# Open Economy IS/LM Model: Fixed Exchange Rate

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#### **Exchange Rate Interventions**

- Almost all central banks intervene in FX markets
- ▶ The mechanics: buy dollars and sell Euros (or vice versa)
- Each intervention changes the money supply.
- ► This produces a conflict: the CB has one instrument (M) but 3 targets
  - stable inflation
  - stable output
  - stable exchange rate

### Exchange Rate Regimes

- Two extremes:
  - floating: the CB does not buy or sell FX
  - peg: the CB stands ready to buy/sell any amount of FX at a fixed E
- ► Reality is somewhere in between

# Pegging and Monetary Control

How can the exchange rate be fixed when capital is mobile? UIP

$$1 + i = (1 + i^*)E/E^e \tag{1}$$

Fixing the exchange rate  $(E = E^e)$  implies

$$i = i^* \tag{2}$$

#### The CB has no control over the interest rate

What happens if the Fed tries to change the interest rate?

- short answer: capital flows overwhelm the Fed
- long answer: below

# Monetary control

Money market clearing

$$M/P = YL(i^*) \tag{3}$$

The CB has no control over the money supply either. Why?

- ▶ short answer: the Fed needs to set M/P to keep  $i = i^*$ 
  - otherwise: capital flows overwhelm the Fed
- long answer: below

# Equilibrium: Fixed Exchange Rate

$$IS: Y = C(Y - T) + I(Y, i^*) + G + NX(Y, Y^*, \varepsilon)$$
 (4)

$$LM: M/P = YL(i^*)$$
 (5)


$$UIP: i = i^* \tag{6}$$

Exogenous:  $E = E^e$ ,  $i = i^*$ , P,  $P^*$ ,  $\varepsilon = EP/P^*$ ,  $Y^*$ .

Endogenous: Y, M

The logic:

ightharpoonup UIP  $\Longrightarrow$  i, IS  $\Longrightarrow$  Y, LM  $\Longrightarrow$  M.



### Fiscal Policy: Process

$$G \uparrow \Longrightarrow IS \to \Longrightarrow Y \uparrow$$
  
 $i \uparrow > i^* \Longrightarrow$  capital inflows

Fed sells dollars to absorb them

$$M \uparrow \Longrightarrow LM \to \Longrightarrow Y \uparrow \text{ and } i \downarrow$$

This continues until  $i = i^*$  again.

Closed economy: rising *i* dampens fiscal expansion


Open economy: fiscal policy is extra powerful

▶ this is exactly what happens in a closed economy when  $G \uparrow$  and  $M \uparrow$ 

## Open Market Operations

- ▶ What happens if the CB tries to increase the money supply?
- Open market operation: buy bonds in exchange for money.
- ▶ We know the eventual outcome:
- ▶ What is the process?

# Open Market Operations



#### Open Market Operations

The CB buys bonds with high powered money

Then it buys the high powered money back in the FX market

#### The Central Bank balance sheet:

Assets	Liabilities
Bonds: $\Delta B$	Monetary base $\Delta B - \Delta B$
Reserves: $-\Delta B$	= 0

 Open Market Operations simply exchange currency reserves for bonds.

1 :- 1-:1:4: - -

No effect on money supply

# Reality Check

- ▶ We have assumed perfect capital mobility (UIP)
- ► In reality, Central Banks have some control over the domestic interest rate
- Outcomes are somewhere in between closed economy and perfect capital mobility.

#### Trade restrictions

What is the effect of a tariff on imports?

Think of a tariff as improving NX for given  $(Y, Y^*, \varepsilon)$ 


$$IS: Y = C(Y-T) + I(Y,i^*) + G + NX(Y,Y^*,\varepsilon,\tau)$$
(7)

Recall the floating outcome:

- the foreign currency depreciates
- ▶ this mostly undoes the effect of the tariff on *NX*

Do fixed exchange rates change this result?

#### Trade restrictions



#### Trade restrictions

Result: tariffs work!

How does is square with


$$NX = (Y - T - C) + (T - G) - I \tag{8}$$

- I↑ worsens the trade balance
- $\triangleright$   $S^p \uparrow$  pays for all of this

But: eventually, the expanding money supply causes higher prices

we will see this in the medium run analysis

Result: Even with fixed exchange rates, tariffs don't improve the trade balance.



## Policy coordination

Countries can achieve domestic expansion in different ways:

- 1.  $G \uparrow$ : positive spillover on other countries  $(NX \downarrow)$
- 2. Devaluation, tariffs: negative spillover

Need for policy coordination

Risk of competitive devaluations

# Reading

▶ Blanchard / Johnson, Macroeconomics, 6th ed., ch. 19, 20