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1  |----- MODULE AJupiter -----|
   |Model checking the Jupiter protocol presented by Attiya and others.
6  EXTENDS Integers, OT, TLC, AdditionalFunctionOperators
7  |-----|
8  CONSTANTS
9      Client,      the set of client replicas
10     Server,      the (unique) server replica
11     Char,        set of characters allowed
12     InitState    the initial state of each replica

14  List  $\triangleq$  Seq(Char  $\cup$  Range(InitState))    all possible lists/strings
15  MaxLen  $\triangleq$  Cardinality(Char) + Len(InitState)    the max length of lists in any states;
16      We assume that all inserted elements are unique.
17  ClientNum  $\triangleq$  Cardinality(Client)
18  Priority  $\triangleq$  CHOOSE  $f \in [Client \rightarrow 1 \dots ClientNum] : Injective(f)$ 
19  |-----|
20  ASSUME
21       $\wedge Range(InitState) \cap Char = \{\}$ 
22       $\wedge Priority \in [Client \rightarrow 1 \dots ClientNum]$ 
23  |-----|
   |The set of all operations. Note: The positions are indexed from 1.
28  Rd  $\triangleq$  [type : { "Rd" }]
29  Del  $\triangleq$  [type : { "Del" }, pos : 1 .. MaxLen]
30  Ins  $\triangleq$  [type : { "Ins" }, pos : 1 .. (MaxLen + 1), ch : Char, pr : 1 .. ClientNum]    pr: priority
32  Op  $\triangleq$  Ins  $\cup$  Del    Now we don't consider Rd operations.
33  |-----|
34  VARIABLES
   |For the client replicas:
38  cbuf,      cbuf[c]: buffer (of operations) at the client  $c \in Client$ 
39  crec,      crec[c]: the number of new messages have been received by the client  $c \in Client$ 
40              since the last time a message was sent
41  cstate,    cstate[c]: state (the list content) of the client  $c \in Client$ 

   |For the server replica:
46  sbuf,      sbuf[c]: buffer (of operations) at the Server, one per client  $c \in Client$ 
47  srec,      srec[c]: the number of new messages have been ... , one per client  $c \in Client$ 
48  sstate,    sstate: state (the list content) of the server Server

   |For communication between the Server and the Clients:
53  cincoming, cincoming[c]: incoming channel at the client  $c \in Client$ 
54  sincoming, incoming channel at the Server
   |For model checking:

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58	$list,$	all list states across the system
59	$chins$	a set of chars to insert

61	-----	
62	$comm \triangleq$	INSTANCE $CSComm$
63	-----	
64	$eVars \triangleq$	$\langle chins \rangle$ variables for the environment
65	$cVars \triangleq$	$\langle cbuf, crec, cstate \rangle$ variables for the clients
66	$ecVars \triangleq$	$\langle eVars, cVars \rangle$ variables for the clients and the environment
67	$sVars \triangleq$	$\langle sbuf, srec, sstate \rangle$ variables for the server
68	$commVars \triangleq$	$\langle cincoming, sincoming \rangle$ variables for communication
69	$vars \triangleq$	$\langle eVars, cVars, sVars, commVars, list \rangle$ all variables
70	-----	
71	$TypeOK \triangleq$	
	For the client replicas:	
75	$\wedge cbuf \in$	$[Client \rightarrow Seq(Op \cup \{Nop\})]$
76	$\wedge crec \in$	$[Client \rightarrow Int]$
77	$\wedge cstate \in$	$[Client \rightarrow List]$
	For the server replica:	
81	$\wedge sbuf \in$	$[Client \rightarrow Seq(Op \cup \{Nop\})]$
82	$\wedge srec \in$	$[Client \rightarrow Int]$
83	$\wedge sstate \in$	$List$
	For communication between the server and the clients:	
87	$\wedge comm!$	$TypeOK$
	For model checking:	
91	$\wedge list \in$	SUBSET $List$
92	$\wedge chins \in$	SUBSET $Char$
93	-----	
	The $Init$ predicate.	
97	$Init \triangleq$	
98	$\wedge list =$	$\{InitState\}$
99	$\wedge chins =$	$Char$
	For the client replicas:	
103	$\wedge cbuf =$	$[c \in Client \mapsto \langle \rangle]$
104	$\wedge crec =$	$[c \in Client \mapsto 0]$
105	$\wedge cstate =$	$[c \in Client \mapsto InitState]$
	For the server replica:	
109	$\wedge sbuf =$	$[c \in Client \mapsto \langle \rangle]$
110	$\wedge srec =$	$[c \in Client \mapsto 0]$
111	$\wedge sstate =$	$InitState$
	For communication between the server and the clients:	
115	$\wedge comm!$	$Init$
116	-----	

Client $c \in Client$ issues an operation op .

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120  $DoOp(c, op) \triangleq$ 
121    $\wedge cstate' = [cstate \text{ EXCEPT } ![c] = Apply(op, @)]$ 
122    $\wedge list' = list \cup \{cstate'[c]\}$ 
123    $\wedge cbuf' = [cbuf \text{ EXCEPT } ![c] = Append(@, op)]$ 
124    $\wedge crec' = [crec \text{ EXCEPT } ![c] = 0]$ 
125    $\wedge comm!CSend([c \mapsto c, ack \mapsto crec[c], op \mapsto op])$ 

127  $DoIns(c) \triangleq$ 
128    $\exists ins \in Ins :$ 
129      $\wedge ins.pos \in 1 \dots (Len(cstate[c]) + 1)$ 
130      $\wedge ins.ch \in chins$ 
131      $\wedge ins.pr = Priority[c]$ 
132      $\wedge chins' = chins \setminus \{ins.ch\}$  We assume that all inserted elements are unique.
133      $\wedge DoOp(c, ins)$ 
134      $\wedge \text{UNCHANGED } sVars$ 

136  $DoDel(c) \triangleq$ 
137    $\exists del \in Del :$ 
138      $\wedge del.pos \in 1 \dots Len(cstate[c])$ 
139      $\wedge DoOp(c, del)$ 
140      $\wedge \text{UNCHANGED } \langle sVars, eVars \rangle$ 

142  $Do(c) \triangleq$ 
143    $\vee DoIns(c)$ 
144    $\vee DoDel(c)$ 

Client  $c \in Client$  receives a message from the Server.

149  $Rev(c) \triangleq$ 
150    $\wedge comm!CRev(c)$ 
151    $\wedge crec' = [crec \text{ EXCEPT } ![c] = @ + 1]$ 
152    $\wedge \text{LET } m \triangleq Head(cincom[ing][c])$ 
153      $cBuf \triangleq cbuf[c]$  the buffer at client  $c \in Client$ 
154      $cShiftedBuf \triangleq SubSeq(cBuf, m.ack + 1, Len(cBuf))$  buffer shifted
155      $xop \triangleq XformOpOps(m.op, cShiftedBuf)$  transform  $op$  vs. shifted buffer
156      $xcBuf \triangleq XformOpsOp(cShiftedBuf, m.op)$  transform shifted buffer vs.  $op$ 
157   IN    $\wedge cbuf' = [cbuf \text{ EXCEPT } ![c] = xcBuf]$ 
158        $\wedge cstate' = [cstate \text{ EXCEPT } ![c] = Apply(xop, @)]$  apply the transformed operation  $xop$ 
159        $\wedge list' = list \cup \{cstate'[c]\}$ 
160        $\wedge \text{UNCHANGED } \langle sVars, eVars \rangle$ 
161 |-----|

The Server receives a message.

165  $SRev \triangleq$ 
166    $\wedge comm!SRev$ 
167    $\wedge \text{LET } m \triangleq Head(sincom[ing])$  the message to handle with

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168 $c \triangleq m.c$ the client $c \in Client$ that sends this message
 169 $cBuf \triangleq sbuf[c]$ the buffer at the *Server* for client $c \in Client$
 170 $cShiftedBuf \triangleq SubSeq(cBuf, m.ack + 1, Len(cBuf))$ buffer shifted
 171 $xop \triangleq XformOps(m.op, cShiftedBuf)$ transform op vs. shifted buffer
 172 $xcBuf \triangleq XformOpsOp(cShiftedBuf, m.op)$ transform shifted buffer vs. op
 173 IN $\wedge srec' = [cl \in Client \mapsto$
 174 IF $cl = c$
 175 THEN $srec[cl] + 1$ receive one more operation from client $c \in Client$
 176 ELSE 0 reset $srec$ for other clients than $c \in Client$
 177 $\wedge sbuf' = [cl \in Client \mapsto$
 178 IF $cl = c$
 179 THEN $xcBuf$ transformed buffer for client $c \in Client$
 180 ELSE $Append(sbuf[cl], xop)$ store transformed xop into other clients' bufs
 181 $\wedge sstate' = Apply(xop, sstate)$ apply the transformed operation
 182 $\wedge list' = list \cup \{sstate'\}$
 183 $\wedge comm!SSend(c, srec, xop)$
 184 \wedge UNCHANGED $ecVars$
 185

 The next-state relation.
 189 $Next \triangleq$
 190 $\vee \exists c \in Client : Do(c) \vee Rev(c)$
 191 $\vee SRev$
 The *Spec.* (TODO: Check the fairness condition.)
 195 $Spec \triangleq Init \wedge \Box[Next]_{vars} \wedge WF_{vars}(Next)$
 196

 The safety properties to check: Eventual Convergence (*EC*), Quiescent Consistency (*QC*), Strong
 Eventual Convergence (*SEC*), Weak *List* Specification, (*WLSpec*), and Strong *List* Specification,
 (*SLSpec*).

 Eventual Consistency (*EC*)

 Quiescent Consistency (*QC*)
 211 $QConvergence \triangleq \forall c \in Client : cstate[c] = sstate$
 212 $QC \triangleq comm!EmptyChannel \Rightarrow QConvergence$
 214 THEOREM $Spec \Rightarrow \Box QC$

 Strong Eventual Consistency (*SEC*)

 Termination
 223 $Termination \triangleq$
 224 $\wedge comm!EmptyChannel$

 Weak *List* Consistency (*WLSpec*)
 229 $WLSpec \triangleq$

230 $\wedge \quad \textit{Termination} \Rightarrow \forall l1, l2 \in list :$
231 $\wedge \textit{Injective}(l1)$
232 $\wedge \textit{Injective}(l2)$
233 $\wedge \textit{Compatible}(l1, l2)$

235 THEOREM $\textit{Spec} \Rightarrow \textit{WLSpec}$

Strong *List Consistency* (\textit{SLSpec})

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