 1990 and 2017. Panels (a)/(e): visit to a primary care physician in past 3 months. Panels (b)/(f): visit to a specialist in past 3 months. Panels (c)/(g): visit to emergency room in past 3 months. Panel (d): Pap smear in past 3 years (only women). Sample includes all CASEN respondents who reached age 21 between 1964 and 1981 (both inclusive) and report complete secondary education. Solid green line corresponds to the line of best fit for cohorts reaching age 21 before 1973, which we extrapolate for later cohorts (dashed line). Grey line corresponds to line of best fit for cohorts reaching age 21 in 1973 or afterwards.

Figure 7: Hospitalization rates and mortality rates of hospitalized patients



Notes: Each panel shows cohort averages for the variable in the caption. Panels (a)/(b): hospitalizations per 1,000 individuals. Panels (c)/(d): Deaths within one year of discharge per 1,000 admitted patients. The sample period is 2002-2018 (ages 44-75) in panels (a)/(b), and 2004-2012 (ages 46-69) in panels (c)/(d). Solid green line corresponds to the line of best fit for cohorts reaching age 21 before 1973, which we extrapolate for later cohorts (dashed line). Grey line corresponds to line of best fit for cohorts reaching age 21 in 1973 or afterwards.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

	Female		Male	
	1964-72	1973-81	1964-72	1973-81
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Education (Share per 10)				
Any primary	9.482	9.757	9.614	9.809
Any secondary	4.683	5.744	4.949	5.875
Complete secondary	2.850	3.728	3.137	3.760
Any college	0.826	1.001	1.064	1.127
Any college complete secondary	2.898	2.686	3.392	2.997
Panel B: Health				
One-year mortality rate (per 1,000)	6.002	2.562	11.189	4.624
Primary care visit in past 3 months (=1)	0.225	0.187	0.158	0.117
Specialist visit in past 3 months (=1)	0.164	0.135	0.109	0.075
One-year hospital visit rate (per 1,000)	80.945	67.401	86.581	59.241
Panel C: Labor Market				
In labor force (=1)	0.423	0.592	0.773	0.932
White-collar high-skill occupation (=1)	0.500	0.434	0.421	0.348
Avg. monthly income	302.024	302.862	658.650	637.981
Public health insurance (=1)	0.636	0.622	0.562	0.552
Individuals in 1992 census	632,127	889,685	598,778	844,349
Individuals in 1992 census full secondary	180,167	331,672	187,859	317,464
Deaths in 1994-2017 full secondary	24,707	19,989	46,080	33,969

Notes: This table presents sample averages of the main variables, disaggregated by gender and exposure to the college contraction. The source for panel A is the 1992 census. The sample in panels B and C is restricted to individuals with complete secondary education. Yearly mortality rate: own calculations for the period 1994-2017 (ages 43-74 and 34-65 for older and younger cohorts), adjusted for previous mortality. Yearly share with hospital visits: own calculations for the period 2002-2018, adjusted for previous mortality. The source for primary care and specialist visits in panel B and all outcomes in panel C is the CASEN survey (1990-2017). Average monthly income is reported in thousands of constant 2015 Chilean pesos.

Table 2: Educational attainment

Dependent variable:	Female				Male			
	Share w/ college per 10 people	Average years of college	Share w/ college per 10 people	Share w/ college per 10 people	Share w/ college per 10 people	Average years of college	Share w/ college per 10 people	Share w/ college per 10 people
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Cohort trend	0.204*** (0.014) [0.000]	0.080*** (0.005) [0.000]			0.150*** (0.008) [0.000]	0.056*** (0.004) [0.000]		
Cohort trend \times After 1973	-0.402*** (0.019) [0.000]	-0.157*** (0.007) [0.000]	-0.411*** (0.006) [0.000]	-0.133*** (0.002) [0.001]	-0.331*** (0.013) [0.000]	-0.130*** (0.006) [0.000]	-0.342*** (0.004) [0.000]	-0.131*** (0.002) [0.000]
Region fixed effects	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Year-by-region fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Age fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	270	270	6,480	6,480	270	270	6,480	6,480
R-squared	0.893	0.895	0.894	0.878	0.918	0.911	0.917	0.941
Avg. dependent variable	2.761	1.165	2.784	0.941	3.144	1.393	3.200	1.131

Notes: The unit of analysis is cohort-region in columns 1-2 and 5-6, and cohort-region-year in columns 3-4 and 7-8. Observations weighted by cell size. Dependent variable in the header. Sample includes all respondents of the 1992 census who reached age 21 between 1964 and 1981 (both inclusive) and report complete secondary education, except for columns 4 and 8 in which we drop the educational restriction. “Cohort trend” is a continuous variable indicating the year when the cohort reached 21 years of age, normalized to zero in 1972. “Cohort trend \times After 1973” is the interaction of this variable with a dummy for cohorts that reached age 21 on or after 1973. In columns 3-4 and 7-8, the share with college is iteratively adjusted based on previous mortality. Robust standard errors (clustered by region-year in columns 3-4 and 7-8) reported in parentheses. P-value from wild cluster bootstrap by cohort reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3: College enrollment and mortality

	Dependent variable: Deaths per 1,000							
	Female				Male			
	Main specification	+ cohort-region trends	without regional variation	without education restriction	Main specification	+ cohort region trends	without regional variation	without education restriction
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Reduced form								
Cohort trend \times After 1973	0.110*** (0.021) [0.071]	0.114*** (0.020) [0.062]	0.107*** (0.024) [0.079]	0.094*** (0.012) [0.244]	0.311*** (0.040) [0.001]	0.316*** (0.036) [0.001]	0.302*** (0.040) [0.001]	0.196*** (0.020) [0.081]
Panel B: IV								
Share with college per 10 people	-0.268*** (0.051) [0.087]	-0.278*** (0.049) [0.067]	-0.258*** (0.058) [0.096]	-0.710*** (0.089) [0.273]	-0.911*** (0.116) [0.001]	-0.923*** (0.104) [0.001]	-0.882*** (0.117) [0.001]	-1.491*** (0.149) [0.146]
Panel C: OLS								
Share with college per 10 people	-0.197*** (0.044) [0.083]	-0.229*** (0.042) [0.052]	-0.221*** (0.051) [0.098]	-0.426*** (0.071) [0.198]	-0.799*** (0.099) [0.001]	-0.809*** (0.092) [0.001]	-0.853*** (0.109) [0.001]	-0.857*** (0.130) [0.081]
Year-by-region fixed effects	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Year fixed effects	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No
Age fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,480	6,480	432	6,480	6,480	6,480	432	6,480
R-squared (panel A)	0.760	0.765	0.972	0.912	0.853	0.859	0.979	0.928
R-squared (panel C)	0.760	0.765	0.972	0.912	0.853	0.859	0.979	0.927
Avg. dependent variable	3.751	3.751	3.751	4.265	6.984	6.984	6.984	7.720
Kleibergen-Paap <i>F</i> -stat (panel B)	4231	4435	4369	6236	8548	9102	6594	6622
Exclusion restriction test (% of RF)	70.5	72.4	67.8	77.1	79.6	81.5	80.3	82.9
H_0 : OLS = IV (p-value)	0.164	0.320	0.523	0.002	0.338	0.272	0.802	0.000

Notes: The unit of analysis is cohort-region-year, except columns 3 and 7 (cohort-year). Observations weighted by cell size. Sample period: 1994-2017 (Ages 34-74). Sample includes all respondents of the 1992 census who reached age 21 between 1964 and 1981 (both inclusive) and report complete secondary education, except columns 4 and 8 where we drop the educational restriction. “Cohort trend” is a continuous variable indicating the year when the cohort reached age 21, normalized to zero in 1972. “Cohort trend \times After 1973” is the interaction of this variable with a dummy for cohorts that reached age 21 on or after 1973. In panel B, this variable is used as excluded instrument for the share with college. Mortality rate and share with college adjusted for previous mortality. Standard errors clustered by region-year (robust in cols. 3, 7) reported in parentheses. P-value from wild cluster bootstrap by cohort in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 4: Labor market outcomes

Dependent variable:	Female				Male			
	In labor force (=1)	White-collar high-skill occupation (=1)	Monthly income	Public health insurance (=1)	In labor force (=1)	White-collar high-skill occupation (=1)	Monthly income	Public health insurance (=1)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Reduced form								
Cohort trend × After 1973	-0.004** (0.002) [0.033]	-0.015*** (0.002) [0.000]	-4.390*** (1.457) [0.019]	0.005*** (0.002) [0.014]	-0.005*** (0.001) [0.001]	-0.008*** (0.002) [0.041]	-5.172*** (1.832) [0.005]	0.009*** (0.001) [0.000]
Panel B: IV								
College enrollment (=1)	0.143** (0.061) [0.017]	0.499*** (0.072) [0.000]	172.673*** (52.438) [0.004]	-0.200*** (0.062) [0.005]	0.212*** (0.059) [0.004]	0.350*** (0.077) [0.017]	233.941*** (82.057) [0.011]	-0.410*** (0.068) [0.003]
Year-by-county fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	82,815	39,677	82,815	81,893	80,704	63,978	80,704	79,580
R-squared (panel A)	0.133	0.128	0.129	0.187	0.256	0.139	0.196	0.175
Avg. dependent variable	0.533	0.452	302.6	0.627	0.874	0.372	645.7	0.555
Kleibergen-Paap <i>F</i> -stat (panel B)	214.0	142.3	214.0	209.2	183.4	153.8	183.4	181.5

Notes: The unit of analysis is an individual respondent in CASEN. Sample includes all survey waves between 1990 and 2017. Sample size varies because not every question is asked every year. Dependent variable in the header: Indicators for labor force participation, white-collar high-skill occupation, and enrollment in public health insurance in columns 1-2, 4-6, and 8. Monthly income is reported in thousands of 2015 Chilean pesos in columns 3 and 7. Sample includes all CASEN respondents who reached age 21 between 1964 and 1981 (both inclusive) and report complete secondary education. “Cohort trend” is a continuous variable indicating the year when the cohort reached age 21, normalized to zero in 1972. “Cohort trend × After 1973” is the interaction of this variable with a dummy for cohorts that reached age 21 on or after 1973. In panel B, this variable is used as excluded instrument for an indicator for college enrollment. Standard errors clustered two-way by county and region-year reported in parentheses. P-value from wild cluster bootstrap by cohort in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 5: Consumption of health services

Dependent variable:	Female				Male		
	Primary care visit (=1)	Specialist visit (=1)	Emergency room visit (=1)	Pap smear (=1)	Primary care visit (=1)	Specialist visit (=1)	Emergency room visit (=1)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Reduced form							
Cohort trend × After 1973	-0.001 (0.001) [0.405]	-0.003** (0.001) [0.065]	0.001 (0.001) [0.230]	-0.004** (0.002) [0.008]	-0.003** (0.001) [0.060]	-0.001 (0.001) [0.260]	-0.000 (0.001) [0.710]
Panel B: IV							
College enrollment (=1)	0.041 (0.047) [0.406]	0.101** (0.046) [0.040]	-0.027 (0.029) [0.236]	0.168** (0.084) [0.004]	0.128** (0.053) [0.055]	0.052 (0.042) [0.254]	0.013 (0.028) [0.709]
Year-by-county fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	82,765	82,801	78,822	58,549	80,671	80,693	76,682
R-squared (panel A)	0.114	0.085	0.067	0.111	0.103	0.083	0.061
Avg. dependent variable	0.200	0.145	0.067	0.726	0.132	0.088	0.045
Kleibergen-Paap <i>F</i> -stat (panel B)	213.3	214.0	197.6	131.8	183.8	183.7	176.6

Notes: The unit of analysis is an individual respondent in CASEN. Sample includes all survey waves between 1990 and 2017. Sample size varies because not every question is asked every year. Dependent variable in the header: Indicators for visit to a primary care physician in the past 3 months (columns 1 and 5), visit to a specialist in the past 3 months (columns 2 and 6), visit to the emergency room in the past 3 months (columns 3 and 7), or having had a Pap smear in the past 3 years (women only, column 4). Sample includes all CASEN respondents who reached age 21 between 1964 and 1981 (both inclusive) and report complete secondary education. “Cohort trend” is a continuous variable indicating the year when the cohort reached age 21, normalized to zero in 1972. “Cohort trend × After 1973” is the interaction of this variable with a dummy for cohorts that reached age 21 on or after 1973. In panel B, this variable is used as excluded instrument for an indicator for college enrollment. Standard errors clustered two-way by county and region-year reported in parentheses. P-value from wild cluster bootstrap by cohort in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 6: Hospitalization rate and patient mortality

Dependent variable:	Hospital admissions per 1,000				1-year mortality per 1,000 patients
	All	Individuals	Public insurance	Private insurance	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Female					
Cohort trend × After 1973	-0.124 (0.131) [0.942]	-0.090 (0.087) [0.927]	0.501*** (0.182) [0.690]	-0.725*** (0.088) [0.140]	1.718*** (0.404) [0.002]
Panel B: Male					
Cohort trend × After 1973	0.247 (0.187) [0.891]	-0.008 (0.110) [0.996]	1.041*** (0.253) [0.495]	-0.807*** (0.116) [0.131]	2.144*** (0.365) [0.000]
Year-by-region fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Year-by-county fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Age fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations (panel A)	4,590	4,590	4,590	4,590	611,795
Observations (panel B)	4,590	4,590	4,590	4,590	525,815
R-squared (panel A)	0.851	0.887	0.903	0.902	0.019
R-squared (panel B)	0.927	0.940	0.933	0.904	0.019
Avg. dependent variable (panel A)	107.4	72.86	77.04	21.70	45.27
Avg. dependent variable (panel B)	106.2	70.11	74.15	22.48	76.95

Notes: The unit of analysis is cohort-region-year in columns 1-4 and a hospitalized patient in column 5. Observations in columns 1-4 are weighted by cell size. Dependent variable in the header (all per 1,000): number of hospitalizations in column 1, number of hospitalized individuals in column 2, and number of deaths within one year of discharge among hospitalized patients in column 5. We disaggregate hospitalizations into those using public insurance (FONASA) in column 3 and hospitalizations using private insurance (ISAPRE, other private, Armed Forces) in column 4. Hospitalization rates are adjusted for previous mortality within cell. Hospitalization rates are based on the number of respondents in the 2002 census who reached age 21 between 1964 and 1981 (both inclusive). The sample period is 2002-2018 (ages 44-75) in columns 1-4 and 2004-2012 (ages 46-69) in column 5. “Cohort trend” is a continuous variable indicating the year when the cohort reached age 21, normalized to zero in 1972. “Cohort trend × After 1973” is the interaction of this variable with a dummy for cohorts that reached age 21 on or after 1973. Standard errors clustered by region-year (two-way clustered also by county in column 5) reported in parentheses. P-value from wild cluster bootstrap by cohort in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

ONLINE APPENDIX
HIGHER EDUCATION AND MORTALITY:
LEGACIES OF AN AUTHORITARIAN COLLEGE CONTRACTION

Felipe González, Luis Martínez, Pablo Muñoz, and Mounu Prem

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
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
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
Figure A.1: Economic, fiscal and health outcomes around the 1973 coup




(a) Public Spending



(b) Gross Domestic Product




(c) Mortality




(d) Fertility

Notes: Panel (a) plots government spending (total, social, education, health) expressed as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Panel (b) shows GDP in trillions of constant 2003 Chilean pesos. Panel (c) shows the crude mortality rate and the infant mortality rate (both per 1,000). Panel (d) shows the crude birth rate and the fertility rate for adolescent women (ages 15-19). Outcomes in panels (c)-(d) are expressed per 1,000 people. Sources: [Cabezas \(1988\)](#); [Diaz et al. \(2016\)](#); World Bank (WDI).

Figure A.2: College graduation and wage premium




(a) Graduation rate



(b) College wage premium


Notes: In panel (a), the circle markers (left axis) show the number of graduating college students as a share of total enrollment per year, based on UNESCO yearbooks. The triangle markers (right axis) show the share of 1992 census respondents per cohort that report four or more years of college, among those with any college. Panel (b) shows point estimates and 95% confidence intervals from a regression of log income (in constant 2015 Chilean pesos) on cohort indicators interacted with an indicator for college enrollment. Sample includes all CASEN survey respondents that reached age 21 between 1964 and 1981 (both inclusive) and report complete secondary education. Controls include county of residence by gender, survey year and age fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by county of residence.

Figure A.3: Private and public healthcare




Notes: These figures characterize the public and private sectors in the Chilean health system. There are 3.3 million beneficiaries in the private sector and 13.5 million in the public sector. The plots show that the public sector is significantly more crowded than the private sector. These numbers correspond to administrative data from [Clínicas de Chile \(2014\)](#).

Figure A.4: Mortality rate by age, year, and educational level




Notes: Plots show the female and male mortality rates (per 1,000) by age, year, and level of education. Sample period: 1994-2017 (Ages 34-74). Mortality rates are based on initial population counts in the 1992 census for individuals reaching age 21 between 1964 and 1981 (both inclusive). In panels (a) and (b), we further restrict the sample to individuals with complete secondary education.

Figure A.5: Secondary completion




(a) Female




(b) Male

Notes: Each panel shows cohort averages for the gender in the caption. The dependent variable is the share with four or more years of secondary education per every 10 individuals in the 1992 census. Solid green line corresponds to the line of best fit for cohorts reaching age 21 before 1973, which we extrapolate for later cohorts (dashed line). Grey line corresponds to line of best fit for cohorts reaching age 21 in 1973 or afterwards.


Figure A.6: College enrollment and mortality (unrestricted sample)




(a) Female: College enrollment



(b) Male: College enrollment




(c) Female: Mortality rate



(d) Male: Mortality rate


Notes: Panels (a) and (b) show the share per cohort with any college education in the 1992 census. Panels (c) and (d) show the average yearly number of deaths (per 1,000) between 1994 and 2017 (ages 34-74). Mortality rate is adjusted for previous deaths before averaging across years. Solid green line corresponds to the line of best fit for cohorts reaching age 21 before 1973, which we extrapolate for later cohorts (dashed line). Grey line corresponds to line of best fit for cohorts reaching age 21 in 1973 or afterwards.

Figure A.7: International migration




Notes: Panel (a) shows the number of people with complete secondary education per cohort in the 1992 census. Panel (b) shows the share per cohort that report in the 1992 census to be living abroad in 1987, among those with complete secondary. Panel (c) shows the share per cohort registered to vote outside of the country in 2017. Solid green line corresponds to the line of best fit for cohorts reaching age 21 before 1973, which we extrapolate for later cohorts (dashed line). Grey line corresponds to line of best fit for cohorts reaching age 21 in 1973 or afterwards.

Figure A.8: Age distribution of the study cohorts




Notes: Plot shows the number of cohorts observed at each age between 1994 and 2017, among those that reached age 21 between 1964 and 1981 (both inclusive). We distinguish between cohorts reaching age 21 before 1973 (i.e., age 21 between 1964 and 1972) and those reaching the same age on or after 1973 (i.e., age 21 between 1973 and 1981).

Figure A.9: College enrollment and mortality at different ages




(a) Gradually removing older ages




(b) Gradually removing younger ages

Notes: Panels show point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of β in equation (5). The baseline sample (leftmost estimates) includes cohorts reaching age 21 between 1969 and 1976 and the sample period is 1994-2017 (ages 39-69). The next set of results to the right restricts the sample to the set of ages observed for all cohorts (46-62). In panel (a), each set of results to the right further restricts the sample by removing the oldest remaining age. In panel (b), each set of results to the right further restricts the sample by removing the youngest remaining age. The mortality rate is (i) expressed per 1,000 people, (ii) based on the number of people per cohort that report complete secondary education in the 1992 census, (ii) adjusted for previous deaths within cell. The endogenous variable is the share with college per 10 individuals. The excluded instrument is the interaction of “Cohort trend”, a continuous variable indicating the year when the cohort reached 21 years of age (normalized to zero in 1972) with a dummy for cohorts that reached age 21 on or after 1973. All regressions include region-by-year and age fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by region-year.

Figure A.10: Mortality Rate of hospitalized patients: additional results



(a) Female



(b) Male

Notes: Each figure plots reduced-form estimates of the kink in mortality ($\times 1,000$) for hospitalized patients in the cohorts that reached age 21 after 1973. The unit of analysis is a hospitalized patient. Each line corresponds to a different time horizon for death relative to time of discharge. Sample includes patients from cohorts that reached age 21 between 1964 and 1981 (both inclusive) and is limited to one observation per patient (i.e. first admission). Sample period: 2004-2012 (ages 46-69). “Cohort trend” is a continuous variable indicating the year when the cohort reached age 21, normalized to zero in 1972. The plotted estimates correspond to “Cohort trend \times After 1973”, the interaction of the cohort trend with a dummy for cohorts that reached age 21 on or after 1973. The baseline regression (leftmost estimates) include year by county of residence and age fixed effects. Each additional market to the right also includes an increasingly saturated set of fixed effects by diagnostic, public insurance ($=1$), hospital, admission type, surgery ($=1$), and previous admission in 2002-3 ($=1$).

Table A.1: Family background of college students

Dependent variable (=1):	Household Income Tercile			Parent Characteristics	
	Top	Middle	Bottom	w/ College	WCHS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Cohort trend	-0.016*** (0.004) [0.006]	0.008** (0.003) [0.029]	0.008*** (0.002) [0.005]	-0.010** (0.004) [0.029]	-0.016*** (0.004) [0.014]
Cohort trend \times After 1973	0.016*** (0.006) [0.057]	-0.006 (0.005) [0.410]	-0.011*** (0.003) [0.000]	0.015** (0.007) [0.036]	0.017** (0.007) [0.088]
Observations	4,170	4,170	4,170	3,340	3,340
R-squared	0.005	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.005
Avg. dependent variable	0.691	0.200	0.079	0.310	0.318

Notes: Unit of analysis is an individual respondent of the EOD survey. Sample includes individuals that (i) report being college students, (ii) reached age 21 between 1964 and 1981 (both inclusive), (iii) had ages 17-25 on the survey year. Dependent variable is an indicator equal to one for the characteristic in the header. Income terciles in columns 1-3 are calculated over all EOD households within a year, before introducing sample restrictions. Parent characteristics in columns 4-5 are calculated for individuals classified as ‘children of the household head’. WCHS: White-collar high-skill occupation. Sample period: 1960-1985. “Cohort trend” is a continuous variable indicating the year when the cohort reached age 21, normalized to zero in 1972. “Cohort trend \times After 1973” is the interaction of this variable with a dummy for cohorts that reached age 21 on or after 1973. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. P-value from wild cluster bootstrap by cohort in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.2: Completion of secondary education

	Dependent variable: Share with complete secondary per 10 people						
	Cohort-region level					Cohort level	
	Pooled	Female	Male			Baseline	Adjusted pop.
			All	No 1981	No 80-81		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Cohort trend	0.086*** (0.008) [0.002]	0.090*** (0.006) [0.001]	0.083*** (0.007) [0.003]	0.079*** (0.007) [0.004]	0.076*** (0.007) [0.007]	0.083*** (0.010) -	0.078*** (0.007) -
Cohort trend × After 1973	-0.011 (0.012) [0.582]	0.008 (0.010) [0.676]	-0.031** (0.012) [0.190]	-0.017 (0.013) [0.429]	-0.004 (0.013) [0.851]	-0.029 (0.020) -	-0.021 (0.016) -
Region fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Observations	540	270	270	255	240	18	18
R-squared	0.932	0.970	0.969	0.971	0.971	0.942	0.960
Avg. dependent variable	3.431	3.363	3.502	3.475	3.440	3.502	3.477

Notes: The unit of analysis is cohort-region in columns 1-5, and cohort in columns 6-7. Observations weighted by cell size. The dependent variable is the share that reports complete secondary education in the 1992 census (per 10 people). Sample includes all census respondents who reached age 21 between 1964 and 1981 (both inclusive). “Cohort trend” is a continuous variable indicating the year when the cohort reached 21 years of age, normalized to zero in 1972. “Cohort trend × After 1973” is the interaction of this variable with a dummy for cohorts that reached age 21 on or after 1973. Column 1 uses a pooled sample, while columns 2 and 3 provide disaggregate results by gender. Columns 4 and 5 replicate the analysis for men excluding the cohorts that reached age 21 in 1981 or 1980-81, respectively. Column 6 replicates the analysis for men without the regional variation (i.e., cohort level). Column 7 further adjusts the initial population counts in the 1992 census for age heaping. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. P-value from wild cluster bootstrap by cohort reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.3: Cohort size and mortality before college age

	Female				Male			
	Size 1960	Deaths per 1,000			Size 1960	Deaths per 1,000		
		Age \leq 21	Age \leq 18	6 \leq Age \leq 18		Age \leq 21	Age \leq 18	6 \leq Age \leq 18
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Cohort trend	0.024*** (0.004)				0.028*** (0.004)			
Cohort trend \times After 1973	0.001 (0.010)	0.012 (0.016) [0.602]	0.002 (0.022) [0.931]	0.007 (0.014) [0.756]	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.037 (0.022) [0.438]	-0.030 (0.031) [0.512]	-0.028 (0.020) [0.567]
Year fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	18	241	187	166	18	241	187	166
R-squared	0.872	0.998	0.998	0.767	0.884	0.997	0.998	0.707
Avg. dependent variable	0.934	2.118	2.340	1.091	0.938	2.724	2.844	1.469

Notes: Unit of analysis is the cohort in columns 1 and 5, and cohort-year in columns 2-4 and 6-8. Observations weighted by cell size. Sample includes all respondents in the 1960 census who reached age 21 between 1964 and 1981 (both inclusive). Observations weighted by cell size in columns 2-4 and 6-8. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 5 is the number of individuals per cohort (/100,000). In all other columns it is the number of deaths per 1,000, adjusted for previous mortality within the cell. In columns 2 and 6 we restrict the sample to cohort-years corresponding to ages \leq 21. In columns 3 and 7 we further restrict to ages \leq 18. In columns 4 and 8 we further restrict to ages 5-18. Sample period: 1960-1981. "Cohort trend" is a continuous variable indicating the year when the cohort reached age 21, normalized to zero in 1972. "Cohort trend \times After 1973" is the interaction of this variable with a dummy for cohorts that reached age 21 on or after 1973. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. P-value from wild cluster bootstrap by cohort in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.4: Youth unemployment

Dependent variable:	Share with college per 10 people	Currently studying (age 20-30)	Unemployed			Deaths per 1,000 people
			age 20+	age 20-30	age 20-30 + secondary	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Female						
Cohort trend	0.160*** (0.019)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	-0.550*** (0.059)
Cohort trend × After 1973	-0.329*** (0.032)	-0.015*** (0.002)	0.003 (0.006)	0.004 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)	0.324*** (0.081)
Panel B: Male						
Cohort trend	0.134*** (0.014)	0.017*** (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)	0.005 (0.003)	-1.048*** (0.061)
Cohort trend × After 1973	-0.308*** (0.023)	-0.023*** (0.003)	0.004 (0.006)	0.003 (0.008)	0.003 (0.007)	0.631*** (0.102)
Observations	18	17	18	18	17	18
R-squared (Panel A)	0.878	0.873	0.480	0.586	0.577	0.975
R-squared (Panel B)	0.940	0.883	0.480	0.433	0.522	0.988
Avg. dependent variable (Panel A)	2.792	0.114	0.071	0.098	0.109	4.127
Avg. dependent variable (Panel B)	3.277	0.174	0.083	0.107	0.089	7.584

Notes: Unit of analysis is the cohort. Sample is restricted to the metropolitan region of Santiago. In column 1, the dependent variable is the share of respondents in the 1992 census that reports any college education, among those with full secondary. The dependent variables in columns 2-5 are based on survey micro-data from EOD for the year in which the cohort reached age 21. In column 2, the dependent variable is the share of EOD respondents that report being currently studying, among those with ages 20-30. In columns 3-5 it is the share of respondents that report being currently unemployed. This share corresponds to all respondents aged 20 and above in column 3, those with ages between 20 and 30 in column 4, and those within this same age range but that also report some secondary education in column 5. The dependent variable in column 6 is the average risk-adjusted mortality rate between 1994-2017 (ages 34-74). “Cohort trend” is a continuous variable indicating the year when the cohort reached age 21, normalized to zero in 1972. “Cohort trend × After 1973” is the interaction of this variable with a dummy for cohorts that reached age 21 on or after 1973. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A.5: Robustness checks

Dependent variable: Deaths per 1,000	RF		IV		Avg. DV	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(1) Years of college	—	—	-0.702*** (0.134) [0.079]	-2.390*** (0.308) [0.001]	3.751	6.984
(2) Macro controls	0.130*** (0.024) [0.321]	0.369*** (0.043) [0.019]	-0.339*** (0.061) [0.318]	-1.113*** (0.126) [0.012]	3.751	6.984
(3) No military bases	0.133*** (0.028) [0.051]	0.280*** (0.045) [0.001]	-0.325*** (0.069) [0.071]	-0.800*** (0.129) [0.002]	3.604	6.688
(4) Discontinuity in 1973	0.112*** (0.022) [0.106]	0.313*** (0.041) [0.001]	-0.277*** (0.053) [0.123]	-0.918*** (0.117) [0.001]	3.751	6.984
(5) Quadratic cohort trend	0.104** (0.049) [0.547]	0.522*** (0.073) [0.037]	-0.313** (0.148) [0.544]	-1.191*** (0.162) [0.036]	3.751	6.984
(6) Unadjusted cell size	0.107*** (0.020) [0.057]	0.282*** (0.033) [0.001]	-0.266*** (0.049) [0.066]	-0.848*** (0.098) [0.001]	3.639	6.600
(7) Adjusting for age heaping	0.112*** (0.014) [0.015]	0.220*** (0.022) [0.006]	-0.842*** (0.114) [0.043]	-1.678*** (0.180) [0.022]	4.251	7.660
(8) 2002 baseline	0.207*** (0.030) [0.028]	0.408*** (0.051) [0.000]	-0.740*** (0.107) [0.068]	-1.758*** (0.224) [0.004]	4.275	7.325

Notes: Columns 1-2 show reduced-form estimates of γ in equation (3), while columns 3-4 show the corresponding IV estimates of β in equation (5), using the kink in college enrollment as excluded instrument. Unit of analysis is cohort-region-year in all exercises except 3 and 7, where it is cohort-year. Observations weighted by cell size. Sample is restricted to individuals with complete secondary in all exercises except 7, which has no restriction. In exercise 1, the endogenous variable is the average number of years of college. In exercise 2, we include as additional controls GDP per capita and government spending (% of GDP) on the year when the cohort reached age 21. In exercise 3, we drop from the sample counties housing a military base in 1970. In exercise 4, we include as an additional regressor a dummy for cohorts reaching college age after 1972, while in exercise 5 we include a quadratic term for the running variable (i.e., cohort trend). In exercise 6, we do not adjust the mortality rate or the share with college for previous mortality. In exercise 7, we smooth the initial population count in the 1992 census based on a linear prediction for cohorts with large discrepancies. In exercise 8 we replicate the analysis using population counts from the 2002 census and restricting the sample period to 2003-2017 (ages 45-74). The sample period for all other exercises is 1994-2017 (ages 34-74). Standard errors clustered by region-year (year in exercises 3,7) in parentheses. P-value from wild cluster bootstrap by cohort in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A.6: Disaggregate mortality by educational attainment

	Dependent variable: Deaths per 1,000							
	Female				Male			
	Complete secondary			Incomplete secondary	Complete secondary			Incomplete secondary
	All	w/ College	w/o College		All	w/ College	w/o College	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Cohort trend \times After 1973	0.110*** (0.021) [0.071]	-0.029*** (0.009) [0.064]	0.139*** (0.018) [0.002]	-0.003 (0.018) [0.978]	0.311*** (0.040) [0.001]	-0.041*** (0.011) [0.111]	0.352*** (0.036) [0.001]	-0.019 (0.026) [0.899]
Year-by-region fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,480	6,408	6,480	6,480	6,480	6,480	6,480	6,480
R-squared	0.760	0.412	0.724	0.858	0.853	0.618	0.819	0.861
Avg. dependent variable	3.751	0.759	2.992	4.989	6.984	1.554	5.430	8.958

Notes: The unit of analysis is cohort-region-year. Observations weighted by cell size. Sample period: 1994-2017 (Ages 34-74). Sample includes all respondents of the 1992 census who reached age 21 between 1964 and 1981 (both inclusive). In columns 1-3 and 5-7, we further restrict the sample to individuals who report complete secondary education, while in columns 4 and 8 we only keep individuals with incomplete secondary or lower educational attainment. In columns 2 and 6 we only consider deaths of individuals with college, while in columns 3 and 7 we only consider deaths of individuals without college. "Cohort trend" is a continuous variable indicating the year when the cohort reached age 21, normalized to zero in 1972. "Cohort trend \times After 1973" is the interaction of this variable with a dummy for cohorts that reached age 21 on or after 1973. Mortality rate adjusted for previous mortality within cell. Standard errors clustered by region-year reported in parentheses. P-value from wild cluster bootstrap by cohort in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A.7: Heterogeneous effects based on exposure to the college contraction

Dependent variable: Deaths per 1,000	Measure of high exposure to the college contraction			
	High secondary completion		Main college campus	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Cohort trend \times After 1973	0.078*** (0.022) [0.223]	0.225*** (0.042) [0.019]	0.064*** (0.022) [0.287]	0.237*** (0.042) [0.009]
Cohort trend \times After 1973 \times High exposure	0.041** (0.017) [0.079]	0.109*** (0.027) [0.039]	0.064*** (0.017) [0.004]	0.102*** (0.027) [0.014]
Year-by-region fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,480	6,480	6,480	6,480
R-squared	0.760	0.853	0.761	0.853
Avg. dependent variable	3.751	6.984	3.751	6.984

Notes: The unit of analysis is cohort-region-year. Observations weighted by cell size. Sample period: 1994-2017 (Ages 34-74). Sample includes all respondents of the 1992 census who reached age 21 between 1964 and 1981 (both inclusive) and report complete secondary education. “Cohort trend” is a continuous variable indicating the year when the cohort reached age 21, normalized to zero in 1972. “Cohort trend \times After 1973” is the interaction of this variable with a dummy for cohorts that reached age 21 on or after 1973. Mortality rate adjusted for previous mortality within cell. “High secondary completion” is an indicator that takes the value one if the share of the population with at least 12 years of education, which corresponds to full secondary or higher, is above the median in the 1970 Census. “Main college campus” is an indicator that takes the value one if there is at least one main university campus in the region: Antofagasta, Valparaíso, Bio-Bio, Santiago, Los Ríos. Standard errors clustered by region-year reported in parentheses. P-value from wild cluster bootstrap by cohort in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.8: Robustness checks: migration

	Dependent variable: Deaths per 1,000					
	Female			Male		
	Non-migrants	Migrants w/ college		Non-migrants	Migrants w/ college	
		10%	50%		10%	50%
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Reduced form						
Cohort trend \times After 1973	0.162*** (0.022) [0.022]	0.075*** (0.025) [0.326]	0.112*** (0.026) [0.115]	0.443*** (0.049) [0.001]	0.398*** (0.050) [0.001]	0.439*** (0.051) [0.001]
Panel B: IV						
Share with college per 10 people	-0.397*** (0.054) [0.028]	-0.197*** (0.065) [0.374]	-0.179*** (0.041) [0.128]	-1.241*** (0.132) [0.001]	-1.503*** (0.196) [0.008]	-0.755*** (0.085) [0.001]
Year-by-region fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,480	6,480	6,480	6,470	6,480	6,480
R-squared (panel A)	0.742	0.763	0.756	0.801	0.844	0.840
Kleibergen-Paap <i>F</i> -stat (panel B)	4219	3120	8335	4304	2149	3741
Avg. dependent variable	3.954	3.716	3.860	7.663	7.407	7.554

Notes: The unit of analysis is cohort-region-year. Observations weighted by cell size. Sample period: 1994-2017 (Ages 34-74). Sample includes all respondents of the 1992 census who reached age 21 between 1964 and 1981 (both inclusive) and report complete secondary education. In columns 1 and 4, we further restrict the sample to individuals that reside in 1992 in their region of birth and we adjust deaths based on an average migration rate of 30%. In columns 2-3 and 5-6, we construct a counterfactual dataset with fewer individuals in post-coup cohorts (i.e., more emigration) using pre-1973 trends. In columns 2 and 5 we assume that 10% of migrants are college educated while in columns 3 and 6 we assume that 50% of migrants are college educated. “Cohort trend” is a continuous variable indicating the year when the cohort reached age 21, normalized to zero in 1972. “Cohort trend \times After 1973” is the interaction of this variable with a dummy for cohorts that reached age 21 on or after 1973. Mortality rate adjusted for previous mortality within cell. Standard errors clustered by region-year reported in parentheses. P-value from wild cluster bootstrap by cohort in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.9: Disaggregate mortality by main causes of death

	Dependent variable: Deaths per 1,000				
	Tumors	Circulatory system	External causes	Digestive system	Respiratory system
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Female					
Share with college per 10 people	-0.111*** (0.032) [0.058]	-0.083*** (0.020) [0.060]	0.001 (0.009) [0.941]	-0.033*** (0.011) [0.076]	-0.006 (0.008) [0.635]
Panel B: Male					
Share with college per 10 people	-0.232*** (0.080) [0.046]	-0.244*** (0.075) [0.060]	-0.105*** (0.040) [0.063]	-0.157*** (0.038) [0.005]	-0.073*** (0.026) [0.003]
Year-by-region fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,480	6,480	6,480	6,480	6,480
Avg. dependent variable (panel A)	1.923	0.695	0.217	0.256	0.159
Avg. dependent variable (panel B)	2.197	1.889	0.871	0.768	0.327
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic (panel A)	4231	4231	4231	4231	4231
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic (panel B)	6404	6404	6404	6404	6404

Notes: The unit of analysis is cohort-region-year. Observations weighted by cell size. Sample period: 1994-2017 (Ages 34-74). Sample includes all respondents of the 1992 census who reached age 21 between 1964 and 1981 (both inclusive) and report complete secondary education. “Cohort trend” is a continuous variable indicating the year when the cohort reached age 21, normalized to zero in 1972. “Cohort trend × After 1973” is the interaction of this variable with a dummy for cohorts that reached age 21 on or after 1973. This variable is used as excluded instrument for the share with college in all regressions. Mortality rate and share with college adjusted for previous mortality within cell. Standard errors clustered by region-year reported in parentheses. P-value from wild cluster bootstrap by cohort in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A.10: Disaggregate mortality by cause of death: tumors

Panel A: Female	Dependent variable: Deaths per 1,000				
	Digestive	Breast	Genital	Respiratory	Lymphatic
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Share with college per 10 people	-0.043** (0.018) [0.119]	-0.030** (0.012) [0.148]	-0.022** (0.010) [0.104]	0.014 (0.012) [0.288]	-0.027*** (0.007) [0.080]
Panel B: Male	Digestive	Respiratory	Lymphatic	Urinary	Genital
Share with college per 10 people	-0.090*** (0.030) [0.027]	-0.060*** (0.019) [0.074]	-0.023** (0.011) [0.072]	-0.008 (0.011) [0.494]	0.003 (0.009) [0.785]
Year-by-region fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,480	6,480	6,480	6,480	6,480
Avg. dependent variable (panel A)	0.616	0.358	0.287	0.222	0.143
Avg. dependent variable (panel B)	0.893	0.431	0.205	0.167	0.135
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic (panel A)	4231	4231	4231	4231	4231
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic (panel B)	8548	8548	8548	8548	8548

Notes: The unit of analysis is cohort-region-year. Observations weighted by cell size. Sample period: 1994-2017 (Ages 34-74). Sample includes all respondents of the 1992 census who reached age 21 between 1964 and 1981 (both inclusive) and report complete secondary education. “Cohort trend” is a continuous variable indicating the year when the cohort reached age 21, normalized to zero in 1972. “Cohort trend \times After 1973” is the interaction of this variable with a dummy for cohorts that reached age 21 on or after 1973. This variable is used as excluded instrument for the share with college in all regressions. Mortality rate and share with college adjusted for previous mortality within cell. Standard errors clustered by region-year reported in parentheses. P-value from wild cluster bootstrap by cohort in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.11: Disaggregate mortality by cause of death: external causes

	Transit accident	Other accident	Homicide	Suicide	Medical complication	Other
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Female						
Share with college per 10 people	0.003 (0.005) [0.660]	0.003 (0.005) [0.505]	-0.002 (0.002) [0.385]	-0.001 (0.004) [0.906]	-0.001 (0.002) [0.589]	-0.001 (0.004) [0.659]
Panel B: Male						
Share with college per 10 people	-0.019 (0.014) [0.312]	-0.029** (0.012) [0.272]	-0.003 (0.005) [0.574]	0.015 (0.012) [0.114]	-0.005** (0.002) [0.001]	-0.021*** (0.006) [0.002]
Year-by-region fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,480	6,480	6,480	6,480	6,480	6,480
Avg. dependent variable (panel A)	0.071	0.053	0.011	0.055	0.005	0.022
Avg. dependent variable (panel B)	0.280	0.239	0.045	0.216	0.006	0.084
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic (panel A)	4231	4231	4231	4231	4231	4231
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic (panel B)	8548	8548	8548	8548	8548	8548

Notes: The unit of analysis is cohort-region-year. Observations weighted by cell size. Sample period: 1994-2017 (Ages 34-74). Sample includes all respondents of the 1992 census who reached age 21 between 1964 and 1981 (both inclusive) and report complete secondary education. “Cohort trend” is a continuous variable indicating the year when the cohort reached age 21, normalized to zero in 1972. “Cohort trend \times After 1973” is the interaction of this variable with a dummy for cohorts that reached age 21 on or after 1973. This variable is used as excluded instrument for the share with college in all regressions. Mortality rate and share with college adjusted for previous mortality within cell. Standard errors clustered by region-year reported in parentheses. P-value from wild cluster bootstrap by cohort in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.12: Reasons for not having a Pap Smear (women)

	Pap smear test in last 3 years					
	Yes	No + stated reason				
		Doesn't know about it	Doesn't know where to do it	Afraid or doesn't like it	Forgot to do it	Uninterested or doesn't need it
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
College enrollment (=1)	0.168** (0.084) [0.004]	-0.016* (0.009) [0.091]	-0.001 (0.007) [0.879]	-0.009 (0.033) [0.806]	-0.075 (0.049) [0.014]	-0.014 (0.048) [0.727]
County-by-year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	58,549	58,549	58,549	58,549	58,549	58,549
Avg. dependent variable	0.726	0.003	0.002	0.033	0.096	0.096
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic	131.8	131.8	131.8	131.8	131.8	131.8

Notes: The unit of analysis is an individual female respondent in CASEN. Dependent variable in the header. In column 1, a dummy for having had a Pap smear in the past three years. In columns 2-6 respective dummies for stated causes for not having a Pap smear (set to zero if Pap smear in past three years). These causes are not exhaustive. Survey waves: 1992, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2003, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017. Sample includes individuals who reached age 21 between 1964 and 1981 (both inclusive) and report complete secondary education. “Cohort trend” is a continuous variable indicating the year when the cohort reached age 21, normalized to zero in 1972. “Cohort trend × After 1973” is the interaction of this variable with a dummy for cohorts that reached age 21 on or after 1973. This variable is used as excluded instrument for an indicator for college enrollment in all regressions. All regressions include year by county of residence and age fixed effects. Standard errors clustered two-way by county and region-year reported in parentheses. P-value from wild cluster bootstrap by cohort in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A.13: Mortality of hospitalized patients over different time horizons

	Dependent variable: Deaths per 1,000 patients				
	at discharge	30 days	6 months	2 years	5 years
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Female					
Cohort trend × After 1973	0.123 (0.194) [0.551]	0.260 (0.242) [0.433]	0.985*** (0.358) [0.058]	2.344*** (0.456) [0.000]	3.970*** (0.519) [0.000]
Panel B: Male					
Cohort trend × After 1973	0.619*** (0.200) [0.056]	1.003*** (0.207) [0.033]	1.811*** (0.316) [0.004]	3.122*** (0.405) [0.000]	5.009*** (0.517) [0.000]
Year-by-county fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cell fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations (panel A)	611,795	611,795	611,795	611,795	611,795
Observations (panel B)	525,822	525,822	525,822	525,822	525,822
R-squared (panel A)	0.009	0.012	0.016	0.022	0.030
R-squared (panel B)	0.009	0.012	0.017	0.023	0.031
Avg. dependent variable (panel A)	11.03	18.60	35.02	59.35	91.58
Avg. dependent variable (panel B)	23.28	36.85	61.36	98.36	148.70

Notes: The unit of analysis is a hospitalized patient. The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the patient dies within the time horizon indicated in the column header (multiplied by 1,000). Sample includes patients from cohorts that reached age 21 between 1964 and 1981 (both inclusive) and is limited to one observation per patient (i.e. first admission). Sample period: 2004-2012 (ages 46-69). “Cohort trend” is a continuous variable indicating the year when the cohort reached age 21, normalized to zero in 1972. “Cohort trend x After 1973” is the interaction of this variable with a dummy for cohorts that reached age 21 on or after 1973. All regressions include year by county of residence and age fixed effects. Standard errors clustered two-way by county and region-year reported in parentheses. P-value from wild cluster bootstrap by cohort in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.