



Fail in Detection flow of AV, based “Malware Bazaar!”

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Introduction

The purpose of this document, it was to execute several efficiency and detection tests in our endpoint solution, provided by Cybereason, this document brings the result of the defensive security analysis with an offensive mindset performed in the execution of 185 different Malwares in our environment.

Regarding the test performed, the first objective it was to simulate targeted attacks using known malware to obtain a panoramic view of the resilience presented by the solution, with regard to the efficiency in its detection by signatures, NGAV and Machine Learning, downloading these artifacts directly on the victim's machine. The second objective consisted of analyzing the detection of those same 185 malwares (or those not detected yet) when they were changed directories, the idea here is to work with manipulation of samples (without execution).

With the final product, the front responsible for the product will have an instrument capable of guiding a process of mitigation and / or correction, as well as optimized improvement, based on the criticality of risks.

2.0.1 Scope

The efficiency and detection analysis had as target the Cybereason Endpoint Protection application (Cybereason Solution Cloud) in **Version 20.1.261.0**;
Installed in the windows machine **Windows 10 Pro**;
Hostname - **Threat-Hunting**, as you can see in the picture below:




Image 1.1: Windows 10 Education 2019 Virtual Machine

2.0.2 Project Summary

The execution of the security analysis tests of the Threat Hunting team it was carried out through the execution of 185 Malwares in a virtualized environment in a controlled way, simulating a real environment, together with their respective best practices of the security policies applied, the test occurred during **1 day**, without count the weekend, along with the making of this document. The intrusion test started on the **02nd of September** of the year 2020 and it was completed on the **03rd of September** of the same year.

1 Running the Tests

3.1 Description

A virtual machine with Windows 10 operating system it was deployed to perform the appropriate tests, as well as the creation of a security policy on the management platform (**ZUP - Threat Hunting - Policy**) e and applied to due device.




Image 1.2: Virtual Machine with Policy applied

The policy created was named **ZUP - Threat Hunting**, following the best practices recommended by the manufacturer, and, for testing purposes, all due actions were based on an aggressive detection method.




Image 1.3: Policy created by Cybereason Manager

3.2 First Test

The first stage of the tests was through the download of 185 malware, that it was uploaded from public repository known and maintained by the security community called **MalwareBazaar** (<https://bazaar.abuse.ch/>);

MalwareBazaar is a project from abuse.ch with the goal of sharing malware samples with the infosec community, AV vendors and threat intelligence providers.

MalwareBazaar creates daily batches of malware sample). The daily batches are created once a day at midnight (00:00 UTC). Please consider that it takes a few minutes to create the batch. So, I kindly ask you to not fetch the daily batch before 00:15 UTC.

The day choose for this test it was 2020-08-23

(<https://mb-api.abuse.ch/downloads/2020-08-23.zip>)




Image 1.4: Download 185 Malwares inside this Folders

The purpose of this test, it was to simulate the same process as a user receiving a zipped file (.zip) and performing the extraction of these artifacts in their own environment.

During this test, one thing called my attention:

- **First Detection** happened on **September 2, 2020 at 2:47:15 PM GMT-3**
- **Last Detection** happened on **September 2, 2020 at 3:23:48 PM GMT-3**

That is, we have a time gap with more than 30 min between the first and the last detection, that was the time it took for malwares to be detected.

















	8a2b137688d4114bc2678bb... Known malware	Disinfected	THREAT-HUNTING	September 2, 2020 at 3:23:48 PM GMT...
	2d30ed2b7cef34f949333c19...	Disinfected	threat-hunting	September 2, 2020 at 3:23:36 PM GMT...
	05bd182048dcc2fa8365755...	Disinfected	threat-hunting	September 2, 2020 at 3:23:24 PM GMT...
	24587d6ea3039f30e66126b...	Disinfected	threat-hunting	September 2, 2020 at 3:23:14 PM GMT...
	e0ae340425fbb9afd4a46334...	Disinfected	threat-hunting	September 2, 2020 at 3:23:02 PM GMT...
	c2a96c37b4beef66ee7b650c...	Disinfected	threat-hunting	September 2, 2020 at 3:22:48 PM GMT...
	454fe83bd5a26429ea01b37...	Disinfected	threat-hunting	September 2, 2020 at 3:22:35 PM GMT...
	429b96b0c9a715d0d7735ed...	Disinfected	threat-hunting	September 2, 2020 at 3:22:23 PM GMT...
	0425f6cf8c9cc7c507e76611...	Disinfected	threat-hunting	September 2, 2020 at 3:22:12 PM GMT...
	eb53e23731948b9e25082bc...	Disinfected	THREAT-HUNTING	September 2, 2020 at 2:48:25 PM GMT...
	05db4df57a4c8f7b40449be0...	Disinfected	THREAT-HUNTING	September 2, 2020 at 2:48:06 PM GMT...
	0333c87c90ad38e8b603e64...	Disinfected	THREAT-HUNTING	September 2, 2020 at 2:47:55 PM GMT...
	3ec4b4a38ee4f97bf1c60e99...	Disinfected	THREAT-HUNTING	September 2, 2020 at 2:47:43 PM GMT...
	ff8d201ff371f6b1fdd72a59c...	Disinfected	threat-hunting	September 2, 2020 at 2:47:33 PM GMT...
	1402ff4a99b35b0ff89ebd9a...	Disinfected	THREAT-HUNTING	September 2, 2020 at 2:47:23 PM GMT...
	f91e366088c0308d770dd8f7...	Disinfected	THREAT-HUNTING	September 2, 2020 at 2:47:15 PM GMT...

Image 1.5: Malware Alerts Detection by Cybereason

After performing the action of extracting the files, it was possible to verify in the *Cybereason* “**Malware Alerts**” logs that many malwares were detected, however it was possible to verify that there are currently **5 (five) Malwares** that, when executed inside the environment, could perform an infection.

All these malwares will be explored in the “Impact” tag.

3.3 Second Test

The second stage of the tests was through the transfer of folders to another directory within the same machine, the purpose of this test was to simulate a transfer of files within the same environment.




Image 1.6: New_Folder_CR – Malware manipulation

When a new file is generated on the disk, soon we should have a new entry in a block of that disk and in theory the antivirus should take some action (considering that it has the real time enabled), we could define it as a file manipulation (**still not running**) where the endpoint protection is already necessary, considering that a new directory was created, soon we would have a new repository with several new hashes inside to be examined.

One of these malwares that were within of the originally **Bazaar.ZIP** file, had other zip packet layer as you can see below.





Image 1.7: New extraction malicious

When we look in this file, with some researches we can find some information's about that.

0ab9857c799e33958581ad7b2b0a4e03e89e9f0ebfe204387fee5ed647ebd78f.zip

In Virus Total reference we can see that this file is known like **Malicious file**, by eleven different antivirus engines.



The screenshot shows the VirusTotal interface for a file. At the top, a red circle indicates that 11 out of 64 engines detected the file. Below this, the file's hash and name are displayed: 0ab9857c799e33958581ad7b2b0a4e03e89e9f0ebfe204387fee5ed647ebd78f and DOC-SCAN11713.pdf.gz. The file size is 435.18 KB, and it was scanned on 2020-08-20 at 04:20:35 UTC. The file is identified as a ZIP archive. Below this information, a table lists the detection results from various antivirus engines.

DETECTION	DETAILS	RELATIONS	COMMUNITY
AegisLab	ⓘ Trojan.ZIP.Generic.41c	Arcabit	ⓘ Trojan.Zmutzy.802
BitDefender	ⓘ Trojan.Zmutzy.802	Elastic	ⓘ Malicious (high Confidence)
FireEye	ⓘ Trojan.Zmutzy.802	Fortinet	ⓘ MSIL/GenKryptik.EQSOltr
Ikarus	ⓘ Win32.Outbreak	MAX	ⓘ Malware (ai Score=83)
Microsoft	ⓘ Trojan:Script/Wacatac.Cml	Sophos AV	ⓘ Mail/DroDZp-A
Yandex	ⓘ Trojan.AvaArher.bTJEKx	Ad-Aware	✓ Undetected
AhnLab-V3	✓ Undetected	Alibaba	✓ Undetected

Image 1.8: VirusTotal Detection

Other perspective is to try find any information in another kind of platforms, or others databases and to try find any reputation for this domain, I made an testing in **Maltiverse** platform, It is born as a service oriented to get used by cybersecurity analysts to research on indicators of compromise (IOCs), as you can see in the *prescreen* below provide by **Maltiverse** Platform.

The result of this test, brought to us that this file is **Malicious**.




Image 1.9: Maltiverse Detection

After this, I made other test in **Any.Run** platform, Cloud-based malware analysis service. Take your information security to the next level. Analyze suspicious and malicious activities using some innovative tools, the result of this test, brought to us the same result **Malicious** file.




Image 1.10: Any Run - Detection

After performing this new extraction of zip file, the Cybereason solution endpoint, blocked the file inside this zip packet as you can see below in the **"Malware Alerts"** log.



	doc-scan11713_pdf.exe Known malware	Disinfected	 threat-hunting	September 2, 2020 at 4:08:32 PM GMT...
Description Known malware was detected		Detection name f0dc7ded13463bae07d94e666e de8b50		Path c:\users\thor\documents\lab\cybereason\second_testing\bazaar.abuse\doc-scan11713_pdf.exe

Image 1.11: Detection logs about Manipulations files (without execution)

After the extraction, we can notice that the malware that had not previously been detected, started to be detected, the thing here in this case, is that there was the manipulation of the files (without execution) and after almost 20min he performed the **disinfected** action.

So, the question here is, how is it works? Detection by pattern? Signature? NGAV? ML?





















	db55b4096e5f74456b74442... Known malware	Disinfected	 THREAT-HUNTING	September 2, 2020 at 4:27:02 PM GMT...
	d5e3a626e77bf27e8e5f6af1... Known malware	Disinfected	 THREAT-HUNTING	September 2, 2020 at 4:26:50 PM GMT...
	64cd497a29a6801daa66b3c... Known malware	Disinfected	 THREAT-HUNTING	September 2, 2020 at 4:26:38 PM GMT...
	0d4355e6a9a2a306980b7e6... Known malware	Disinfected	 THREAT-HUNTING	September 2, 2020 at 4:26:26 PM GMT...
	0ab9857c799e33958581ad7... Known malware	Disinfected	 THREAT-HUNTING	September 2, 2020 at 4:26:13 PM GMT...
	db55b4096e5f74456b74442... Known malware	Disinfected	 THREAT-HUNTING	September 2, 2020 at 4:25:30 PM GMT...
	d5e3a626e77bf27e8e5f6af1... Known malware	Disinfected	 THREAT-HUNTING	September 2, 2020 at 4:25:17 PM GMT...
	64cd497a29a6801daa66b3c... Known malware	Disinfected	 THREAT-HUNTING	September 2, 2020 at 4:25:06 PM GMT...
	0d4355e6a9a2a306980b7e6... Known malware	Disinfected	 threat-hunting	September 2, 2020 at 4:24:54 PM GMT...
	0ab9857c799e33958581ad7... Known malware	Disinfected	 threat-hunting	September 2, 2020 at 4:24:41 PM GMT...

Image 1.9: Malware Alerts Detection

2 Impact

At the end of this test, it was possible to verify that there were **5 known malware** that, when executed inside the environment, may perform an infection.

➤ Problem during the first test - unzipping ZIP file (detection time)

- During this test it was possible to see that the Cybereason Endpoint Solution took almost 30 min to realize all detections in our environment test, that is, if the attack happened in the same time in the victim, this user could click in anyone of the samples and could be infected, because it's not clear how works the prevalence, maybe priority of the engine in the detection flow.

➤ Malicious Zip NOT Detected

- As we can see the sample (0ab9857c799e33958581ad7b2b0a4e03e89e9f0ebfe204387fee5ed647ebd78f.zip) it's not detected like a Malicious, we used three different source to prove that is sample it's malicious.

➤ File Manipulation (no execution) Problem during second test - unzipping ZIP file (detection time)

- During the last test it was possible to see that the Cybereason Endpoint Solution took almost 20 min to realize all detections in our environment test, that is, if the attack happened in the same time in the victim, this user could click in anyone of the samples and could be infected, because it's not clear how works the prevalence, maybe priority of the engine in the detection flow, but in this case, we are talking about just 10 malwares, that is, there was the manipulation of the files (without execution) and "just" after almost 20min he got performed the **disinfection** action.

➤ MALWARE INFORMATION

- **Backdoor.Linux.BASHLITE.SMJC3 | Unix Dropper MIRAI**

`hxxps://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/0d4355e6a9a2a306980b7e6fda7cdc04fdce2864dc8845a24b400e6196c70dc5/`

This Backdoor arrives on a system as a file dropped by other malware or as a file downloaded unknowingly by users when visiting malicious sites.

Backdoor Routine

This Backdoor executes the following commands from a remote malicious user:

UDP - UDP flood or UDP flood with random strings

XMAS - TCP flood (flags are set to high)

VSE - VSE flood or VSE flood with random strings

TCP - TCP flood with a flag set to high or all flags set to high (XMAS)


STD - UDP flood with specific strings.

HEX STOP - stop bot operation

```
1  SHA256 hash: 0d4355e6a9a2a306980b7e6fda7cdc04fdce2864dc8845a24b400e6196c70dc5
2  SHA3-384 hash:
2e9e9d572d5b03bd1ced6d12dfd5251ca9905bd85026a905390728fac687e6e6631fa68daa04052a0f8800f3290e6ca2
3  SHA1 hash: e8d372c5f43dcbadd587c61c6715f9a07b7ad01
4  MD5 hash: d170e954e8fcfed897a6a0e10cb603f4
5  File name: 0d4355e6a9a2a306980b7e6fda7cdc04fdce2864dc8845a24b400e6196c70dc5_65.174_x-8.6-.SN00PY
6  File size: 86'699 bytes
7  First seen: 2020-08-23 11:36:48 UTC
8  Last seen: Never
9  File type: elf
10 MIME type: application/x-executable
11 ssdeep 1536:n7crCbveWad7SkD+fPS7khLbN+7Fm3GOW3TeUmoIYu0Vje+ZNne:7tvebd7efPUY47FqGOWpnrYu0Vy+ZNne
12 TLSH 3B835B23A651C57BC08757F92BDBD5615423B8BE0B33720A73D8BDA92B26CC85D6D302
```

Intelligence

File Origin ⓘ

of uploads ⓘ: 1
of downloads ⓘ: 31
Origin country ⓘ:  FR
Mail intelligence ⓘ: No data

Vendor Threat Intelligence ⓘ

ClamAV Detected	+
CERT.PL MWDB	+
ReversingLabs TitaniumCloud Malicious	+
VirusTotal 50.88%	+
YOROI YOMI Legit	+

Image 1.11: Backdoor.Linux.BASHLITE – MalwareBazaar

- **Gen.Variant.Trojan Linux.GAFGYT | Linux Trojan MIRAI**

hxxps://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/64cd497a29a6801daa66b3ca23b63a1355b0b84fdf5a23a12810b88685b22f63/

This Backdoor arrives on a system as a file dropped by other malware or as a file downloaded unknowingly by users when visiting malicious sites.


```

1      SHA256 hash: 64cd497a29a6801daa66b3ca23b63a1355b0b84fdf5a23a12810b88685b22f63
2      SHA3-384 hash:
7232ac862e8f4db158e53ee793ddbc3458dab4b4e2acba36a973558ded458899b591f090aa1edda6c8ccf65ad7e0419
3      SHA1 hash: 5ab29bf2b71fe1114bb8f37bc515dfc78deee3b
4      MD5 hash: b9e122860983d035a21f6984a92bfb22
5      File name: SecuriteInfo.com.Gen.Variant.Trojan.Linux.Gafgyt.8.29135.1737
6      File size: 119'920 bytes
7      First seen: 2020-08-23 15:38:10 UTC
8      Last seen: Never
9      File type: elf
10     MIME type: application/x-executable
11     ssdeep 3072:W5dGAqDqP+gPYHwWi8JmEJh685UgyOmaAamsU:Wv3qDk+4Yw+mEGhaAoU
12     TLSH BEC3024132C767DAD4123E3820F688B16B7368613CF6AC2FEDE5F1D9BA0111BD2564B9

```

Intelligence

File Origin ⓘ

of uploads ⓘ: 1
 # of downloads ⓘ: 51
 Origin country ⓘ:  US
 Mail intelligence ⓘ: No data

Vendor Threat Intelligence ⓘ


ClamAV	Detected	+
CERT.PL MWDB		+
ReversingLabs TitaniumCloud	Malicious	-
Threat name: Linux.Trojan.Mirai Status: Malicious First seen: 2020-08-23 13:50:46 UTC AV detection: 20 of 47 (42.55%) Threat level:  5/5		
VirusTotal	20.69%	-
AV coverage: 20.69% AV detections: 12 / 58 Link: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/64cd497a29a6801daa66b3ca23b63a1355b0b84fdf5a23a12810b88685b22f63/detection/f-64cd497a29a6801daa66b3ca23b63a1355b0b84fdf5a23a12810b88685b22f63-1598184947		

Image 1.12: Gen.Variant.Trojan Linux.GAFGYT – MalwareBazaar

- **Trojan.Linux.ZYX.USELVF319 | Trojan GenericKD**

hxxps://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/d5e3a626e77bf27e8e5f6af1b4b4e9a10f920f0ed5f467cc6ef7bb488f073aba/

This Trojan arrives on a system as a file dropped by other malware or as a file downloaded unknowingly by users when visiting malicious sites. However, as of this writing, the said sites are inaccessible.

```

1      SHA256 hash: d5e3a626e77bf27e8e5f6af1b4b4e9a10f920f0ed5f467cc6ef7bb488f073aba
2      SHA3-384 hash:
0a58288993aaa631df3da8a33885d673a559ac449db90c89e0870512414d0e440fc277d11f37bc758f3dbd8944f2a0dc
3      SHA1 hash:      e767febe03335bf48f880edc9339892111cca672
4      MD5 hash:       1bbb0d45ba10d03b10b2ee581b738394
5      File name:      Trojan.GenericKD.42202203.11752.23239
6      File size:      27'512 bytes
7      First seen:     2020-08-23 07:39:13 UTC
8      Last seen:      Never
9      File type:       elf
10     MIME type:      application/x-executable
11     ssdeep   768:pymLLG2ABgyO4FFrkHZWlh77Ij0wkEC6rhwsy7:pymLLU1F5kHirIj0D6rhQ
12     TLSH     95C2F222069B06C2CB5372B1B35075947E39829FF53F2AA9072D9719328B57C50EB3B9

```

Intelligence

File Origin ⓘ

of uploads ⓘ: 1

of downloads ⓘ: 40

Origin country ⓘ: 🇫🇷 FR

Mail intelligence ⓘ: No data

Vendor Threat Intelligence ⓘ

ClamAV	Detected	—
Detection(s):	SecuriteInfo.com.Trojan.GenericKD.42202203.11752.23239.UNOFFICIAL	
CERT.PL MWDB		+
ReversingLabs TitaniumCloud	Malicious	+
VirusTotal	40.00%	—
AV coverage:	40.00%	
AV detections:	24 / 60	
Link:	https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/d5e3a626e77bf27e8e5f6af1b4b4e9a10f920f0ed5f467cc6ef7bb488f073aba/detection/f-d5e3a626e77bf27e8e5f6af1b4b4e9a10f920f0ed5f467cc6ef7bb488f073aba-1583362192	
YOROI YOMI	Gaigyt	+

Image 1.13: Trojan.Linux.ZYX.USELVF319 – Malware Bazaar

- **Backdoor.Linux.BASHLITE.SMJC2 | Unix Dropper Mirai**

hxxps://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/db55b4096e5f74456b7444272da9239bf96e048de51985f1809aa19b5a0877d7/

It arrives on a system as a file dropped by other malware or as a file downloaded unknowingly by users when visiting malicious sites. Execute commands from a malicious remote user that endangers the affected system.

```

1      SHA256 hash:  db55b4096e5f74456b7444272da9239bf96e048de51985f1809aa19b5a0877d7
2      SHA3-384 hash:
4c6868c2a8b6afd919e67ff0b6e0dc06c892e169665db2f261b1847de1af0505a710c7012ca229834c27e7e14bb6979d
3      SHA1 hash:    1395dc885d0d7d01a0f0f8a1528152e516788140
4      MD5 hash:     7ef22b7cc08767f79b7a04bb39685eec
5      File name:    db55b4096e5f74456b7444272da9239bf96e048de51985f1809aa19b5a0877d7_5.174_a-r.m-6.SN00PY
6      File size:    112'344 bytes
7      First seen:   2020-08-23 11:36:26 UTC
8      Last seen:    Never
9      File type:    elf
10     MIME type:    application/x-executable
11     ssdeep
1536:SKnh/pSWla6DY9MoTi/9lgtZWu2Vjg5KqwLYIoD+hxg5CNIZdWZbmwMQOW8fXAOn:farKlgtZWuMg32roDBCNHbmTQOWsXAOn
12     TLSH          97B32901D5508B17C2D2277AB79F825D37332BA8979B33125A248FF42BC279D1E3A521

```

Intelligence

File Origin ⓘ

of uploads ⓘ: 1
 # of downloads ⓘ: 30
 Origin country ⓘ: 🇫🇷 FR
 Mail intelligence ⓘ: No data

Vendor Threat Intelligence ⓘ

ClamAV	Detected	—
Detection(s):	SecuriteInfo.com.Linux.Siggen.2205.UNOFFICIAL Unix.Dropper.Mirai-7139232-0 Unix.Trojan.Mirai-7582945-0 Unix.Trojan.Gafgyt-7643791-0 Unix.Trojan.Mirai-7645947-0 Unix.Trojan.Gafgyt-7785026-0	
CERT.PL MWDB		+
ReversingLabs TitaniumCloud	Malicious	+
VirusTotal	53.57%	—
AV coverage:	53.57%	
AV detections:	30 / 56	
Link:	https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/db55b4096e5f74456b7444272da9239bf96e048de51985f1809aa19b5a0877d7/detection/f-db55b4096e5f74456b7444272da9239bf96e048de51985f1809aa19b5a0877d7-1598182592	

Image 1.13: Backdoor.Linux.BASHLITE.SMJC2 – Malware Bazaar

3 Recommendation Actions

As we mentioned before, the idea it was execute test in many malwares, and this case, for this reason to be totally known the following actions will be taken to improve the protection environment of our assets:

- This report it was sent to Cybereason to validate with them how the detection flow for known malware works, and understand why these 5 malwares didn't detect in the first test, and to try understand the detection time;
- Validate the performance of NGAV and Machine Learning, regarding this type of detection;
- The best practices of the configurations should be revalidated with the Cybereason team;
- Double checking with all policies implemented at the customer that bought the solution;

4 Answers from Cybereason Company

As we mentioned before, the idea it was execute test in many malwares, and this case to bring the result of the defensive security analysis with an offensive mindset performed in the execution of 185 different Malwares in our environment.

We opened a support case with the Cybereason support team on **September 03th** as you can see below




Image 1.15: Report to manufacturer

As this is a **Very Critical** problem, the answer should happen in 3 hours, but in some conversation with Customer Success Managers, Support Managers, Director Customers and VP from Cybereason, it was requested to wait 72 hours to us receive any answer, but it's not happened.

After 5 days (125 hours) I needed to send another email requesting some answer, and I receive another generic answer:

Apologies for the delay in response but this email will have to be escalated to our detections and product teams who will be able to answer the questions in the document with a deeper understanding. "@CustomerSucessManager" Can this email be escalated over to the support/detections team who will be able to give a better explanation on why or why not certain types of malware was detected or not.

And until now **(18/09/2020)** we didn't receive any answer provide by manufacturer.

By the end, a simple question that we need to do in those cases is:

Why didn't Cybereason detect them? ...What engine didn't work well? Or maybe, Which flow failed? Detection by pattern? Signature? NGAV? ML? We need to have (if possible) answers for these questions.