

# Reimagining the intelligence deliverable

**Gert-Jan Bruggink**

BSides Cheltenham 2023

03 June 2023



# Key takeaways

- ✓ One key industry problem is storytelling
- ✓ Structured content improves stakeholder engagement, making 'threat informed' storytelling way more effective
- ✓ Applying structured content in practice is easy to start with, very hard to master



Hi there! 🖐️

Practitioner & hands-on client support in

Cyber Threat Intelligence

Risk Management

Capability Building

Intelligence-led Red Teaming

Transformation Programs

Strategic Change

Most notably in these industries

Financial Services

High Tech

Manufacturing

Rest of my time goes into

Entrepreneurship

Coaching

Volunteering

Research

Father x 2

Gaming

Lego




Meme's

Sports




## Gert-Jan Bruggink

Cyber threat cartographer  
Builder of high-performance teams  
Lego aficionado

 [@gertjanbruggink](https://twitter.com/gertjanbruggink)  
 [github.com/gertjanbruggink](https://github.com/gertjanbruggink)  
 [/gertjanbruggink](https://www.linkedin.com/company/gertjanbruggink/)



# Threat Informed Risk Management is hard



Understanding  
opportunity,  
capability, intent

Structuring &  
standardizing

Direct or immediate 'threat'

Operational priorities

# CTI capabilities struggle with their own success

Periodic assessment on industry verticals, innovations, & threats



Quality baseline & expertise required

Calculating value

Knowing stakeholders & aligning requirements

Development and/or adjustment of deliverables

Structured content takes time


The background features a solid purple upper half and a dark blue lower half, separated by a horizontal dotted line. Stylized, overlapping mountain-like shapes in shades of purple and blue are positioned behind the text.

Talking the same language

# Common Risk Management language

- Risk = Impact x likelihood
- Risk = Impact x likelihood (threat x asset x vulnerability)
- **Risk = Impact x likelihood x threat (capability x intent x opportunity)**
- Risk = Threat x vulnerability/capacity
- Risk = Impact x likelihood


# (Cyber) threat in context of risk








# Talking the right stakeholder language




Extending the 'Pyramid of pain'



# Non-exhaustive structured content overview



# Telling our (current) cyber threat stories



Source: Amazon

**Date of Report:** YYYY-MM-DD **Report #:** XXXXXXXXX

**Subject:** [WHAT THIS REPORT IS ABOUT]

**TLP/Classification:** [Amber, sensitive, confidential, etc.]

**Requested by:** [Primary] **Ticket #:** XXXX

**Stakeholders/Customers:** [Other stakeholders as identified by Requirements]

**Date of Information:** [Helps to determine what is actually "new" information]

**Executive Summary:** [Brief statement of what happened, why the reader should care, and what is being done or needs to be done.]

**Information:** [The news/ 5 Ws – breaking 0-day, New DDoS tactic, new ATO campaign, etc.]

**CTI Assessment:** [The "So What?" Why this matters or why the analyst feels the need to write this report. What is the Risk scenario this speaks to? Potential Impact? Likelihood? Are we vulnerable? What controls in place?]

**Next steps:** [What actions are we taking now, how will the right people get this information?]

**Intelligence Gaps:** [What we don't know/would like to know/can't know.]

**Prepared by:** [Ticket owner]

**Related Reporting:** [Other reports from same Ticket, Task, or Requirement (s)]

**Requirements:** [10, 10.1, 11, 11.2, etc.]

**Source(s) used:** [Vendor #1, Internal #3, Internal #4]

Source: ReqFast & Venation



# Challenges of translation

## Intelligence product



## Structured technical content

Date of Report: YYYY-MM-DD    Report #: XXXXXXXXX

Subject: [WHAT THIS REPORT IS ABOUT]

TLP/Classification: [Amber, sensitive, confidential, etc.]

Requested by: [Primary Stakeholders/Customer]

Date of Information: [When was this information gathered?]

Executive Summary: [Brief statement of what happened, why the reader should care, and what is being done or needs to be done.]

Information: [The news/ 5 Ws – breaking 0-day, New DDoS tactic, new ATO campaign, etc.]

CTI Assessment: [The “So What?” Why this matters or why the analyst feels the need to write this report. What is the Risk scenario this speaks to? Potential Impact? Likelihood? Are we vulnerable? What controls in place?]

Next steps: [What actions are we taking now, how will the right people get this information?]

Intelligence Gaps: [What do we need to know more about?]

Prepared by: [Ticket owner]

Related Reporting: [Other reports from same Ticket, Task, or Requirement (s)]

Requirements: [10, 10.1, 11, 11.2, etc.]

Source(s) used: [Vendor #1, Internal #3, Internal #4]

**Executive Summary:** [Brief statement of what happened, why the reader should care, and what is being done or needs to be done.]

**Information:** [The news/ 5 Ws – breaking 0-day, New DDoS tactic, new ATO campaign, etc.]

**CTI Assessment:** [The “So What?” Why this matters or why the analyst feels the need to write this report. What is the Risk scenario this speaks to? Potential Impact? Likelihood? Are we vulnerable? What controls in place?]

**Next steps:** [What actions are we taking now, how will the right people get this information?]

Source: Venation & ReqFast

### Unstructured (currently)


description (optional)	string	A description that provides more details and context about the Course of Action, potentially including its purpose and its key characteristics.
------------------------	--------	---

### Structured

pattern (required)	string	The detection pattern for this Indicator <b>MAY</b> be expressed as a STIX Pattern as specified in section 9 or another appropriate language such as SNORT, YARA, etc.
pattern_type (required)	open-vocab	<p>The pattern language used in this indicator.</p> <p>The value for this property <b>SHOULD</b> come from the <b>pattern-type-ov</b> open vocabulary.</p> <p>The value of this property <b>MUST</b> match the type of pattern data included in the <b>pattern</b> property.</p>

Source: STIX 2.1 documentation

# Tying it to stakeholder demands







# Our age-old frontier: storytelling




Source:  
<http://bugyedmonkeys.com/lic/about/img/screen1.png>



Applying this in practice

# Reimagining CTI 'storytelling'





Source:  
[https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/1553/8473/files/201912-MMB-Instructions\\_Penguin\\_40332\\_-\\_1\\_2048x2048.png?v=1583304951](https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/1553/8473/files/201912-MMB-Instructions_Penguin_40332_-_1_2048x2048.png?v=1583304951)

TLDR: it is not this simple





# Creating individual scenarios using structured content



## Approach

Created a framework-like structure to drive research

Interlinked to frameworks and models

Create codified version(s)

Collaborate with academia to extend existing frameworks/models/schemas

Trialing this in the private sector






# Knowing your threat environment



# Translating adversary playbook to practice



## Adversary playbook

Associated threat actor profile:

Name	Tag	Category	Capability	Intent	Comments
DarkHotel	#Actor/DarkHotel	State-sponsored	High	High	'Retro' campaign in 2017-2019. 'Ransom' campaign in 2019.
Sednit	#Actor/Sednit				
Tropic Trooper	#Actor/TropicTrooper				
Equation Group	#Actor/EquationGroup				
Goblin Panda	#Actor/GoblinPanda				
Mustang Panda	#Actor/MustangPanda				

TTP breakdown:


Name	Tag	Category	Capability	Intent	Comments
APT28	#Actor/Example	State-sponsored entity	High	High	

TTP breakdown:

Tactic_ID	Tactic	Technique_ID	Technique	Procedure(s)	Detection Opportunity
TA0043	Reconnaissance	T1589	Gather Victim Identity Information	Acquire potential targets, possibly for mobile malware or additional phishing operation	
TA0001	Initial Access	T1189	Drive-by Compromise	Use watering hole attack within a specific IP range.	Detection_tagging   TBD
TA0008	Lateral Movement	T1550.001	Use Alternate Authentication Material	several malicious applications that abused OAuth access tokens to gain access	Detection_tagging   TBD

Source: <https://github.com/venation-digital/>

# Providing better context through narratives



## Objective(s):

The objective of this scenario is to gain access to an air-gapped network.

## Summary:

This scenario details how malware, or malware frameworks, implements an offline, covert communication mechanism between an air-gapped system and an attacker that is bi-directional. Specifically, it emphasises automated execution: getting malware to compromise an air-gapped system.

## Scenario walkthrough:

- **Initial compromise:** An attacker targets users through one of the following: phishing with malicious attachment, human asset installation or watering hole attacks. Gaining access to an internet-connected system that is connected alongside the air-gapped network. Using the Established a persistent shell on a system that connects to the C&C server. Spearphishing using malicious attachments.
- **Weaponize USB drives:** Once compromised, that system is used to weaponize USB drives with a malicious payload and some mechanism to compromise the next target: the air-gapped system. Should the scenario be executed from a **assume breach** perspective, then the scenario initiates here.
- **Compromise air-gapped system:** Air-gapped system is compromised through its execution vector, it only depends on the capabilities of the malware framework.

## Industry Tagging:

#Industry/Manufacturing  
#Industry/Energy

## Functions and/or systems targeted:

All known malware frameworks implement this scenario.

## Scenario walkthrough:

- **Initial compromise:** An attacker targets users through one of the following: phishing with malicious attachment, human asset installation or watering hole attacks. Gaining access to an internet-connected system that is connected alongside the air-gapped network. Using the Established a persistent shell on a system that connects to the C&C server. Spearphishing using malicious attachments.
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
# Using encoding to analyze scenario's more effective

Practically start with  
Markdown

Ingest in open-  
source note keeping  
tool




<https://obsidian.md/>



Out of the box relationship visualizing  
based on tagging

## Explore your internal technology stack for creative uses

## Identify how your stakeholders are reporting and 'hook' in on that



Source  
<https://www.atlassian.com/software/jira/service-management/resources/insight-data-center-get-started-guide>





# Emerging model / schema: CACAO

We know how to get from this to that

Data and information input  
remains an industry wide  
challenge

## Conti cyber attack on the HSE

Independent Post Incident Review

Commissioned by the HSE Board in conjunction  
with the CEO and Executive Management Team

03 December 2021

Source  
<https://www.hse.ie/eng/services/publications/conti-cyber-attack-on-the-hse-full-report.pdf>

## Attack Playbook Template

This example Attack type playbook template captures the Conti ransomware attack on the Irish healthcare system.

```
[
  {
    "type": "playbook-template",
    "spec_version": "1.1",
    "id": "playbook-template--27",
    "name": "Irish HSE Conti Com",
    "description": "This playboo",
    "playbook_types": ["attack"],
    "playbook_functionalities": [
      "ransomware attack on the Irish Healt",
      "healthcare",
      "government-public-servi"
    ],
    "created_by": "identity--c59",
    "created": "2022-07-27T12:50",
    "modified": "2022-07-27T12:50",
    "industry_sectors": [
      "healthcare",
      "government-public-servi"
    ],
    "labels": [
      "Board.",
      "on-the-hse-ful"
    ],
    "external_references": [
      "featu",
      "flow",
      "workf"
    ],
    "name": "Start HSE C",
    "on_completion": "action"
  },
  {
    "name": "Start HSE C",
    "on_completion": "action"
  }
]
```

## Detection Playbook Template

This Detection playbook template captures a cyber analytic.

```
[{
  "type": "playbook-template",
  "spec_version": "1.1",
  "id": "playbook-template--278dba30-8aac-5cfe-8334-0831258431ac",
  "name": "Cyber Analytic Playbook",
  "description": "The Windows Command Prompt (cmd.exe) is a utility...<snip>.",
  "playbook_types": ["detection"],
  "playbook_functionalities": ["match-indicator"],
  "created": "2020-09-04T10:58:16.000Z",
  "modified": "2020-09-04T10:58:16.000Z",
  "created_by": "identity--c59f3ff7-2f24-5bd4-a0ed-2fd36ec04b06",
  "external_references": [
    "33-...": {
      "name": "Start HSE C",
      "on_completion": "action"
    }
  ]
}]
```

Collaborative Automated  
Course of Action Operations  
(CACAO): emerging standard  
for workflows

Desiree A Beck, Principal Cyber Security Engineer, MITRE  
Image source: Example CACAO Attack & Detection Playbook(s)

Source  
<https://docs.oasis-open.org/cacao/security-playbooks/v1.0/security-playbooks-v1.0.html>

We struggle with these



Source  
<https://martijnvanotterlo.nl/minority.jpg>

Correlation  
Visualisation  
Corresponding action(s)

Wrapping it up



# Success factors to effective 'threat informed' storytelling



Explore codifying your (internal) data or information. Regardless of your maturity.

Align with priorities & stakeholders and identify easy machine-readable sharing

Reimagine your approach to storytelling and explore a narrative format

# Your reimagined deliverable



Executive



Manager



Specialist



# Let's continue exploring further!

Gert-Jan Bruggink

[gertjanbruggink@venation.digital](mailto:gertjanbruggink@venation.digital)



[@gertjanbruggink](https://twitter.com/gertjanbruggink)



[/gertjanbruggink](https://www.linkedin.com/company/gertjanbruggink)



# References

STIX	<a href="https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data">https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data</a> .
MISP Object templates	<a href="https://www.misp-project.org/objects.html">https://www.misp-project.org/objects.html</a>
OCSF	<a href="https://github.com/ocsf">https://github.com/ocsf</a>
VERIS	<a href="https://github.com/vz-risk/veris">https://github.com/vz-risk/veris</a>
OpenIOC	<a href="https://github.com/fireeye/OpenIOC_1.1">https://github.com/fireeye/OpenIOC_1.1</a>
CACAO	<a href="https://docs.oasis-open.org/cacao/security-playbooks/v1.0/security-playbooks-v1.0.html">https://docs.oasis-open.org/cacao/security-playbooks/v1.0/security-playbooks-v1.0.html</a>