

Challenges in building a private web

(without burning it all down)

Steven Englehardt


Privacy Engineer



Each dot represents one tracking resource (like a script, tracking pixel or image), which would be blocked by an ad-blocker


Tracking Resources

- Amazon
 - Facebook
 - Google
 - Collects my latitude and longitude
 - ... Trackers sharing unique ID



I Visited 47 Sites.
Hundreds of Trackers
Followed Me.

**By Farhad Manjoo
Graphics by Nadieh Bremer**



<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/23/opinion/data-internet-privacy-tracking.html>

Sections 

Sign In 

Try 1 month for \$1

Consumer Tech • Perspective

Think you're anonymous online? A third of popular websites are 'fingerprinting' you.

Our latest privacy experiment tested sites for an invisible form of online tracking that you can't easily avoid.




<https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/10/31/think-youre-anonymous-online-third-popular-websites-are-fingerprinting-you/>

Let's just block it all! Who needs Javascript or cookies?

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the following details:

- Title Bar:** JS How to enable JavaScript
- Address Bar:** https://enable-javascript.com
- Content Area:**
 - A message: "This website uses cookies to improve performance and enhance the user experience."
 - A language navigation bar with links: EN, HR, DE, NL, ES, PT, IT, NO, RU, FR, CZ, JA, KO, HU, TH, PH, TR, ID, SK, PL, AR, UR.
 - A main heading: "How to enable JavaScript in your browser"
 - A text box with a border:


Nowadays almost all web pages contain JavaScript, a scripting programming language that runs on visitor's web browser. It makes web pages functional for specific purposes and if disabled for some reason, the content or the functionality of the web page can be limited or unavailable. Here you can find instructions on how to enable (activate) JavaScript in five most commonly used browsers.
 - Logos for five browsers: Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, Opera, and Apple Safari.
 - A red-bordered box containing the text: "Javascript is disabled in your web browser. If you enable JavaScript, this text will change".




*...okay maybe we
need Javascript*

Can we at least block all third-party cookies?

We've tried that
back in 2013...



Can we at least block all third-party cookies?



Cohort_3: Block all third-party cookies
Cohort_2: Block cookies from trackers
Cohort_1: Control; No blocking


Compared to no blocking, users who had all third-party cookies blocked (over a 1 - 2 week study period):

- ~1% fewer active users overall
- 2 - 5% fewer users active over 10 hours

The drop was so significant, we ended this part of the study immediately.

https://mozilla.report/post/projects/cookie_restrictions.kp/

The core problem: one identifier, many uses



id=LgzccCiQvIbXtXjtkWrOZ

- Cross-site tracking
- Ad performance tracking
- Federated login
- First-party login
- Fraud detection
- Captcha / device reputation
- Analytics
- ... and many more

Our approach to anti-tracking...

1. No configuration necessary; **private by default.**
2. **Block the trackers**, not necessarily the tracking capability.
3. Don't break experiences **users care about.**


"[T]racking practices that Mozilla believes, as a matter of policy,
should be blocked by default **by web browsers.**"

1. Cross-site tracking:

- a. Cookie-based
- b. URL parameter-based

2. Unintended identification techniques:

- a. Browser fingerprinting
- b. Supercookies



The screenshot shows a Mozilla wiki page titled "Security/Anti tracking policy". The page content discusses online tracking practices and Mozilla's intent to implement technical protections in Firefox to block them. It mentions the Tracking Protection list and Disconnect. The page includes a sidebar with links to MozillaWiki pages like Main page, Product releases, and Help, as well as a navigation bar with tabs for Page, Discussion, Read, View source, and View history.

Security/Anti tracking policy

This document describes the online tracking practices that Mozilla believes, as a matter of policy, should be blocked by web browsers. These practices are potentially harmful to users and cannot be meaningfully controlled by users.


We intend to Implement technical protections in Firefox to block all tracking practices included in this policy. In addition to these tracking techniques, we may expand this policy to include the new techniques identified in this document.

Our current anti-tracking mitigations in Firefox rely on the Tracking Protection list to classify and block trackers. Disconnect is in alignment with this policy.

Contents [hide]

- 1 Tracking Definition
- 2 Tracking We Will Block
 - 2.1 1. Cross-site tracking
 - 2.2 2. Tracking via unintended identification techniques
- 3 Policy circumvention
- 4 Policy Exceptions

Our first step: Block only **tracking** cookies



Trackers are identified by Disconnect, based on a review of privacy policies.

It's more than just cookies...

We block all of this →

for all domains on the
Disconnect Tracking
Protection list

Cookies:

- Block `Cookie` request headers and ignore `Set-Cookie` response headers.
- Return an empty string for calls to `Document.cookie` and ignore requests to set cookies via `Document.cookie`.

DOM Storage:

- `localStorage`: `Window.localStorage` is `null`. Thus, attempts to read and write using this object will throw a `TypeError` exception.
- `sessionStorage`: read and write attempts are permitted.
- `IndexedDB`: read and write attempts throw a `SecurityError` exception.

Messaging and Workers:

- `Broadcast Channel`: attempts to create a new `BroadcastChannel` will throw a `SecurityError` exception.
- `Shared Worker`: attempts to create a new `SharedWorker` will throw a `SecurityError` exception.
- `Service Worker`: attempts to create a new `ServiceWorker` will throw a `SecurityError` exception.

DOM Cache:

- Calls to `CacheStorage` will always reject with a `SecurityError`.

Browser caches:


- The `HTTP cache` and the Image cache are partitioned for tracking resources, such that each top-level origin will have a separate partition and tracking resources on different top-level origins will be cached separate from each other.

Network connections:


- `TLS` sessions will not be resumed using a session ticket when an HTTPS connection is made to an embedded third-party resource that is classified as a tracker.
- `HTTP connection reuse` by domains classified as trackers is limited to requests that occur under the same top-level origin. For example, a request for content from `tracker.example` on `news.example` will not reuse an HTTP connection with a request for content from `tracker.example` on `shopping.example` or with requests that occur when `tracker.example` is visited directly (i.e., as a first party).

https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Firefox/Privacy/Storage_access_policy


Some tracking is dual-use



Key insight: users interact with these services!



Cookies permitted after interaction, but **only on**
example.com



https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Firefox/Privacy/Storage_access_policy

Programmatic cookie access: the Storage Access API

Storage Access API methods

The storage API methods are implemented on the [Document](#) interface:

`Document.hasStorageAccess()`



Returns a [Promise](#) that resolves with a boolean value indicating whether the document has access to its first-party storage.

`Document.requestStorageAccess()`

Returns a [Promise](#) that resolves if the access to first-party storage was granted, and rejects if access was denied.

https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Storage_Access_API

Programmatic cookie access: the Storage Access API



Notable differences in the prompting heuristics and scope of granted access:

- [https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Document/requestStorageAccess#Conditions for granting storage access](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Document/requestStorageAccess#Conditions_for_granting_storage_access)
- [https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Storage_Access_API#Safari implementation differences](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Storage_Access_API#Safari_implementation_differences)

We're seeing adoption of the Storage Access API

89 Comments

Sort by Oldest



Hello!

Also post on Facebook

Log In to Post



Michael DiTraglia

When you've lost Obama... https://www.realclearpolitics.com/.../obama_worried_that...

Like · Reply · 6w



Mildred R. Rosario

calls Document.requestStorageAccess()

Cart > Information > Shipping > Payment

Information

pay Address book

To complete your purchase, your browser needs your permission to access Amazon Pay.

Continue

Amazon Pay Privacy

Log out from Amazon Pay


Save this information for next time

The next step: browser fingerprinting

Locale



Screen Size



User Agent



WebGL



Font probing

Times New Roman, Arial,
Open Sans, Courier New,
Georgia, Comic Sans, ...

HTML Canvas



Fingerprinting use is still growing...

2016

~1.6% of the Alexa
top 1M


*Englehardt & Narayanan;
Online Tracking (CCS2016)*

2019

~3.8% of the
Alexa top 1M

*Unpublished OpenWPM
measurements from Feb 2019*

Two general approaches to anti-fingerprinting



Tor Browser's anti-fingerprinting in
Firefox behind
privacy.resistFingerprinting

Enhanced Tracking Protection

Trackers follow you around online to collect information about your browsing habits and interests. Firefox blocks many of these trackers and other malicious scripts. [Learn more](#)

Standard
Balanced for protection and performance. Pages will load normally.

Strict
Stronger protection, but may cause some sites or content to break.

- Social media trackers
- Cross-site tracking cookies
- Tracking content in all windows
- Cryptominers
- Fingerprinters**

Firefox 70

Bug 1507517 depends on 32 open bugs:

[view as bug list](#) | [change several](#)


- ▼ [1507517: \[META\] Breakage from Fingerprinting Resistance](#) ↗
 - ⌚ [1377744: privacy.resistfingerprinting's UTC timezone should not affect extensions](#) ↗
 - ⌚ [1394448: Cannot install Addon with privacy.resistFingerprinting=true](#) ↗
 - ⌚ [1404017: Pref for fingerprinting resistance in private browsing mode](#) ↗
 - ⌚ [1394735: Enabling privacy.resistFingerprinting causes jank in jquery scrolling](#) ↗
 - ⌚ [1399279: initial viewport too small for fullscreen WebApps with privacy.resistFingerprinting enabled](#) ↗
 - ⌚ [1401493: Perform Fingerprint Comparison of Tor Browser and Firefox](#) ↗
 - ⌚ [1414311: New window size is different than expected after changing screen dpi \(with privacy.resistFingerprinting pref enabled\)](#) ↗
 - ⌚ [1428331: HiDPI and privacy.resistFingerprinting](#) ↗
 - ⌚ [1554751: Consider to change the spoof value of window.devicePixelRatio](#) ↗
 - ⌚ [1403099: game in http://www.best.io/paper-io has very bad performance due to anti-fingerprinting setting \(needs higher resolution timer\)](#) ↗
 - ⌚ [1444311: New window size is different than expected after changing screen dpi \(with privacy.resistFingerprinting pref enabled\)](#) ↗ ⚡
 - ⌚ [1418537: Bad window height set when windows toolbar is open with resistfingerprinting option](#) ↗
 - ⌚ [1428331: HiDPI and privacy.resistFingerprinting](#) ↗ ⚡
 - ⌚ [1437266: Navigating back on youtube sometimes fails and restarts the current video with resistFingerprinting enabled](#) ↗
 - ⌚ [1442863: Smooth scrolling implementations perform badly with resistFingerprinting's reduced timer precision](#) ↗
 - ⌚ [1448423: browser.startup.blankWindow bugs when privacy.resistFingerprinting is enabled](#) ↗
 - ⌚ [1448848: privacy.resistFingerprinting should not affect screen coordinates for extensions/content scripts](#) ↗
 - ⌚ [1456378: privacy.resistFingerprinting breaks image cropping in Expensify](#) ↗
 - ▼ [1462115: privacy.resistfingerprinting affects the timezone displayed in native file picker dialogs](#) ↗
 - ⌚ [1491343: Time is incorrect when the instance is opened via about:profiles in another profile with privacy.resistFingerprinting enabled](#) ↗
 - ⌚ [1470828: privacy.resistFingerprinting breaks some shortcut keys](#) ↗
 - ⌚ [1491343: Time is incorrect when the instance is opened via about:profiles in another profile with privacy.resistFingerprinting enabled](#) ↗ ⚡
 - ⌚ [1503872: reCAPTCHA v3 fails with Resist Fingerprinting Enabled](#) ↗
 - ⌚ [1511941: privacy.resistFingerprinting performance API spoofing breaks vimeo.com](#) ↗
 - ⌚ [1511982: chase.com login does not work when RFP is enabled](#) ↗
 - ▼ [1532859: privacy.resistFingerprinting makes Google Spreadsheet text blur](#) ↗
 - ⌚ [1554751: Consider to change the spoof value of window.devicePixelRatio](#) ↗ ⚡
 - ▼ [1533787: privacy.resistFingerprinting causes icons on some sites \(including Gmail\) to be blurry](#) ↗
 - ⌚ [1554751: Consider to change the spoof value of window.devicePixelRatio](#) ↗ ⚡
 - ⌚ [1535565: \[Wayland\]\[ResistFingerprinting\] Maximized window remains garbled on startup until manually redrawn by switching windows](#) ↗
 - ⌚ [1535568: \[Wayland\]\[ResistFingerprinting\] First maximized window dimensions are not being rounded down on startup](#) ↗
 - ⌚ [1540308: privacy.resistFingerprinting set to true causes webpage to be white. Background image with z-index 5000 is not transparent.](#) ↗
 - ⌚ [1554751: Consider to change the spoof value of window.devicePixelRatio](#) ↗ ⚡
 - ⌚ [1560816: privacy.resistFingerprinting should not return exact window dimensions as screen size](#) ↗
 - ⌚ [1569561: wasm game doesn't run smoothly with privacy.resistFingerprinting enabled](#) ↗
 - ⌚ [1573834: Uploading images on craigslist breaks with resistFingerprinting enabled](#) ↗
 - ⌚ [1581492: \[resistFingerprinting\] Performance API spoofing prevents site from loading login scripts](#) ↗
 - ⌚ [1589060: privacy.resistFingerprinting limits canvas webgl framerate to 10 fps](#) ↗

Changing APIs is hard...

- **Image scaling problems from changing devicePixelRatio**
- **Image transparency issues**
- **Framerate and performance problems from timing changes**

https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1507517

Our current approach: blocking fingerprinting scripts




Crawl the web with OpenWPM.
Detect fingerprinting scripts.

Share flagged scripts with
Disconnect, who does a review
to remove false positives.

Domains blocked in Firefox.
Eventually by default.

Our current approach: blocking fingerprinting scripts



→ 138 verified fingerprinters
75% of the fingerprinting instances we've detected

Disconnect reviews candidate scripts

An example:

LeadsHub

This service has been classified as `Fingerprinting` for the following reasons:

Technical Review

Script: <http://cdn.ztsrv.com/js/0.5.0/ztag.js>

1. Script embeds or includes snippets of an open source fingerprinting library, `fingerprintJs2`:


```
g = function() {
  if (!o()) return void 0;
  var t = document.createElement("canvas"),
    e = t.getContext("2d"),
    n = "http://valve.github.io";
  return e.textBaseline = "top", e.font = '14px "Arial"', e.textBaseline = "alphabetic", e.fillS
},
```
2. Sends computed fingerprint back to server

Request URL: <http://us-west-2-v2-t.ztsrv.com/1/i/REMOVED;za/p.gif>



<https://github.com/disconnectme/disconnect-tracking-protection/blob/master/descriptions.md>


Initial success: changing practices



TinyMCE removed fingerprint2js from their HTML Editor as a result of our blocking

https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1544159

Initial success: changing practices




Gleam moved fingerprinting script from gleam.io to fraudjs.io to avoid app breakage

https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1558658

Challenge: Fingerprinting for anti-fraud

The image shows two web browser tabs side-by-side. The left tab is for Stripe, Inc. (US) at https://stripe.com, featuring a purple header with the word 'stripe' and a blue main area with the text 'The new standard in on'. Below this, it says 'Stripe is the best software platform for running an internet business. We handle billions of dollars every year for forward-thinking businesses around the world.' It includes a 'START NOW' button and a 'CONTACT SALES' button. The right tab is for Sift Science, Inc. (US) at https://sift.com/products/account-defense, titled 'Block Fake Accounts and ...'. The main heading is 'ACCOUNT DEFENSE' with the subtext 'Defend your users. Protect your brand.' It features a 'REQUEST A DEMO' button and a screenshot of the Sift dashboard showing various account analysis metrics like 'Accounts Created', 'Accounts Blocked', and 'Percentage Blocked' over time.

Blocking anti-fraud leads to major site breakage



Github account creation broken when Arkose Labs captcha was blocked for fingerprinting

<https://twitter.com/richgilbank/status/1090269987888082944>

Blocking anti-fraud leads to major site breakage

The screenshot shows the AARP login page at <https://secure.aarp.org/applications/user/login?request>. The page title is "Log in to AARP". It features fields for "Email Address" and "Password". Below these is a CAPTCHA challenge labeled "Security Challenge" with the letters "ATE" displayed. A red box highlights this challenge area. A yellow "LOG IN" button is at the bottom.

No Blocking

The screenshot shows the same AARP login page, but with anti-fraud blocking applied. The "ATE" CAPTCHA challenge is missing, replaced by a placeholder "Type the moving characters". A red arrow points from the text "Missing CAPTCHA" to this placeholder field. The rest of the page structure is identical to the first screenshot.

Blocking Fingerprinters

Two possible solutions to safer anti-fraud?

A screenshot of a web browser showing a Facebook Engineering blog post. The title is "Fighting fraud using partially blind signatures". The post features an illustration of three people at a desk with a laptop and a smartphone. Below the illustration, it says "By Ben Savage Subodh Iyengar". There are social sharing icons for Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn. To the right, there's a "Related Posts" section with two thumbnails: one for "Redesigning our systems to provide more control over Off-Facebook activity" and another for "Zoncolan: How Facebook uses static analysis to detect and prevent security issues".


A screenshot of a GitHub page titled "Trust Token API Explainer". The page contains a heading, a paragraph about the Privacy Pass protocol, a table of contents, and a detailed list of topics under each category. The table of contents includes sections like Motivation, Overview, Potential API (with sub-sections for Trust Token Issuance, Redemption, Forwarding, and Extensions), Privacy Considerations, Cryptographic Property: Unlinkability, Cross site Information Transfer, Security Considerations, and Future Extensions.

This document is an explainer for a potential future web platform API that allows propagating trust across sites, using the [Privacy Pass](#) protocol as an underlying primitive.


Table of Contents

- Motivation
- Overview
- Potential API
 - Trust Token Issuance
 - Trust Token Redemption
 - Forwarding Redemption Attestation
 - Extension: Trust-Bound Keypair and Request Signing
 - Extension: Private Metadata
- Privacy Considerations
 - Cryptographic Property: Unlinkability
 - Key Consistency
 - Potential Attack: Side Channel Fingerprinting
 - Cross site Information Transfer
 - Mitigation: Dynamic Issuance / Redemption Limits
 - Mitigation: Allowed/Blocked Issuer Lists
 - Mitigation: Per-Site Issuer Limits
 - First Party Tracking Potential
- Security Considerations
 - Trust Token Exhaustion
 - Double-Spend Prevention
- Future Extensions
 - Publicly Verifiable Tokens

Assume fraud is solved; can we block everything else?



Assume fraud is solved; can we block everything else?



... we tried that in a user study but we still saw 0.2% and 0.6% users leave Firefox because of it.

https://mozilla.report/post/projects/fingerprinting_protections.kp/

Why does blocking non-tracking fingerprinters
cause users to leave Firefox?

נִשְׁנָה

Challenge: discovering sites broken by our protections

Approach	Problems
User Reports	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Noisy• Unreliable
User Studies	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Noisy• No clear way to measure
Manual QA	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Limited scope• Expensive: 1 month of full-time work per 1,000 sites
Automated Crawls	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Limited scope• No clear way to measure

Mozilla Research Grants 2019H2

**How can we automate the process
of discovering broken sites?**



Amount: \$40,000

Deadline

Friday, November 22nd at 2:22pm
Pacific Daylight Time (PDT)

<https://mozilla-research.forms.fm/mozilla-research-grants-2019h2/forms/7376>

A possible step forward for anti-fingerprinting?



The screenshot shows the 'Enhanced Tracking Protection' settings in Firefox. At the top, there's a shield icon and a brief description: 'Trackers follow you around online to collect information about your browsing habits and interests. Firefox blocks many of these trackers and other malicious scripts.' A 'Manage Exceptions...' button is also present. Below this, there are two radio button options: 'Standard' (selected) and 'Strict'. Under 'Standard', it says 'Balanced for protection and performance. Pages will load normally.' Under 'Strict', it says 'Stronger protection, but may cause some sites or content to break.' and lists several tracking types with checkboxes: Social media trackers (unchecked), Cross-site tracking cookies (unchecked), Tracking content in all windows (checked), Cryptominers (unchecked), and Fingerprinters (unchecked).

Per-frame fingerprinting resistance based on a blocklist

https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1531873


My asks for you:

1. Help us find technical alternatives to a global identifier for:
 - a. Federated login
 - b. Anti-fraud / device reputation
 - c. Advertisement attribution / measurement
2. Find violations of our anti-tracking policies
 - a. Name and shame
 - b. We can update our blocks
3. Help us explore ways to better discover broken sites
 - a. Apply to our grant!


THANK YOU!

BACKUP SLIDES

Interaction allows interactive embeds to work



Interaction allows interactive embeds to work




login.google.com receives storage
access on **example.com***

* *Provided it meets some additional requirements.*

See: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Firefox/Privacy/Storage_access_policy

We also handle redirects...



See: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Firefox/Privacy/Storage_access_policy

A workaround: Cross-site tracking with query strings



[social.example's cookie jar](#)
user_id=123;
clicks=ABC, ...



[news.example's cookie jar](#)

A workaround: Cross-site tracking via query strings

(1) Append unique id in click_id parameter




social.example's cookie jar
user_id=123;
clicks=ABC, XYZ, ...



news.example's cookie jar

A workaround: Cross-site tracking via query strings




social.example's cookie jar
user_id=123;
clicks=ABC, XYZ, ...



news.example's cookie jar

A workaround: Cross-site tracking via query strings



Request: a safer way to do ad measurement

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL <https://trac.webkit.org/wiki/ad-click-attribution-draft-spec>. The page title is "[Draft Spec] Ad Click Attribution for the Web". The content discusses a web technology for ad click attribution, mentioning a popular business model involving attribution and payment for conversions like purchases or sign-ups. It also notes the potential for privacy invasive cross-site tracking. The page includes sections on Terminology, Conversion, and Ad Campaign Id, along with a note about Ad Attribution Data.

This document specifies a web technology for ad click attribution, i.e. attribution sent to a source of an ad click as the result of user activities on the destination of the same click.

Ad Click Attribution and Privacy

A popular business model for the web is to get attribution and payment for conversions, for instance purchases or sign-ups, which result from the click on an ad. Traditionally, such attribution has been facilitated by user identifying cookies sent in third-party HTTP requests to the click source. However, the same technology can be and has been used for privacy invasive cross-site tracking of users. The technology described in this document is intended to allow for ad click attribution while disallowing arbitrary cross-site tracking.

Terminology

Ad click. This document will use the term "ad click" for any kind of user gesture on an ad that invokes the navigation to a link destination, such as clicks, taps, and accessibility tools.

Conversion. A user activity that is notable such as a purchase, a sign-up to a service, or the submission of personal information such as an email address.

The four parties involved in this technology are:

1. **The user.** They click on an ad, end up on a destination website, and perform what's deemed to be a conversion, such as a purchase.
2. **The user agent.** The web browser that acts on behalf of the user and facilitates ad click attribution.
3. **The ad click source.** The first-party website where the user clicks on the ad.
4. **The ad click destination.** The destination website where the conversion happens.

Ad Campaign Id. A 6-bit hexadecimal identifier for an ad campaign associated with the ad click destination. This means support for 64 concurrent ad campaigns per ad click destination on the ad click source. Example: merchant.example can run up to 64 concurrent ad campaigns on search.example. The valid hexadecimal values are 00 to 40.

Ad Attribution Data. A 6-bit hexadecimal value encoding the details of the attribution. This data may contain things like specific steps in a sales funnel or the value of

Challenge: Fingerprinting for anti-fraud

Policy exceptions:

1. Improving client authentication
2. Preventing the creation of fraudulent accounts
3. Preventing the completion of fraudulent purchases.

The screenshot shows a Mozilla Firefox browser window displaying a Mozilla Wiki page. The title of the page is "Security/Anti tracking policy". The page content discusses online tracking practices and Mozilla's intentions to implement technical protections in Firefox to block them. It mentions the Tracking Protection list and the Disconnect extension. A sidebar on the left contains links to various Mozilla projects and resources, such as Main page, Product releases, Recent changes, and Help. A navigation bar at the top includes links for Page, Discussion, Read, View source, and a search bar.

Security/Anti tracking policy

This document describes the online tracking practices that Mozilla believes, as a matter of principle, should not be supported by web browsers. These practices are potentially harmful to users and cannot be controlled by users.

We intend to implement technical protections in Firefox to block all tracking practices. In addition to the techniques described here, we may expand this policy to include the new techniques we develop to block those techniques in Firefox.

Our current anti-tracking mitigations in Firefox rely on the Tracking Protection list and the Disconnect extension in alignment with this policy.


Contents [hide]

- 1 Tracking Definition
- 2 Tracking We Will Block
 - 2.1 1. Cross-site tracking
 - 2.2 2. Tracking via unintended identification techniques
- 3 Policy circumvention
- 4 Policy Exceptions

The web needs **default-on** tracking protection ...

4 news sites

272 third parties



The web needs **default-on** tracking protection ...
... and not just from third-party cookies



Browser state



IP Address + Device
Properties



Identity



Browser state



IP Address + Device
Properties



Identity

**Tracking vectors completely
within browser's control**

The tracking landscape



Browser state



IP Address + Device
Properties



Identity

The tracking landscape



Browser state



IP Address + Device
Properties




Identity


Scripts can collect PII for tracking




Scripts can collect PII for tracking





Scripts can collect PII for tracking



Scripts can collect PII for tracking



We can block scripts that scrape PII



Tracker 1




Tracker 2



Tracker 3

In-browser protection options are limited...



The tracking landscape



Browser state




IP Address + Device
Properties



Identity

Fingerprinting blocking available since Firefox 67

Firefox 70



How can we prevent identity-based tracking?

Request: a safer way to do anti-fraud