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Revisions to malware section
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- More strongly emphasize printer use
- More consistently recommend speaking to admin/digisec staff
  before exporting files in digital form
- Describe file conversion as a "tip" which is really all it is,
  given the large scope of the overall problem
- Organize sections a bit more clearly

Also adds a note that VeraCrypt support is only available since
Tails 3.9, and clarifies one old reference to the Journalist
Workstation.
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eloquence committed Aug 15, 2019
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78 changes: 48 additions & 30 deletions docs/journalist.rst
Expand Up @@ -449,8 +449,8 @@ and flac. You can open MAT by clicking **Applications** ▸ **System Tools** ▸
**MAT**.

We recommend always doing as much work as possible inside of Tails
before copying documents back to your *Journalist Workstation*. This
includes stripping metadata with MAT.
before working with documents on your everyday workstation. This includes
stripping metadata with MAT.

.. warning:: MAT is no longer actively maintained and **will not**
strip all metadata, even when the output claims the
Expand All @@ -469,42 +469,54 @@ choose **Wipe** to delete them.
Risks From Malware
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

As long as you are using the latest version of Tails, you should be
able to open submitted documents with a low risk of malicious
files compromising the *Secure Viewing Station*. However, even if a
compromise does occur, Tails is designed so that the next time you
reboot, the malware will be gone.

It is crucial, however, that you have a strategy for dealing with malware before
you move documents off the *Secure Viewing Station* in electronic form.
SecureDrop does not scan for or automatically remove malware. If you copy an
original file you received via SecureDrop to your everyday workstation, and that
file contains malware, you may still end up running the malware on your everyday
workstation.

For this reason, we recommend taking additional precautions. Printing a file
is often safer than exchanging it electronically, and it has the additional
benefits of removing embedded metadata (except for printer codes, watermarks,
or similar identifiers that may not be visible to the naked eye).

Alternatively, you can use the tools provided within Tails to examine
documents, or convert files from one format to another (e.g., export a Word
document as PDF). Fully mitigating the risks of malware is beyond the scope
of this documentation.
As long as you are using the latest version of Tails on your *Secure Viewing Station*,
you can open submitted documents with a low risk of malicious files compromising
it. Tails only preserves changes to your persistent volume across reboots,
making it difficult for malware to take hold. The air-gap prevents malware
from "phoning home". Keeping your *Secure Viewing Station* up-to-date is the
single best way to protect its security.

If you copy files you have received via SecureDrop to your everyday workstation
and open them there in their original form, the risks from malware are
significantly greater. SecureDrop does not scan for or remove malware, and your
everyday workstation likely has a much greater `attack surface <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface>`__
than the *Secure Viewing Station*.

Instead of exporting files in digital form, print them whenever possible. Printing
essentially neutralizes malware, and it has the additional benefit of removing
embedded metadata. Printing a document may, however, preserve watermarks,
printer codes, steganographically encoded data, or other information
not visible to the naked eye.

If you must copy files in digital form (e.g., because of the quantity of
information or the format), we recommend consulting with your administrator or
your digital security staff before the export. Fully mitigating the risks of
malware is beyond the scope of this documentation.

.. tip::

Tails provides both graphical and command-line utilities that can be used to
convert files across formats (e.g., PDF to PNG). This can be a good way to
dramatically reduce the risk of malware, especially when converting to the
simplest possible format that can hold the information you need.

Risks From QR Codes and Links
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

`Never scan QR codes`_ from the *Secure Viewing Station* using a network
connected device. These QR codes can contain links that your connected device
connected device. QR codes can contain links that your connected device
will automatically visit. In general, you should take care when opening any
links provided in a SecureDrop submission, as this can leak information to third
parties. If you are unsure if a link is safe to click, you should consult your
digital security staff or Freedom of the Press Foundation for assistance.


.. _`Never scan QR codes`: https://securedrop.org/news/security-advisory-do-not-scan-qr-codes-submitted-through-securedrop-connected-devices
.. _`working with sensitive documents`: https://tails.boum.org/doc/sensitive_documents/index.en.html
.. _`Metadata Anonymisation Toolkit`: https://mat.boum.org/

Risks From Photography
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Risks From Digital Photography
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

It may be tempting to use your smartphone to photograph a submission, in order
to share it with another journalist for quick review. Please note that many
Expand All @@ -527,13 +539,19 @@ Moving Documents to Your Everyday Workstation
the risk of spreading malware to that computer. Make sure you understand the
risks, and consider other methods to export the document (e.g., print).

If you want to copy files from your *Secure Viewing Station* to your everyday
workstation, our :doc:`recommendation <set_up_transfer_and_export_device>` is
that journalists are provided with an *Export Device*, typically a USB drive,
If you must copy a file from your *Secure Viewing Station* to your everyday
workstation in digital form, our :doc:`recommendation <set_up_transfer_and_export_device>`
is that journalists are provided with an *Export Device*, typically a USB drive,
which is encrypted using `VeraCrypt <https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Home.html>`__.
These instructions assume that you are following the recommended workflow.
If you are unsure, ask your administrator.

.. note::

VeraCrypt support was added to Tails in `version 3.9 <https://tails.boum.org/news/version_3.9/index.en.html>`__.
We strongly recommend keeping your *Secure Viewing Station* up-to-date with
each release of Tails.

To open the *Export Device* on the *Secure Viewing Station*, follow these steps:

1. If your *Export Device* has a physical write protection switch, make sure
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