

Bernd Paysan

#wefixthenet, YBTI session, 32c3, Hamburg

Outline



Motivation

Level 7: Applications
Basic Frameworks
Try it

GUI framework

Apps in a Sandbox

API Basics

2.5 years after Snowden



What happend to change the world:

Politics Manhatten project to find "the golden key"?

Users don't want their dick picks be watched and use DuckDuckGo and encrypted chat

Software NSA backdoors have been refitted by attackers (Juniper)

Solutions net2o starts to be usable (somewhat)

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- 2. Path switched packets with 2^n size writing into shared memory buffers
- Ephemeral key exchange and signatures with Ed25519, symmetric authenticated encryption+hash+prng with Keccak, symmetric block encryption with Threefish onion routing camouflage probably with AES
- 4. Timing driven delay minimizing flow control
- 5. Stack-oriented tokenized command language
- 6. Distributed data (files) and distributed metadata (prefix hash trie)
- 7. Apps in a sandboxed environment for displaying content



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- secure
- media capable
- works as overlay on current networks (UDP/IP), but car replace the entire stack



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Named file copy For testing only

Vault A container for encrypted data without metadata exposure

DHT Query key/value pairs (keys are pubkeys or hash keys)

Chat Instant messaging 1:1 or in chat groups

Version control system For larger content (not yet implemented)

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git automake autoconf make gcc libtool libltdl7 fossil

you run: mkdir net2o

wget

https://fossil.net2o.de/net2o/doc/trunk/dochmod +x do; ./do

This will install some stuff and take some time (I will try to improve that).

Android Get Gforth from play store or https://net2o.de/Gforth.apk
Open/close (back button) Gforth if you like; then open net2o.

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keygen <nick>

Enter your passphrase twice.

Android Tap on the little nettie to start the app, it will autodetect that you don't have a key generated Enter nick and passphrase twice.

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- Aquire more keys by observing a group chat. List your keys with

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Level 7: Application





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- Corollary: Every efficient sufficiently complex system can execute native machine code
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There are several options tried; as usual, things are broken:

- 1. Execute code in a controlled secure VM, see for example Java. This is broken by design, as securing something from the inside doesn't work
- 2. Execute code in a sandbox. This has shown as more robust, depending on how complex the outside of the sandbox is.
- Public inspection of code. This is how the open source world works, but the underhanded C contest shows that inspection is tricky.
- 4. Scan for known evil code. This is the security industry's approach, and it is not working.
- 5. Code signing can work together with public inspection but using it for accountability doesn't work



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Formats&Requirements How to display things



Text
utf-8,markup

Font
OpenType

Camera

Pictures
png, jpg, h264 stills

Videos

Microphone

mkv, h264

Music

Texture
Glyphs

Texture

Texture

Speaker

Screen

Level 7: Application 0 000 GUI framework



Why OpenGL? OpenGL can do everything

OpenGL renders:

- 1. Triangles, lines, points simple components
- 2. Textures and gradients
- and uses shader programs the most powerful thing in OpenGL from 2.0.

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- containers with Flash, Java, ActiveX, PDF, Google's NaCl...
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- freetype-gl for fonts (TrueType/OpenType into a texture)
- OpenMAX on Android, gstreamer on Linux: videos into a texture
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net2o source repository and wiki http://fossil.net2o.de/net2o