



Evidence in favor of a scientific theory With great complexity comes great honesty

Gustavo Landfried

MSc in Anthropological Sciences PhD student in Computer Sciences



Why Bayesian inference?

Allows us to optimally update a priori beliefs given a model and data.

Where comes from?

	Not infected	Infected	
Not vaccinated	4	2	6
Vaccinated	76	18	94
	80	20	100

From conditional probability

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Bayes theorem:

$$P(A_1|B_1) = \frac{P(B_1 \cap A_1)}{P(B_1)} = \frac{P(B_1|A_1)P(A_1)}{P(B_1)}$$
(1)

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In this example all frequencies were observables

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Bayesian inference is about hidden variables
About our belief distributions of those hidden variables!

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The inferential jump

Bayesian inference is about hidden variables
About our belief distributions of those hidden variables!

$$\underbrace{P(\mathsf{Belief}|\mathsf{Data})}_{\mathsf{Posterior}} = \underbrace{\frac{P(\mathsf{Data}|\mathsf{Belief})}{P(\mathsf{Data})}}_{\substack{\mathsf{Evidence or} \\ \mathsf{Average likelihood}}} \underbrace{\frac{P\mathsf{rior}}{P(\mathsf{Belief})}}_{\substack{\mathsf{Evidence or} \\ \mathsf{Average likelihood}}}$$

A model is always there!

$$\underbrace{P(\mathsf{Belief}|\mathsf{Data},\mathsf{Model})}_{\mathsf{Posterior}} = \underbrace{\frac{\mathsf{Likelihood}}{P(\mathsf{Data}|\mathsf{Belief},\mathsf{Model})} \underbrace{P(\mathsf{Belief}|\mathsf{Model})}_{\mathsf{Evidence}} \underbrace{\frac{P(\mathsf{Data}|\mathsf{Model})}{P(\mathsf{Data}|\mathsf{Model})}}_{\mathsf{Average}}$$

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
$$P(D|M) = \sum_{B \in \mathsf{Beliefs}} \underbrace{P(D|B,M)}_{\mathsf{likelihood}} \underbrace{P(B|M)}_{\mathsf{prior}}$$

Posterior belief (distribution):

$$P(B|D,M) = \frac{P(D|B,M)P(B|M)}{P(D|M)} \qquad \forall B \in \mathsf{Beliefs}$$


To update our beliefs (posterior), we need to consider every possible path in the model that could have lead us to the observed data (likelihood).

Model (M): Data $\sim \mathsf{Binomial}(n,p)$




Ways given M and B = 0000 (First marbel)


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
(Second marbel)





Data (D): ● ○ ● Beliefs (B): 0000, ●000, ●●00, ●●●0, ●●●

Model (M): Data \sim Binomial(n, p)




Ways given M and B = 0000

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Data (D): ● ○ ● Beliefs (B): ○○○○, ●○○○, ●●○○, ●●●○, ●●●●

Model (M): Data \sim Binomial(n, p)




Ways given M and B = 0000

Belief Ways to produce ● ○ ●

0000


The garden of forking paths



Ways given M and $B = \circ \circ \circ \circ$


Belief	Ways to produce ● ○ ●
0000	$0 \times 4 \times 0 = 0$

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
Ways given M and $B=\circ\circ\circ\circ$

Belief	Ways to produce ● ○ ●	Likelihood	Prior	Posterior \propto
0000	$0 \times 4 \times 0 = 0$	$\frac{0\times4\times0}{4\times4\times4} = \frac{0}{64}$	1/5	$\frac{0}{64} \frac{1}{5}$




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
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
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
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
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				P(D M)



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
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				$\frac{3+8+9}{64\cdot 5}$

Model (M): Data \sim Binomial(n, p)



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
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└─The garden of forking paths

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••00	$2\times2\times2=8$	8/64	1/5	$\frac{8}{64} \frac{1}{5}$	$\frac{8}{3+8+9} = 0.40$
$\bullet \bullet \bullet \circ$	$3 \times 1 \times 3 = 9$	9/64	1/5	$\frac{9}{64} \frac{1}{5}$	$\frac{9}{3+8+9} = 0.45$
••••	$4\times 0\times 4=0$	0/64	1/5	$\frac{0}{64} \frac{1}{5}$	$\frac{0}{3+8+9} = 0.00$
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
Bayesian skill estimator


How to estimate skill of players?



Arpad Elo







The factor graphs specifies the way to compute the posterior, likelihood, and evidence. Kschischang FR, Frey BJ, Loeliger HA. Factor graphs and the sum-product algorithm. 2001


Bayesian inference

Conditional probability


$$\underbrace{P(s_a \mid r_{ab}, \text{Elo model})}_{\text{Posterior}} \propto \underbrace{N(s_a \mid \widehat{\mu}_a, \widehat{\sigma}_a^2)}_{\text{Prior}} \underbrace{1 - \Phi(s_a \mid \widehat{\mu}_b, 2\beta^2 + \widehat{\sigma}_b^2)}_{\text{Umage}} \qquad \text{Win case}$$

Conditional probability


$$\underbrace{P_{\text{Osterior}}}_{\text{Posterior}} \underbrace{N(s_a \mid \widehat{\mu}_a, \widehat{\sigma}_a^2)}_{\text{Prior}} \underbrace{1 - \Phi(s_a \mid \widehat{\mu}_b, 2\beta^2 + \widehat{\sigma}_b^2)}_{\text{Un} \text{ case}}$$
 Win case




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
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$$\underbrace{P(s_a \mid r_{ab}, \text{Elo model})}_{\text{Posterior}} \propto \underbrace{N(s_a \mid \widehat{\mu}_a, \widehat{\sigma}_a^2)}_{\text{Posterior}} \underbrace{1 - \Phi(s_a \mid \widehat{\mu}_b, 2\beta^2 + \widehat{\sigma}_b^2)}_{\text{Un case}} \quad \text{Win case}$$




$$\underbrace{P_{(s_a \mid r_{ab}, \, \mathsf{Elo} \, \mathsf{model})}^{\mathsf{Prior}} \times \underbrace{N(s_a \mid \widehat{\mu}_a, \widehat{\sigma}_a^2)}_{1 - \Phi(s_a \mid \widehat{\mu}_b, 2\beta^2 + \widehat{\sigma}_b^2)}^{\mathsf{Likelihood}}}_{\mathsf{Win} \, \mathsf{case}}$$




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Loose case



$$\overbrace{P(s_a \mid r_{ab}, \mathsf{Elo} \; \mathsf{model})}^{\mathsf{Prior}} \propto \overbrace{N(s_a \mid \widehat{\mu}_a, \widehat{\sigma}_a^2)}^{\mathsf{Prior}} \underbrace{\Phi(s_a \mid \widehat{\mu}_b, 2\beta^2 + \widehat{\sigma}_b^2)}^{\mathsf{Likelihood}} \qquad \mathsf{Loose} \; \mathsf{case}$$



For a detailed demostration, see Landfried. TrueSkill: Technical Report. 2019

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Bayes factor
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All you need is evidence

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
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
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











Evience encode a trade-off between complexity and prediction.







With evidence there is no need for regularization



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Why evidence is not widely used in machine learning?

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First let's take a look at Bayesian no-doubt case

Bayesian no-doubt case

Fixed beliefs, even with infinite new data

$$\#\mathsf{Beliefs} = 1 \Longrightarrow \underbrace{P(B)}_{\mathsf{Prior}} = \underbrace{P(B|D)}_{\mathsf{Posterior}} \quad \begin{tabular}{l} \forall D \in \mathsf{Data} \\ \forall B \in \mathsf{Beliefs} \end{tabular}$$

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Likelihood is just the Evidence

$$\#$$
Beliefs = 1 \iff Likelihood = Evidence

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- All non-bayesian machine learning (the hacked-belief approach)

The best belief after seeing the data maximum likelihood estimator =
$$\arg\!\max_{B}\!P(D|B,M) = \widehat{B}$$

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Hacked evidence (with MLE) = Maximum likelihood

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Hacked evidence (with MLE) = Maximum likelihood

With great hacked-belief approach comes great overfitting!

With great overfitting comes great regularization!

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Hacked evidence (with MAP) = L2 or L1 regularization

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Evidence and data science metrics

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Is there any data science metrics equivalent to evidence?

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Evidence \propto Cross entropy (at validation data set, if hacked-belief approach)