

Lost in Transition: The Persistence of Dictatorship Mayors*

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Democratic transitions are critical junctures that affect the functioning of new democracies. This paper looks at Chile’s transition in 1990 to study the authoritarian roots of local politicians. Using data on the universe of mayors appointed by the Pinochet dictatorship between 1973 and 1989, and leveraging on the arbitrary election rules that characterized the first local election in 1992, we establish two main findings. First, dictatorship mayors – particularly incumbents – obtained a vote premium that is partially explained by an increase in local spending during the transition. Second, democratically elected dictatorship mayors brought votes for the parties that collaborated with the dictatorship, without differential performance in their local governments.

Keywords: politicians, dictatorship, democratic transition

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1 Introduction

Democracies differ in the extent to which political elites can retain their influence over time. To explain this persistence of elites, social scientists have argued that there is an important link between the authoritarian past of a country and the degree of elite capture observed in democracy (e.g., Acemoglu 2008; Albertus and Menaldo 2018). This explanation is particularly relevant if a democratization changes the distribution of *de jure* political power but it does not lead to changes in *de facto* political power.

Despite the importance of an authoritarian past, the mechanisms used by dictatorships to maintain their power are far from understood. Empirical research on the legacies of dictatorships is still meager, probably due to the dearth in data to follow politicians across-regimes. A notable exception is Martínez Bravo et al.’s (2018a) study of Indonesia that shows how the persistence of political elites after democratization can have profound impacts on a variety of economic and political outcomes. In contrast to her work, we contribute novel evidence to this topic by focusing on a democratic transition that unfolded relatively slowly and gave the elite more time to prepare for the upcoming democracy.

We leverage rich historical data and transitory variation in electoral rules around Chile’s democratization in 1990 to contribute with two findings. First, dictatorship mayors obtained a vote premium of nine percentage points in the first local election held in democracy. This premium was twice as large for incumbents than for non-incumbent dictatorship mayors. Our analysis suggests that an increase in local spending during the transition period helps to explain this result. Second, the persistence of dictatorship mayors in the new democracy increased votes for the coalition of parties aligned with the former dictatorship, without affecting the performance of local governments.

Chile is an interesting case study. The Pinochet dictatorship (1973-1990) exhibited many of the key features of twentieth-century authoritarian governments, including state-led repression (Bautista et al., 2019), media censorship (Yang, 2019), concentrated power in a single person (Geddes et al., 2018), and democratization by election (Treisman, 2020). Immediately after the 1973 coup d’état, a military *junta* removed all democrat-

ically elected mayors and appointed officials that were “to be trusted”.¹ The transition to democracy began in October of 1988, when Augusto Pinochet lost a referendum. A new democratic government was elected in 1989, which took office in March 1990, and local elections were held in June 1992 to decide the new body of mayors.

Despite extensive literature studying the Pinochet regime (e.g. Huneeus 2006; Cavallo et al. 2011), very little is known about local governments and appointed mayors. We contribute with new evidence on this topic using vast amounts of recorded but previously unexplored data, i.e. the appointments of *all* mayors during this period. Although these appointments were discretionary, a descriptive analysis of the temporal dynamics in the appearance of new names in a municipality suggests that these were unrelated to performance: protests, natural disasters, and poor budget management were unrelated to the replacement of mayors. In the light of recent research (e.g., Myerson, 2015, Martinez-Bravo et al., 2017), we interpret this as suggestive evidence that authoritarian appointments are associated with poor monitoring and selection of government officials.

To study the fate of dictatorship mayors after democratization, we matched their names to administrative records and digitized data on public spending by municipality. We begin by documenting that dictatorship mayors who ran in the first local election obtained a vote premium of nine percentage points. This premium was twice as large for those who ran in the municipalities where they were seating incumbents. Motivated by the fact that government spending increased sharply during the transition period (October 1988 to March 1990), we study whether the amount of monetary resources spent at the local level helped old-regime politicians to maintain their power. We find that a one standard deviation increase in the monetary resources spent during the transition period increased the vote share of dictatorship mayors by three percentage points. This finding is consistent with recent research (Voigtländer and Voth, 2018), and it reflects on the nature of this transition which gave time to the elite to prepare for the upcoming democracy.

¹The last local election before the Pinochet dictatorship was held in April 1971 under the government of deposed socialist president Salvador Allende (1970-1973). In this election the coalition that supported Allende in the 1970 presidential election (Popular Unity) obtained more than 50% of the votes.

In the second part of the paper we study the influence of these old-regime mayors on the new democratic period. Since dictatorship mayors were not randomly placed across municipalities, we exploit quasi-experimental variation coming from the transitory electoral rules that characterized the first local elections. These rules allow us to approximate a natural experiment in which dictatorship mayors were close to being randomly appointed as mayors in a subset of municipalities. Using this source of variation we show that dictatorship mayors were associated with a higher vote share for right-wing candidates in local and presidential elections without differential performance effects in their municipalities. Since the right-wing coalition was aligned with the Pinochet dictatorship, we interpret this as a potential mechanism behind elite persistence.

This paper contributes to the literature documenting the legacies of dictatorships and more generally the functioning of young democracies with an authoritarian past. Although several authors have emphasized the link between authoritarian regimes and subsequent democracies (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Huntington, 1991; Linz and Stepan, 1996), empirical studies have only appeared recently. There is evidence that local officials inherited from a dictatorship affected clientelistic spending and facilitated elite capture in Indonesia (Martínez Bravo, 2014; Martínez Bravo et al., 2018a). In contrast to the Indonesian case, Chile's transition was less abrupt and consequently appointed mayors – and the elite more generally – had time to prepare for the upcoming democracy (González and Prem, 2020). In this regard, we contribute to a literature documenting the strategies used by elites to maintain their power (Robinson and Hadiz, 2004; Honna, 2010; Albertus and Menaldo, 2014, 2018; González et al., 2020). In addition, by empirically studying the fate of mayors appointed by a dictatorship, our paper also contributes to the literature studying elite persistence (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008; Albertus, 2019).

We also contribute to a literature that studies appointments to local governments. Research in democracies is vast – see Dal Bó and Finan (2018) for a review – but there is less evidence from autocracies. Many authoritarian regimes use local elections, but some do not.² When dictators select mayors the drivers of appointments are unknown. There

²Examples of authoritarian regimes *with* local elections include Brazil (1964-1985), Indonesia (1968-

is, however, evidence of patronage among public officials different from mayors in the British Empire and current democracies (Xu, 2018; Colonnelli et al., 2019). A related literature shows that elected officials respond more to their constituents than appointed ones due to electoral incentives (Besley and Coate, 2003; Levin and Tadelis, 2010; Choi et al., 2010; Hessami, 2018). Our contribution is twofold. First, we show descriptive evidence suggesting that appointments of mayors in dictatorship were unrelated to performance. Second, we show that “once appointed” (then elected) mayors perform similarly to “never appointed” ones but increase the vote share of their parties. The increase in votes is consistent with a literature studying political dynasties in dictatorships (Brownlee, 2007) and democracies (Dal Bó et al., 2009), but across-regime evidence is more limited.

Finally, we contribute to the literature studying how local spending can affect voting patterns. Previous research has shown that local spending can boost political support because -when efficient- it signals economic competence and -when targeted- it spreads support through social networks (Berman et al., 2011; Voigtländer and Voth, 2018; Fafchamps and Labonne, 2019). Moreover, elections can provide political incentives to complete urban projects and voters reward incumbents for doing so (Marx, 2018).³ We contribute to this literature by showing how an authoritarian regime might use local spending in urban projects to maintain their political power after a democratization.

2 Historical background

The last local election before the Pinochet dictatorship (1973-1990) was held in April 1971 under the government of socialist Salvador Allende (1970-1973). In this election the coalition of left-wing parties known as Popular Unity, which supported Allende in

1998), Pakistan (1977-1988), and China (1980s-1990s), among others. Examples of these regimes *without* elections include Chile (1973-1990). Martínez Bravo et al. (2018b) argues that the existence of local elections in authoritarian regimes can be explained by information asymmetries.

³Related work has also shown how targeted income transfers or even random income shocks can increase support for the incumbent government (Manacorda et al., 2011; Labonne, 2013; Bagues and Esteve-Volart, 2016). There is also a vast literature estimating the local non-political effects of infrastructure projects (e.g. Michaels 2008; Faber 2014; Hornbeck and Donaldson 2016; Donaldson 2018).

the 1970 presidential election, obtained more than 50% of the votes.⁴ After the 1973 coup d'état, a military *junta* ruled the country and suspended the constitution, removed all democratically elected mayors, and appointed a new body of mayors that were “to be trusted” (Decree Law N. 25). Fifteen years later Augusto Pinochet would lose a referendum and the transition to democracy would begin. The new democratically elected government took office in March 1990 and local elections were held in June 1992 to decide the new body of mayors. Figure 1-A presents a timeline of the main events.

2.1 Mayors in dictatorship

There is a vast literature studying the Pinochet regime (e.g. Huneeus 2006; Cavallo et al. 2011). Yet we know much less about local governments and appointed mayors. Perhaps the most detailed account of the importance of local governments during this period comes from Valdivia et al. (2012). The authors argue that from the beginning of the 1980s municipalities became key for the implementation of the regime's policy platform, particularly social policies.⁵ The regime attempted to effectively change the policy-deliberation process from traditional institutions like the Congress and political parties to local areas. Mayors became very important and had *de facto* power over the functioning of municipalities, with *regidores* in the *Consejo de Desarrollo Comunal* – i.e. the Council – serving only as advisors. Despite the importance of mayors, we know very little about their appointments and fate after the return to democracy.

The 1980 Constitution crafted by the Pinochet regime established that mayors were to be appointed by the President and would last four years in power. The opposition was critical of this change which they argued broke a long-standing democratic tradition (Díaz and Maturana, 1994). Unfortunately most information about the selection and re-

⁴In terms of political parties, the winner of that election was the Christian Democrats (political center) with 26% of the votes, followed closely by the Socialist Party (left-wing) with 23%, and then by the National Party (right-wing) with 18% of the votes.

⁵Examples of these social programs include the Minimum Employment Program implemented in 1975 (PEM) and the Occupation Program for Head of Households (POJH) implemented in 1982.

removal of mayors comes from anecdotes and interviews. For example, some members of right-wing parties seem to have started their political careers as appointed mayors and then got elected as members of the Congress in parliamentary elections or as mayors in local elections.⁶ Anecdotal evidence also suggests that Pinochet's wife was responsible for many appointments, sometimes removing a mayor because he was not helping with CEMA-Chile, an organization of housewives that she led (Farfán and Vega, 2009), or because she felt that a mayor or his wife threatened her power, and sometimes rewarding people by appointing them as mayors of important municipalities (Camus, 2014).

As stated in the Constitution, a referendum was held in October 1988 to determine whether Augusto Pinochet would remain in power for the following eight years. Pinochet got 44% of the vote and the transition to democracy began. The opposition candidate Patricio Aylwin won the subsequent presidential election in 1989 running with (among others) a proposal to “democratize municipalities.” At the time, the opposition coalition and the regime could not agree about what to do with local governments, and a final agreement to democratically elect mayors and councils only happened during the second year post-dictatorship. The first attempt came from President Patricio Aylwin, who in May 1990 proposed to hold local elections but the right-wing coalition expressed their discontent with the proposal because it could “weakened the institutional stability” (*La Tercera*, May 1990). A new proposal was sent in May 1991 which ended up being approved by right-wing parties in August 1991 (Díaz and Maturana, 1994; Mardones, 2006).

2.2 The 1992 local election

Law N. 19097 enacted in November 1991 established that a municipality was to be ruled by a mayor and a council who would be democratically elected in local elections to be held in June 1992. However, in this election voters elected *councilors* instead of *mayors*. Councilors were to be elected using a D'Hondt method and the electoral rule for mayors

⁶Examples include the appointed mayors of *Pudahuel* municipality in the 1985-1989 period and *La Cisterna* municipality in the 1989-1992 period. Both mayors were members of right-wing parties, went on to win seats in the Congress representing the same local areas and remain in power until today.

was as follows: if a candidate obtained more than 35% of the votes *and* was part of the most voted list, then he or she became the mayor for the 1992-1996 period.⁷ If one of these requirements was not met, then the council elected the mayor using a simple majority rule.⁸ The council was composed by the most voted candidates. Municipalities with less than 70 thousand registered voters elected 6 councilors, between 70 and 150 thousand elected 8, and those with more than 150 thousand elected 10.

The winner of this local election was the left-wing coalition *Concertación por la Democracia* with 53% of the votes. They elected 266 mayors and 1159 of 2076 councilors. The runner-up was the right-wing coalition with 30% of the votes, 62 mayors, and 756 councilors. The electoral rule together with the even number of councilors caused that in 84 races two mayors were elected by the council. In these cases the two elected mayors split the period in two terms of two years with a random order of incumbency. A total of 50 mayors obtained more than 35% of votes and were part of the most voted list and hence were directly elected as mayors for the 1992-1996 period. Of these mayors, 29 were from the left-wing coalition and 21 from the right-wing coalition, with the Christian Democrats being the party with the most mayors (18).

The rules to elect mayors changed for the 1996 local elections. If the most voted candidate was not part of the most voted list, then the most voted candidate from the most voted list was elected mayor. From 2004 onwards mayors and councilors were elected using a simple majority rule in separate ballots.

⁷Lists were groups of political parties and were registered before election day. There were six lists in the 1992 election: *Concertación por la Democracia* (list A) – composed by six parties – Communist Party (list B), Liberal Party (list C), *Participación y Progreso* (list D) – composed by three parties – *Unión de Centro Centro* (list E), and Independent (list I).

⁸This electoral rule favored the Christian Democrats, a party in the center of the political spectrum but aligned with the left-wing coalition during the transition to democracy. Figure A.1 shows that a simple majority rule would have lead to more dictatorship mayors being elected (18% instead of 12%).

3 Data construction

This section explains how we gathered information about dictatorship mayors, how we constructed local spending measures, and provides descriptive statistics.

3.1 Administrative sources

We constructed two main datasets. The first contains the names of all mayors appointed by Pinochet between 1973 and 1992. To the best of our knowledge this is the first time all names have been gathered in a single dataset. To construct it we collected the universe of official records on mayors' appointments from the Ministry of Interior. Each time a mayor was appointed by Pinochet a decree was created with the full name of the mayor, the first date of the mandate, and the name of the municipality. In the few cases without information, we contacted municipalities directly to fill the gaps. We converted this information into a panel dataset of municipalities observed annually with the names of dictatorship mayors in each year. We observe 1,104 unique individuals serving as mayors in approximately 6,500 municipality-year positions.

The second dataset measures local spending annually during the dictatorship period using two sources. First, we digitized information about all urban projects implemented in the period from 1979 until 1992. We collected this information from annual reports produced by the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism. Projects were classified by the Ministry in four categories: housing, sanitation, equipment, and other. Examples of these projects include health infrastructure, paving, lighting, sewerage, fire stations, sport courts, and social housing, among others. We observe the exact dates of implementation, the municipality of the project, and the financial cost. Second, we digitized the revenues and spending of municipalities from annual reports collected by the General Accounting Office, available from 1985 onwards. Figure 1-B presents a summary of the data collection.

We complemented this information with other administrative data. We use electoral data for local, parliamentary, and presidential elections which we take directly from the

Electoral Service after 1988 and digitized from their administrative records before that year. We identified dictatorship mayors in the list of 6,500 candidates in the first local election in 1992 using a supervised probabilistic record matching algorithm. We found 246 dictatorship mayors running. We also use data measuring state repression by municipality and individual-level data on prisoners, information collected by the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation and the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture (a.k.a. Valech and Rettig reports). When studying the performance of mayors in democracy we use additional data from the General Accounting Office and the Health Bureau. Table A.1 presents descriptive statistics for these additional data.

3.2 Descriptive statistics

The data we constructed allow us to characterize patterns of appointments during dictatorship in an unusually rich way. Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics. The average municipality had three mayors during the dictatorship and a mayor stayed in power for an average of four years. Yet some mayors remained in office for less than one year and some for the entire period of dictatorship. Figure 2-A shows the number of new appointments per year from 1973 until 1992, where we can see that on average the dictatorship replaced 10-20% of mayors each year.

The drivers behind new appointments are poorly understood but anecdotal evidence suggest that they did *not* respond to changes in performance. The lower panels in Figure 2 provide suggestive evidence of this being the case. These panels show the correlation between the percentage of new appointments per municipality in a given periods (e.g. 1983-1985) as a function of variables that could have revealed the ability or performance of mayors. The percentage of new appointments is empirically unrelated to the intensity of protests in 1983-1984, to the intensity of one of the largest earthquakes ever recorded in 1985, to the local performance of mayors as measured by municipal deficit, and to the local implementation of repression during the 1973-1976 period.⁹ These patterns suggest

⁹Data for the intensity of the 1985 earthquake at the local level comes from the National Office of

that mayors were not removed because of their performance.

The lower panel in Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for revenues and spending in municipalities and the middle panel for local spending in urban projects. Figure 3 presents time variation in local spending as measured by the total number of projects and their monetary cost in the period 1979-1992. Two noticeable patterns emerge. First, the effect of the 1982-83 economic crisis can be seen by looking at the monetary resources invested during those years. Second, there is a significant increase of approximately 50% in local spending in 1989. This year is somewhat special because Pinochet knew that he would be leaving power and the new opposition coalition was going to take office in March 1990. Pinochet also had full control of monetary resources and could implement projects at discretion. As we argue, both features imply that this is the ideal scenario for the dictatorship to attempt to retain their political power by spending in local projects in order to gain support before the next election.

4 The vote premium of dictatorship mayors

This section shows that the dictatorship mayors who ran in the 1992 election obtained more votes than other candidates. This vote premium can be explained by an incumbency advantage and local spending before the transition to democracy.

To estimate the differential electoral performance of dictatorship mayors we focus in the 1992 local election and estimate the following regression equation:

$$V_{ijc} = \beta \cdot \text{Dictatorship mayor}_i + \phi_j + \phi_c + \varepsilon_{ijc} \quad (1)$$

where V_{ijc} is the vote share of candidate i , affiliated to political party j , and running in municipality c . The main variable of interest is Dictatorship mayor $_i$, an indicator that takes the value of one for candidates who were mayors during the dictatorship period. In

Emergency of the Interior Ministry (ONEMI). Protest data comes from annual reports produced by the Vicariate of Solidarity, a human rights organization operating during the dictatorship.

addition, parameters ϕ_j and ϕ_c represent fixed effects by political party and municipality respectively, and we allow the error term ε_{ijc} to be arbitrarily correlated within municipalities. There are 333 local elections in our data and 13 political parties. The parameter of interest is β and measures the average differential vote share obtained by dictatorship mayors within municipalities and parties. Note that we can estimate β because dictatorship mayors run as independent candidates or as members of different right-wing parties, meaning that our estimation controls for any incumbency advantage the dictatorship might have had through connections with right-wing political parties.

It is worth noticing that those candidates who decided to run in the election might have been different in unobservable dimensions that are valued by voters, which in turn could lead to bias in the β coefficient. For instance, if the dictatorship mayors (or the citizens) with the highest probability of winning decided to run, then the coefficient on incumbents will be upward (downward) biased. Unfortunately, the dearth in data precludes us from any attempt to model the decision of becoming a candidate. In this regard, our β estimate has to be interpreted as the electoral premium for the dictatorship mayors who became candidates relative to the citizens who became candidates.

Column 1 in Table 2 presents estimates of equation (1) without fixed effects, column 2 adds municipality fixed effects, and column 3 adds political party fixed effects. We always include an indicator for dictatorship prisoners to estimate their premium and for comparison purposes. Prisoners are defined as individuals who were imprisoned at some point during the 1973-1990 dictatorship period.¹⁰ For reference, the average candidate obtained 5.1% of votes in a municipality, there were 246 dictatorship mayors and 514 dictatorship prisoners running, the average municipality had 19 candidates competing, and there was at least one dictatorship mayor as candidate in 196 races. Municipality fixed effects imply that we estimate β using variation from these 196 municipalities.

Results indicate that dictatorship mayors obtained 9 percentage points higher vote

¹⁰The names of dictatorship prisoners comes from The National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture Report produced by the Chilean Congress. We match this list of names with the list of names with all candidates in the 1992 election using the same probabilistic record matching algorithm.

share than other candidates. Consequently, Table A.2 in the appendix shows that they were 18 percentage points more likely to win the election, a substantial increase from a base of 7%. In contrast, dictatorship prisoners obtained a vote premium of around 1 percentage point and only a marginally significant increase in the probability of winning. Table A.3 shows that all these results are robust to the inclusion of the following more flexible two-way fixed effects: (i) political party by region, and (ii) political party by province. We also randomized being a dictatorship mayor within a municipality 1,000 times and estimated equation (1) each time to perform randomization inference. Our estimate is above the 99% of randomized estimates.

All in all, we find robust evidence of dictatorship mayors obtaining a nine percentage point higher vote share than other candidates in the same municipality. But why were citizens voting relatively more for mayors previously appointed by Pinochet? Perhaps the most intuitive explanation for the vote premium is the existence of an incumbency advantage. The last dictatorship mayor before the 1992 election could have had an advantage simply because he or she was the incumbent mayor, a robust empirical finding across many countries and time periods.¹¹ To test for this explanation we identified the last dictatorship mayor in all municipalities before the 1992 local election. With this information we constructed an indicator for candidates who were the incumbent mayor and augmented equation (1) to include this variable.

Column 4 in Table 2 presents this result. The coefficient for dictatorship mayors decreases from 9 to 6 percentage points and the coefficient for incumbents is around 6-7 percentage points (p -value<0.05). This estimate constitutes suggestive evidence of an incumbency advantage among dictatorship mayors. Because the vote premium was 9 percentage points and dictatorship mayors who were not incumbents obtained 6 percentage points of premium, we conclude that an incumbency advantage can explain at most one-third of the vote premium of dictatorship mayors.

¹¹There is a large literature estimating the advantage that incumbents have on elections. See, for example, Lee (2008); Fowler and Hall (2014); Erikson and Titiunik (2015); Fiva and Smith (2018).

4.1 The role of local spending

Before the transition to democracy the dictatorship could have decided to increase their spending locally to maximize the probability of their mayors being elected in the upcoming elections. Descriptive statistics in the previous section suggest that local spending increased after the announcement of the transition in October 1988. To test for this explanation we augment equation (1) to allow for a differential effect of local spending in urban projects in different political periods. In particular, we estimate:

$$V_{ijc} = \beta \cdot \text{Dict mayor}_i + \sum_p \gamma_p \cdot (\text{Dict mayor}_i \times \text{Local spending}_c^p) \quad (2)$$

$$+ \phi_j + \phi_c + \varepsilon_{ijc}$$

where $\text{Local spending}_c^p$ is local spending in urban projects in municipality c during period p . We call “dictatorship” to the period before October 1988, “transition” to the period between October 1988 and March 1990, and “democracy” to the period between March 1990 and June 1992. The remaining variables are defined in the same way as before and we again include dictatorship prisoners for comparison purposes.

The coefficients of interest are γ_{DICT} , γ_{TRAN} , γ_{DEM} and measure the empirical association between local spending in different political periods and the vote share of dictatorship mayors in the 1992 election. We use two measures of local spending and one measure of municipal spending for comparison purposes. The former were relatively visible urban projects where the dictatorship had decision power and the latter is related to the day-to-day functioning of local governments. To measure local spending we use the logarithm of total spending (in monetary units) per capita and the number of projects per capita. To measure municipal spending we use the logarithm of spending per capita.

If the dictatorship was successful at gaining political support through public spending before the transition to democracy, then we expect that $\widehat{\gamma}_{TRAN} > 0$ and $\widehat{\gamma}_{TRAN} > \widehat{\gamma}_{DICT}, \widehat{\gamma}_{DEM}$. To be clear, we expect that $\widehat{\gamma}_{TRAN} > \widehat{\gamma}_{DEM}$ because we assume voters knew which coalition was doing the spending and could associate it with old-regime candidates from those coalitions. In addition, we believe $\widehat{\gamma}_{TRAN} > \widehat{\gamma}_{DICT}$ for two reasons. First,

spending during the transition could have been targeted precisely for political purposes. Second, local spending that is closer to the local election should have a higher impact on vote shares simply because of recency bias, i.e. the tendency of voters to value recent information more than older information (Berry and Howell, 2007). In any case, if $\widehat{\gamma}_{TRAN} > \widehat{\gamma}_{DICT}$ is ultimately an empirical question.

Table 3 presents estimates of equation (2). Column 1 uses spending per capita as independent variable, column 2 the total number of projects per capita, and column 3 municipal spending per capita. Overall, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that the Pinochet regime was successful at winning political support via public spending in the transition period. To facilitate the interpretation of coefficients we have standardized local and municipal spending. A one standard deviation increase in local spending during the transition period is associated to an increase of 2-4 percentage points in the vote share of dictatorship mayors (columns 2 and 3). In contrast, local spending in other periods has little statistical relationship with vote shares in the 1992 election and the point estimate is also of significantly lower magnitude. Moreover, changes in municipal spending are also *not* statistically associated with vote shares and the vote shares of dictatorship prisoners remain similar across different patterns of spending. We conclude that local spending can also partially explain the vote premium of dictatorship mayors.

5 The legacies of dictatorship mayors

What are the political effects of electing dictatorship mayors? Do they perform better or worst than other politicians? These are key questions that speak directly to the functioning of young democracies with recent authoritarian history. In this section, we address these questions by evaluating the legacies of dictatorship mayors on local and presidential elections, and also on municipality's performance after the transition.

5.1 Econometric strategy

Dictatorship mayors were not randomly placed across municipalities after the 1992 local election. Therefore, a simple comparison of outcomes across municipalities with and without them is unlikely to reflect the causal effect of their presence. However, electoral rules in this election help us to approximate a natural experiment in which dictatorship mayors are quasi-randomly elected in a subset of municipalities. In particular, we use the fact that the most-voted candidates within a municipality were elected as councilors and these councilors elected 284 mayors using a simple majority rule.

To illustrate our argument, Table 4 considers voting scenarios in a municipality with six councilors.¹² In some municipalities, the five or six most voted candidates were from the same coalition and elected a mayor from their coalition (cases L1, L2, R1, and R2). Something similar happened if the four most voted candidates and the 6th/7th candidates were from the same coalition (cases L4 and R3). However, in a subset of elections the order of the 6th/7th candidates had a large impact on the elected mayor (cases L3, L5, R6, and R4). There are two types of cases: (i) a coalition had a majority *because* of the order of the 6th/7th candidates (cases L3 and R4) but a different order would have made them lose the majority; and (ii) coalitions are equally represented but a different order of the 6th/7th candidate would have caused a majority (cases L5 and R6 below).

By focusing on the subset of municipalities in which the order of the last candidates affected the majority of the council we can implement a research design in the spirit of the regression discontinuity analysis for close elections (e.g. Lee 2008). In our case, the councils that *marginally* obtained a left-wing majority never elected a dictatorship mayor, but had the order of the last candidates been different, the council could have elected a dictatorship mayor. We observe 103 races with this quasi-experimental variation in council composition in which the vote difference between the last candidates was smaller than 5 percentage points. We focus on these municipalities with “close council majority”

¹²As discussed in section 2 the size of the council could have been eight or ten in some municipalities depending on population, but the argument extends naturally to those cases.

and estimate the following regression equation:

$$Y_{ct} = \beta_t \text{Dict. Mayor Elected}_c^{1992} + f(\text{Vote Margin}) + \varepsilon_{ct} \quad (3)$$

where Y_{ct} is an outcome of interest in municipality c measured in year $t > 1992$ and $\text{Dict. Mayor Elected}_c^{1992}$ is an indicator that equals one if a dictatorship mayor was elected in municipality c in 1992, and zero otherwise. We also control by the voting margin between the last candidate who integrated the council and the first candidate who did not enter the council, and allow for heteroskedasticity in the error term ε_{ct} . Note that all parameters are indexed by t because we estimate equation (3) separately for different years. We deal with the potential endogeneity of electing a dictatorship mayor by estimating equation (3) using two-stage least squares (2SLS), with a first stage equation given by:

$$\text{Dict. Mayor Elected}_c^{1992} = \pi \text{Left-wing Council}_c^{1992} + f(\text{Vote Margin}) + \epsilon_c, \quad (4)$$

where $\text{Left-wing Council}_c^{1992}$ is our instrumental variable, a dummy that equals one if the council obtains left-wing majority by a small margin. Regarding this first-stage, panel (a) of Figure 4 shows that the “close council majority” is a good predictor of the probability that a dictatorship mayors is elected in democracy. In the restricted sample, the probability of a dictatorship mayor being elected was 17%. However, dictatorship mayors were never elected when the majority of the council was left-wing. Thus, when we estimate equation (4), we obtain a coefficient of -0.25 (s.e. 0.08, $p\text{-value} < 0.01$).

If our research design is valid, then municipalities with and without left-wing close majority after the 1992 local elections should look politically similar in the years before the dictatorship. Reassuringly, panels (b) to (e) of Figure 4 show that this seems to indeed be the case: we do not observe significant differences in political support for left or right-wing parties in the key presidential election in 1970, the contended local elections in 1971, and the parliamentary election in 1973 only months before the coup.

5.2 Results

We study two sets of outcomes related to political and economic legacies. For the former we focus on the vote shares for right-wing candidates in local and presidential elections.¹³ To measure the latter we use variables related to the performance of mayors. In particular, we use two variables related to the management of the local budget, the ratio of revenues to expenditures and an indicator for misreporting of expenditures as measured by the General Accounting Office of Chile. We also use administrative data measuring deaths in transit accidents – arguably related to transit infrastructure and the functioning of public hospitals – and the number of urban projects implemented and their amount in monetary units. Urban projects are administrative data from the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism.

Table 5 presents the reduced forms (RF) and the 2SLS (IV) estimates of equation (3). Panel A studies the impact of dictatorship mayors on the vote share for right-wing candidates in local elections, panel B in presidential elections, and panel C on the performance of municipalities at the beginning of democracy. Tables A.6, A.7, and A.8 show the robustness of these results to: i) using a smaller margin of vote bandwidth, ii) to the inclusion of a quadratic polynomial of the voting margin, and iii) to the inclusion of (predetermined) political and geographical control variables.

Panels A and B show that the vote share of right-wing candidates increased as a consequence of dictatorship mayors being elected in the first democratic election, though point estimates and statistical significance vary by year and type of election. These estimates suggest that, when an old-regime mayor was elected, the vote share of right-wing candidates increased by approximately 30 percentage points in local elections and by approximately 15 percentage points in presidential elections. These coefficients are similar in magnitude to prominent estimates of incumbency advantage (e.g. Lee 2008).

In contrast to the political outcomes, we find little difference in the performance of dictatorship mayors when compared to other mayors in democracy. Panel C of Table 5

¹³Right-wing candidates were aligned with the dictatorship and many candidates worked for the dictatorship. Tables A.4 and A.5 provide more details about how we grouped candidates and coalitions in left- and right-wing candidates and coalitions using administrative data from the Electoral Service office.

cannot reject that municipalities with and without dictatorship mayors in 1992 performed similarly in the 1990s. Moreover, the sign of coefficients is inconsistent across columns, sometimes suggesting that in municipalities with dictatorship mayors there was less corruption and lower deficit (columns 1 and 2) and sometimes suggesting worse performance as measured by more deaths in transit accidents and fewer monetary resources invested in urban projects. Taken together, we interpret these estimates as inconclusive about the performance of (elected) dictatorship mayors after the transition to democracy.

6 Conclusion

We have shown that mayors appointed by the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile obtained a vote premium in the first local election, and that an increase in local spending in before the transition have the ability to partially account for this result. Because these mayors are associated to more votes for right-wing parties in democracy, these findings reveal new ways in which dictatorships can influence the functioning of young democracies.

The results in this paper suggest that policies limiting the participation of dictatorship politicians in elections in a new democracy have the potential to reduce the influence of the previous authoritarian regime. Even in the absence of an increase in local spending, the existence of an incumbency advantage implies that dictatorship politicians will always obtain a significant number of votes. When authoritarian regimes hold local elections, the competitiveness of these races and the representation of opposition parties can naturally affect whether the body of elected officials can or should participate in subsequent elections held in democracy.

There are at least two limitations that are important to mention to interpret the results in this study. First, besides local spending in urban projects there might be additional strategies used by incumbent dictatorships to preserve their political power. Examples include an improvement in the provision of police services, public education, public health, or other state services more generally. An increase in urban projects could crowd-out some of these other services or could complement them. Second, some democratizations

might be more abrupt than a democratization by election and, precisely because of it, these transitions restrict the ability of incumbent dictators to strategically act to transmit their power across regimes.

Finally, we believe this study opens new questions about the fate of dictatorship politicians after a democratization. In Chile many politicians started their careers by being appointed in the Pinochet years and remain working in the public sector until today. Whether this creates inefficiencies needs to be better understood empirically. In addition, more work is necessary to understand if authoritarian regimes are able to allocate resources across municipalities efficiently or not. Uncontested political power might facilitate the extraction of rents but it might also allow accomplishing projects that might be more difficult to pursue when negotiating with others.

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
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
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Figure 1: Timeline of events and data collection




(a) Main political events




(b) Data collection


Figure 2: The appointments of dictatorship mayors




(a) Percentage of new mayors over time




(b) Intensity of protests



(c) Earthquake intensity




(d) Municipal budget




(e) Local repression

Notes: Panel (a) shows the percentage of new mayors over time. The bottom four panels show that mayors were *not* removed after events that were likely to reveal performance. Section 3 provides more details.

Figure 3: Urban projects




(a) Urban projects (\$)




(b) Urban projects (number)

Notes: Time series variation in local spending in urban projects. Administrative data from annual reports of the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism. Section 3 presents more details.


Figure 4: Close council majority




(a) Probability of electing a dictatorship mayor




(b) Vote share Alessandri (1970)



(c) Vote share Allende (1970)



(d) Vote share U.P. (1971)



(e) Vote share U.P. (1973)

Notes: All figures consider councils with close majorities (i.e., councils in which the order of the last candidates affected the majority of the council but where these last candidates had a margin of less than 5 percentage points among them). The upper right corner of each figure displays the point estimate and robust standard error obtained from projecting the respective variable on a “Left Council Majority” dummy. U.P. stands for *Unidad Popular*, the left-wing coalition in the early 1970s. All plots are weighted by the 1992 population.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Mayors appointed by Pinochet ($N=1,104$)				
Years of tenure (1973–1987)	4.14	3.60	1.00	15.00
Municipalities per mayor (1973–1987)	1.04	0.21	1.00	3.00
Municipalities ($N=333$)				
Number of mayors (1973–1987)	3.22	1.61	1.00	8.00
Spending in urban projects per capita (1979–1987)	50.16	358.22	0.00	6305.66
Number of projects per capita (1979–1987)	16.85	23.55	0.00	327.87
Budget: deficit (1985–1987)	1.09	0.89	0.38	10.72
Budget: revenues per capita (1985–1987)	15.05	35.58	0.24	605.12
Budget: spending per capita (1985–1987)	14.94	34.98	0.35	594.41

Notes: Descriptive statistics for 1,104 dictatorship mayors in the upper panel and for 333 counties in the lower panel. All variables are measured until the year before the democratization announcement (1988). Section 3 presents more details.

Table 2: Dictatorship mayors in the first democratic local election*The dependent variable is the vote share of candidates in the 1992 local election*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dictatorship mayor	9.04*** (0.76)	8.96*** (0.78)	9.39*** (0.77)	6.53*** (0.92)
Dictatorship prisoner	0.21 (0.32)	0.51 (0.33)	1.16*** (0.31)	1.15*** (0.31)
Incumbent mayor				6.03*** (1.52)
Candidates (observations)	6,497	6,497	6,497	6,497
Municipalities	333	333	333	333
Municipality fixed effects		X	X	X
Political party fixed effects			X	X
Avg. dependent variable	5.13	5.13	5.13	5.13

Notes: Each observation is a candidate in the 1992 local election. The number of dictatorship prisoners is 514, the number of dictatorship mayors is 246, and the number of incumbent dictatorship mayors is 117. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parenthesis. Significance level: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 3: Local elections and local spending in urban projects*The dependent variable is the vote share of candidates in the 1992 local election*

Local spending variable:	Development projects		Municipal spending
	Log spending per capita	Number of projects per capita	Log spending per capita
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dictatorship mayor	9.51*** (0.77)	9.51*** (0.77)	9.42*** (0.74)
× Spending in democracy	0.16 (1.13)	-0.02 (1.15)	2.81 (3.08)
× Spending in transition	2.44* (1.29)	3.56** (1.48)	-0.52 (3.41)
× Spending in dictatorship	-0.03 (0.94)	0.79 (0.90)	1.16 (1.93)
Dictatorship prisoner	1.11*** (0.32)	1.18*** (0.38)	1.05*** (0.33)
× Spending in democracy	-0.38 (0.72)	0.19 (0.63)	1.19 (1.10)
× Spending in transition	0.70 (0.46)	0.97 (0.78)	-1.30 (1.17)
× Spending in dictatorship	-0.01 (0.92)	-0.65 (1.55)	-0.22 (0.69)
Candidates (observations)	6,274	6,274	6,274
Municipalities	324	324	324
Municipality fixed effects	X	X	X
Political party fixed effects	X	X	X
Avg. dependent variable	5.164	5.164	5.164

Notes: Each observation is a candidate in the 1992 local elections. The number of dictatorship mayors is 246 and the number of dictatorship prisoners is 514. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. Significance level: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. See section 4 for details.

Table 4: Hypothetical voting scenarios

	(L1)	(L2)	(L3)	(L4)	(L5)	...	(R6)	(R5)	(R4)	(R3)	(R2)	(R1)
Candidate 1	L	L	L	L	L	...	R	R	R	R	R	R
Candidate 2	L	L	R	R	R	...	L	L	L	L	R	R
Candidate 3	L	R	L	L	L	...	R	R	R	R	L	R
Candidate 4	L	L	R	R	R	...	L	L	L	L	R	R
Candidate 5	L	L	L	L	R	...	L	R	R	R	R	R
Candidate 6	L	L	L	L	L	...	R	L	R	R	R	R
Candidate 7	L	L	R	L	R	...	L	R	L	R	R	R
⋮												
Candidate N												

Notes: Hypothetical order of left- (L) and right-wing (R) candidates in a municipality after the 1992 local election. The six most voted candidates became councilors and elected the mayor whenever the most voted candidate obtained less than 35% of voters or was not part of the most voted list. A list is a group of political parties.

Table 5: The legacies of dictatorship mayors

<i>Panel A: Vote share for right-wing candidates in local elections</i>					
	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
IV: Dictatorship mayor elected	51.05*** (19.16)	24.32* (14.72)	33.21** (16.29)	14.86 (18.60)	25.16 (18.75)
RF: Left-wing council	-12.96*** (3.18)	-6.18* (3.56)	-8.43** (3.58)	-3.77 (4.67)	-6.39 (4.07)
Avg. dependent variable	34.55	38.11	35.03	34.82	33.34
<i>Panel B: Vote share for right-wing candidates in presidential elections</i>					
	1993	1999	2005	2009	2013
IV: Dictatorship mayor elected	13.81** (6.59)	15.58* (8.79)	16.43* (8.75)	13.83 (8.73)	17.00* (9.55)
RF: Left-wing council	-3.51** (1.67)	-3.96* (2.01)	-4.17** (1.87)	-3.51* (2.10)	-4.32* (2.34)
Avg. dependent variable	30.80	50.08	50.39	45.02	24.44
<i>Panel C: Related to the local performance of mayors</i>					
	Misreported expenditures	Deficit	Deaths in transit accidents	Money in urban projects	Number of urban projects
IV: Dictatorship mayor elected	-0.70 (0.60)	-0.02 (0.07)	0.03 (0.08)	-4.53 (3.02)	-1.46 (4.18)
RF: Left-wing council	0.18 (0.15)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	1.15 (0.77)	0.37 (1.10)
Observations	103	103	103	103	103
Avg. dependent variable	0.38	1.00	0.17	3.02	6.48

Notes: All regressions are weighted by 1992 population and control for the margin of victory in the 1992 election. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. The Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is 9.5. Significance level: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Online Appendix

Lost in Transition: The Persistence of Dictatorship Mayors


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Figure A.1: Who profited from the electoral rule in the 1992 election




Notes: Electoral results (**black bars**) and counterfactual results (**gray bars**) in the 1992 local elections under different electoral rules. Percentage of mayors by appointed or not in the left part of the figure and by political party in the right part of the figure. Black bars indicate the actual percentage of mayors elected, while gray bars represent the percentage of mayors elected in a counterfactual world with a simple majority rule to elect mayors. Section 2 provides more details.


Figure A.2: Data on urban projects

OBRAS TERMINADAS AL 31 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1985															
Comuna	Nombre de la obra	Linea de accion	Cant	Fecha Contrato	Fecha Term	Sup Unitaria m ²	Sup Total m ²	Costo Unitario U F.	Costo Total U F	Origen Financ	Decreto de Contrato	N° de pisos	Forma agrupac.	Contra-tista	
OBRAS DEL SECTOR															
Pavimentación:															
Los Andes	Av. Argentina	Pavimentos nuevos		12-06-84	01-85				19.370	Sector	170			24	
Los Andes	Av. Argentina	Pavimentos nuevos		20-11-84	01-85				1.403	Sector	170			24	
Viña del Mar	Av. 1 Norte	Varios		14-11-84	01-85				1.917	Sector	170			24	
Viña del Mar	Varias calles	Recuperación		20-06-85	08-85				439	Sector	29			17	
Viña del Mar	Varias calles	Recuperación		03-06-85	08-85				6.928	Sector	29			24	
Viña del Mar	Granadillas 1-2-3-4	Pavimentos nuevos		12-03-85	09-85				7.733	Sector	29			24	
Valparaíso		Recuperación		30-04-85	06-85				462	Sector	170			9	
Valparaíso	Av. 11 de Septiembre	Varios		31-05-85	07-85				1.140	Sector	170			9	
Quilpué	Acceso Puente El Belloto	Pavimentos nuevos		14-11-84	01-85				1.457	Sector	170			24	
Total inversión en pavimentación									40.849						
Otras obras:															
Valparaíso	Av. Altamirano	Varios		10-09-84	01-85				8.300	Sector	170			24	
OBRAS POR CONVENIOS Y MANDATOS SIN ADMINISTRACION FINANCIERA															
Saneamiento de poblaciones:															
Villa Alemana	Rosenquist	Unidades sanitarias	450	29-06-84	08-85	7,08	3.186	87,00	39.152	Municipal-BID	Especial			19	
Quillota	Aconcagua Sur	Unidades Sanitarias	307	29-06-84	07-85	7,08	2.174	90,10	27.662	Municipal-BID	Especial			19	
San Antonio	Varias obras	Unidades Sanitarias	327	31-07-84	08-85	7,08	2.315	105,18	34.393	Municipal-BID	Especial			19	
Total			1.084				7.675	101.207							
Pavimentación:															
Viña del Mar	Varias calles	Pavimentos nuevos		12-03-85	03-85				5.327	Municipal	170			24	
San Felipe	Av. 11 de Septiembre	Pavimentos nuevos		25-07-85	10-85				6.462	Municipal	29			18	
Total									11.789						

OLMUE
C. Condell



QUILLOTA
El Bajío



Notes: Section 3 provides more details.

Figure A.3: Data on municipal spending

SECTOR PUBLICO ESTADO DE EJECUCION PRESUPUESTARIA									
PARTIDA 1 05 MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR CAPITULO 1 87 MUNICIPIOS REGION METROPOLITANA DE SANTIAGO PROGRAMA 1 22 MUNICIPALIDAD DE PROVIDENCIA SUBPROGRAMA 1 01 GESTION MUNICIPAL									
1113									
NIVEL INSTITUCIONAL									
PERIODO ENERO 85 A DICIEMBRE 85									
MONEDA NACIONAL (MILES DE PESOS)									
CODIGO	INGRESOS	PRESUPUESTO	DEVENGADOS ACUMULADOS	SALDO PRESUPUESTARIO	DEL PERIODO				
					DEVENGADOS	PERCIBIDOS	POR PERCIBIR		
010000	INGRESOS DE OPERACION								
040000	VENTAS DE ACTIVOS								
070000	OTROS INGRESOS	1.479.913	1.503.333	-23.420	1.503.333	1.503.333			
100000	OPERACION ANOS ANTERIOR	26.165	26.164	1	26.164	26.164			
	SUBTOTAL INGRESOS	1.506.078	1.529.497	-23.419	1.529.497	1.529.497			
110000	SALDO INICIAL DE CAJA	1.603.615	1.642.671	-39.056	1.642.671	1.642.671			
150000	FLUCTUACION DEUDORES	100.621	0	100.621	0	0			
	TOTALES	1.704.236	1.642.671	61.565	1.642.671	1.610.291	32.380		
CODIGO	GASTOS	PRESUPUESTO	OBLIGACION ACUMULADA	SALDO PRESUPUESTARIO	DEL PERIODO				
					DEVENGADOS	PAGADOS	POR PAGAR		
210000	GASTOS EN PERSONAL	239.980	234.387	5.593	234.387	234.388	-1		
220000	BIENES Y SERVICIOS CONSUMIDOS	473.052	424.508	48.544	424.508	420.159	4.345		
240000	PRESTACIONES PREVISIONALES	2.600	2.576	24	2.576	2.576	0		
250000	TRANSFERENCIAS CORRIENTES	658.402	645.158	13.244	645.158	645.154	4		
310000	INVERSION REAL	318.555	261.499	57.056	261.499	259.621	1.878		
320000	INVERSION FINANCIERA	0	0	0	0	0	0		
600000	OPERACION ANOS ANTERIOR	5.837	9.825	12	9.825	9.825	0		
700000	OTROS COMPRAS PREVISIONALES	5.330	5.131	199	5.131	5.131	0		
	SUBTOTAL GASTOS	1.704.236	1.583.084	121.152	1.583.084	1.577.054	6.030		
	TOTALES	1.704.236	1.583.084	121.152	1.583.084	1.577.054	6.030		

Notes: Section 3 provides more details.

Table A.1: Additional descriptive statistics

	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Counties
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Indicator misreporting local finance (1996)	0.35	0.48	0.00	1.00	333
Municipal budget deficit (1993–1994)	1.00	0.06	0.76	1.36	333
< Death in transit accidents accidents per 1,000 inhab. (1993–1996)	0.15	0.10	0.00	0.56	333
Neonatal deaths per 1,000 inhab. (1993–1996)	0.35	0.21	0.00	1.41	333
Spending urban projects per capita (in \$, 1993–1996)	3.09	3.88	0.00	36.18	333
Number of urban projects per capita (1993–1996)	9.46	15.12	0.00	178.04	333

Notes: Data for misreporting of local finance and budget deficit comes from the General Accounting Office. Data for deaths in transit accidents and neonatal deaths comes from the Health Statistics Bureau. Data for urban projects comes from annual reports of the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism.

Table A.2: Winners in the first local election*The dependent variable is an indicator for the winners of the 1992 local election*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Designated mayor	0.15*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)
Dictatorship prisoner	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Incumbent mayor				0.10** (0.05)
Candidates	6,497	6,497	6,497	6,497
Municipalities	333	333	333	333
R-squared	0.02	0.03	0.11	0.11
Municipality fixed effects		X	X	X
Political party fixed effects			X	X
Mean of dependent variable	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07

Notes: Each observation is a candidate in the 1992 local election. The number of dictatorship prisoners is 514 and the number of dictatorship mayors is 246. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parenthesis. Significance level: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.3: Robustness to flexible fixed effects by party

	Vote share		Indicator elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dictatorship mayor	9.37*** (0.77)	9.50*** (0.76)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)
Dictatorship prisoner	1.13*** (0.31)	1.18*** (0.30)	0.02* (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)
Candidates	6,491	6,481	6,491	6,481
Municipalities	333	333	333	333
Municipality fixed effects	X	X	X	X
Political party by region fixed effects	X		X	
Political party by province fixed effects		X		X
Avg. dependent variable	5.13	5.13	0.07	0.07

Notes: Each observation is a candidate in the 1992 local election. The number of dictatorship mayors is 246, the number of dictatorship prisoners is 514, and the number of incumbent dictatorship mayors is 117. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parenthesis. Significance level: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.4: Candidates presidential elections 1993 – 2013

Coalition	1993	1999	2005	2009	2013
RIGHT-WING	A. Alessandri J. Piñera	J. Lavín	S. Piñera J. Lavín	S. Piñera	E. Matthei
LEFT-WING	E. Frei M. Max Neef E. Pizarro C. Reitze	R. Lagos G. Marín T. Hirsch	M. Bachelet T. Hirsch	E. Frei J. Arrate M. Enríquez	M. Bachelet M. Enríquez M. Claude A. Sfeir R. Miranda

Notes: Own construction based on administrative data from the Electoral Service.

Table A.5: Coalitions local elections 1992 – 2012

	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
Right-wing	Participación y Prog. U. Centro Centro	Unión por Chile Prog. Centro Centro	Alianza Centro Centro	Alianza Centro Centro	Alianza	Alianza
Left-wing	Concertación P. Comunista	Concertación La Izquierda Humanista	Concertación La Izquierda Humanistas y Ecologistas	Concertación Juntos Podemos Hum. y Eco.	Concertación Dem. Juntos Podemos Hum. y Eco. Concertación Prog. Chile Limpio Fza. Norte	Concertación Dem. Chile en Otra El Cambio Por Ti Más Humanos Desarrollo Norte Chile Justo

Notes: Own construction based on administrative data from the Electoral Service.

Table A.6: Robustness to a 2.5% bandwidth

<i>Panel A: Vote share for right-wing candidates in local elections</i>					
	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dictatorship Mayor Elected	49.34** (20.30)	26.18* (15.47)	36.37** (17.30)	16.94 (18.75)	22.47 (19.57)
Observations	92	92	92	92	92
Avg. dependent variable	34.59	38.51	35.77	35.02	33.09
<i>Panel B: Vote share for right-wing candidates in presidential elections</i>					
	1993	1999	2005	2009	2013
Dictatorship Mayor Elected	14.73** (6.86)	15.85* (9.24)	16.57* (9.45)	16.13 (9.87)	20.67* (11.85)
Observations	92	92	92	92	92
Avg. dependent variable	30.72	49.96	50.21	45.01	24.45
<i>Panel C: Related to the local performance of mayors</i>					
	Misreported expenditures	Deficit	Deaths in transit accidents	Money in urban projects	Number of urban projects
Dictatorship Mayor Elected	-0.87 (0.58)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.08)	-4.67 (2.95)	-1.70 (3.92)
Observations	92	92	92	92	92
Avg. dependent variable	0.358	0.995	0.163	2.975	6.467

Notes: All regressions are weighted by 1992 population and control for the margin of victory in the 1992 election. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. The Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is 7.7. Significance level: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.7: Robustness to a quadratic polynomial of the vote margin

<i>Panel A: Vote share for right-wing candidates in local elections</i>					
	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dictatorship Mayor Elected	49.95** (19.44)	23.16 (14.31)	34.25** (16.08)	13.13 (17.66)	20.60 (18.06)
Observations	103	103	103	103	103
Avg. dependent variable	34.55	38.11	35.03	34.82	33.34
<i>Panel B: Vote share for right-wing candidates in presidential elections</i>					
	1993	1999	2005	2009	2013
Dictatorship Mayor Elected	13.43** (6.34)	14.23* (8.56)	15.50* (8.71)	13.93 (8.98)	17.86* (10.47)
Observations	103	103	103	103	103
Avg. dependent variable	30.80	50.08	50.39	45.02	24.44
<i>Panel C: Related to the local performance of mayors</i>					
	Misreported expenditures	Deficit	Deaths in transit accidents	Money in urban projects	Number of urban projects
Dictatorship Mayor Elected	-0.64 (0.55)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.07)	-4.29 (2.80)	-1.93 (3.76)
Observations	103	103	103	103	103
Avg. dependent variable	0.375	0.996	0.165	3.024	6.477

Notes: All regressions are weighted by 1992 population and control for the margin of victory in the 1992 election. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. The Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is 8.4. Significance level: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.8: Robustness to adding municipality level controls

<i>Panel A: Vote share for right-wing candidates in local elections</i>					
	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dictatorship Mayor Elected	40.30** (16.66)	17.26 (11.52)	27.74* (14.20)	4.06 (11.84)	15.65 (17.97)
Observations	103	103	103	103	103
Avg. dependent variable	34.55	38.11	35.03	34.82	33.34
<i>Panel B: Vote share for right-wing candidates in presidential elections</i>					
	1993	1999	2005	2009	2013
Dictatorship Mayor Elected	9.88** (4.49)	6.66 (4.93)	8.63* (5.16)	8.94 (5.47)	14.67** (7.30)
Observations	103	103	103	103	103
Avg. dependent variable	30.80	50.08	50.39	45.02	24.44
<i>Panel C: Related to the local performance of mayors</i>					
	Misreported expenditures	Deficit	Deaths in transit accidents	Money in urban projects	Number of urban projects
Dictatorship Mayor Elected	-0.49 (0.44)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.07)	-3.85 (2.64)	-1.62 (3.19)
Observations	103	103	103	103	103
Avg. dependent variable	0.375	0.996	0.165	3.024	6.477

Notes: All regressions are weighted by 1992 population and control for the margin of victory in the 1992 election. The controls include the vote share in the presidential 1970 elections for Salvador Allende and Jorge Alessandri and the log distance to the regional and country's capital. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. The Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is 8.4. Significance level: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.