

Detection of Unknown Computer Worms Activity Based on Computer Behavior using Data Mining

Robert Moskovitch, Ido Gus, Shay Pluderman, Dima Stopel, Clint Feher, Chanan Glezer, Yuval Shahar and Yuval Elovici

Abstract — Detecting unknown worms is a challenging task. Extant solutions, such as anti-virus tools, rely mainly on prior explicit knowledge of specific worm signatures. As a result, after the appearance of a new worm on the Web there is a significant delay until an update carrying the worm's signature is distributed to anti-virus tools. During this time interval a new worm can infect many computers and cause significant damage. We propose an innovative technique for detecting the presence of an *unknown* worm, not necessarily by recognizing specific instances of the worm, but rather based on the computer measurements. We designed an experiment to test the new technique employing several computer configurations and background applications activity. During the experiments 323 computer features were monitored. Four feature selection techniques were used to reduce the amount of features and four classification algorithms were applied on the resulting feature subsets. Our results indicate that using this approach resulted in an above 90% average accuracy, and for specific unknown worms accuracy reached above 99%, using just 20 features while maintaining a low level of false positive rate.

I. INTRODUCTION

THE detection of malicious code (malcode) transmitted over computer networks has been researched intensively in recent years. One type of abundant malcode is *worms*, which proactively propagate across networks while exploiting vulnerabilities in operating systems or in installed programs. Other types of malcode include computer *viruses*, *Trojan horses*, *spyware*, and *adware*. In this study we focus

on worms, though we plan to expand the approach to other malcodes.

Nowadays, excellent technology (i.e., antivirus software packages) exists for detecting *known* malicious code. Typically, *antivirus software packages* inspect each file that enters the system, looking for known signs (signatures) uniquely identifying an instance of malcode. Nevertheless, antivirus technology is based on prior explicit knowledge of malcode signatures and cannot be used for detecting unknown malcode. Following the appearance of a new *worm* instance, a patch is provided by the operating system provider and the antivirus vendors update their signatures-base accordingly. This solution is not perfect, however, since worms propagate very rapidly. By the time the antivirus software has been notified about the new worm, very expensive damage has already been inflicted [1].

Intrusion detection, commonly done at the network level, called *network-based intrusion detection (NIDS)*, was researched substantially [2]. However, *NIDS* are limited in their detection capabilities (like any detection system). In order to detect malcodes which slipped through the *NIDS* at the network level, detection operations are performed locally at the host level, called *Host-based Intrusion Detection (HIDS)*. *HIDS* are detection systems which monitor activities at a host. *HIDS* usually compare the states of the computer in several aspects, such as the changes in the file system using checksum comparisons. The main drawback of this approach is the ability of malcodes to disable antiviruses; other technical limiting factors include the fast changes in the file system. The main problem is detection knowledge maintenance, which is usually performed manually by the domain expert.

Recent studies have proposed methods for detecting unknown malcode using Machine Learning techniques. Given a training set of malicious and benign executables binary code, a classifier is trained and learns to identify and classify unknown malicious executables as being malicious [3,4,5]. While this approach is a potentially good solution, it is not complete, since it can detect only executable files, and malcodes located entirely in the memory, such as the *Slammer* worm [6], cannot be detected using this technique. Moreover, any technique can be sabotaged by a malcode.

Our suggested approach can be classified under *HIDS*, but the novelty here is that it is based on the computer measurements and that the knowledge is acquired

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Robert Moskovitch (corresponding author) is a PhD student, Deutsche Telekom Laboratories at Ben-Gurion University, Be'er Sheva, 84105 Israel. Phone: +972-52-2668071; email: robertmo@bgu.ac.il.

Ido Gus and Shay Pluderman were undergraduate students at the Deutsche Telekom Laboratories at Ben-Gurion University, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Be'er Sheva, 84105 Israel; email: gus@bgu.ac.il, shaip1@gbgu.ac.il.

Dima Stopel is an M.Sc. student, Deutsche Telekom Laboratories at Ben-Gurion University, Be'er Sheva, 84105 Israel. email: stopel@cs.bgu.ac.il.

Chanan Glezer is with Deutsche Telekom Laboratories at Ben-Gurion University, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Be'er Sheva, 84105 Israel; email: chanan@bgu.ac.il.

Yuval Shahar, is the Head of the Department of Information Systems Engineering, Deutsche Telekom Laboratories at Ben-Gurion University, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Be'er Sheva, 84105 Israel; email: yshahar@bgu.ac.il.

Yuval Elovici, is the Head of the Deutsche Telekom Laboratories at Ben-Gurion University, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Be'er Sheva, 84105 Israel; email: elovici@bgu.ac.il.

automatically using inductive learning, given a dataset of known worms. This approach avoids the need for manual acquisition of knowledge, which is sometimes unavailable, especially in such an approach, as well as knowledge maintenance. While this approach does not prevent infection, it enables fast detection of an infection which may result in an alert, which can be further reasoned, based on hosts alerts, at the network level. Further reasoning based on the network-topology can be performed by a network administration function, and relevant decisions and policies, such as disconnecting a single computer or a cluster, can be further implemented. In this study, we focus on a proposed technique that enables the detection of unknown worms based on a single computer's (host) behavior.

Generally speaking, malware within the same category (e.g., *worms*, *Trojans*, *spyware*, *adware*) share similar characteristics and behavior patterns. These patterns are reflected by the infected computer's behavior as represented by its measurements. Based on these common characteristics, we suggest that an unknown worm can be detected based on the computer's behavior using Data Mining techniques. In the proposed approach, a classifier is trained on computer measurements of known *worm* and *non-worm* behaviors. Based on the generalization capability of the classification algorithm, we argue that a classifier can further detect previously unknown worm activity. Nevertheless, this approach may be affected by the variation of computer and application configurations as well as user behavior on each computer. In this study, we investigate whether an unknown worm activity can be detected, at a high level of accuracy, given the variation in hardware and software environmental conditions on individual computers, while minimizing the set of features required.

The rest of the article is structured as follows: in section 2, a survey of the relevant background for this work is presented. The methods used in this study are described in section 3, followed by the research questions and the corresponding experimental plan in section 4. Finally, results are presented, followed by a discussion and conclusions.

II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

A. Malicious Code and Worms

The term 'malicious code' (malcode) refers to a piece of code, not necessarily an executable file, intended to harm, whether generally or in particular, a specific owner (host). The approach suggested in this study aims at detecting any malcode activity, whether known or unknown. However, since our original research was on worms, we will focus on them in this section.

Kienzle and Elder [7], define a *worm* by several aspects through which it can be distinguished from other types of malcode: 1) *Malicious code* – worms are considered malicious in nature; 2) *Network propagation or Human intervention* – a commonly agreed upon aspect, that is,

worms propagate actively over a network, while other types of malicious codes, such as viruses, commonly require human activity to propagate; 3) *Standalone or file infecting* – while viruses infect a file (its host), a worm does not require a host file, and sometimes does not even require an executable file, residing entirely in the memory, as did the *Code Red* [8] worm. Different purposes and motivations stand behind worms developers [9] including: *Experimental curiosity* which can lead any person to create a worm, such as the *ILoveYou* worm [10]; *pride and power* leading programmers to show off their knowledge and skill through the harm caused by the worm; *commercial advantage*, *extortion* and *criminal gain*, *random* and *political protest*, and *terrorism* and *cyber warfare*. The existence of all these types of motivation indicates that computer worms are here to stay as a network vehicle serving different purposes and implemented in different ways. To address the challenge posed by worms effectively, meaningful experience and knowledge should be extracted by analyzing known worms. Today, given the known worms, we have a great opportunity to learn from these examples in order to generalize. We argue that data mining methods can be a very useful way to learn and generalize from previously seen worms, in order to classify unknown worms effectively, as a last detection method.

B. Detecting Malicious Code Using Data Mining

Data mining, commonly considered as the application of machine learning to huge data sets, has already been used in efforts to detect and protect against malicious codes.

A recent survey on intrusion detection [2] summarizes recent proposed applications of data mining in recognizing malcodes in single computers and in computer networks. Lee et al. proposed a framework consisting of data mining algorithms for the extraction of anomalies of user normal behavior for use in *anomaly detection* [11], in which a normal behavior is learned and any *abnormal* activity is considered as intrusive. The authors suggest several techniques, such as classification, meta-learning, association rules, and frequent episodes, to extract knowledge for further implementation in intrusion detection systems. They evaluated their approach on the DARPA98 [12] benchmark test collection, which is a standard benchmark of network data for intrusion detection research.

A Naïve Bayesian classifier was suggested in [2] referring to its implementation within the ADAM system developed by Barbara et al. [13]. The ADAM system had three main parts: (a) a network data monitor which listens to TCP/IP protocol; (b) a data mining engine which enables acquisition of the association rules from the network data; and (c) a classification module which classifies the nature of the traffic in two possible classes, normal and abnormal, which can later be linked to specific attacks. Other machine learning algorithms techniques proposed are Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) [14,15,16], Self Organizing Maps (SOM)

[17] and fuzzy logic [18,19,20].

III. METHODS

The general goal of this study is to assess the viability of employing Data Mining techniques in detecting the existence of unknown worms in an individual computer host based on its behavior (measurements). In order to create a testing environment, we have built a local network of computers, which enabled us to inject worms into a controlled environment, while monitoring the computers and collecting measurements. Preliminary results were very encouraging, but we wanted to estimate the influence of the environment in which the training set was produced on the detection accuracy in another environment. In an extensive experiment we have shown elsewhere [21] that there is no significant influence. Moreover, when a classifier was trained on an old computer, its detection accuracy was better than when trained on a new. In this study we want to investigate further the possibility of detecting unknown malicious code.

A. DataSet Creation

Since there is no benchmark dataset which could be used for this study, we created our own dataset. A network with various computers (configurations) was deployed, into which we could inject worms. The network was a controlled environment, in which we could monitor the computer features and document the measurements into log files.

1) Environment Description

The lab network consisted of seven computers, which contained heterogenic hardware, and a server computer simulating the internet. We used the *windows performance counters*¹, which enable monitoring system features that appear in these main categories (the amount of features in each category appear in parenthesis): *Internet Control Message Protocol* (27), *Internet Protocol* (17), *Memory* (29), *Network Interface* (17), *Physical Disk* (21), *Process* (27), *Processor* (15), *System* (17), *Transport Control Protocol* (9), *Thread*(12), *User Datagram Protocol* (5). In addition we used *VTrace* [22], a software tool which can be installed on a PC running Windows for monitoring purposes. *VTrace* collects traces of the *file system*, *the network*, *the disk drive*, *processes*, *threads*, *interprocess communication*, *waitable objects*, *cursor changes*, *windows*, and *the keyboard*. The data from the *windows performance* were configured to measure the features every second and store them in a log file as vector. *VTrace* stored time-stamped events, which were aggregated into the same fixed intervals, and merged with the *windows performance* log files. These eventually included a vector of 323 features for every second.

2) Injected Worms

While selecting worms from the wild, our goal was to choose worms that differ in their behavior from the available

worms. Some of the worms have a heavy payload of Trojans to install in parallel to the distribution process upon the network; others focus only on distribution. Another aspect is having different strategies for IP scanning which results in varying communication behavior, CPU consumption, and network usage. While all the worms are different, we wanted to find common characteristics so as to be able to detect an unknown worm. We briefly describe here the main characteristics, relevant to this study, of each worm included in this study. The information is based on the virus libraries on the web²³⁴. We briefly describe the five worms we used:

(1) **W32.Dabber.A** scans *IP addresses* randomly. It uses the *W32.Sasser.D* worm to propagate and opens the FTP server to upload itself to the victim computer. Registering itself enables its execution on the next user login (human based activation). It drops a backdoor, which listens on a predefined port. This worm is distinguished by its use of an external worm in order to propagate.

(2) **W32.Deborm.Y** is a self-carried worm, which prefers local IP addresses,. This worm registers itself as an MS Windows service and is executed upon user login (human based activation). This worm contains three Trojans as a payload: *Backdoor.Sdbot*, *Backdoor.Litmus*, and *Trojan.KillAV*, and executes all of them. We chose this worm because of its heavy payload.

(3) **W32.Korgo.X** is a self-carrying worm which uses a totally random method for *IP addresses* scanning. It is self-activated and tries to inject itself as a function into MS Internet Explorer as a new thread. It contains a payload code which enables it to connect to predefined websites in order to receive orders or download newer worm versions.

(4) **W32.Sasser.D** uses a preference for local addresses optimization while scanning the network. About half of the time it scans local addresses and the other half random addresses. In particular it opens 128 threads for scanning the network, which requires a heavy CPU consumption, as well as significant network traffic. It is a self-carried worm that uses a shell to connect to the infected computer's FTP server and to upload itself.

(5) **W32.Slackor.A**, a self-carried worm, exploits MS Windows sharing vulnerability to propagate. The worm registers itself to be executed upon user login. It contains a Trojan payload and opens an IRC server on the infected computer in order to receive orders.

All the worms perform port scanning and possess different characteristics. Further information about these worms can be accessed through libraries on the web⁵⁶⁷.

3) Dataset Description

In order to examine the influence of a computer hardware

² Symantec – www.symantec.com

³ Kasparsky www.viruslist.com

⁴ Macfee <http://vil.nai.com>

⁵ Symantec – www.symantec.com

⁶ Kasparsky www.viruslist.com

⁷ Macfee <http://vil.nai.com>

¹ http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/counter/counters2_lbfc.asp

configuration, background running applications, and user activity, we considered three major aspects: *computer hardware configuration*, *constant background application* consuming extreme computational resources, and *user activity*, being binary variables. (1) *Computer hardware configuration*: Both computers ran on Windows XP, which is considered the most widely used operation system, having two configuration types: an "old," having Pentium 3 800Mhz CPU, bus speed 133Mhz and memory 512 Mb, and a "new," having Pentium 4 3Ghz CPU, bus speed 800Mhz and memory 1 Gb. (2) *Background application*: We ran an application affecting mainly the following features: *Processor object*, *Processor Time* (usage of 100%); *Page Faults/sec*; *Physical Disk object*, *Avg Disk Bytes/Transfer*, *Avg Disk Bytes/Write*, and *Disk Writes/sec*. (3) *User activity*: several applications, including browsing, downloading and streaming operations through Internet Explorer, Word, Excel, chat through MSN messenger, and Windows Media Player, were executed to imitate user activity in a scheduled order. The two options in the *Background Application* and *User Activity* were presence or absence of the user activity.

Each dataset contained monitored samples of each one of the five injected worms separately, and samples of a *normal* computer behavior, without any injected worm. Each worm was monitored for a period of 20 minutes in resolution of seconds. Thus, each record, containing a vector of measurements and a label, presented a second activity labeled by the specific *worm*, or *none* activity label. Each dataset contained a few thousand (labeled samples) of each worm or none activity. We therefore had three binary aspects, which resulted in eight possible combinations representing a variety of dynamic computer configurations and usage patterns. Each dataset contained monitored samples for each of the five worms injected separately, and samples of a normal computer behavior without any injected worm. Each sample (record) was labeled with the relevant worm (class), or 'none' for "clean" samples.

B. Feature Selection

In Data Mining applications, the large number of features in many domains presents a huge challenge. Typically, some of the features do not contribute to the accuracy of the classification task and may even hamper it. Moreover, in our approach, reducing the amount of features while maintaining a high level of detection accuracy is crucial for meeting computer performance and resource consumption. Ideally, we would like to minimize the self-consumption of computer resources required for the monitoring operations (measurements) and the classifier computations. This can be achieved through reduction of the classified features using the *feature selection* technique. Since this is not the focus of this paper, we will describe the feature selection preprocessing very briefly. In order to compare the performance of the classification algorithms, we used the *filters* approach, which is applied on the dataset and is

independent of any classification algorithm (unlike wrappers, in which the best subset is chosen upon an iterative evaluation experiment). Under *filters*, a measure is calculated to quantify the correlation of each feature with the class (in our case, the presence or absence of a worm activity). Each feature receives a *rank* representing its expected contribution in the classification task. Eventually, the top ranked features were selected.

We used three feature-selection measures, which resulted in a list of ranks for each feature selection measure and an ensemble incorporating all three of them. We used *Chi-Square* (CS), *Gain Ratio* (GR), *ReliefF* implemented in the Weka environment [23] and their ensemble, based on a simple average of the three ranks. We took the highest ranked (top) features 5, 10, 20 and 30 from each feature selection measure ranked list. Finally we had four subsets and the *full* features set, for which we had eight datasets each resulting in 17 datasets. While the feature selection is not the focus of this study, but rather its application, we briefly describe the measures we used.

Chi-Square measures the lack of independence between a feature f and a class c_i and can be compared to the chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom to judge extremeness. Equation 1 shows how the chi-square measure is defined and computed, where N is the total number of documents and f refers to the presence of the feature (and \bar{f} its absence), and c_i refers to its membership in c_i .

$$\chi^2(f, c_i) = \frac{N[P(f, c_i)P(\bar{f}, \bar{c}_i) - P(f, \bar{c}_i)P(\bar{f}, c_i)]^2}{P(f)P(\bar{f})P(c_i)P(\bar{c}_i)} \quad (1)$$

Gain Ratio was originally presented by Quinlan in the context of *Decision Trees* [24], which was designed to overcome a bias in the *Information Gain* (IG) measure [25], and which measures the expected reduction of entropy caused by partitioning the examples according to a chosen feature. Given entropy $E(S)$ as a measure of the impurity in a collection of items, it is possible to quantify the effectiveness of a feature in classifying the training data. Equation 3 presents the formula of the entropy of a set of items S , based on C subsets of S (for example, classes of the items), presented by S_c . *Information Gain* measures the expected reduction of entropy caused by portioning the examples according to attribute A , in which V is the set of possible values of A , as shown in equation 2. These equations refer to discrete values; however, it is possible to extend it to continuous values attribute.

$$IG(S, A) = E(S) - \sum_{v \in V(A)} \frac{|S_v|}{|S|} \cdot E(S_v) \quad (2)$$

$$E(S) = \sum_{c \in C} - \frac{|S_c|}{|S|} \cdot \log_2 \frac{|S_c|}{|S|} \quad (3)$$

The *IG* measure favors features having a high variety of values over those with only a few. *GR* overcomes this problem by considering how the feature splits the data (Equations 4 and 5). S_i are d subsets of examples resulting from portioning S by the d -valued feature A .

$$GR(S, A) = \frac{IG(S, A)}{SI(S, A)} \quad (4)$$

$$SI(S, A) = - \sum_{i=1}^d \frac{|S_i|}{|S|} \cdot \log_2 \frac{|S_i|}{|S|} \quad (5)$$

ReliefF [26] estimates the quality of the features according to how well their values distinguish between instances that are near each other. Given a randomly selected instance x , from a dataset s with k features, Relief searches the data set for its two nearest neighbors from the same class, called nearest hit H and from a different class, called nearest miss M . The quality estimation $W[A_i]$ is stored in a vector of the features A_i , based on the values of a difference function *diff()* given x , H and M as shown in equation 6..

$$diff(A_i, x_{1i}, x_{2i}) = \begin{cases} |x_{1i} - x_{2i}| & \text{if } A_i \text{ is numeric,} \\ 0 & \text{if } A_i \text{ is nominal \& } x_{1i} = x_{2i}, \\ 1 & \text{if } A_i \text{ is nominal \& } x_{1i} \neq x_{2i}, \end{cases} \quad (6)$$

C. Classification Algorithms

One of the goals of this study was to pinpoint the classification algorithm that provides the highest level of detection accuracy. We employed four commonly used Machine Learning algorithms: *Decision Trees*, *Naïve Bayes*, *Bayesian Networks* and *Artificial Neural Networks*, in a *supervised learning* approach, in which the classification algorithm learns from a provided training set, containing labeled examples.

While the focus of this paper is not on *classification* algorithm techniques, but on their application in the task of detecting worm activity, we briefly describe the classification algorithms we used in this study.

1) Decision Trees

Decision tree learners [24] are a well-established family of learning algorithms. Classifiers are represented as trees whose internal nodes are tests on individual features and leaves are classification decisions. Typically, a greedy heuristic search method is used to find a small decision tree that correctly classifies the training data. The decision tree is induced from the dataset by splitting the variables based on the *expected information gain*. Modern implementations include pruning which avoids over fitting. In this study we evaluated J48, the Weka version of the commonly used C4.5 algorithm [24]. An important characteristic of Decision Trees is the explicit form of their knowledge which can be easily represented as a set of rules.

2) Naïve Bayes

The Naïve Bayes classifier is based on the *Bayes theorem*,

which in the context of classification states that the posterior probability of a class is proportional to its prior probability as well as to the conditional likelihood of the features, given this class. If no independent assumptions are made, a Bayesian algorithm must estimate conditional probabilities for an exponential number of feature combinations. “Naive Bayes” simplifies this process by making the assumption that features are *conditionally independent* given the class, and requires that only a linear number of parameters be estimated. The prior probability of each class and the probability of each feature, given each class, is easily estimated from the training data and used to determine the posterior probability of each class, given a set of features. Naive Bayes has been shown empirically to produce good classification accuracy across a variety of problem domains [27]. In this study, we evaluated Naive Bayes, the standard version that comes with Weka.

3) Bayesian Networks

Bayesian networks is a form of the probabilistic graphical model [28]. Specifically, a Bayesian network is a directed acyclic graph of nodes with variables and arcs representing dependence among the variables. Like Naïve Bayes, Bayesian networks are based on the Bayes Theorem; however, unlike Naïve Bayes, they do not assume that the variables are independent. Actually Bayesian Networks are known for their ability to represent conditional probabilities which are the relations between variables. A Bayesian network can thus be considered a mechanism for automatically constructing extensions of Bayes' theorem to more complex problems. Bayesian networks were used for modeling knowledge and implemented successfully in different domains. We evaluated the Bayesian Network standard version which comes with WEKA.

4) Artificial Neural Networks

An Artificial Neural Network (ANN) [29] is an information processing paradigm that is inspired by the way biological nervous systems (i.e., the brain) are modeled with regard to information processing. The key element of this paradigm is the structure of the information processing system. It is a network composed of a large number of highly interconnected processing elements, called neurons, working together in order to approximate a specific function. An ANN is configured for a specific application, such as pattern recognition or data classification, through a *learning process* during which the weights of the inputs in each neuron are updated. The weights are updated by a *training algorithm*, such as back-propagation, according to the examples the network receives, in order to reduce the value of *error function*. The power and usefulness of ANN have been demonstrated in numerous applications including speech synthesis, medicine, finance and many other pattern recognition problems. For some application domains, neural models show more promise in achieving human-like performance than do more traditional artificial intelligence techniques. All ANN manipulations in this study have been

performed within a MATLAB(r) environment using Neural Network Toolbox [30].

IV. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

In the first part of the study, we wanted to identify the best feature selection measure, the best classification algorithm and the minimal features required to maintain a high level of accuracy. In the second part we wanted to measure the possibility of classifying unknown worms using a training set of known worms. In order to answer these questions we designed two experimental plans, based on *seventeen* sets of subsets which resulted from the four feature selection measures, from which we extracted the *Top 5, 10, 20* and *30*, and the *full* feature set, in which each set appeared in eight created datasets (described earlier), for the evaluation. After evaluating all the classification algorithms on the sets of datasets, we selected the best feature selection and the top features to evaluate the unknown worms' detection.

A. Experiment I – Best feature selection

To determine which feature selection measure, top feature selection and classification algorithm are the best, we had a wide set of experiments, in which we evaluated each classification algorithm, feature selection and top selection combination. In this experiment, called *e1*, we trained each classifier on a single dataset *i* and tested on each one (*j*) of the *eight* datasets. Thus, we had a set of eight iterations in which a dataset was used for training, and eight corresponding evaluations which were done on each one of the datasets, resulting in 64 evaluation runs, for each one of the combinations of classification algorithm, feature selection measure and top feature selection. When $i = j$, we used *10 folded [10-fold??] cross validation* [31], in which the dataset is partitioned into ten partitions and repeatedly the classifier is trained on nine partitions and tested on the tenth. Note, that the task was to classify specifically the exact worm out of the five or a none (worm) activity, and not generally to a binary classification of “worm” or a “none” activity, which was our final goal in the context of an unknown worm detection. Such conditions, while being more challenging, were expected to bring more insight.

B. Experiment II – Unknown worms detection

To estimate the potential of the suggested approach in classifying an *unknown worm* activity, which was the main objective of this study, we designed an additional experiment, called *e2*, in which we trained classifiers based on *part* of the (five) *worms* and the *none* activity, and tested on the *excluded worms* (from the training set) and the *none* activity, in order to measure the detection capability of an *unknown worm* and the *none* activity.

In the first experiment (*e2₁*) the training set consisted of *four* worms and the testing set contained the *fifth* excluded worm, while the *none* activity appeared in both datasets. This process was repeated five times for each worm.

To estimate the generalization based on the amount of worm activity examples in the training set better, we extended *e2₁* to *e2₂*, in which we decreased the amount of worms in the training set and increased the amount of (unknown) worms in the test set. We did this for three options of one to three worms in the training set in addition to *e2₁*, in which there were four worms. The test set included *only* the excluded worms and not the worms presented in the training set since we wanted to measure specifically the detection rate of the unknown. Note that in these experiments, unlike in *e1*, there were two classes: (generally) *worm*, for any type of worm, and *none* activity. This experiment was evaluated on each classification algorithm, using the outperforming top selected features from *e1*.

C. Evaluation Measures

For the purpose of evaluation we used the *True Positive (TP)* measure presenting the rate of instances classified as *positive* correctly, *False Positive (FP)* presenting the rate of *positive* instances misclassified (Equation 7), and the *Total Accuracy* – the rate of the entire *correctly* classified instances, either positive or negative, divided by the entire number of instances, as shown in Equation 8. The actual (^A) amount of classifications are represented by XY^A , where *Y* presents the classification (*positive* or *negative*) and *X* presents the classification correctness (*true* or *false*).

$$TP = \frac{TP^A}{TP^A + FN^A}; \quad FP = \frac{FP^A}{FP^A + TN^A}; \quad (7)$$

$$Total\ Accuracy = \frac{TP^A + TN^A}{TP^A + FP^A + TN^A + FN^A}; \quad (8)$$

We also measured a *confusion matrix*, which depicts the number of instances from each class which were classified in each one of the classes (ideally all the instances would be in their actual class).

V. RESULTS

A. Experiment I

Our objective in *e1* was to determine the best feature selection measure, top feature subset size, and classification algorithms. We ran 68 (four classification algorithms applied to 17 data sets) evaluations (each comprises 64 runs), summing up to 4352 evaluation runs. Figure 1 shows the mean performance achieved for each feature selection measure in each top selection. Based on the mean performance of the four classification algorithms *GainRatio* outperformed the other measures in most of the top features selection, while the ensemble outperformed at the *Top5*. Unlike the independent measures, in which there was a monotonic growth when features were added, in the ensemble a monotonic slight decrease was observed as more

features were used. The *Top20* features outperformed in general (by averaging) and in *GainRatio* in particular.

Figure 2 shows the same results, but presents the mean performance of the classification algorithms and the top feature subset size. *Bayesian Networks* outperforms for any amount of top selection, and on average the *Top20* outperformed the other top selections. To emphasize the significant feature types the *Top5* of the *GainRatio* included: A_1ICMP: *Sent_Echo_sec*, *Messages_Sent_sec*, *Messages_sec*, and A_1TCP: *Connections_Passive* and *Connection_Failures*, which are windows performance counters, related to ICMP and TCP, describing general communication properties.




Fig. 1. The mean performance achieved by each feature selection measure, and the top ranked features. While *Top20* outperforms for most of the measures, *Top5* outperforms for the *Ensemble*.

B. Experiment II

Based on the results achieved in *e1*, in which the *Top20* from *GainRatio* outperformed on average, we used only this features subset in *e2*. Table 1 presents a detailed report on the results from *e2*. Each row presents the results achieved when worm *i* (see section III.A.2) was in the test set and the columns refer to the classification algorithms. On average, while the *Decision Trees* outperformed the other classification algorithms, each classification algorithm outperformed in detecting different unknown worms and the *false positive* rates in all the classification algorithms were low.




Fig. 2. The performance achieved by each classification algorithm and the top ranked selection. *Bayesian Networks* outperformed across all categories. While for most of the algorithms *Top30* and *Top20* achieved similar performance, in the *Bayesian Networks* the *Top30* outperformed.

TABLE I

THE RESULTS OF *e2*, SHOW A DIFFERENCE IN THE DETECTION ACCURACY OF EACH CLASSIFICATION ALGORITHM FOR EACH TYPE OF WORM. ON AVERAGE, *DECISION TREES* OUTPERFORMED THE OTHER ALGORITHMS, WHILE MAINTAINING A VERY LOW LEVEL OF FALSE POSITIVE RATE.

Worm	ANN_20			BN_20			DT_20			NB_20		
	Acc	TP	FP	Acc	TP	FP	Acc	TP	FP	Acc	TP	FP
1	0.985	0.985	0.014	0.554	0.557	0.443	0.936	0.937	0.063	0.497	0.500	0.499
2	0.494	0.499	0.500	0.992	0.992	0.007	0.999	0.999	0.0005	0.997	0.997	0.002
3	0.952	0.952	0.047	0.992	0.993	0.007	0.680	0.678	0.3215	0.844	0.843	0.156
4	0.994	0.994	0.005	0.998	0.998	0.002	0.968	0.968	0.032	0.998	0.998	0.002
5	0.636	0.637	0.362	0.990	0.991	0.008	0.999	0.999	0.0005	0.975	0.974	0.026
Avg.	0.81	0.81	0.19	0.91	0.91	0.09	0.92	0.92	0.08	0.86	0.86	0.14
StdDev	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.05

Figure 3 presents the results of $e2_2$, in which a monotonic increase in the accuracy is shown. As more worms are included in the training set, the accuracy improves. Note that the number of worms in the x axis refers to the number of excluded worms, which were in the test set.




Fig 3. The performance monotonically increases as fewer worms are excluded (and more worms appear in the training set)

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

We presented the concept of detecting *unknown* computer worms based on a host behavior, using Data Mining algorithms. Based on the results shown in this study using Data Mining concepts, such as *feature selection* and *classification algorithms*, it is possible to identify the most important computer features in order to detect unknown worm activity, currently performed by human experts. Based on the initial experiment ($e1$), the *GainRatio* feature selection measure was most suitable to this task. On average the *Top20* features produced the highest results. *Bayesian Networks* commonly outperformed other classification algorithms. In the detection of unknown worms ($e2$), the results show that it is possible to achieve a high level of accuracy (above 90% on average); however, the detection of each worm varied and each classification algorithm seemed to classify different unknown worms better, exceeding 99% accuracy. Thus, we are considering applying an ensemble of classifiers to achieve a unified level of accuracy in detecting a variety of worm instances. These results are highly encouraging and show that worms, which commonly spread intensively, can be stopped from propagating in real time. The advantage of the suggested approach is the automatic acquisition and maintenance of knowledge, based on inductive learning. This avoids the need for a human expert who is not always available and familiar with the general rules. This is possible these days, based on the existing amount of known worms, as well as the generalization capabilities of classification algorithms.

We are currently in the process of extending the amount of worms in the dataset, as well as extending the suggested

approach to other types of malicious code using temporal data mining.

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