

Open Economy IS/LM Model: Fixed Exchange Rate

Prof. Lutz Hendricks

Econ520

April 28, 2021

Exchange Rate Interventions

- ▶ Almost all central banks intervene in FX markets
- ▶ The mechanics: buy dollars and sell Euros (or vice versa)
- ▶ Each intervention changes the money supply.
- ▶ This produces a conflict: the CB has one instrument (M) but 3 targets
 - ▶ stable inflation
 - ▶ stable output
 - ▶ stable exchange rate

Exchange Rate Regimes

- ▶ Two extremes:
 - ▶ **floating**: the CB does not buy or sell FX
 - ▶ **peg**: the CB stands ready to buy/sell any amount of FX at a fixed *E*
- ▶ Reality is somewhere in between

Pegging and Monetary Control

How can the exchange rate be fixed when capital is mobile?

UIP

$$1 + i = (1 + i^*)E/E^e \quad (1)$$

Fixing the exchange rate ($E = E^e$) implies

$$i = i^* \quad (2)$$

The CB has no control over the interest rate

What happens if the Fed tries to change the interest rate?

- ▶ short answer: capital flows overwhelm the Fed
- ▶ long answer: below

Monetary control

Money market clearing

$$M/P = YL(i^*) \quad (3)$$

The CB has no control over the money supply either.

Why?

- ▶ short answer: the Fed needs to set M/P to keep $i = i^*$
 - ▶ otherwise: capital flows overwhelm the Fed
- ▶ long answer: below

Equilibrium: Fixed Exchange Rate

$$IS : Y = C(Y - T) + I(Y, i^*) + G + NX(Y, Y^*, \varepsilon) \quad (4)$$

$-, +, -$

$$LM : M/P = YL(i^*) \quad (5)$$

$$UIP : i = i^* \quad (6)$$

Exogenous: $E = E^e$, $i = i^*$, P , P^* , $\varepsilon = EP/P^*$, Y^* .


Endogenous: Y, M

The logic:

► $UIP \implies i$, $IS \implies Y$, $LM \implies M$.

Caveat: We have assumed that the peg is credible ($E = E^e$).

Fiscal Policy



Fiscal Policy: Process

$$G \uparrow \implies IS \rightarrow \implies Y \uparrow$$

$$i \uparrow > i^* \implies \text{capital inflows}$$

Fed sells dollars to absorb them

$$M \uparrow \implies LM \rightarrow \implies Y \uparrow \text{ and } i \downarrow$$

This continues until $i = i^*$ again.

Closed economy: rising i dampens fiscal expansion



Open economy: fiscal policy is extra powerful

- ▶ this is exactly what happens in a closed economy when $G \uparrow$ and $M \uparrow$

Open Market Operations

- ▶ What happens if the CB tries to increase the money supply?
- ▶ Open market operation: buy bonds in exchange for money.
- ▶ We know the eventual outcome:
- ▶ What is the process?

Open Market Operations



Open Market Operations

The CB buys bonds with high powered money

- ▶ $M \uparrow$
- ▶ downward pressure on the dollar

In the FX market: CB must buy dollars to keep the peg

- ▶ $M \downarrow$
- ▶ FX reserves \downarrow

Net result: the CB has effectively paid for the bonds with FX reserves.

- ▶ M stays unchanged (as required by UIP)

Reality Check

- ▶ We have assumed perfect capital mobility (UIP)
- ▶ In reality, Central Banks have some control over the domestic interest rate
- ▶ Outcomes are somewhere in between closed economy and perfect capital mobility.

Trade restrictions

What is the effect of a tariff on imports?

Think of a tariff as improving NX for given (Y, Y^*, ε)

$$IS : Y = C(Y - T) + I(Y, i^*) + G + NX(Y, Y^*, \varepsilon, \tau) \quad (7)$$


$-, +, -$

Recall the floating outcome:

- ▶ the foreign currency depreciates
- ▶ this mostly undoes the effect of the tariff on NX

Do fixed exchange rates change this result?

Trade restrictions



Trade restrictions

Result: tariffs work!

How does it square with

$$NX = (Y - T - C) + (T - G) - I \quad (8)$$


- ▶ $I \uparrow$ worsens the trade balance
- ▶ $S^p \uparrow$ pays for all of this

But: eventually, the expanding money supply causes higher prices

- ▶ we will see this in the medium run analysis

Result: Even with fixed exchange rates, tariffs don't improve the trade balance.

Devaluation



Policy coordination

Countries can achieve domestic expansion in different ways:

1. $G \uparrow$: positive spillover on other countries ($NX \downarrow$)
2. Devaluation, tariffs: negative spillover

Need for policy coordination

Risk of competitive devaluations

Reading

- ▶ Blanchard / Johnson, Macroeconomics, 6th ed., ch. 19, 20