

The "why" of human reasoning and  
communication:  
Cognitive capacities through the lens of evolution

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# Todo list

|  |   |
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| 1: Don't overuse passive voice. Don't make sentences too long (rule of thumb: not longer than two lines). Don't abuse semicolons. Don't have too long NPs before the VP comes. Watch out for Dutch word order. Explain technical terms always, to fix their meaning. Give examples (and keep them as familiar as possible). Don't undersell your points, be confident! Don't vary terminology for the sake of variation. . . . . | 4 |
| 2: This paragraph is saying the same thing twice, and word order is funky . . . . .  | 4 |
| 3: Explicate this; cite a source . . . . .   | 4 |
| 4: Add a few words about why this thesis is worth scrutinizing: for example, that others also disagree (see the MS11 commentary), or already hint at your own objections . . . . .   | 5 |
| 5: Add a few words on that the "why" of communication is an important question, explain why this is needed to ultimately answer the RQ. It's more primitive, or primary; address this . . . . .  | 5 |
| 6: Could do with some more explication: how will I scrutinize this position? . . . . .   | 5 |
| 7: Explicate why "why we communicate" is also an important question (maybe elsewhere) . . . . .  | 6 |
| 8: Be confident! . . . . .   | 6 |
| 9: Define evolution! . . . . .   | 6 |
| 10: Add an example to illustrate . . . . .   | 7 |
| 11: Apparently a category mistake: causes don't answer questions, <i>statements</i> about causes answer questions. I'm not sure if I fully agree though; think about this . . . . .  | 7 |
| 12: Maybe reformulate this: still reads funky . . . . .  | 7 |
| 13: Add here a word on how Tinbergen's questions can be split into proximate and ultimate answers: cite Rymer et al. (2022), and maybe see Wikipedia for extra references . . . . .  | 7 |
| 14: By whom? I don't remember, maybe it would be elucidating to know why and how they say so . . . . .   | 7 |
| 15: Define niche and add an example to illustrate: discuss and elaborate way more! . . . . .   | 7 |
| 16: Is niche construction governed by natural selection? . . . . .   | 7 |

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| Ask Karolina about feedback here: didn't understand . . . . .  | 8  |
| 17: Are the groups the EEA or the savannah? Elaborate more on this:<br>is it the physical environment or does it include the groups? Aren't<br>the groups a trait that evolved? Think about this . . . . .   | 8  |
| 18: Elaborate on this, because it seems to be important for my argument  | 8  |
| 19: The following section warrants a larger discussion about domain-<br>specificity; define it and give examples (outside of psychology: maybe<br>vision?), maybe with Cosmides/Tooby conception of Wason selec-<br>tion task as cheater detection? Find some literature on domain-specificity,<br>because it turns out to be a bit of a hairy subject. Find definition;<br>because opinions may vary on what features are and aren't domain-<br>specific . . . . .  | 8  |
| This line in particular needs a citation . . . . .   | 9  |
| 20: Add references: where did you read this? Or, if it's your own con-<br>tribution, make that clear. If it's a summarizing contribution from<br>multiple references, say that, and you don't need to cite them all –<br>use e.g. . . . . .  | 9  |
| 21: This section needs quite some work: see notes from discussion<br>with Karolina . . . . .   | 9  |
| 22: Maybe reformulate this sentence again: still too convoluted? . . .   | 9  |
| 23: Address the controversy around teleological explanations. Talk<br>about instrumentalism, usefulness of the concepts. Lack of formal-<br>ization is not such a big problem for the purpose here maybe, but<br>the other thing is more of a problem. Address why they won't be a<br>problem for you. Can mention that MS assume it as well, this tele-<br>ological explanation is at the heart of their thesis (quote it?), so it's<br>their problem to defend this. I work using the same assumptions as<br>them. . . . . | 9  |
| 24: Add example here . . . . .   | 10 |
| 25: Is this view compatible with reciprocal causation and niche con-<br>struction? I think so; they're a complication for the whole picture,<br>not necessarily for using this definition. . . . .   | 10 |
| 26: Is this view compatible with cultural learning? From the quote, it<br>doesn't necessarily follow that it's about biology necessarily. Think<br>about this, and after writing a section on culture, state to what extent<br>and in what way we'll adhere to Ayala (1999) . . . . .  | 10 |
| 27: Add example . . . . .  | 10 |
| 28: This "direct result of natural selection" is very vague/slippery; ac-<br>knowledge this, and elaborate more on it if it turns out to be impor-<br>tant for my thesis. A way to do this would be to contrast it with an<br>indirect result. Talk about side effects? . . . . .  | 10 |
| 29: Change structure to drop headings: make sure that the content of<br>the paragraph is still clear without using the headings . . . . .  | 10 |

|  |    |
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| 30: Add a section on culture to this chapter (where?): add things from Heyes (2018, Chapter 2: "Nature, nurture, culture"), and maybe some things from Laland et al. (2013) and Laland and Brown (2002). In there, try to figure out if the parallel between biological and cultural evolution is strong enough that you can assume that the specific driving force behind the evolution is not important. Also, distinguish clearly between (and define) cultural evolution and cultural learning. Taught vs. inherited. . . . .  | 11 |
| 31: Missing: strong argument for making this assumption; see Laland and Brown (2002, p. 178) for doubts about this assumption . . . . .  | 11 |
| 32: Elaborate a lot on this: this is a key key point of my research question, so it deserves more attention. Settle on a definition. . . . .   | 12 |
| 33: Rewrite this: first reformulate Tinbergen's questions. An enumeration with (i) would be appropriate, or even give each question a code, as you'll maybe refer to them a lot as they're the basis for your methodology. Then say the first one (proximate) – though interesting – is out of scope. Also note that Tinbergen's paper was seminal, so you justify why you use his questions at all as our desiderata: give reasons for obeying his methodological advice. You've seen his method mentioned in many papers, but since you don't say it, your reader won't know that. . . . . | 12 |
| Missing from this section: what Mercier (& Sperber) define as, and/or have to say about, communication . . . . .   | 13 |
| provide some examples of communication here . . . . .  | 14 |
| This is not yet a good explanation . . . . .   | 14 |
| Add example . . . . .  | 14 |
| Add a comment on how the underdeterminacy <i>is</i> captured by the ostensive-inferential model . . . . .  | 14 |
| Add an example, this needs to be way clearer and elaborated more if this will be my definition of human communication . . . . .  | 14 |
| Explicate the relation between the two definitions, because else it's very unclear because you're using two different definitions at the same time . . . . .   | 15 |
| add definitions of communication from Benítez-Burraco et al. (2021) . . . . .  | 15 |
| give examples . . . . .  | 16 |
| give example . . . . .   | 16 |
| is this relevant here? is this relevant at all? . . . . .  | 16 |
| add citation . . . . .   | 16 |
| give example . . . . .   | 16 |
| Elaborate more on this? Or is the argument clear enough . . . . .  | 17 |

# Introduction

{sec:introduction}

1: Don't overuse passive voice. Don't make sentences too long (rule of thumb: not longer than two lines). Don't abuse semicolons. Don't have too long NPs before the VP comes. Watch out for Dutch word order. Explain technical terms always, to fix their meaning. Give examples (and keep them as familiar as possible). Don't undersell your points, be confident! Don't vary terminology for the sake of variation.

Two cognitive skills that are often considered to set humans apart from their evolutionarily closest relatives are on the one hand our outstanding capacity for reasoning, and on the other our profound communicative abilities. Broadly considered to be unmatched in the animal kingdom (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1997) are on the one hand our sophisticated reasoning abilities

2: This paragraph is saying the same thing twice, and word order is funky

3: Explicate this; cite a source

and on the other hand our communication using languages that are infinitely creative in enabling the production of complex sentences.

Our reasoning and communication are intertwined with each other in different ways; it is hard to imagine our communication without reasoning. In our everyday lives, a lot of the content we intend to convey to others, we relay pragmatically: we do not literally spell out these things, but rather hope and expect our interlocutors to infer the intended message from the communicated content. When I ask my dinner partner if they can pass me the salt, they infer that I am not interested in learning about their ability to pass me the salt but rather that I am requesting to be passed the salt. When I give feedback on an interlocutor's behavior, I first reason about how my words will come across to her in order to minimize social conflict.

It is thus easy to see that reasoning and communication are intricately linked. But what exactly is the extent and nature of this link? In 2011, Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber proposed a revolutionary theory of reasoning that intended to account for a number of long-standing issues in the experimental psychology of reasoning. According to their *argumentative theory of reasoning*, the main function of reasoning in humans is argumentative; that is, reasoning evolved in humans in order to devise arguments and evaluate those of others. Their theory is able to explain a number of purported 'flaws' of human reasoning, such as poor performance on standard reasoning tasks such as the Wason selection task; confirmation bias; and the phenomenon of motivated reasoning leading to attitude polarization.

In the words of Mercier and Sperber,

Reasoning has evolved and persisted mainly because it makes human communication more effective and advantageous. (Mercier and Sperber, 2011, p. 60)

4: Add a few words about why this thesis is worth scrutinizing: for example, that others also disagree (see the MS11 commentary), or already hint at your own objections

5: Add a few words on that the "why" of communication is an important question, explain why this is needed to ultimately answer the RQ. It's more primitive, or primary; address this

In this thesis, I will scrutinize this position in order to ultimately answer the question of whether advanced reasoning skills in humans evolved because they facilitate more advanced communication.

6: Could do with some more explication: how will I scrutinize this position?

# 1 | The chicken and the egg: the evolutionary approach

{ch:evolution}

Before we are able to answer any *why*-questions about humans' cognitive capacities, some groundwork needs to be laid out. For what does it mean for some trait to evolve 'for the purpose of' another trait? Are we even justified in using this kind of terminology when it comes to evolution, a process which cannot be said to be intentional or purposeful? And what intermediate questions will we need to ask ourselves in order to ultimately answer the question of why we reason and communicate?

7: Explicate why "why we communicate" is also an important question (maybe elsewhere)

This chapter attempts to answer these questions. It by no means provides an overview of issues in evolutionary theory, a large field of research in its own right with widely diverging opinions on a number of specifics of the process of evolution (see Ariew et al. (2002) and Uller and Laland (2019) for overviews of topics in evolutionary theory). This chapter will serve to get a number of foundational issues 'out of the way' before we can continue our investigation into the cognitive mechanisms of reasoning and communication.

8: Be confident!

9: Define evolution!

## 1.1 Causation in evolution

{sec:causation-evolution}

First, we will dip our toes into the waters of causation in evolution.

Evolutionary causation is a subfield of philosophy of biology that has continued to see widely diverging opinions (Baedke, 2021; Uller and Laland, 2019). In this section I will restrict focus to three topics in evolutionary causation that are of interest to this thesis: firstly the distinction between proximate and ultimate causation, secondly Tinbergen's methodological questions, and lastly niche construction. The former two will serve to illuminate some basic aspects of the issues evolutionary causation concerns itself with, and the latter is of particular interest in considering the evolution of human cognition.

In evolutionary causation, one may distinguish *proximate* from *ultimate* causes. Proximate causes are the *immediate* influences on a trait: they explain how the trait results from the internal and external factors causing it. Ultimate causes

on the other hand are the higher-level historical and evolutionary explanation of those traits (Mayr, 1961)

10: Add an example to illustrate

. In other words, these two different causes answer two different explanatory questions

11: Apparently a category mistake: causes don't answer questions, *statements* about causes answer questions. I'm not sure if I fully agree though; think about this

: the proximate cause is the answer to the *how*-question, whereas the ultimate cause answers the *why*-question. According to Mayr (1961), who pioneered the distinction<sup>1</sup>, one needs to answer both of these questions in order to obtain a complete understanding of the trait.

13: Add here a word on how Tinbergen's questions can be split into proximate and ultimate answers: cite Rymer et al. (2022), and maybe see Wikipedia for extra references

12: Maybe reformulate this: still reads funky

In an influential proposal considered by some to be an extension of this distinction, Tinbergen (1963) outlined four questions or problems central to the study of animal behavior. In order to fully understand a pattern of behavior, one must consider (1) the proximate causation of the behavior, (2) the lifetime development of the behavior, (3) the function<sup>2</sup> of the behavior, and (4) the evolutionary history of the behavior.

14: By whom? I don't remember, maybe it would be elucidating to know why and how they say so

While Mayr's and Tinbergen's frameworks have had considerable explanatory value in the field of evolutionary causation, it has been argued that biologists would be better off rejecting them in favor of a framework of *reciprocal causation* (Laland et al., 2013). In reciprocal causation, there is feedback between the organism and its environment: not only does the environment influence the organism through the process of natural selection, but the organism in turn influences its environment through the process of *niche construction* (Svensson, 2018), where organisms actively partake in modifying their environment and shaping their niche, usually to their own benefit.

15: Define niche and add an example to illustrate: discuss and elaborate way more!

It has been argued that niche construction is at least as important as natural selection in shaping evolution

16: Is niche construction governed by natural selection?

, and moreover that especially in evolutionary processes involving interactions between organisms, reciprocal causation is very frequent (Svensson, 2018).

## 1.2 Evolutionary psychology and its issues

{sec:evol-psych}

In order to answer the question of whether reasoning evolved for the purpose of communication, we will also need to zoom out to consider the field of evolu-

<sup>1</sup>See (Laland et al., 2013) for a discussion of the origins of the distinction

<sup>2</sup>See Section 1.3 for a discussion of function in biology.



tionary psychology as a whole. What is the merit, and the validity, of adopting an evolutionary approach in our endeavor?

The field of evolutionary psychology concerns itself with trying to understand human behavior using evolutionary theory, by looking into the past and considering how our ancestors must have adapted to their environment in order to survive and reproduce. Researchers in the social sciences and humanities have historically been wary of using evolutionary approaches to study human behavior, because evolutionary theory has been abused for prejudiced ends in the past; see Laland and Brown (2002, pp. 19–20) for an overview. Moreover, evolutionary-psychological research has received the criticism that too much of it is "just-so" storytelling and post-hoc explanation of known phenomena, sometimes accompanied by a sensationalist spin on the story (Laland and Brown, 2002). However, if these pitfalls are avoided, looking at human psychology from the evolutionary perspective can be an illuminating endeavor.

Ask Karolina about feedback here: didn't understand

Let us now consider some of the central concepts and assumptions of evolutionary psychology.

In order to explain humans' psychological mechanisms, evolutionary psychologists look to the concept of an *environment of evolutionary adaptedness* (EEA). The EEA is the environment in which these psychological mechanisms must have come into being; usually the EEA is identified as hunting and gathering groups on the African savannah in the second half of the Pleistocene, between 1.7 million and ten thousand years ago (Laland and Brown, 2002)

17: Are the groups the EEA or the savannah? Elaborate more on this: is it the physical environment or does it include the groups? Aren't the groups a trait that evolved? Think about this

. The assumptions underlying the use of the concept of an EEA are that (1) our modern-day environment is too different from that of our ancestors for us to use it to explain why and how our psychological mechanisms evolved in the past; and (2), for our psychological mechanisms to be as complex as they are, they must have evolved slowly — and thus a considerable amount of time ago, without changing significantly since the Stone Age.

There are a number of issues associated with the use of the concept of the EEA (Laland and Brown, 2002). Firstly, we do not know very much about the environment of our ancestors, so the specifics of the EEA may be filled in as is seen fit for one's purpose. Secondly, we do not know enough about the process of evolution to make assumption (2); while evolution does in general operate on a large timescale, research has shown that it can also be faster, operating on a time scale of thousands of years, or less than 100 generations (Laland and Brown, 2002, pp. 190–191 and references therein). Thirdly, the argument can be made that for our species to have flourished and dominated in the way that it did, we must have remained adaptive to our changing modern environments after the Stone Age. Lastly, the EEA argument does not take into account reciprocal causation or niche construction.

18: Elaborate on this, because it seems to be important for my argument

19: The following section warrants a larger discussion about domain-specificity; define it and give examples (outside of psychology: maybe vision?), maybe with Cosmides/Tooby conception of Wason selection task as cheater detection? Find some literature on domain-specificity, because it turns out to be a bit of a hairy subject. Find definition; because opinions may vary on what features are and aren't domain-specific

Another topic of discussion in evolutionary psychology that is of importance to our investigation, is that of domain-specificity of the psychological mechanisms. The argument has been made that these adaptive mechanisms are necessarily problem- or domain-specific, because the evolutionary process would not favor general solutions to specific problems (Buss, 2015, p. 50). However, as with the EEA, issues with this stance have been raised: the push to domain-specificity can be said to rely on overly strong assumptions about the modularity of the brain; and moreover, there is also a push to domain-generality of cognitive skills because domain-general skills are neurologically more cost-efficient than domain-specific skills (Laland and Brown, 2002).

Lastly, a criticism raised to evolutionary psychology is that not only biological evolution, but also cultural evolution can be said to have played a role in shaping human behavior and human cognitive capacities; it is a joint endeavor facilitated by nature and nurture.

This line in particular needs a citation

### 1.3 Teleological notions in evolutionary theory

{sec:teleology}

21: This section needs quite some work: see notes from discussion with Karolina

Next, it is useful to scrutinize the terminology that I will be using throughout this thesis. Biological literature frequently makes use of *teleological* terminology, that is, terminology that implies goal-directedness of the processes it describes. Such terminology includes concepts like the *design* of a trait, and *function*, *purpose*, or *utility* of a trait. At first glance, the usage of these terms in discussing evolution would seem to be inappropriate; for evolution is a process of nature, not purposefully performed by an agent, and it is thus without any intentionality or goals. And indeed, this teleological terminology has its roots in pre-Darwinian conceptions of nature: it originates from Aristotle's views on causation, and it was subsequently adopted by creationist Muslim and Christian scholars (Johnson, 2005).

In general, teleological explanations in biology are quite controversial: not only is the usage of the specific terminology itself debated (Ayala, 1999, p. 27 and references therein), the concept has been criticized for its apparent lack of formalization and insufficient argumentative persuasiveness (Baedke, 2021, p. 83).

23: Address the controversy around teleological explanations. Talk about instrumentalism, usefulness of the concepts. Lack of formalization is not such a big problem for the purpose here maybe, but the other thing is more of a problem. Address why they won't be a problem for you. Can mention that MS assume it as well, this teleological explanation is at the heart of their thesis (quote it?), so it's their problem to defend this. I work using the same assumptions as them.

20: Add references: where did you read this? Or, if it's your own contribution, make that clear. If it's a summarizing contribution from multiple references, say that, and you don't need to cite them all – use e.g.

22: Maybe reformulate this sentence again: still too convoluted?

However, explanations in terms of goals and function have considerable instrumental value in describing evolutionary processes. Throughout this thesis, I will be adhering to the conception of teleological explanations of Ayala (1999), which is as follows:

Teleological explanations account for the existence of a certain feature in a system by demonstrating the feature's contribution to a specific property or state of the system, in such a way that this contribution is *the reason why the feature or behaviour exists at all*. (p. 13)

In this respect, the evolutionary process of adaptation merits a teleological explanation: the function of a trait (its 'contribution to a specific property or state of the system') is the reason that the trait exists, because it exists as a consequence of natural selection.

25: Is this view compatible with reciprocal causation and niche construction? I think so; they're a complication for the whole picture, not necessarily for using this definition.

26: Is this view compatible with cultural learning? From the quote, it doesn't necessarily follow that it's about biology necessarily. Think about this, and after writing a section on culture, state to what extent and in what way we'll adhere to Ayala (1999)

24: Add example here

The distinction between proximate and ultimate causes we saw in Section 1.1 can be applied to teleological explanation as well, yielding the distinction between proximate and ultimate *ends* of features. The proximate end is then the 'immediate' function the feature serves, and the ultimate end is the reproductive success of the organism.

A footnote to this account is that not all features of organisms can be explained teleologically; only if the feature has arisen and persisted as a direct result of natural selection, a teleological explanation is in place.

28: This "direct result of natural selection" is very vague/slippery; acknowledge this, and elaborate more on it if it turns out to be important for my thesis. A way to do this would be to contrast it with an indirect result. Talk about side effects?

27: Add example

## 1.4 An evolutionary foundation

{sec:evol-method}

Now that we have gathered the puzzle pieces, let us return focus to our field of investigation and lay its groundwork. In particular, before we can continue with our evolutionary approach to human reasoning and communication in the next chapters, we will need to outline and justify the assumptions made.

It has become apparent that for none of the topics in evolutionary theory discussed here consensus has been reached among its practitioners. Since the purpose of this thesis will not be to provide a complete causal framework for the evolution of reasoning and communication, we will be able to cast aside some of the issues plaguing the frameworks discussed in this chapter. We will proceed cautiously, using the concepts outlined without needing to account in detail for their shortcomings.

29: Change structure to drop headings: make sure that the content of the paragraph is still clear without using the headings

**Why can we consider these cognitive capacities from an evolutionary perspective?** In choosing to explore human reasoning and communication from the evolutionary perspective, I am working on the assumption that it is appropriate to the endeavor: reasoning and communication are two key features of the homo sapiens that must have arisen at some point in our evolutionary history, shaped by natural selection, niche construction, and perhaps (cultural) learning. Moreover, it is justified to assume that the cognitive abilities underlying human reasoning and communication are heritable, either genetically or culturally.

#### **What do we mean when we say 'evolution'?**

30: Add a section on culture to this chapter (where?): add things from Heyes (2018, Chapter 2: "Nature, nurture, culture"), and maybe some things from Laland et al. (2013) and Laland and Brown (2002). In there, try to figure out if the parallel between biological and cultural evolution is strong enough that you can assume that the specific driving force behind the evolution is not important. Also, distinguish clearly between (and define) cultural evolution and cultural learning. Taught vs. inherited.

So far, we have mostly considered the concepts and issues surrounding *biological* evolution, and the role of *culture* has remained largely undiscussed. In this thesis, I will use the term 'evolution' and associated terminology to talk about the development of cognitive capacities in humans over time, remaining agnostic about whether this evolution is due to biological processes like natural selection, or cultural processes like cultural learning.

**What are our assumptions about the evolutionary process?** I accept the concept of the EEA in a general sense despite the flaws discussed in Section 1.2; for our purposes, we need not commit to any strong assumptions about the nature and properties of the EEA. The most important assumption I will make is that homo sapiens throughout history has been dependent on strong social groups for survival.

31: Missing: strong argument for making this assumption; see Laland and Brown (2002, p. 178) for doubts about this assumption

Moreover, I will adopt a reciprocal causal framework along the lines of Laland et al. (2013) and Svensson (2018), maintaining that humans throughout history have not only been the object of natural selection, but that they have also been the subject in shaping their environments through the formation of social groups and development of technology.

**What does it entail for one trait to evolve for the purpose of another?** In using Ayala's (1999) definition of teleological explanation, we can speak of some feature of an organism having a certain function or purpose, that ultimately contributes to its reproductive success. In the case of our investigation, we are interested in what evolutionary benefits one feature (reasoning) may have to another feature (communication). In order to answer this question, we should first consider what the function of communication is to humans; only then can

we consider whether the function of reasoning could be to advance communication and in doing so improve the reproductive fitness of humans.

32: Elaborate a lot on this: this is a key key point of my research question, so it deserves more attention. Settle on a definition.

### What questions will we need to answer?

33: Rewrite this: first reformulate Tinbergen's questions. An enumeration with (i) would be appropriate, or even give each question a code, as you'll maybe refer to them a lot as they're the basis for your methodology. Then say the first one (proximate) – though interesting – is out of scope. Also note that Tinbergen's paper was seminal, so you justify why you use his questions at all as our desiderata: give reasons for obeying his methodological advice. You've seen his method mentioned in many papers, but since you don't say it, your reader won't know that.

In exploring cognitive capacities in more detail from an evolutionary perspective, I will loosely follow Tinbergen's (1963) questions by considering the following aspects of reasoning and communication:

- How does the capacity to reason and the capacity to communicate develop throughout childhood?
- What would advancements in reasoning or communication contribute to the reproductive success of humans? In other words, what is the function of reasoning and the function of communication?
- What is the evolutionary history of reasoning and of communication? To what extent and how do they present in our nearest evolutionary relatives?

One may note that we will skip Tinbergen's first question about what the proximate causation of the behavior in question is. I consider the neurological mechanisms underlying reasoning and communication to be out of the scope of this thesis. The most important reason for this is that we do not know nearly enough about the human brain to provide a satisfactory account of the proximate causation of reasoning and communication.

## 2 | Why do we communicate?

{ch:communication}

In order to answer the question of how advanced reasoning may have evolved to further communication, we will first need to examine communication in its own right: why do we communicate? In the process of answering this question, we will first fix our definition of communication, and then we will answer each of the methodological questions raised in Section 1.4 as they pertain to communication: in Section 2.2 we consider the comparison with our evolutionary relatives, then in Section 2.3 we examine how communication arises in infancy and lastly we discuss the function of communication in Section 2.4.

### 2.1 Conceptions of communication

{sec:comm:definition}

Missing from this section: what Mercier (& Sperber) define as, and/or have to say about, communication

Before we can take a look at the evolutionary history, developmental origins and functions of communication, we need to settle on a definition of communication, since this determines the frame of our research question.

There are many different ways organisms may communicate with each other, and indeed many different ways in which one may define communication. In any case, communication is an process necessarily involving a signaler (a sender) and at least one receiver (a listener).

Some authors regard communication to inherently be a tool of persuasion, which then translates to their very definition of communication: for example, on the manipulative model of communication, communication can be defined as "when an animal, the actor, does something which appears to be the result of selection to influence the sense organs of another animal, the reactor, so that the reactor's behavior changes to the advantage of the actor" (Dawkins and Krebs, 1978, p. 283). One may also notice that this definition has some teleological explanation embedded in it as well (see Chapter 1). I mention this definition for completeness' sake; but I believe this definition to be insufficiently parsimonious in its assumptions about the function of communication.

In their discussion of communication as it relates to social cognition, Freeberg et al. (2019) define communication as follows:

Communication involves an action or characteristic of one individual that

influences the behaviour, behavioural tendency or physiology of at least one other individual in a fashion typically adaptive to both (p. 281)

This is a very broad conception of communication; on this definition, all organisms, from bacteria to fungi to plants to animals, communicate.

provide some examples of communication here

However, when it comes to human communication in particular, the definition may be refined a bit. Scott-Phillips (2015, 2018) contrasts two different models of communication with each other: the classical *code model* of communication, and the *ostensive-inferential* model of communication. On the former model, communication involves processes of coding and decoding messages. The coding, on the side of the sender, involves a mapping between the state of the world and a behavior (namely the signal they send), and the decoding, on the side of the receiver, involves a mapping between two behaviors: the signal received, and a subsequent response of the receiver. If the mappings are properly calibrated to each other, communication between sender and receiver can be said to have occurred.

This is not yet a good explanation

However, in order to exactly capture human communication, the code model is too simplistic, because it fails to account for the *underdeterminacy of meaning*: in merely looking at the content of the message, one cannot account for the meaning that the message conveys to the sender (Scott-Phillips, 2018). Therefore, a move away from the code model of communication towards the *ostensive-inferential* model of communication would be in order. This model takes into account the intentionality inherent in human communication.

Add example

On the ostensive-inferential model, one may speak of a sender's *informative intention*, which is their intending for their receiver to believe something. The sender's *communicative intention* is then their intending for the receiver to believe that they have an informative intention. The sender may then express or convey this communicative intention to their receiver with an *ostensive* behavior. If their receiver receives their communicative intention, then ostensive-inferential communication has occurred.

Add a comment on how the underdeterminacy is captured by the ostensive-inferential model

Add an example, this needs to be way clearer and elaborated more if this will be my definition of human communication

Currently, there is no evidence that any species other than humans communicate ostensively (Scott-Phillips, 2018). As a result, not only may one distinguish between the code model and the ostensive-inferential model to define what communication entails, one may also conceptualize these two models as two different types of communication. The code model then captures the way that non-human animals communicate, and the ostensive-inferential model then captures the way that humans communicate with each other.

It is the ostensive-inferential model that I will consider to form the definition of *human communication* throughout this thesis. When I speak of communication broadly construed, I will adhere to the definition of communication

by Freeberg et al. (2019). This definition is compatible with the code model outlined by Scott-Phillips (2018); the code model however provides a level of detail that will not be necessary for our discussions of non-human animal communication.

Explicate the relation between the two definitions, because else it's very unclear because you're using two different definitions at the same time

As a last sidenote: while we would often equate human communication with linguistic communication, humans can easily communicate without language – for example, using glances or gestures<sup>1</sup>, see also Section 2.3 – and can use language without communicating – for example, when one is talking to one-self. Therefore, language will come up now and then throughout this chapter, but it is not our object of focus at the present moment.

add definitions of communication from Benítez-Burraco et al. (2021)

## 2.2 Communication in non-human animals

{sec:comm:phylogeny}

In order to illuminate communication in humans, it is necessary to look at the communication of other animals, especially those that we are evolutionarily closely related to. As already mentioned, one fundamental difference between the communication of non-human animals and humans is by which model their communication is best described (the code model and the ostensive-inferential model, respectively) (Scott-Phillips, 2015, 2018).

Communication is used by non-human animals for a wide range of purposes, and it can be elicited by a number of stimuli. One can broadly distinguish between communication in aggressive and cooperative interactions (Seyfarth and Cheney, 2003). In aggressive interactions, primates may for example use communication in order to intimidate, by using it to signal their size and willingness to fight. This minimizes the chances of a physical altercation or fight actually happening, which minimizes the chance of injury for the animal. In cooperative interactions on the other hand, where the interests of the signaler and the receiver overlap more, communication can be used to alert others of predators, to coordinate foraging activities and to facilitate social interactions:

[information acquired by listeners] may include, but is not limited to, information about predators or the urgency of a predator's approach, group movements, intergroup interactions, or the identities of individuals involved in social events (Seyfarth and Cheney, 2003, p. 168)

In animals in general, vocalizations are most often elicited by a "complex combination of stimuli" (Seyfarth and Cheney, 2003, p. 150), which may be 'immediate', or dependent on the "history of interactions between the individuals involved" (Seyfarth and Cheney, 2003, p. 151). As for the immediate features,

<sup>1</sup>One might even speculate that any human behavior can be used to communicate.



we may distinguish between sensory stimuli on the one hand and mental stimuli on the other. Sensory stimuli then refer to stimuli received through the external senses, such as visual, auditory and olfactory senses. Mental stimuli on the other hand, can be viewed as the mental states an animal attributes to another animal. This type of stimuli elicits the majority of vocalizations in human conversation, but there is no evidence that the attribution of mental states to others causes vocalizations in other animals, except for possibly chimpanzees (Seyfarth and Cheney, 2003).

## 2.3 Communication in children's development

{sec:comm:ontogeny}

Now that we have seen how communication works in non-human animals, let us consider how children start communicating in their development. Around their first birthdays, children start to communicate ostensibly by pointing (Tomasello, 2008). Although at first glance pointing may seem like a simple behavior, it may be used in a number of communicative contexts to convey a fairly wide range of messages and intentions. On the classic account, pointing can serve either of two communicative motives: an imperative motive, in which the pointer requests things from someone, and a declarative motive, in which the pointer shares their experiences and emotions with someone. Tomasello (2008) proposes to extend this account by distinguishing between declaratives as expressives (sharing attitudes and emotions) and declaratives as informatives (providing information), and by conceiving of imperatives as a continuum, with the underlying motive ranging on a scale from individualistic (e.g. forcing someone to do something) to cooperative (e.g. indirectly requesting someone by informing them of some desire). The fact that pointing is a fairly complex communicative act is underscored by the fact that non-human animals (primates in particular) are not able to understand pointing in the same way humans are. The hypothesis is that in order to communicate intentionally, like children begin doing around their first birthday, first the skills and motivations for *shared intentionality* need to be present in the infant; that without skills of shared intentionality, infants could only communicate intentionally, but not cooperatively. Shared intentionality is the "ability to participate with others in interactions involving joint goals, intentions, and attention" (Tomasello, 2008, p. 139). Communicative pointing behaviors in infants emerge around the same time as skills and motivations of shared intentionality do, which according to Tomasello confirms this hypothesis of dependency between them.

Tomasello further investigates what he calls *pantomiming* or *iconic gestures*, which are symbolic or representational gestures. He presents empirical evidence that these kinds of gestures rely heavily on convention for their meaning, and that the acquisition and usage of these conventions bears a strong resemblance to the acquisition and usage of language.

give examples

give example

is this relevant here? is this relevant at all?

add citation

give example

{sec:comm:function}

## 2.4 What is the function of communication?

Finally, let us have a look at different conceptions of what the function of communication might be. We have already seen that we can broadly distinguish between a competitive and cooperative function of communication (Seyfarth and Cheney, 2003).

In communicating for competitive or aggressive motives, one might attempt to intimidate a competitor for food or for a mate. It would be evolutionarily beneficial to the communicator to intimidate verbally rather than physically, because the risk of injury is reduced. On the theory of human self-domestication, the way that *homo sapiens* is, is the result of a process of 'self-domestication' due to a preference of females for less aggressive males. It has been proposed that because of this reduction in physical aggression, interactions between individuals became longer and more frequent, which allowed for our language and communication to become more complex (Benítez-Burraco et al., 2021).

As for the cooperative function of communication, Tomasello (2008) proposes a distinction between three different communicative motives: sharing (of emotions and attitudes), informing, and requesting (help to achieve goals). Foundational to these motives are the underpinning cooperative motives of sharing and helping, which he calls "the two main types of motivation in shared intentionality" (Tomasello, 2008, p. 123). It is clear that communication enables individuals to cooperate and collaborate, and that more sophisticated communication would enable more sophisticated forms of cooperation and collaboration, all the way down to the social institutions we depend on nowadays. But in order for us to complete the causal chain, we need to have a look at what makes cooperation and collaboration something evolution has selected for at all.

### 2.4.1 Why is cooperation evolutionarily advantageous?

In cooperative behaviors, one can distinguish between altruistic behavior (sacrificing something for the benefit of another individual) and collaborative behavior (working together with another individual for mutual benefit) (Tomasello, 2009). In the case of the latter, the mutual benefit of the outcome constitutes the evolutionary pressure that has selected for it. In the case of the former though, it is not immediately obvious that helping another person without benefit to the self would be evolutionarily advantageous. Tomasello hypothesizes that altruism can be best explained in the broader picture of the social group, considering the norms that are enforced and being conformed to within the group and the shared intentionality inherent in the group. Moreover, he emphasizes the role of both human biology and human culture in shaping humans' cooperative tendencies; see also Chapter 1.

Elaborate more on this? Or is the argument clear enough

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