<page_title> Ranked pairs </page_title> <section_title> Comparison table </section_title> <table> <cell> Monotonic <col_header> vteComparison of Preferential Electoral Systems </col_header> <row_header>  </row_header> </cell> <cell> Condorcet <col_header> vteComparison of Preferential Electoral Systems </col_header> <row_header>  </row_header> <row_header> Monotonic </row_header> </cell> <cell> Majority <col_header> vteComparison of Preferential Electoral Systems </col_header> <row_header>  </row_header> <row_header> Monotonic </row_header> <row_header> Condorcet </row_header> </cell> <cell> Condorcet loser <col_header> vteComparison of Preferential Electoral Systems </col_header> <row_header>  </row_header> <row_header> Monotonic </row_header> <row_header> Condorcet </row_header> <row_header> Majority </row_header> </cell> <cell> Smith <col_header> vteComparison of Preferential Electoral Systems </col_header> <row_header>  </row_header> <row_header> Monotonic </row_header> <row_header> Condorcet </row_header> <row_header> Majority </row_header> <row_header> Condorcet loser </row_header> <row_header> Majority loser </row_header> <row_header> Mutual majority </row_header> </cell> <cell> Clone independence <col_header> vteComparison of Preferential Electoral Systems </col_header> <row_header>  </row_header> <row_header> Monotonic </row_header> <row_header> Condorcet </row_header> <row_header> Majority </row_header> <row_header> Condorcet loser </row_header> <row_header> Majority loser </row_header> <row_header> Mutual majority </row_header> <row_header> Smith </row_header> <row_header> ISDA </row_header> <row_header> LIIA </row_header> </cell> </table>
The ranked pairs method passes the majority criterion, the monotonicity criterion, the Smith criterion, the Condorcet criterion, the Condorcet loser criterion, and the independence of clones criterion.