



Hunting the Hunters: Detection and Efficiency Testing of Endpoint Security Sensors



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1 Introduction

The purpose of this document, it was to execute several efficiency and detection tests in our endpoint solution, provided by Sophos, this document brings the result of the defensive security analysis with an offensive mindset performed in the execution of 27 folders download with **Malwares by The Zoo** repository in our environment.

Regarding the test performed, the first objective it was to simulate targeted attacks using known malware to obtain a panoramic view of the resilience presented by the solution, with regard to the efficiency in its detection by signatures, downloading these artifacts directly on the victim's machine. The second objective consisted of analyzing the detection of those same 27 folders download with Malwares (or those not detected yet) when they were changed directories, the idea here is to work with manipulation of samples (without execution), and the third focal objective it was the execution of a *ScanNow* inside victim's machines for effectiveness analysis.

With the final product, the front responsible for the product will have an instrument capable of guiding a process of mitigation and / or correction, as well as optimized improvement, based on the criticality of risks.

2.0.1 Scope

The efficiency and detection analysis had as target the Cybereason Endpoint Protection application (<https://cloud.sophos.com>) in **Version** :

- **Agent Version = 10.8.9 VE3.79.0**
- **Core Agent – 2.10.7 BETA**
- **Endpoint Advanced 10.8.9.1 BETA**
- **Sophos Intercept X 2.0.17 BETA**
- **Device Encryption 2.0.82**

Installed in the windows machine `Windows 10 Pro`;

Hostname - `Threat-Hunting-Win10-POC`, as you can see in the picture below:




Image 1.1: Windows 10 Pro 2019 Virtual Machine

2.02 Project Summary

The execution of the security analysis tests of the Threat Hunting team it was carried out through the execution of 42 Malwares in a virtualized environment in a controlled way, simulating a real environment, together with their respective best practices of the security policies applied, the test occurred during **2 days**, without count the weekend, along with the making of this document. The intrusion test started on the **24th of September** of the year 2020 and it was completed on the **28th of September** of the same year.

2 Running the Tests

3.1 Description

A virtual machine with Windows 10 operating system it was deployed to perform the appropriate tests, as well as the creation of a security policy on the management platform ([Threat-Hunting-Win10-POC](#)) e and applied to due device.

SOPHOS

CENTRAL

Admin

Endpoint Protection

Back to Overview

ANALYZE

Dashboard

Logs & Reports

MANAGE PROTECTION

People

Computers

CONFIGURE

Policies

Settings

Protect Devices

MORE PRODUCTS

Free Trials

Endpoint Protection - Threat-Hunting-Win10-POC\Thor

Overview / Endpoint Protection Dashboard / Users / Threat-Hunting-Win10-POC\Thor

Threat-Hunting-Win10-POC\T...

Exchange Login: None

Edit | Delete User

SUMMARY

DEVICES (1)

Threat-Hunting-Win10-POC

Windows 10

SOPHOS

Status

Eventos

Detecções

Início de sessão admin

Status de atualização

Última atualização: quinta-feira, 24 de setembro de 2020 18:14

Atualizar Agora

Produtos

Core Agent 2.10.7 BETA

Endpoint Advanced 10.8.9.1 BETA

Sophos Intercept X 2.0.17 BETA

Device Encryption 2.0.81

Solução de Problemas

Abrir a ferramenta Endpoint Self Help

Fórum da comunidade

Informação legal

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Ajuda | Informações

Image 1.2: Virtual Machine with Policy applied

The policy created was named **Threat-Hunting-Win10-POC**, following the best practices recommended by the manufacturer, and, for testing purposes, all due actions were based on an aggressive detection method.

Encryption - Threat-Hunting-Win10-POC

Overview / Encryption Dashboard / Computers / Threat-Hunting-Win10-POC

Help

Filipi Pires

Zup Innovation

Super Admin

Threat-Hunting-Win10-POC

Windows 10

IP: 192.168.106.138

Last User: Thor

Isolate

Update now

Delete

Live Response (Beta)

More actions

SUMMARY

EVENTS

STATUS

POLICIES

Policies below apply to Threat-Hunting-Win10-POC.

TYPE	NAME
Encryption: Device Encryption	Base Policy - Device Encryption
Endpoint Protection: Application Control (user)	Threat Hunting - POC
Endpoint Protection: Data Loss Prevention (user)	Threat Hunting - POC
Endpoint Protection: Windows Firewall (device)	Threat Hunting - POC
Endpoint Protection: Peripheral Control (user)	Threat Hunting - POC
Endpoint Protection: Threat Protection (user)	Threat Hunting - POC
Endpoint Protection: Update Management (device)	Threat Hunting - POC
Endpoint Protection: Web Control (user)	Threat Hunting - POC

Image 1.3: Policy created by Sophos Central

3.2 First Test

The first stage of the tests was through the download of 27 folders with many different kind of malwares, all of which are already known to be older, all of them are in the public repository known and maintained by the security community called **The Zoo** (<https://github.com/ytisf/theZoo/tree/master/malwares/Binaries>);




Image 1.4: Download 27 Folders with malicious files

The purpose of this test was to simulate the same process as a user receiving a zipped file (.zip) and performing the extraction of these artifacts in their own environment.

Nome	Data de modificação	Tipo	Tamanho
__NEW_FOLDER__	24/09/2020 19:30	Pasta de arquivos	
Linux.Chapros.A	24/09/2020 18:53	Pasta de arquivos	
MacOSK.Lazarus	24/09/2020 18:50	Pasta de arquivos	
MacSecurity.app	04/05/2011 19:51	Pasta de arquivos	
Win32DirCrypt.Trojan.Ransom.ABZ	24/09/2020 18:51	Pasta de arquivos	
Backdoor.MSIL.Tyupkin.zip	27/08/2020 17:19	Arquivo ZIP do Wi...	575 KB
CryptoLocker_10Sep2013.zip	27/08/2020 17:19	Arquivo ZIP do Wi...	283 KB
EquationGroup.DoubleFantasy.zip	27/08/2020 17:20	Arquivo ZIP do Wi...	92 KB
EquationGroup.EquationDrug.zip	27/08/2020 17:20	Arquivo ZIP do Wi...	331 KB
EquationGroup.EquationLaser.zip	01/09/2020 16:57	Arquivo ZIP do Wi...	76 KB
EquationGroup.Fanny.zip	27/08/2020 17:20	Arquivo ZIP do Wi...	99 KB
I-Worm.NewLove.zip	31/05/2004 20:00	Arquivo ZIP do Wi...	77 KB
I-WORM-1.VBS	09/01/2019 20:40	Arquivo de script ...	3 KB
Linux.Chapros.A.zip	27/08/2020 17:20	Arquivo ZIP do Wi...	214 KB
Linux.Encoder.1.zip	27/08/2020 17:21	Arquivo ZIP do Wi...	1.076 KB
loveletter.VBS	09/01/2019 20:40	Arquivo de script ...	3 KB
OSK.Lazarus.zip	27/08/2020 17:21	Arquivo ZIP do Wi...	33.348 KB
OSK.MacSecurity.zip	27/08/2020 17:21	Arquivo ZIP do Wi...	1.996 KB
Ransomware.Cerber.zip	27/08/2020 17:21	Arquivo ZIP do Wi...	216 KB
Ransomware.Cryptowall.zip	27/08/2020 17:21	Arquivo ZIP do Wi...	101 KB
Ransomware.Igswa.zip	27/08/2020 17:21	Arquivo ZIP do Wi...	240 KB
Ransomware.Mamba.zip	27/08/2020 17:21	Arquivo ZIP do Wi...	1.064 KB
Salaty_627B8095B1024A0DDF0A01BF9AFF803	24/09/2020 18:48	Arquivo	20 KB
soy.exe	09/12/2019 14:48	Aplicativo	65 KB
Variant.Kazy.zip	27/08/2020 17:23	Arquivo ZIP do Wi...	53 KB
VBS.Carnival.zip	27/08/2020 17:23	Arquivo ZIP do Wi...	3 KB
VBS.NewLove.A.zip	27/08/2020 17:23	Arquivo ZIP do Wi...	77 KB
Win32.AgentTesla.zip	27/08/2020 17:23	Arquivo ZIP do Wi...	327 KB
Win32.APT28.SekoiaRootkit.zip	27/08/2020 17:23	Arquivo ZIP do Wi...	14 KB
Win32.APT32.WindShield.zip	27/08/2020 17:24	Arquivo ZIP do Wi...	121 KB
Win32.KeyPass.zip	27/08/2020 17:24	Arquivo ZIP do Wi...	1.294 KB
Win32.Sality.zip	27/08/2020 17:25	Arquivo ZIP do Wi...	29 KB
Win32.Stuxnet.A.Duqu-C-Media.zip	27/08/2020 17:24	Arquivo ZIP do Wi...	13 KB
Win32.Stuxnet.B.Duqu-Realtek.zip	27/08/2020 17:25	Arquivo ZIP do Wi...	56 KB
Win32.ZeroClear.zip	27/08/2020 17:25	Arquivo ZIP do Wi...	561 KB
Win32DirCrypt.Trojan.Ransom.ABZ.zip	27/08/2020 17:25	Arquivo ZIP do Wi...	764 KB
ZeroLocker.zip	27/08/2020 17:25	Arquivo ZIP do Wi...	255 KB

Image 1.5: Extraction of 26 Folders with malicious files

After performing the action of extracting the files, it was possible to verify that Sophos Security Endpoint there were currently **4 (four) Malwares** that, when executed inside the environment, could perform an infection.

The VirusTotal window shows the following detections:

- GData: Trojan.Agent.EJCG
- Ikarus: Trojan.Win64.Dustman
- Jiangmin: Trojan.Agent.cobol
- K7AntiVirus: Trojan (0055a12e1)
- K7GW: Trojan (0055a12e1)
- Kaspersky: Trojan.Win64.Agent.ily
- MAX: Malware (a Score=82)
- McAfee: Disttrack
- Microsoft: Trojan.Win32(Zleare.A)
- NANO-Antivirus: Ransomware.Win64.BadBot.gny.cpd
- Panda: Trj/CIA
- Qihoo-360: Win4/Trojan.4db
- Rising: Trojan.Agent.BE (CLOUD)
- Sophos AV: Trj/Agent-BD.HK
- Symantec: Trojan.Gen.2
- Tencent: Win4.Trojan.Agent.Suwei
- TrendMicro: TRJO_GEN.R002C0DAF20
- TrendMicro-HouseCall: TRJO_GEN.R002C0DAF20
- VBA32: Trojan.Win64.Agent

Image 1.6: Malwares Not Detection by Sophos

3.3 Second Test

The second stage of the tests was through the transfer of folders to another directory within the same machine, the purpose of this test was to simulate a transfer of files within the same environment.




Image 1.7: ___NEW_FOLDER___(Sophoo) – Malware manipulation

When a new file is generated on the disk, soon we should have a new entry in a block of that disk and in theory the antivirus should take some action (considering that it has the real time enabled), we could define it as a file manipulation (still not running) where the endpoint protection is already necessary, considering that a new directory was created, soon we would have a new repository with several hashes inside to be examined..

After performing this second test, we saw that the same 4 malwares there were detected yet, as we can see below and mentioned earlier, all these malware were already known and validated even in the tool about antivirus scanning known as a Virus Total (<https://virustotal.com>).




Image 1.8: Malwares – Not Detected

3.4 Third Test

The third stage of the tests was through the use of the *ScanNow* action by Cloud Sophos, to perform a complete scan on the machine, manually, in this way, all malware should be eliminated, as they are already known malware as mentioned earlier.




Image 1.9: Malwares – Not Detected after *ScanNow*

After performing this third test and the execution of the *ScanNow* feature, we saw that the same 4 malwares there were detected yet, as we can see below and mentioned earlier, even all these malwares were already known.




Image 1.10: Malwares – Not Detected after ScanNow

3 Impact and Risk

At the end of this test, it was possible to verify that there are currently 4 known malware that, when executed inside the environment, may perform an infection.

➤ Problem during the first test - unzipping ZIP file (Not Blocked)

- During this test it was possible to see that the Sophos Endpoint Solution didn't block many ZIP files, all of them known as a malicious file, if the attack happened in the same time in the victim, this user could click in anyone of the samples and could be infected, because it's not clear how works the prevalence, maybe priority of the engine in the detection flow.

➤ Malicious .Zip files NOT Detected

- As we can see the sample (I-Worm.NewLove.zip | hash-2246a1a31f8ef272a8ac44c97d383d0607d86ddf4509a176b157853d9c6e0028) it's not detected like a Malicious.

➤ Malicious ELF files Not Detected in the second test.

- ELF file not detected even though malicious; In our test environment, wouldn't be dangerous, because our environment it was Windows, but

should be block but it was not detected.

➤ **Malicious files Not Detected in the third test after *ScanNow*.**

- *ELF* file not detected even though malicious; In our test environment, wouldn't be dangerous, because our environment it was Windows, but should be block but it was not detected.

➤ **MALWARES NOT BLOCKED / ATTACK VECTOR**

- **I-Worm.NewLove**

`hxxps://github.com/ytisf/theZoo/tree/master/malwares/Binaries/VBS.NewLove.`
A

Basic Properties

MD5 95f4156f23d61b1b888d3b3bb87b6d72

SHA-1 09d2470d17821728cd1da95186f5f51272634287

SHA-256 2246a1a31f8ef272a8ac44c97d383d0607d86ddf4509a176b157853d9c6e0028

Vhash 773a411c5a56087d4d7c5cc36bbf2901

SSDEEP

1536:cfY1wBDtr94PLDcwZANv1pG1ZuQK100ksk/L1xVCXJW5C6U7EjSRVve0:R1wBJoL4F1w6QK1
qFnVCXJYCF7a0

Names

I-Worm.NewLove.zip

output.149790737.txt;

Worm-type malware, with high criticality, associated with the execution of VBS - Visual Basic Script, we have as a characteristic high propagation within the environment in which it is executed.




Image 1.10: • I-Worm.NewLove.zip – VirusTotal

- **Win32.ZeroCleare (soy.exe)**

[hxxps://github.com/ytisf/theZoo/tree/master/malwares/Binaries/Win32.ZeroCleare](https://github.com/ytisf/theZoo/tree/master/malwares/Binaries/Win32.ZeroCleare)

Trojan-type malware, which has a dropper behavior, and is responsible for downloading other malware within the victim's environment, developed for Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1 and Windows 10 operating systems.

Basic Properties

MD5 c04236b5678af08c8b70a7aa696f87d5

SHA-1 4b713963f7f7032dda431d8042344febac017cf2

SHA-256 17cc26eb17b5562423dd47ddf6c3bbda34e69c0c65027fe659a9c0becf8438ef

Vhash cbfe429774b42621c19bbebf0681ac1

SSDEEP

1536:wYFJsIiHyVaM2frJe31Uod74Fru71mTuscFDoRZe6m/fqhuFOnto7:wcWIiHmM81kFyJmTvcBoze6m3qT2

Names

soy.exe

output.149792855.txt;

17cc26eb17b5562423dd47ddf6c
3bbda34e69c0c65027fe659a9c0
becf8438ef

Basic Properties

Type

Size

First Seen

Last Seen

Submissions

File Name

ZIP

64.49 kB

2020-01-15 11:43:16

2020-04-28 00:59:24

3

soy.exe

Relations

It doesn't have relations.

[Expand using new intelligence search](#)

Detections

42 / 64

Please, introduce 3 or more characters to perform a search in the graph

Image 1.11: Win32.ZeroCleare (soy.exe) - VirusTotal

- **OSX.Lazarus**

`hxxps://github.com/ytisf/theZoo/blob/master/malwares/Binaries/OSX.Lazarus/`

Basic Properties

```
MD5      bb66ab2db0bad88ac6b829085164cbbb
```

SHA-1 b16fcd3f5afe5298c7db9128fb057fed66461cf

SHA-256 ae4be6343ba403a264c0f0e5ccff169648dc854f0a71d6509f38b018ce325042

SSDEEP 393216:PB1L7fxLRsW73YjCet0N10FHuFQdpEMcKY66o:b7f5Rswoj4CJuGdpc66o

Names

```
BitcoinTrader.pkg;
```

Malware developed for MacOS environments, focusing on cryptocurrency developed by Lazarus Group (APT group).




Image 1.12: OSX.Lazarus - VirusTotal

- **The_injected_iFrame_java-cve-2012-1723**

`hxxps://github.com/ytisf/theZoo/tree/master/malwares/Binaries/Linux.Chapros.A`

Basic Properties

MD5 2bd88b0f267e5aa5ec00d1452a63d9dc
 SHA-1 d01f76f5467c86bfa266c429e1315e7aad821f93
 SHA-256 a70a8891829344ad3db818b3c4ad76e38a78b0ce3c43d7aaf65752fe56d10e09
 Vhash 03fc64a044d19b92f3ce659f6ee3b940
 SSDEEP 768:+8YnvovLx9vqu8UvRRToT2Sv4LoM0kit/1a0c0:+8YWF1XMAF0kj0

Names

2bd88b0f267e5aa5ec00d1452a63d9dc_the_injected_iFrame_java-cve-2012-1723
 the_injected_iFrame_java-cve-2012-1723
 java-cve-2012-1723
 a70a8891829344ad3db818b3c4ad76e38a78b0ce3c43d7aaf65752fe56d10e09.bin
 d01f76f5467c86bfa266c429e1315e7aad821f93_jar.jar
 2BD88B0F267E5AA5EC00D1452A63D9DC
 jar.jar
 nYCND
 the_injected_iFrame_java-cve-2012-1723.infected;

Java Exploit

Unspecified vulnerability in the **Java Runtime Environment (JRE)** component in Oracle Java SE 7 update 4 and earlier, 6 update 32 and earlier, 5 update 35 and earlier, and 1.4.2_37 and earlier allows remote attackers to affect confidentiality, integrity, and availability via unknown vectors related to Hotspot.




Image 1.13: The_injected_iFrame_java-cve-2012-1723 - VirusTotal

4 Recommendation Actions


As we mentioned before, the idea it was execute test in many malwares, and this case, for this reason to be totally known the following actions will be taken to improve the protection environment of our assets:

- This report was sent to Sophos Security Team to validate with them how the detection flow for known malware works, and why these 4 malwares didn't detect;
- Validate the performance of NGAV, Machine Learning and other components, regarding this type of detection;
- The best practices of the configurations will be revalidated with the Sophos team;

5 Answers from Sophos Company

As we mentioned before, the idea it was execute test in many malwares, and this case to bring the result of the defensive security analysis with an offensive mindset performed in the execution of 27 folders different Malwares in our environment.

We sent this email request information's with the Sophos Support team on **September 28th** as you can see below



But for my surprise, after fifteen days (on **October 13th**), we received an unbelievable and generic answer about the test.

