How To Interpret Counterexamples

In [1], we defined three different properties for access control policies namely policy-completeness, policy-consistency, and obligation-safety.

1. Interpreting counterexamples violating the Policy-Completeness property

The Policy-Completeness property is defined as follows:

Policy-Completeness: A set of policies is complete if it covers all the access requests. More formally, for every Request action, the policy set will inevitably provide a Response action.

If there is a request that cannot be covered by the policies, it would be considered a violation of the Policy-Completeness property. As a result, the mCRL2 IDE generates a counterexample, as shown in Figure 1. The counterexample violates the Policy-Completeness property by demonstrating the existence of a *Request* action for a set of attributes (in this case, subjectid=Doctor, resourceid=MedicalRecords, and actionid=Read), for which there exists no corresponding *Response* action. In other words, Figure 1 shows that the examined policies do not cover a scenario where a *Doctor* wants to *Read MedicalRecords*.

To address this issue, the policy authors can define a new rule or modify an existing one to cover such requests. It is worth noting that, according to our approach, every *Request* action may contain up to four sets of attributes: Subject Attributes, Object Attributes, Action Attributes, and Environment Attributes. Each attribute is represented as attribute(name, value), and a *Request* action is represented as follows:

Request({Subject Attribute 1, ..., Subject Attribute N}, {Object Attribute 1, ..., Object Attribute N}, {Action Attribute 1, ..., Action Attribute N}, {Environment Attribute 1, ..., Environment Attribute N}) or simply Request({Attributes}).

Or simply:

Request({Attributes})




Figure 1: A counterexample violating the Policy-Completeness property.

2. Interpreting counterexamples violating the Policy-Consistency property

The Policy-Consistency property is defined as follows:

Policy-Consistency: A set of policies is conflict-free if there is no inconsistency between policies.

This property requires that executing a Request action (with specific attributes) cannot result in both a Deny and a Permit decision.

Hence, if there are two different decisions for a single request, it would be deemed as a violation of the Policy-Consistency property. As a consequence, the mCRL2 IDE generates a counterexample, which is shown in Figure 2.

Based on our approach, every *Response* action carries a **Decision**, which can either be *Permit* or *Deny*, in addition to the sets of attributes for subject, object, action, and environment attributes. A *Response* action is represented as follows:

Response({Subject Attribute 1, ..., Subject Attribute N}, {Object Attribute 1, ..., Object Attribute N}, {Action Attribute 1, ..., Action Attribute N}, {Environment Attribute 1, ..., Environment Attribute N}, **Decision**)

Or simply:

Response({Attributes}, Decision)

Figure 2 indicates that there are two different *Response* actions after the same *Request* action. In other words, there is an inconsistency among examined policies since two different rules with different rule effects (decisions) cover the same request where *CareGiverA* wants to *Read HealthData* (subjectid is *CareGiverA*, resourceid is *HealthData*, and actionid is *Read*).

The request is:

Request({attribute(subjectid, CareGiverA)}, {attribute(resourceid, HealthData)}, {attribute(actionid, Read)})

And responses are:

Response({attribute(subjectid, CareGiverA)}, {attribute(resourceid, HealthData)}, {attribute(actionid, Read)}, **Permit**)

Response({attribute(subjectid, CareGiverA)}, {attribute(resourceid, HealthData)}, {attribute(actionid, Read)}, **Deny**)

The policy authors can remove the inconsistency by modifying the existing rules that cover such a request.




Figure 2: A counterexample violating the Policy-Consistency property.

3. Interpreting counterexamples violating the Obligation-Safety property

The Obligation-Safety property is defined as follows:

Obligation-Safety: A concrete Request either will always yield an Obligation, or it will never yield an Obligation.

In other words, for every Request action, if there is an Obligation action after the Request action, then there should not exist a Response action without a preceding Obligation action for the same request. If this condition is not met, then the mCRL2 IDE generates a counterexample.

For instance, Figure 3 illustrates a counterexample violating the Obligation-Safety property for a request where a *Doctor* wants to *Read HealthData*. As shown in Figure 3, there exists an *Obligation* action after the *Request* action. However, there also exists a *Response* action that is not preceded by an *Obligation* action. In other words, a *Doctor* would be able to *Read HealthData* without the enforcement of the obligation.

Based on our approach, every *Obligation* action carries an *Obligation ID* in addition to the sets of attributes for subject, object, action, and environment attributes. An *Obligation* action is represented as follows:

Obligation({Subject Attribute 1, ..., Subject Attribute N}, {Object Attribute 1, ..., Object Attribute N}, {Action Attribute 1, ..., Action Attribute N}, {Environment Attribute 1, ..., Environment Attribute N}, **ObligationID**)

Or simply:

Obligation ({Attributes}, **ObligationID**)




Figure 3: A counterexample violating the Obligation-Safety property.

References:

 Arshad, H., Horne, R., Johansen, C., Owe, O., Willemse, T.A.C. (2022). Process Algebra Can Save Lives: Static Analysis of XACML Access Control Policies Using mCRL2. In: Mousavi, M.R., Philippou, A. (eds) Formal Techniques for Distributed Objects, Components, and Systems. FORTE 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13273. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08679-3_2