Threat Hunting Labs Engines problems in Cybereason AV

ZUP Security Labs at Zup Innovation

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Abstract

There are a large number of cyber threats today, many of these cyber threats can be based on malicious code, one of this code is known as Malware (Malicious Software or Maldoc - Malicious Document) to refer these kinds of threats. The term Malware, is a generic term that covers all types of programs specifically developed to perform malicious actions on a computer, thus the term malware has become the name for any type of program specifically developed to perform harmful actions and malicious activities on a compromised system. This paper presents how it is possible to execute several efficiency and detection tests in endpoint solution, provided by Cybereason, this document brings the result of the defensive security analysis with an offensive mindset performed in the execution of 42 different Malwares in controlled environment, using three different techniques simulating a real-attack, with the final result, the front responsible for the product will have an instrument capable of guiding a process of mitigation and / or correction, as well as optimized improvement, based on the criticality of risks..

Keywords: MalwareAnalysis, Anti-Virus, ThreatHunting,Security.

1 Introduction

The purpose of this document, it was to execute several efficiency and detection tests in our endpoint solution, provided by Cybereason, this document brings the result of the defensive security analysis with an offensive mindset performed in the execution of 42 different Malwares in our environment.

Regarding the test performed, the first objective it was to simulate targeted attacks using known malware to obtain a panoramic view of the resilience presented by the solution, with regard to the efficiency in its detection by signatures, downloading these artifacts directly on the victim's machine. The second objective consisted of analyzing the detection of those same 42 malwares (or those not detected yet) when they were changed directories, the idea here is to work with manipulation of samples (without execution), and the third focal objective it was the execution of a *fullscan* inside victim's machines for effectiveness analysis.

With the final product, the front responsible for the product will have an instrument capable of guiding a process of mitigation and / or correction, as well as optimized improvement, based on the criticality of risks.

2.0.1 Scope

The efficiency and detection analysis had as target the Cybereason Endpoint Protection application (`Cybereason Cloud Solution`) in **Version 20.1.261.0;**
Installed in the windows machine `Windows 10 Education 2019`;
Hostname - `Threat-Hunting-win10`, as you can see in the picture below:



Image 1.1: Windows 10 Education 2019 Virtual Machine

2.0.2 Project Summary

The execution of the security analysis tests of the Threat Hunting team it was carried out through the execution of 42 Malwares in a virtualized environment in a controlled way, simulating a real environment, together with their respective best practices of the security policies applied , the test occurred during **4 days**, without count the weekend, along with the making of this document. The intrusion test started on the **12th of August** of the year 2020 and it was completed on the **18th of August** of the same year.

2 Running the Tests

3.1 Description

A virtual machine with Windows 10 operating system it was deployed to perform the appropriate tests, as well as the creation of a security policy on the management platform (`ZUP - Threat Hunting - Policy`) e and applied to due device.



Image 1.2: Virtual Machine with Policy applied

The policy created was named **`ZUP - Threat Hunting`**, following the best practices recommended by the manufacturer, and, for testing purposes, all due actions were based on an aggressive detection method.



Image 1.3: Policy cretead by Cybereason Manager

3.2 First Test

The first stage of the tests was through the download of 26 folders containing a total of 42 malware, all of which are already known to be older, all of them are in the public repository known and maintained by the security community called **The Zoo** (https://github.com/ytisf/theZoo/tree/master/malwares/Binaries);



Image 1.4: Download 26 Folders with malicious files

The purpose of this test was to simulate the same process as a user receiving a zipped file (`.zip`) and performing the extraction of these artifacts in their own environment.



Image 1.5: Extraction of 26 Folders with malicious files

After performing the action of extracting the files, it was possible to verify in the cybereason "***Malware Alerts***" logs that only 12 malwares were detected.



Image 1.6: Malware Alerts Detection Cybereason

3.3 Second Test

The second stage of the tests was through the transfer of folders to another directory within the same machine, the purpose of this test was to simulate a transfer of files within the same environment.



Image 1.7: New Folder (Cybereason Folder) – Malware manipulation

When a new file is generated on the disk, soon we should have a new entry in a block of that disk and in theory the antivirus should take some action (considering that it has the real time enabled), we could define it as a file manipulation (still not running) where the endpoint protection is already necessary, considering that a new directory was created, soon we would have a new repository with several hashes inside to be examined..

Name	Detection name	Machine name	Detection time UTC	Status
zerolocker.exe	Trojan.AgentWDCR.CED	THREAT-HUNTING-	August 13 at 23:08	Disinfected
c161134bf333.exe	Trojan.Dropper.ZCI	THREAT-HUNTING-	August 13 at 23:07	Disinfected
4bfe2216ee.exe	Trojan.GenericKD.3703072	threat-hunting-win10	August 13 at 23:07	Deleting on restart
4bfe2216ee.exe	Trojan.GenericKD.3703072	threat-hunting-win10	August 13 at 23:07	Deleting on restart
locky.exe	Trojan.GenericKD.3048400	THREAT-HUNTING-	August 13 at 23:06	Disinfected
doublefantasy.exe	Trojan.Agent.BHVP	THREAT-HUNTING-	August 13 at 23:04	Disinfected
jigsaw.exe	Trojan.AgentWDCR.GLX	THREAT-HUNTING-	August 13 at 23:03	Disinfected
{71257279-042b-371d-a1d3-fbf8d2fadffa}.exe	Trojan.Agent.BBPC	threat-hunting-win10	August 12 at 23:11	Disinfected
agent.exe	Trojan.Agent.EJPD	threat-hunting-win10	August 12 at 23:11	Disinfected
dustman.exe	Trojan.GenericKD.43363856	threat-hunting-win10	August 12 at 23:10	Disinfected
clientupdate.exe (x86).bin	Trojan.GenericKD.41568057	threat-hunting-win10	August 12 at 23:10	Disinfected
clientupdate.exe (x64).bin	Gen:Variant.Johnnie.211399	threat-hunting-win10	August 12 at 23:10	Disinfected
win32.keypass.bin	Dropped:Generic.Ransom.KeyPass.887F95AB	threat-hunting-win10	August 12 at 23:10	Disinfected
win32.agenttesla.exe	Gen:Variant.Razy.252302	threat-hunting-win10	August 12 at 23:09	Disinfected
21.exe	Gen:Variant.Graftor.18277	threat-hunting-win10	August 12 at 23:09	Disinfected
26b4699a7b9eeb16e76305d843d4ab05e94d43f320143	Trojan.Ransom.Petya.C	threat-hunting-win10	August 12 at 23:09	Disinfected
4c1dc737915d76b7ce579abddaba74ead6fdb5b519a1e	Trojan.Ransom.AUC	threat-hunting-win10	August 12 at 23:09	Disinfected
cryptowall.bin	Trojan.GenericKD.2080196	threat-hunting-win10	August 12 at 23:08	Disinfected
cerber.exe	Trojan.GenericKDZ.39212	threat-hunting-win10	August 12 at 23:08	Disinfected
ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439	Trojan.Ransom.WannaCryptor.A	THREAT-HUNTING-	August 12 at 19:42	Disinfected
131.exe	Gen:Variant.Ransom.HDDCrypt.1	THREAT-HUNTING-	August 12 at 19:41	Disinfected
invoice_2318362983713_823931342io.pdf.exe	Trojan.WLDCR.C	THREAT-HUNTING-	August 12 at 19:40	Disinfected
tasksche.exe	Trojan.Ransom.WannaCryptor.A	THREAT-HUNTING-	August 12 at 19:39	Disinfected

Image 1.8: Detection logs about Manipulations files (without execution)

After performing this second test, we noticed that only 2 more threats were detected, but there were still many malware that had not been detected, as we can see below, as mentioned earlier, all these malware were already known and validated even in the tool about antivirus scanning known as a Virus Total (`https://virustotal.com`).



Image 1.9: Backdoor Known – Not Detected

Other threats that were created by APT (Advanced Persistent Threats) groups like Lazarus Groups in other more.



Image 1.10: Lazarus Malwares – Not Detected

In addition to this evidence, there are other types of better-known malware associated with organizations that run APTS, such as:

- EquationGroup (Malicious PE)
- Linux Chapro (Malicious ELF)
- Linux Enconder (Malicious ELF)
- MacOS – Lazarus (Malicous Mach-o)
- Malware in PDF (Maldoc Sample)

3.4 Third Test

The third stage of the tests was through the use of the *fullscan* function by Cybereason Manager, to perform a complete scan of the entire disk, manually, in this way, all malware should be eliminated, as they are already known malware as mentioned earlier.



Image 1.11: Malwares – Not Detected after *FullScan*

3 Impact and Risk

At the end of this test, it was possible to verify that there are currently 3 known malware that, when executed inside the environment, may perform an infection.

- **Problem during the first test - unzipping ZIP file (Not Blocked)**
  - During this test it was possible to see that the Cybereason Endpoint Solution didn't block many ZIP files, all of them known as a malicious file, if the attack happened in the same time in the victim, this user could click in anyone of the samples and could be infected, because it's not clear how works the prevalence, maybe priority of the engine in the detection flow.
- **Malicious .Zip files NOT Detected**
  - As we can see the sample (`I-Worm.NewLove.zip | hash-2246a1a31f8ef272a8ac44c97d383d0607d86ddf4509a176b157853d9c6e0028`) it's not detected like a Malicious.
- **Malicious EXE files Not Detected in the second test.**
  - PE files not detected even though malicious; it was not detected.
- **Malicious PDF file Not Detected in the second test.**
  - *DLL* files not detected even though malicious; it was not detected.
- **Malicious ELF files Not Detected in the second test.**
  - *ELF* file not detected even though malicious; In our test environment, wouldn't be dangerous, because our environment it was Windows, but should be block but it was not detected.
- **Malicious files Not Detected in the third test after *fullscan*.**
  - *ELF* file not detected even though malicious; In our test environment, wouldn't be dangerous, because our environment it was Windows, but should be block but it was not detected.

➢ MALWARES INFORMATION NOT BLOCKED

- **I-Worm.NewLove**

hxxps://github.com/ytisf/theZoo/tree/master/malwares/Binaries/VBS.NewLove.A

Worm-type malware, with high criticality, associated with the execution of VBS - Visual Basic Script, we have as a characteristic high propagation within the environment in which it is executed.

```
Basic Properties
MD5    95f4156f23d61b1b888d3b3bb87b6d72
SHA-1  09d2470d17821728cd1da95186f5f51272634287
SHA-256      2246a1a31f8ef272a8ac44c97d383d0607d86ddf4509a176b157853d9c6e0028
Vhash  773a411c5a56087d4d7c5cc36bbf2901
SSDEEP
       1536:cfY1wBDtr94PLDcwZANv1pG1ZuQK10Oksk/L1xVCXJW5C6U7EjSRVveO:R1wBJoL4F1w6QK1
qFnVCXJYCF7aO

File type    ZIP
Magic  Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract

History
First Submission    2019-03-14 07:22:02
Last Submission     2020-02-20 02:59:21
Last Analysis       2020-03-22 19:37:09
Earliest Contents Modification  2000-07-21 12:55:20
Latest Contents Modification    2001-09-21 20:20:26

Names
I-Worm.NewLove.zip
output.149790737.txt
```



Image 1.12: • I-Worm.NewLove.zip – VirusTotal

- **Win32.ZeroCleare (soy.exe)**

https://github.com/ytisf/theZoo/tree/master/malwares/Binaries/Win32.ZeroCleare

Trojan-type malware, which has a dropper behavior, and is responsible for downloading other malware within the victim's environment, developed for Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1 and Windows 10 operating systems.

```
Basic Properties
MD5    c04236b5678af08c8b70a7aa696f87d5
SHA-1  4b713963f7f7032dda431d8042344febac017cf2
SHA-256      17cc26eb17b5562423dd47ddf6c3bbda34e69c0c65027fe659a9c0becf8438ef
Vhash  cbfe429774b42621c19bbecbf0681ac1
SSDEEP
       1536:wYFJsIiHyVaM2frJe31Uod74Fru71mTUscFDoRZe6m/fqhuFOnto7:wcWIiHmM8lkFyJmTvc
Boze6m3qT2

File type    ZIP
Magic  Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract

History
First Submission    2020-01-15 11:43:16
Last Submission     2020-04-28 00:59:24
Last Analysis       2020-04-28 00:59:24
Earliest Contents Modification  2019-12-09 12:36:08
Latest Contents Modification    2019-12-09 12:36:08

Names
soy.exe
output.149792855.txt
```



Image 1.13: Win32.ZeroCleare (soy.exe) - VirusTotal

- **OSX.Lazarus**

hxxps://github.com/ytisf/theZoo/blob/master/malwares/Binaries/OSX.Lazarus/

Malware developed for MacOS environments, focusing on cryptocurrency developed by Lazarus Group (APT group).

```
Basic Properties
MD5    bb66ab2db0bad88ac6b829085164cbbb
SHA-1  b16fcd3f5afe5298c7db9128fb057fede66461cf
SHA-256      ae4be6343ba403a264c0f0e5ccff169648dc854f0a71d6509f38b018ce325042
SSDEEP 393216:PB1L7fxLRsW73YjCet0N10FHuFQdpEMcKY66o:b7f5Rswoj4CJuGdpc66o

File type    Apple software package
Magic  xar archive version 1, SHA-1 checksum

History
First Submission   2019-05-27 07:18:40
Last Submission    2019-05-27 07:18:40
Last Analysis      2020-08-01 05:38:39

Names
BitcoinTrader.pkg
```



Image 1.14: OSX.Lazarus - VirusTotal

4 Recommendation Actions

As we mentioned before, the idea it was execute test in many malwares, and this case, for this reason to be totally known the following actions will be taken to improve the protection environment of our assets:

- This report it was sent to Cybereason to validate with them how the detection flow for known malware works, and why these 3 malwares didn't detect;
- Validate the performance of NGAV and Machine Learning, regarding this type of detection;
- The best practices of the configurations should be revalidated with the Cybereason team;
- Double checking with all policies implemented at the customer that bought the solution;

5 Answers from Cybereason Company

As we mentioned before, the idea it was execute test in many malwares, and this case to bring the result of the defensive security analysis with an offensive mindset performed in the execution of 42 different Malwares in our environment.

We opened a support case with the Cybereason support team on **August 19th** as you can see below



Image 1.15: Support Case issue

We just receive a generic information by support:

- **20/08 | 25/08 | 26/08 | 27/08 | 31/08 | 04/09 | 10/09 | 11/09**
    - Remember that we are talk about **Critical** problem here.

After many times, I escalate this problem with many Customer Success Managers, Support Managers, Director Customers and VP from Cybereason, but we still waiting any resolution of this Detection problem.

By the end, a simple question that we need to do in those cases is:

Why didn't Cybereason detect them? ...What engine didn't work well? Or maybe, Which flow failed? Detection by pattern? Signature? NGAV? ML? We need to have (If possible) answers for these questions.